# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384271

## Case

- **Full name:** Devin J. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Devin J.,1 :
: Case No. 2:24-cv-03082
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Graham
v. :
:
Commissioner of Social : Magistrate Judge Litkovitz
Security, :
:
Defendant. :

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Devin J. (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action for judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s
applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security
income (“SSI”). See Statement of Errors, doc. 9. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”) which found Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors
unpersuasive and recommended that the Commissioner’s final decision be affirmed.
Doc. 13. Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R are now before the Court and ripe for ruling.
Doc. 14. For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections,
ADOPTS the R&R, in full, and therefore AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final
decision and DISMISSES this case.

1 Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in social security cases in the
Southern District of Ohio shall refer to plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Social Security
The Magistrate Judge accurately set forth the general standards which guide

the benefit determination decisions of the Commissioner:
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from
a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be
expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A) (DIB), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (SSI). The impairment must
render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously
performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that
exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2),
1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner establish a
five-step sequential evaluation process for disability
determinations:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the
claimant is not disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment – i.e., an impairment
that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities – the claimant is not disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or
equals one of the listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the
regulations and meets the duration requirement, the claimant is
disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her
from doing his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not
disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the
claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment
to other work, the claimant is disabled.
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 404.1520(b)-(g)).
The claimant has the burden of proof at the first four steps of the
sequential evaluation process. Id.; Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004). Once the claimant establishes a
prima facie case by showing an inability to perform the relevant
previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful
employment and that such employment exists in the national
economy. Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652; Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289,
291 (6th Cir. 1999).

Doc. 13, # 3405-06.2
Judicial Review
Neither party objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the standards
which guide judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination:
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is
limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and involves a twofold inquiry:
(1) whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial
evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

2 Page numbers following the “#” symbol refer to the ECF PAGEID numbering system. Page
numbers following “Tr.” refer to the pagination of the administrative record.
standards. See Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2009); see also Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d
742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Commissioner’s findings must stand if they are
supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence consists
of “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.
. . .” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007). In deciding whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, the Court considers the record
as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978).
The Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards in the disability determination. Even if
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff
is not disabled, “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld
where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error
prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen, 478
F.3d at 746). See also Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545–46 (reversal required
even though ALJ’s decision was otherwise supported by substantial
evidence where ALJ failed to give good reasons for not giving weight
to treating physician’s opinion, thereby violating the agency’s own
regulations).
Doc. 13, # 3408-09
Objections to a Report and Recommendation
If a party raises timely objections to the report and recommendation of a

magistrate judge, the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the court
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
554 F. Supp. 3d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) “The filing of objections provides the
district court with the opportunity… to focus attention on those issues-factual and

legal-that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554
F. Supp. 3d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (quoting United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981) and Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d
435 (1985)). Therefore, “only those specific objections to the magistrate's report made
to the district court will be preserved for appellate review.” Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of
Tchrs. Loc. 231, Am. Fed'n of Tchrs., AFL-CIO, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Neither party raises any issues with the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the R&R:
The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process and made
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2020.
2. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since April 5, 2015, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,
and 416.971 et seq.).
3. Since the alleged onset date of disability, April 5, 2015,
[plaintiff] has had the following severe impairments: cervical
degenerative disc disease; lumbar strain; generalized osteoarthritis
(osteoarthritis/enthesopathy right knee, mild right foot osteoarthritis,
osteoarthritis bilateral first metatarsophalangeal joint); obesity;
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and trauma or stressor
disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. Since April 5, 2015, [plaintiff] has not had an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the [ALJ]
finds that since April 5, 2015, [plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except standing is limited to 75% of the day or 6 hours
of an 8 hour day; foot control operation with the left is limited to the
frequent level; never climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds; occasional for
crawling; frequent for climbing ramps or stairs, stooping, kneeling
and crouching; no exposure to unprotected heights; goal based
production where work is measured by end result, no fast paced
work, no strict production quotas; work in a low stress job defined
as only occasional changes in the work setting; occasional
interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.
6. Since April 5, 2015, [plaintiff] has been unable to perform
any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. Prior to the established disability onset date, [plaintiff] was
a younger individual age 18-49 and an individual closely
approaching advanced age. Applying the age categories non-
mechanically, and considering the additional adversities in this case,
on December 31, 2020, [plaintiff]’s age category changed to an
individual of advanced age (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. [Plaintiff] has at least a high school education (20 CFR
404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Prior to December 31, 2020, transferability of job skills is
not material to the determination of disability because using the
Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
[plaintiff] is “not disabled” whether or not [plaintiff] has transferable
job skills. Beginning on December 31, 2020, [plaintiff] has not been
able to transfer job skills to other occupations (See SSR 82-41 and
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Prior to December 31, 2020, the date [plaintiff]’s age
category changed, considering [plaintiff]’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that [plaintiff]
could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and
416.969a).
11. Beginning on December 31, 2020, the date [plaintiff]’s
age category changed, considering [plaintiff]’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are no jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [plaintiff]
could perform (20 CFR 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c), and
416.966).
12. [Plaintiff] was not disabled prior to December 31, 2020,
but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled
through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)).

