# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · May 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384876

## Case

- **Full name:** Dawn M. Shaw v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** May 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
DAWN M. SHAW,
9 Case No. 1:23-cv-00600-SKO
Plaintiff,
10
v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL
11
SECURITY COMPLAINT
FRANK BISIGNANO,
12 Commissioner of Social Security,1
13 Defendant. (Doc. 1)
14 _____________________________________/
15
16
I. INTRODUCTION
17
18 Plaintiff Dawn M. Shaw (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
19 Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for
20 disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). (Doc. 1.) The matter
21 is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to
22 the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.2
23 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
24 On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed a claim for DIB payments, alleging she
25

26 1 On May 6, 2025, Frank Bisignano was appointed the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See
https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2025/#2025-05-07. He is therefore substituted as the defendant in this action.
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the
Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).
28 2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (See Doc. 8.) On April 13, 2026, this case was
1 became disabled on October 29, 2020, due to chronic complex cervicalgia; osteoarthritis; migraines;
2 weakness and numbness in hands; and constant pain in neck and shoulder areas. (Administrative
3 Record (“AR”) 16, 278, 293, 412.)
4 Plaintiff was born in 1970 and was 50 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (AR
5 277, 292.) She has at least a high school education and previously worked as a medical biller. (AR
6 25, 413.)
7 A. Relevant Evidence of Record3
8 In February 2020, Plaintiff complained that she had experienced neck pain for two months
9 that radiated down her bilateral upper extremities with tingling and numbness. (AR 704.) She also
10 reported a flare up of lower back pain radiating down her bilateral anterior thighs. (AR 704.) A
11 history of sciatica was noted. (AR 704.) On examination, Plaintiff had mild right trapezius
12 tenderness and right shoulder joint tenderness, with full range of motion. (AR 707.) She also had
13 lumbar spine tenderness with palpation and a positive straight leg raising test. (AR 707.) Plaintiff
14 was assessed with acute pain of the right shoulder, neck pain, and acute bilateral low back pain with
15 bilateral sciatica. (AR 707.) A lumbar spine x-ray performed that same month showed “significant
16 degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine” with a “degenerative grade 1 anterolisthesis of L4 on
17 L5” and a “[stable] degenerative retrolisthesis of L3 on L4.” (AR 730)
18 Plaintiff reported to her physical therapist later in February 2020 that she was experiencing
19 neck and right shoulder pain for the past four months, migraines for the past five to six years, and
20 difficulty gripping. (AR 851.) She denied dropping any items. (AR 851.) Plaintiff also reported
21 low back pain but indicated it is “doing okay right now” and that she wished to “focus on her neck
22 and shoulder.” (AR 851.)
23 In March 2021, Plaintiff presented for a neurosurgery consultation complaining of neck and
24 arm pain. (AR 709.) She reported a loss of fine motor skills, hand strength, and balance difficulties.
25 (AR 709.) It was noted that Plaintiff underwent cervical epidural injections and attempted physical
26 therapy, but her symptoms returned. (AR 709.) Her physical examination results were normal, with
27

28 3 Because the parties are familiar with the medical evidence, it is summarized here only to the extent relevant to the
1 normal strength and sensation. (AR 711.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine performed that same
2 month showed an “[i]nterval C7-T1 small 2 mm right paramedian focal disc protrusion effacing the
3 anterior thecal sac without cord compromise, an “[u]ncovertebral arthrosis . . . contributing to mild
4 left foraminal stenosis at C4-C5 and mild right foramina stenosis at C7-T1,” with “[n]o significant
5 central canal stenosis” and “[m]ild reversal of the usual cervical lordosis.” (AR 735–36.)
6 Plaintiff presented for a follow up appointment with neurosurgery in May 2021. (AR 742–
7 44.) She reported no changes since her last appointment and continued arm pain. (AR 742.) Her
8 physical examination results were normal as before. (AR 743–44.) No neurosurgical intervention
9 was indicated, and Plaintiff was directed to continue injections for pain management and to “[f]ollow
10 up if conservative treatment fails.” (AR 744.)
