# Freden

> District Court, W.D. New York · July 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385581

## Case

- **Full name:** Najay Cummings v. Philip Rhoney, in his official capacity as Acting Field Office Director in charge of Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NAJAY CUMMINGS,

Petitioner,

v. DECISION AND ORDER

PHILIP RHONEY, in his official capacity 6:25-CV-6664-EAW
as Acting Field Office Director in charge
of Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, et
al.,1

Respondents.

BACKGROUND
Pro se petitioner Najay Cummings (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, is a civil
immigration detainee currently held at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility. Petitioner
claims that he is being detained in the custody of the United States Department of
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), pending removal
proceedings in violation of the United States Constitution. Petitioner seeks relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1).

1 Philip Rhoney is the Acting Field Office Director of the Buffalo Field Office and is
substituted in place of Joseph Freden pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
In addition, Todd Blanche is the Acting U.S. Attorney General and is substituted in place
of Pamela Bondi; Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security and is substituted in place of Kristi Noem; and David Venturella is the Acting
Director of ICE and is substituted in place of Daren K. Margolin. The Clerk of Court is
directed to update the docket to reflect these substitutions.
- 1 -
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on September
6, 2018. (Dkt. 6 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 6-2 at ¶ 5). On October 15, 2019, Petitioner was convicted of

attempted murder in the second degree in violation of New York State Penal Law §§ 11-
125.25(01). (See Dkt. 6 at ¶ 6; Dkt. 6-2 at ¶ 6). On September 25, 2024, Petitioner was
served with a Notice to Appear in connection with removal proceedings in relation to his
criminal conviction. (Dkt. 6 at ¶¶ 7, 8; Dkt. 6-2 at ¶ 7). On April 9, 2025, Petitioner was
transferred from criminal detention and into ICE custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
(Dkt. 1 at ¶ 3). On October 3, 2025, Petitioner was ordered removed to Jamaica. (Dkt. 6.

at ¶ 11). On November 3, 2025, Petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and his appeal remains pending. (Id. at ¶ 12; Dkt. 6-2 at ¶¶ 11-12).
Petitioner filed his habeas petition on November 14, 2025. (Dkt. 1). On November
24, 2025, the Court entered a Scheduling Order that directed Respondents to answer the
petition within 45 days, and gave Petitioner 25 days to reply. (Dkt. 2). On January 21,

2026, Respondents filed their answer. (Dkt. 6).
On February 1, 2026, the Court issued a Text Order granting the petition to the
extent it sought a bond hearing. (Dkt. 7). This Court stated in a subsequent Text Order
that a more detailed decision explaining the Court’s reasoning would be issued in due
course.2 (Dkt. 8).

2 In light of the unprecedented volume of immigration habeas petitions pending
before this Court and in order to provide expeditious relief to petitioners, the Court at times
proceeds by Text Order and then amplifies the basis for its reasoning by written decision
later, as it has done here.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion seeking conditional release or to stay (Dkt. 9)
on February 9, 2026, and a motion to enforce (Dkt. 14) on February 17, 2026.

DISCUSSION
I. Merits of Petition
“Section 1226 of title 8 authorizes the government to detain a noncitizen pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Black v. Decker,
103 F.4th 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Petitioner is detained pursuant to
§ 1226(c), under which “noncitizens who have committed one of certain listed offenses or

who have been identified by the government as involved in terrorist activities are subject
to mandatory detention.” Id. at 140-41.
In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court “held that detention
under section 1226(c) without an initial bond determination does not, on its face, violate
the detainee’s due process rights where detention is ‘for the limited period of . . . removal

proceedings.’” Black, 103 F.4th at 141 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 531). But numerous
courts—including this Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—have found
that “a noncitizen’s right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention
under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing.” Id. at 143; see also, e.g., Vazques v.
Garland, No. 1:21-CV-00477 EAW, 2022 WL 2467655, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 6, 2022)

(“[U]nreasonably prolonged immigration detention without appropriate procedural
protections may constitute a due process violation.”).
Prior to Black, this Court (and many district courts within the Second Circuit)
applied “the multi-factor approach articulated by the court in Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-
CV-2447 (AJN), 2018 WL 2357266, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) . . . for addressing
procedural due process claims for aliens—like Petitioner—who are detained pursuant to

§ 1226(c).” Vazquez, 2022 WL 2467655, at *2. But in Black, the Second Circuit held that
due process challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c) should be reviewed using
“the three-factor balancing test established in Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)].”
103 F.4th at 147. The three Mathews factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Applying the Mathews factors, the Second Circuit concluded that the petitioners in
Black, who had been detained pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond hearing for seven

months and 21 months, respectively, were entitled to “individualized bond hearings by an
IJ.” Black, 103 F.4th at 155. The Second Circuit further held that the burden was properly
on the government to justify detention by clear and convincing evidence and that the IJ was
required to consider the ability to pay and alternatives to detention when setting any bond
amount. Id. at 155-58.