Doc. 13, # 3407-08 (footnotes omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his
analysis of the treating source opinion evidence provided by Dr. Angela Gannon.

Doc. 9. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) by
assigning Dr. Gannon’s opinion “little weight” without articulating good reasons for
that conclusion. Id. at # 3378-80. The Magistrate Judge found no error. In his
objections, Plaintiff largely reiterates the arguments raised in the Statement of
Specific Errors for the purposes of de novo review. Upon such review, the Court
likewise finds no error.

Treating Source Opinions
The central issue in this matter is the consideration of a treating source opinion
in a benefits determination. Neither party objected to the Magistrate Judge’s
statement of the legal standard guiding consideration of treating source medical
opinions:
For claims filed prior to March 27, 2017, a treating source’s
medical opinion must be given controlling weight if it is “well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques” and “is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013)
and Hargett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 964 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.
2020). If the ALJ declines to assign a treating source opinion
controlling weight, the ALJ must balance the following factors in
determining what weight to give the opinion: the length of the
treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship; the supportability of the
opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole;
and the specialization of the treating source. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544;
Hargett, 964 F.3d at 552 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)).
“Separate from the treating physician rule, but closely
related, is the requirement that the ALJ ‘always give good reasons’
for the weight ascribed to a treating-source opinion.” Hargett, 964
F.3d at 552 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). The ALJ’s reasons
must be supported by the evidence in the case record and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion
and the reasons for that weight. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376 (quoting
SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5). This “good reasons rule” helps
claimants understand the disposition of their case, especially “where
a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled” and
“permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the [treating-
source] rule.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Therefore, “an ALJ may not
summarily discount a treating-source opinion as not well-supported
by objective findings or being inconsistent with the record without
identifying and explaining how the substantial evidence is
purportedly inconsistent with the treating-source opinion.” Hargett,
964 F.3d at 552 (citing Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376-77 and quoting
Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[I]t is not enough to dismiss a treating physician’s opinion as
‘incompatible’ with other evidence of record; there must be some
effort to identify the specific discrepancies and to explain why it is
the treating physician’s conclusion that gets the short end of the
stick.”)).

Doc. 13, # 3410-11 (footnotes omitted).
Analysis
In her medical source opinion, Dr. Gannon indicated that Plaintiff had
“Marked” impairments in his ability to (1) relate to the general public and maintain
socially appropriate behavior, (2) respond appropriately to changes in his work
setting, and (3) tolerate customary work pressures. Tr. 1858-60. She indicated

“Moderate” impairments to other social and behavioral areas, as well as his attention
and concentration. Id. In all other areas, Dr. Gannon opined that Plaintiff had “Mild”
or no impairment. Id. She further opined that, “due to the diagnosed conditions and/or
side effects of medication,” Plaintiff was “likely to have partial or full day unscheduled
absences from work occurring 5 or more days per month,” thus making him incapable
of engaging in work activity on a regular and continuing basis. Id.

In assigning “little weight” to Dr. Gannon’s opinion, the ALJ articulated five
(5) reasons for such a conclusion: (1) Dr. Gannon’s opinion was based plaintiff’s
subjective self-reports; (2) “ample” evidence in the record “strongly suggest[s]” that
Plaintiff “overreported or exaggerated symptoms and limitations in connection with
mental health conditions”; (3) the evaluations conducted by Dr. Gannon consistently
found Plaintiff’s mental status to be “normal” and thus “contrary to [the] degree of
impairment” opined by Dr. Gannon; (4) Dr. Gannon does not cite to any “specific
objective evidence” in support of these limitations; and (5) Dr. Gannon’s opinion is
internally inconsistent. Tr. 1880. The Magistrate Judge found that these reasons