11 In July 2021, Plaintiff attended a follow up appointment with pain management after
12 receiving a cervical epidural injection for neck pain. (AR 798–802.) It was noted that she had
13 undergone three injections, and the last two “did not work.” (AR 799.) Plaintiff reported that she
14 drops objects and is unable to unscrew bottles. (AR 799.) On examination, Plaintiff demonstrated
15 limited range of motion due moderate pain in her cervical spine, with tenderness upon palpation.
16 (AR 801.) She had “4/4” muscle strength in upper and lower extremities, and normal sensation and
17 reflexes. (AR 801.) Her balance and gait were normal. (AR 801.) She was referred back to a
18 neurosurgeon. (AR 801.)
19 Plaintiff underwent an EMG neurology study in August 2021, which showed “generalized
20 predominantly axonal sensory motor neuropathy affecting both upper in the right lower extremities”
21 and “electrodiagnostic evidence of mild chronic left-sided C6 root level involvement.” (AR 787–
22 90.) That next month, Plaintiff presented to a neurologist complaining of numbness in both arms
23 and neck pain. (AR 769–74.) A history of peripheral neuropathy and cervical spondylosis was
24 noted. (AR 769.) It was also noted that she had been seen by a neurosurgeon and that no surgery
25 had been recommended. (AR 769.) Plaintiff denied new focal weakness, numbness, paresthesias,
26 double vision, trouble swallowing, trouble speaking, imbalance, and vertigo. (AR 772.) Her
27 physical examination was normal, with normal motor, sensation, coordination, and “narrow based”
28 gait. (AR 773.) She was prescribed Gabapentin. (AR 773.)
1 In November 2021, Plaintiff complained of a muscle spasm in her back. (AR 855.) She was
2 prescribed medications. (AR 858.) That same month, she presented for a follow up appointment
3 with a neurologist complaining of “worsening peripheral neuropathy.” (AR 859.) Her physical
4 examination was normal, as before. (AR 862–63.) She was assessed with lumbar radiculopathy and
5 an MRI was ordered. (AR 863–64.)
6 B. Administrative Proceedings
7 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on April 20, 2021, and
8 again on reconsideration on July 30, 2021. (AR 16, 308–11, 313–14.) Consequently, Plaintiff
9 requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 324–54.) At the hearing on
10 January 4, 2022, Plaintiff appeared by telephone with counsel and testified before an ALJ as to her
11 alleged disabling conditions. (AR 33–50.) A Vocational Expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing.
12 (AR 50–54.)
13 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony
14 At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work due to lower back issues, which
15 cause problems with sitting and standing for long periods. (AR 34.) Plaintiff testified that she cannot
16 do her past work in medical billing because she cannot sit for long periods and because her hands
17 cannot feel the keyboard to type or move around the monitor on the keyboard. (AR 38.) She stated
18 she could stand for two hours and sit for three hours before she must change positions. (AR 34.)
19 Plaintiff testified that she saw a neurologist because of constant numbness and tingling in her legs,
20 feet, arms, and hands. (AR 35.) According to Plaintiff, the numbness and tingling cause her to walk
21 slowly and have difficulty typing, gripping, and grasping because she does not have feeling in both
22 hands. (AR 35–36.) Plaintiff does not use an assistive device, and she has not experienced any falls.
23 (AR 36.)
24 Regarding her neck, Plaintiff testified that she has pain, but “no problems” turning her neck
25 and that her problem was “in the cervical.” (AR 46.) Plaintiff was then informed that “cervical”
26 means “neck.” (AR 46, 47–48.) According to Plaintiff, with that clarification she would have
27 problems reaching for the monitor or keyboard in her prior work, and she would have difficulty with
28 the monitor being higher and fluctuating her head up and down. (AR 46–47.) Plaintiff testified that
1 the most she can lift and carry is three pounds, and that lifting a gallon of milk hurts her hands. (AR
2 48.) She also testified that she has migraines at least twice a week and they can last four to five
3 hours. (AR 49.)
