# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385808

## Case

- **Full name:** Kimball Lodge Condominium Association, Inc. v. Wright National Flood Insurance Company
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

KIMBALL LODGE

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Case No. 2:24-cv-662-KCD-NPM
INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant,
/

ORDER
Plaintiff Kimball Lodge Condominium Association, Inc. allegedly
suffered flood damage during Hurricane Ian. It sought coverage from its
insurer, Defendant Wright National Flood Insurance Company, but
eventually filed this breach-of-contract lawsuit after Wright paid only a
portion of the claim. (Doc. 1.)1 To assess the scope and cost of the damage,
Wright retained John W. Crawford, a professional engineer, to evaluate the
property. Unhappy with his findings, the Association now moves to exclude
Crawford’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. (Doc. 38.) In the
Association’s view, his report strays from technical engineering analysis and

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and
alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.
crosses into the realm of impermissible legal conclusions. Wright opposes the
motion. (Doc. 39.)

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 tasks district courts with a critical
gatekeeping role: keeping unreliable expert testimony out of the courtroom.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). To make it
through the gate, the party offering the expert must show three things: the

expert is qualified to testify competently, the methodology underlying the
testimony is sufficiently reliable, and the testimony will help the trier of fact
understand the evidence or resolve a disputed fact. City of Tuscaloosa v.
Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). But playing

gatekeeper does not mean supplanting the adversary system. See Quiet Tech.
DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). So
long as an expert grounds their opinion in reliable principles, “[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction

on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
The Association asks the Court to strike Crawford’s opinions, pointing
to five conclusions it claims are disguised legal instructions. (Doc. 38 at 3-5.)

Its motion promises that Crawford’s full “Flood Damage Assessment” is
attached, yet there was no exhibit provided. Wright spots the missing exhibit
and flags it in a footnote. (Doc. 39 at 2 n.5.) But Wright then leaves the Court
similarly empty-handed, choosing not to attach the report to its own
response.

That leaves the Court with a Daubert motion untethered to a Daubert
record. The gatekeeping function under Rule 702 demands a rigorous, hands-
on review of the expert’s methodology. See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d
1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This function inherently require[s] the trial

court to conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions to
ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.”). We have
to look at what data the expert used, what principles he applied, and how he
connected the dots from the facts to his conclusions. A court simply cannot

perform that exacting analysis based on an adversary’s five-bullet-point
paraphrase of the expert’s findings. Without seeing Crawford’s report, the
Court has no way to tell whether he is reliably applying engineering
expertise or impermissibly interpreting the insurance contract. Because the

record is missing the very document the Court has been asked to evaluate,
the Association’s motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
One last point. The Association is not asking to exclude Crawford.
Rather, it takes aim at a few opinions that are allegedly impermissible legal

conclusions. That kind of granular line-drawing is almost always better left
for trial. And because this case will be a bench trial (Doc. 32), the ordinary
fears of a jury being led astray by improper expert testimony are not present.
See United States v. Brown, 415 F.8d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2005). If
Wright attempts to elicit the disputed opinions on the stand, the Association

can raise its objections in real time. The Court can then hear the testimony in
context, separate the technical engineering analysis from any improper
contract interpretation, and give the testimony exactly the weight it deserves.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 7, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385808. Public record. Not legal advice.