# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · June 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385256

## Case

- **Full name:** Alberto L. Castillo Miranda v. Warden of the Golden State Annex ICE Detention Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ALBERTO L. CASTILLO MIRANDA, Case No. 1:26-cv-00644-KES-EPG-HC

12 Petitioners, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
DENY FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR
13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE (ECF No. 21)
ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
15
Respondents.
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17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas
18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
19 I.
20 BACKGROUND
21 Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador who initially entered the United States on March 27,
22 2013. He was arrested by immigration authorities and detained for about one month.
23 Subsequently, he was released on his own recognizance. Petitioner applied for asylum and
24 withholding of removal and obtained work authorization. The first amended petition (“FAP”)
25 alleges that Petitioner has worked and paid taxes in this country for more than a decade, he has
26 complied with all release conditions, and he has not committed any crimes. When Petitioner
27 appeared for an immigration court proceeding on June 2, 2025, Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) officials re-arrested Petitioner without providing him with prior notice or an
1 explanation of the basis for his re-arrest or re-detention. Petitioner was not afforded an
2 opportunity to contest the basis of the revocation of his parole and re-detention, and he has been
3 detained without a bond hearing. On or around November 10, 2025, Petitioner’s immigration
4 attorney withdrew from representing him. Despite continuing efforts, Petitioner has been unable
5 to obtain replacement counsel. (ECF No. 21 at 7.1)
6 On January 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising a
7 prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1.) On February 6, 2026, an immigration judge
8 (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed to El Salvador. Petitioner was not represented by counsel at
9 the removal hearing. The removal order states that Petitioner waived his right to an appeal.2
10 Petitioner attempted to file a pro se appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). It was
11 later returned to him due to a filing error. (ECF No. 21 at 8.)
12 On February 10, 2026, this Court ordered that “Respondents shall not transfer Petitioner
13 out of this District” pending the Court’s decision on the habeas petition. (ECF No. 13 (emphasis
14 deleted).) On February 18, 2026, Respondents transferred Petitioner to Arizona. In the days
15 following, they moved him through several other states before ultimately detaining him in El
16 Paso, Texas. (ECF No. 21 at 8.) On February 25, 2026, the Federal Public Defender moved this
17 Court to reconsider its earlier denial of appointment of counsel in this matter, noting Petitioner’s
18 transfer to El Paso in violation of the Court’s order. (ECF No. 14.) The Court granted the motion
19 and appointed counsel. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) At some point after that February 25 filing and before
20 March 3, 2026, Respondents transferred Petitioner back to Golden State Annex. (ECF No. 21 at
21 8.) Petitioner’s appeal deadline to the BIA was March 9, 2026. He was unable to obtain counsel
22 to assist him in filing the appeal.3
23 On March 27, 2026, Petitioner filed a first amended petition (“FAP”) challenging his
24 detention on due process grounds. (ECF No. 21.) On April 10, 2026, Respondents filed a
25 response, and Petitioner filed a reply on April 17, 2026. (ECF Nos. 22, 23.)
26
1 Page numbers refer to the ECF pagination stamped at the top of the page.
27 2 The FAP alleges that Petitioner did not knowingly waive that right. (ECF No. 21 at 8.)
3 The FAP alleges that “[i]n total, Petitioner was in transit or in temporary holding locations for one-
1 II.
2 DISCUSSION
3 In the FAP, Petitioner asserts that: (1) Petitioner is not a flight risk or danger to the
4 community and therefore his detention is unjustified and unlawful; and (2) Petitioner’s re-
5 detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated due process. (ECF No. 21 at 9–11.)
6 Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1231(a)(2)(A). (ECF No. 22 at 2–4.)
8 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
9 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v.
10 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
11 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause
12 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court
13 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior
14 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in
15 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated:
16 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things
open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The
17 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that
he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and
18 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free
19 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him
20 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition
is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The
21 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be
revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.
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23 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although
24 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts
25 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and
26 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
27 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who
1 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787
2 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK
3 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-
4 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran,
5 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez
6 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal.
7 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8
8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376,
9 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025).
10 However, the instant matter is distinguishable from the above cases because Petitioner is
11 subject to a final order of removal. “[W]hile revocation of Petitioner’s parole without a bond or
12 custody hearing may implicate a due process issue . . . relief under due process is unavailable at
13 this time in light of the final order of removal entered against Petitioner.” Wakil v. Warden of
14 Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-cv-01098-CDB (HC), 2026 WL 161223, at *4 (E.D.
15 Cal. Jan. 21, 2026).
16 “Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C.
17 § 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the
18 United States.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). “After the entry of a
19 final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure the
20 noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day ‘removal period.’ § 1231(a)(1)(A). The statute provides
21 that the Government ‘shall’ detain noncitizens during the statutory removal period.
22 § 1231(a)(2).”4 Id. at 578 (some internal quotation marks omitted). “In particular, § 1231(a)(6)
23 provides that after a 90-day ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released
24 under terms of supervision.” Id. “After the removal period expires, the Government ‘may’ detain
25 only four categories of people: (1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified grounds; (2)
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4 “The removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes
27 ‘administratively final,’ (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3)
the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement.” Johnson v.
1 those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to be a risk to
2 the community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order of
3 removal.’” Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578–79 (quoting 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)).
4 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to
5 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the
6 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could
7 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United
8 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062
9 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation” into the
10 statute “in light of the Constitution’s demands,” holding that § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize
11 indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
12 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
13 689.
14 After [a presumptively reasonable] 6–month period, once the alien
provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
15 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
16 showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of
prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the
17 “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink.
This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every
18 alien not removed must be released after six months. To the
contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been
19 determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
20
21 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “In Zadvydas, the Court construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that an alien
22 who has been ordered removed may not be detained beyond ‘a period reasonably necessary to
23 secure removal,’ and it further held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period.”
24 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298–99 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
25 Petitioner argues that “even if this Court concludes that the 90-day removal period in
26 § 1231(a)(2)(A) supersedes any due process violations that led to the removal order becoming
27 final, this Court should maintain jurisdiction and order that he be released on that expiration date
1 stated it “will maintain jurisdiction over this action throughout the statutory 90-day removal
2 period and order Respondents to file a report no later than the expiration of that period, i.e., no
3 later than March 30, 2026, updating the Court on Petitioner's status and to showing cause why, if
4 he has not been removed, Petitioner should not be released and subject to a bond hearing prior to
5 any re-detention[.]” Wakil, 2026 WL 161223, at *5. The undersigned recommends denying
6 Petitioner’s request because on February 10, 2026, this Court ordered that “Respondents shall
7 not transfer Petitioner out of this District” pending the Court’s decision on the habeas petition,
8 and thus, Respondents have been unable to execute Petitioner’s removal order during the 90-day
9 removal period due to this Court’s no-transfer order. (ECF No. 13 (emphasis deleted).) Further,
10 Petitioner has not “provide[d] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
11 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” as required by Zadvydas. 533 U.S. at 701.
12 However, if “continued detention under § 1231(a)(6) becomes unreasonably prolonged and
13 indefinite, Petitioner may file another habeas petition at that time. At this time, however,
14 Petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Inamzhon v. Warden of Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-cv-
15 01059-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3080525, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). See also Singh v. Warden,
16 No. 1:26-cv-01242-DAD-JDP, 2026 WL 523191, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026).
17 III.
18 RECOMMENDATION
19 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for
20 writ of habeas corpus be denied.
21 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District
22 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
23 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within
24 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file
25 written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and
26 serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
27 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed
1 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
2 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the
3 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.
4 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
7] Dated: _ June 2, 2026 [spe ey ——
8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11385256. Public record. Not legal advice.