4 Plaintiff testified that she can do chores around the house, such as laundry, cooking, cleaning,
5 and washing dishes, but after 20 minutes of being on her feet she must take a break for an hour to an
6 hour and a half. (AR 36–37, 40–41, 43.) Plaintiff later testified that she can be on her feet for an
7 hour and a half at a time. (AR 42–43.) She can shower and dress on her own. (AR 37.) Plaintiff’s
8 daughter helps twice a week with the heavier tasks. (AR 40.) According to Plaintiff, she can use
9 her hands for 30 minutes before needing to rest them for two hours. (AR 41.) Plaintiff testified that
10 she must recline in her recliner to take pressure off her lower back. (AR 37.)
11 During a typical day, Plaintiff gets up at 5:30 a.m. and she sits in her recliner because sleeping
12 flat hurts her back. (AR 37.) She sits for about an hour then she will wash dishes, sit for 15 to 20
13 minutes, and then do laundry. (AR 37–38.) Plaintiff sits for a couple of hours after that and around
14 4 p.m. she starts prepping for dinner, which takes about two hours. (AR 37–38.) Plaintiff testified
15 that her husband helps with cutting/chopping and opening jars. (AR 38.) She testified that she tries
16 not to drive because she cannot feel the steering wheel. (AR 38.)
17 Plaintiff uses Lidocaine patches and reclining for pain relief. (AR 39.) She also takes
18 Gabapentin, which she said helps at night but not during the day. (AR 39.) Plaintiff did physical
19 therapy, but it did not help after five weeks. (AR 40.)
20 2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony
21 According to the VE, Plaintiff had past work as a medical voucher clerk, Dictionary of
22 Operational Titles (DOT) code 214.482-018, performed at the sedentary exertional level with a
23 specific vocational preparation (SVP)4 of 3. (AR 50–51.) The ALJ asked the VE to consider a
24 person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and past work history. (AR 51.) The VE was also to assume
25 this person could perform sedentary work, with frequent bilateral handling and fingering. (AR 51.)
26
4 Specific vocational preparation, as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical worker
27 to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific
job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). Jobs in
28 the DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the highest level
1 The VE testified that such a person could perform Plaintiff’s past work. (AR 51.)
2 Considering a second hypothetical, where the person in the first hypothetical would need a
3 minimum of two 20-minute unscheduled breaks per day, the VE testified that such a limitation would
4 preclude all work. (AR 51–52.) According to the VE, considering a third hypothetical involving a
5 person limited to sedentary exertional work with occasional handling and fingering, there would be
6 no work such a person could perform. (AR 52.)
7 The VE considered a fourth hypothetical, which included an additional limitation to the first
8 hypothetical that the individual would be limited to occasional reaching, the VE testified that
9 Plaintiff’s past work would be ruled out. (AR 52.) Finally, considering a fifth hypothetical, the VE
10 testified that adding the additional limitation to the fourth hypothetical of occasional movement of
11 the neck would be work preclusive. (AR 52–53.)
12 C. The ALJ’s Decision
13 In a decision dated February 9, 2022, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined
14 by the Act. (AR 16–25.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R.
15 § 404.1520. (AR 18–25.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the
16 Act through December 31, 2025, and she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
17 October 29, 2020, the alleged onset date (step one). (AR 18.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
18 following impairments to be severe: peripheral neuropathy and degenerative changes of the cervical
19 spine with cervical radiculopathy. (AR 18–19.) Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
20 of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
21 Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”) (step three). (AR 19–20.)
22 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC)5 and applied the
23 assessment at steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“Before we go from step three
24

25 5 RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work
setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. TITLES
26 II & XVI: ASSESSING RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY IN INITIAL CLAIMS, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P
(S.S.A. July 2, 1996). The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an
27 individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. “In determining a claimant’s
RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and
28 ‘the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.’”
1 to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity . . . . We use this residual functional capacity
2 assessment at both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.”). The ALJ
3 determined that Plaintiff had the RFC:
4 to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 [§] CFR 404.1567(a) except she can
frequently handle and finger.
5
6 (AR 20–25.) Although the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be
7 expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms[,]” the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony
8 as “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons
9 explained in this decision.” (AR 21.)