Here, Respondents concede that Black controls and that “applying that decision here
would likely lead to a grant of the habeas petition.” (Dkt. 6-1 at 7). But Respondents
“preserve” their objection to Black and reserve all rights, including the right to appeal. (Id.
at 7).
As Respondents note, this Court is bound by the Second Circuit holding in Black
and there is no basis to depart from that holding. Applying the Mathews factors to

Petitioner’s detention, the Court concludes that, as ordered on February 1, 2026, Petitioner
is entitled to a bond hearing. (Dkt. 7). As for the first factor, Petitioner’s private interest
“is the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from
imprisonment,” Black, 103 F.4th at 151 (quoting Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
851 (2d Cir. 2020)), and Petitioner’s current immigration detention, now exceeding one
year, is significant and weighs in favor of a due process remedy. And given the lack of

bond rights under § 1226(c), without this Court’s intervention, Petitioner’s detention will
continue for a long time.
Consideration of the second factor also weighs in favor of an individualized bond
hearing because of the limited options detainees under § 1226(c) are provided to contest
the length of detention. See Black, 103 F. 4th at 152 (“Here, the almost nonexistent

procedural protections in place for section 1226(c) detainees markedly increased the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s private liberty interests.”); Peralta-Malla v.
Mullin, No. 26 CIV. 2903 (AT), 2026 WL 1346325, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2026) (same);
Joseph v. Arteta, No. 26-CV-2979 (JGK), 2026 WL 1193489, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,
2026) (second Mathews factor favored petitioner detained under §1226(c) due to lack of

any “procedural safeguards in place to determine whether his detention has become
unreasonably prolonged” under that statute). After completion of his criminal detention,
Petitioner was transferred into ICE custody without any individualized assessment of his
danger or flight risk. Sosa v. Warden of Orange Cty. Corr., No. 26 CIV. 2304 (DEH),
2026 WL 1803814, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026) (finding risk of erroneous deprivation
of liberty where § 1226(c) statutory procedures were “virtually nonexistent” and petitioner

“fully served his sentences for his misdemeanor convictions, and there is no assertion that
he has engaged in any kind of unlawful conduct in the approximately eight years since
those convictions”); D.C. v. Noem, No. 26 CIV. 1833 (PAE), 2026 WL 787895, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026) (“A bond hearing would permit D.C. to pursue these arguments
for release. The absence of such a hearing gives rise to a risk that his continued detention
is unnecessary.”).

As for the third factor, the Court acknowledges that the government’s discretion to
detain individuals under § 1226(c) “is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,’ such as ‘ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and
preventing danger to the community,” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 495-
96 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), but concludes that those interests are not unduly encumbered by

granting a bond hearing here.
II. Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and to Enforce
On February 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion seeking conditional release or
alternatively, a stay of the action enjoining Respondents from conducting any bond hearing
absent further order from the Court. (Dkt. 9). It appears that the motion was filed before

Petitioner received this Court’s order requiring a bond hearing. Because the hearing was
ultimately conducted, this motion is denied as moot.
In addition, following his bond hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to enforce, arguing
that he did not receive a constitutionally-adequate hearing. (Dkt. 14). Petitioner challenges
the IJ’s determination that Respondents met their burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner was a danger and flight risk. The Court set a briefing schedule

(Dkt. 15) and directed Respondents to provide a copy of the bond hearing transcript, which
they have done (Dkt. 23-2).
In reviewing Petitioner’s motion to enforce, “it is important to emphasize that the
Court’s task is narrow: it is to determine whether Respondent complied with the Decision
and Order, not to review the hearing evidence de novo[.]” Apollinaire v. Barr, No. 19-CV-
6285-FPG, 2019 WL 4023560, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019); see Gutierrez Cupido v.

Barr, No. 19-CV-6367-FPG, 2020 WL 103477, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020) (same);
Nguti v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-6703, 2017 WL 5891328, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017)
(“In reviewing the government's compliance with the May 2, 2017 order, this Court is
careful not to overstep its bounds and set aside an immigration judge’s bond determination
on discretionary or evidentiary grounds.”). Upon careful review of the bond hearing

transcript (Dkt. 23-2), along with Petitioner’s papers in support of the motion (Dkt. 14;
Dkt. 17; Dkt. 19; Dkt. 20; Dkt. 22; Dkt. 25) and Respondents’ opposition (Dkt. 16; Dkt.
23), the Court does not find that the IJ failed to comply with its Order. Indeed, the IJ placed
the burden on Respondents to show danger and flight by clear and convincing evidence,
and he also considered whether alternatives to detention could protect against those risks

(concluding that they could not). (See Dkt. 23-1; Dkt. 23-2). Because it is not the Court’s
job to substitute judgment for the IJ, the motion to enforce is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is granted to the extent Petitioner seeks a
bond hearing consistent with the provisions of the Court’s Text Order entered on February
1, 2026. (See Dkt. 7). Petitioner’s motion for a stay (Dkt. 9) is denied as moot, and the
motion to enforce (Dkt. 14) 1s denied for the reasons set forth herein. The issues raised by
the petition have now been resolved and the Clerk of Court is accordingly directed to close
this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 7, 2026 ,
Rochester, New York _ {
LIZABETH A. WOLFORD
PHTET-HIDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-8-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385581. Public record. Not legal advice.