10 Based on the RFC assessment, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past
11 relevant work as a medical voucher clerk (step 4). (AR 25.) The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not
12 disabled from October 29, 2020, through the date of the decision. (AR 25.)
13 Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review on
14 March 13, 2023. (AR 1–7.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
15 Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
16 III. LEGAL STANDARD
17 A. Applicable Law
18 An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if they are unable
19 “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
20 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
21 to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). However,
22 “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [their] physical or mental
23 impairment or impairments are of such severity that [they] are not only unable to do [their] previous
24 work but cannot, considering [their] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
25 of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
26 “The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining
27 whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180
28 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The Ninth Circuit has provided the
1 following description of the sequential evaluation analysis:
2
In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in
3 substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ
proceeds to step two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe
4 impairment or combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If
so, the ALJ proceeds to step three and considers whether the impairment or
5 combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt.
404, subpt. P, [a]pp. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If
6
not, the ALJ proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of
7 performing [their] past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the
ALJ proceeds to step five and examines whether the claimant has the [RFC] . . . to
8 perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. If so, the
claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.
9
10 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or
11 ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett,
12 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
13 “The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of
14 the analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).
15 “However, if a claimant establishes an inability to continue [their] past work, the burden shifts to
16 the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work.”
17 Id. (citing Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687).
18 B. Scope of Review
19 “This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of [social security] benefits [only] when
20 the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record
21 as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than
22 a mere scintilla,’” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
23 adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting
24 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154
25 (9th Cir. 2020).
26 “This is a highly deferential standard of review . . . .” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
27 Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by
28 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.
1 2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the
2 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund v. Massanari,
3 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
4 interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.” (citations
5 omitted)).
6 Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a
7 specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan,
8 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole,
9 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s]
10 conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).
11 Finally, courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.”
12 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
13 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Harmless error “exists when it is clear from the record
14 that ‘the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti,
15 533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[T]he
16 burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
17 determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted).
18 IV. DISCUSSION
19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for
20 discounting her testimony regarding her subjective symptom complaints. (Docs. 10, 13.) The
21 Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined the
22 credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (Doc. 12.) The Court
23 agrees with the Commissioner and will affirm the ALJ’s decision.
24 A. Legal Standard
25 In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective complaints, an
26 ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First,
27 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
28 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Id. The
1 claimant is not required to show that their impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause the
2 severity of the symptom [they have] alleged; [they] need only show that it could reasonably have
3 caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th
4 Cir. 2007)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can
5 only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if they give “specific, clear
6 and convincing reasons” for the rejection.6 Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
7 The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility,
including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s
8
reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and
9 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or
inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course
10 of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s finding is
supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.
11
12 Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bray v.
13 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2009). Other factors the ALJ may
14 consider include a claimant’s work record and testimony from physicians and third parties
15 concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he complains. Light v. Social
16 Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).
17 The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet,” as it is “‘the most
18 demanding required in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir.
19 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). General
20 findings are not enough to satisfy this standard; the ALJ “‘must identify what testimony is not
21 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.’” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d
22 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
23 B. Analysis
24 As noted above, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to
25 cause the alleged symptoms,” but rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not entirely consistent
26 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (AR 21.) In view of this finding,
27 the only remaining issue is whether the ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for
28
1 Plaintiff’s adverse credibility finding. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591.
2 Here, the ALJ identified at least four valid reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony.
3 1. Medical Evidence
4 First, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff stated she has “issues” with her “lower back” and
5 “neck/cervical spine” and “numbness in both arms” (AR 21, 22, 23), the “evidence of record does
6 not support the severity of symptoms and degree of limitations alleged by [Plaintiff]” (AR 21).
7 While “an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical
8 evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain,” a lack of medical evidence “is a factor
9 that the ALJ can consider in [their] credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680, 681
10 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Comm’r
11 of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). “When objective medical evidence in the record is
12 inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting
13 such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original)
14 (collecting cases); see also Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir.
15 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s
16 subjective testimony.”).
17 Here, the ALJ noted that although the medical evidence “demonstrates [Plaintiff] does have
18 severe impairments that limit her” (AR 21), it also documents “unremarkable” physical
19 examinations, including normal motor, sensation, strength, gait, coordination, and balance. (AR 22–
20 23 (citing 711, 743–44, 801, 773, 862–63).) It also shows that Plaintiff reported to providers that
21 her low back pain was “doing okay” (AR 851) and that she denied weakness, numbness, and
22 paresthesias (AR 772).
23 Plaintiff does not dispute this evidence. Instead, she asserts that the ALJ only “recit[ed] the
24 medical evidence” without explaining why specific testimony was rejected. (Doc. 10 at 9.) The
25 Court disagrees. A reviewing court must look to “all the pages of the ALJ’s decision.” Kaufmann
26 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the ALJ pointed to specific treatment records
27 to highlight the disparity between Plaintiff’s alleged debilitating low back pain, neck pain, and hand
28 numbness (AR 20–21) with examination results showing normal motor, sensation, strength, gait,
1 coordination, and balance and self-reports of her symptoms. (AR 22–23.) Plaintiff’s argument that
2 more is required in this case is unavailing. See Cooper v. Kijakazi, No. 20-15935, 2022 WL
3 1553170, at *1 (9th Cir. May 17, 2022) (finding no error where the ALJ summarized the plaintiff’s
4 “relevant testimony concerning her key asserted limitations,” “stated that he found ‘these statements
5 of extremely limited physical capacity inconsistent with the overall record,’” and then “explained
6 the specific reasons upon which that conclusion was based.”); Young v. Saul, 845 F. App’x 518,
7 519–20 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The ALJ specifically cited Young’s written statements and testimony as
8 among the items he had “carefully consider[ed],” and he gave specific reasons why he did not credit
9 Young’s claims concerning the ‘limiting effects’ of Young’s symptoms . . . . The ALJ was not
10 required to mention explicitly, in his ruling, each detail of Young’s testimony.”); Razaqi v. Kijakazi,
11 No. 1:20-CV-01705-GSA, 2022 WL 1460204, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2022) (“The ALJ did not
12 necessarily match each piece of evidence with the testimony it purportedly undermined, but no
13 controlling precedent requires that level of specificity. No inferential leaps are required to find the
14 ALJ’s reasoning clear and convincing.”). See also Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir.
15 2020) (The ALJ need not “perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony” or “draft
16 dissertations when denying benefits.”); cf. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir.
17 2015) (finding error where the ALJ stated only a general, nonspecific finding regarding credibility
18 after simply reciting the medical evidence).
19 The Court finds the ALJ’s conclusion that the evidentiary record does not support, and in
20 fact undermines, Plaintiff’s subjective statements is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s
21 determination that Plaintiff’s complaints are inconsistent with the medical evidence is therefore a
22 clear and convincing reason for discounting her subjective symptom testimony. See Smartt, 53 F.4th
23 at 499 (concluding that the ALJ properly discredited the claimant’s testimony based on
24 inconsistencies with objective medical evidence); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165–66 (9th
25 Cir. 2001) (affirming an ALJ’s rejection of allegations of disabling pain based on normal physical
26 examinations).
27 2. Treatment History
28 Second, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff claimed she had “significant low back issues,”
1 there was a nearly a two-year gap in Plaintiff’s treatment for those issues. (AR 22.) “An ALJ may
2 properly discount a plaintiff’s credibility based on an unexplained failure to seek treatment
3 consistent with the alleged severity of the subjective complaints.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,
4 346 (9th Cir. 1991).
5 The ALJ also observed that Plaintiff’s treatment for her “neck/cervical spine issues” was
6 “conservative” in nature. (AR 22.) Specifically, the ALJ cited evidence of physical therapy, cervical
7 epidural injections, Lidocaine patches, and treatment notes from a neurosurgeon indicating no
8 surgery was recommended. (AR 21, 22–23 (citing 39, 709, 744, 799).) “[E]vidence of ‘conservative
9 treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.”
10 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434
11 (9th Cir. 1995)). See also Jones v. Comm’r of Social Sec., No. 2:12–cv–01714–KJN, 2014 WL
12 228590, at *7–10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s conservative
13 treatment, which included physical therapy, anti-inflammatory and narcotic medications, use of a
14 TENS unit, occasional epidural steroid injections, and massage therapy, diminished the plaintiff’s
15 credibility).
16 Plaintiff does not address, much less explain, her lack of treatment for low back pain between
17 February 2020 and November 2021, nor does she contest the ALJ’s conclusion that her neck pain
18 treatment was conservative. Instead, she contends that the ALJ “never asserts that [Plaintiff’s]
19 testimony is belied by her ‘treatment history.’ Or anything close.” (Doc. 13 at 6.) To the contrary,
20 the ALJ expressly cited evidence of a “gap in treatment” and “conservative treatment” in discussing
21 Plaintiff’s allegations of “significant low back issues” and “neck/cervical spine issues,” respectively.
22 (AR 22–23.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff’s treatment history suggests that her symptoms
23 “may not exist at the level of severity alleged.” (AR 24.) The Court can “reasonably discern” the
24 ALJ’s path, and that is all that is required of the ALJ. Cueva v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-000407-
25 BAM, 2021 WL 4192872, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2021) (citing Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492);
26 see also Guthrie v. Kijakazi, No. 21-36023, 2022 WL 15761380, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2022) (the
27 ALJ sufficiently explained her reasons for discounting the plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and “we
28 can easily follow her reasoning and meaningfully review those reasons.”) (citing Kaufman, 32 F. 4th
1 at 851); Mazon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-00342-SAB, 2023 WL 3177797, at *7 (E.D.
2 May 1, 2023) (the ALJ’s sequence of summarizing evidence followed by giving specific findings,
3 followed a conventional organization for ALJ decision writing which is sufficiently clear for judicial
4 review). See also Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (“The standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but
5 instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.”).
6 The Court finds that the ALJ supported their conclusion that Plaintiff’s treatment history is
7 inconsistent with her testimony as to the severity of her impairments with substantial evidence in the
8 record. The ALJ’s discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony in light of her treatment
9 history is therefore another clear and convincing reason for doing so. Parra, 481 F.3d at 751;
10 Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346.
11 3. Inconsistent Testimony
12 Third, the ALJ found that inconsistent testimony at the hearing suggest that Plaintiff’s
13 symptoms “may not be accurately reported.” (AR 21, 24.) General inconsistent statements—even
14 those unrelated to a claimant’s symptoms—can provide a permissible basis to discredit a claimant’s
15 testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistencies in a
16 claimant’s testimony may be used to discredit subjective complaints); Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (“An
17 ALJ’s finding that a claimant generally lacked credibility is a permissible basis to reject excess
18 pain testimony.”); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1284 (ALJ may rely on ordinary techniques
19 of credibility evaluation including prior inconsistent statements or statements that are less than
20 candid); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 n.5 (1989) (an ALJ can reject pain testimony based on
21 contradictions in plaintiff’s testimony).
22 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s hearing testimony was at times “contradict[ory].” (AR
23 21.) Plaintiff initially testified that she could stand for two hours at a time (AR 34), then testified
24 that she can be on her feet for an hour and a half (AR 42), and ultimately testified that she can be
25 on her feet only 20 minutes before needing a break (AR43). She also testified first that she had
26 “no problems” turning her neck (AR 46), but then testified that she would have difficulty moving
27 her neck “up and down and side-to-side” (once she understood “cervical” meant “neck”). (AR 47.)
28 Plaintiff—who does not address her neck movement testimony—asserts that there is no
1 inconsistency because “staying on task requires focus and attention and standing in one place does
2 not.” (Doc. 13 at 5.) But Plaintiff’s testimony was not directed to her ability to stay “on task”: it
3 was elicited in response to questions, by her attorney, regarding how long she “could be on [her]
4 feet.” (See AR 42 (“Q. So you told the judge that you could be your feet, I think, and sit two to
5 three hours at one time, is that correct? A Yes. Q. Are you on your feet at home for that entire
6 period of time that you told the judge you could do or typically do you do less than that at one time?
7 A. Typically I do less. Q. So when you get to choose and don’t push yourself, you might be able
8 to go two or three hours, but what do you usually go at home? A. About an hour-and-a-half.”); AR
9 43 (“Q. When I asked you about when you were working and how much would you be on your
10 feet, I thought you said about 20 minutes and then you’d take a 2-hour break? A. Correct.”).)
11 The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in concluding that inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s
12 testimony suggest that her symptoms “may not be accurately reported” (AR 24), and they supported
13 this conclusion with substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s inconsistent testimony is yet
14 another clear and convincing reason to discredit her subjective complaints. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at
15 497 (relying on “direct contradiction” in testimony to uphold adverse credibility finding).
16 4. Daily Activities
17 Fourth, and finally, an ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities
18 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040. Even if the claimant
19 experiences some difficulty or pain, her daily activities “may be grounds for discrediting the
20 claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”
21 Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113.
22 Here, the ALJ made a reasonable determination based on specific, clear, and convincing
23 evidence that Plaintiff’s ability to participate in daily activities “undermines [her] allegations of
24 disabling functional limitations.” (AR 23.) Plaintiff testified that she does chores around the house,
25 such as laundry, cooking, cleaning, and washing dishes, albeit with breaks, and can shower and dress
26 on her own. (AR 36–37, 40–41, 43.) Citing this testimony, the ALJ reasonably concluded that
27 “despite her impairments, [Plaintiff] has engaged in a somewhat normal level of daily activity and
28 interaction.” (AR 23.) In fact, Plaintiff’s daily activities require many of the same “physical and
1 mental abilities and social interactions . . . necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment”
2 (AR 23). See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2021) (plaintiff’s “ability to play video
3 games and watch television for sustained periods, to use a library computer a few times a week for
4 two hours at a time (the maximum time permitted by the library), to use public transportation, to
5 shop at stores, to perform personal care, to prepare meals, to socialize with friends, and to perform
6 household chores” provided “substantial evidence” to support the ALJ’s decision.); Thomas, 278
7 F.3d at 959 (affirming an ALJ’s decision discounting a claimant’s testimony after finding that the
8 claimant “was able to perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes,
9 and shopping”).
10 Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for not identifying the specific testimony they found not to be
11 credible in view of her daily activities. (See Doc. 10 at 11; Doc. 13 at 6–7.) The Court rejects this
12 argument and instead finds sufficient support in the record to find the ALJ’s discussion of daily
13 activities was a clear and convincing reason to give less weight to Plaintiff’s complaints of
14 “significant low back issues,” “neck/cervical spine issues,” and “numbness and tingling” in her
15 extremities (AR 22–23). See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499; Kaufmann, 32 F.4th at 851–52 (“Looking to
16 the entire record, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Claimant’s testimony
17 about the extent of her limitations conflicted with the evidence of her daily activities, such as sewing,
18 crocheting, and vacationing.”); Lopez v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-00741-SKO, 2014 WL 3362250, at
19 *16 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2014) (“While the ALJ did not explain that Plaintiff’s daily activities were
20 consistent with specific work activity, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent
21 with the severity of symptoms he alleged . . . [and] [b]ecause Plaintiff’s daily activities were
22 inconsistent with the disabling symptoms he alleged, the ALJ properly found such claims not
23 credible.”) (emphasis in original); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e
24 are not deprived of our faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s
25 opinion.”).7
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7 Even if the ALJ erred in relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities, the Court finds the ALJ provided other clear and
27 convincing reasons for discrediting her subjective complaints, discussed above. See Reyes v. Berryhill, 716 F. App’x
714, 714 (9th Cir. 2018) (where ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting claimant’s testimony, “[a]ny error in other
28 reasons provided by the ALJ was harmless”); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.
1 In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ provided at least four clear and convincing reasons,
2 supported by substantial evidence, to discredit Plaintiff’s reports regarding the severity of her
3 limitations.
4 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
5 After consideration of Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s briefs and a thorough review of the record,
6 the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore
7 AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Frank
8 Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff.
9
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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11 Dated: May 27, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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28 2018) (“Because the ALJ is only required to provide a single valid reason for rejecting a claimant’s pain complaints,

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384876. Public record. Not legal advice.