were supported by substantial evidence, and the Court agrees.
Plaintiff disputes this conclusion. He argues that both the ALJ and the
Magistrate Judge “place to[o] great an emphasis on the theory that Dr. Gannon’s
opinion was based primarily on [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints,” because “by its
very nature, mental health treatment is going to be subjective.” Doc. 14, # 3423-24.
But Plaintiff also asserts that “[j]ust because Dr. Gannon treated [Plaintiff] does not
mean that her opinions are based on his statements rather than her expertise as a

mental health professional.” Id. at # 3424. As such, Plaintiff appears to concede that
Dr. Gannon’s opinion was necessarily based on Plaintiff’s self-reports, but instead of
addressing the evidence of his overreporting and exaggeration of symptoms, Plaintiff
simultaneously suggests that her opinion was actually based on “her expertise as a
mental health professional.” Id. This is either an irreconcilable contradiction or a
distinction without a difference. Presumably, Dr. Gannon’s “expertise” would be

exercised, at least in part, in her interpretation and evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective
self-reports.3 But the ALJ thoroughly explained why he found Plaintiff’s subjective
self-reports to be unreliable. See Tr. 1880.

3 Plaintiff describes the basis of Dr. Gannon’s opinion as “her treatment and her treating
relationship” with Plaintiff, noting her explanation that Plaintiff “had previously lost jobs
due to problems with his mood” and that his “stress levels constricted his ability to function
appropriately.” Doc. 14, # 3424. These findings clearly derive from Plaintiff’s self-reports, not
the least because mental status examinations conducted by Dr. Gannon consistently yielded
normal results.
Plaintiff offers minimal argument regarding the evidence which “strongly
suggest[s]” that he “overreported or exaggerated symptoms.” Id. He refers to this
evidence as “a single note suggesting that [he] exaggerated his symptoms.”4 Doc. 12,

# 3401. And he argues that it should be “rejected in the face of specific functional
opined limitations from a claimant’s long time treating source medical provider.” Id.
But, as Plaintiff himself concedes, the “specific functional opined limitations” from
Dr. Gannon are necessarily based on his self-reports. Id. Regardless of whether
Plaintiff in fact overreported or exaggerated symptoms, the ALJ sufficiently
supported his reasoning in discounting a treating source opinion “based largely on
the claimant’s self-reported symptoms and limitations.” Tr. 1880; see also Blakley,

581 F.3d at 406 (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The
substantial-evidence standard ... presupposes that there is a zone of choice within
which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.”).
The ALJ’s 3rd, 4th, and 5th reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Gannon’s
opinion are related. The ALJ pointed to the mental status examinations conducted
by Dr. Gannon which did not yield results supporting her opinion. As the Magistrate

Judge summarized, Dr. Gannon’s examinations “consistently found [P]laintiff calm,
cooperative, alert, oriented, logical, organized, in no acute distress, with no speech or
thought abnormalities, and experiencing no suicidal or homicidal thoughts or plans.”
Doc. 13, # 3416 (citing Tr. 839, 1232-33, 1282, 1331, 1706). And while Plaintiff
contends that his mental health treatment with Dr. Gannon was inherently

4 The ALJ refers to “two invalid profiles and one source specifically noting the questionable
validity of [Plaintiff’s] self-report.” Tr. 1880.
subjective, the ALJ did not err by discounting the opinion based on a lack of “specific
objective evidence.” Tr. 1880. Notably, Dr. Gannon cited no treatment records at all
in support of her medical source opinion. Furthermore, the applicable regulations

(i.e., prior to amendments made effective March 26, 2017) state that “objective
medical evidence” includes “psychological abnormalities… shown by medically
acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques,” such as “abnormalities of behavior, mood,
thought, memory, orientation, development, or perception.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; 20
C.F.R. § 404.1528. But, as noted, Dr. Gannon’s mental status examinations
consistently showed no such abnormalities, including the examination conducted on
the same day that she completed the medical source opinion. Tr. 1706-07.

Therefore, the objective medical evidence does not support Dr. Gannon’s
opinion as to Plaintiff’s areas of limitation. But even if it did, the limitations opined
by Dr. Gannon do not support her opinion that Plaintiff is incapable of engaging in
work activity on a regular and continuing basis. As discussed by the ALJ, Dr.
Gannon’s opinion indicated “marked limits only in dealing with the public and
tolerance to change and customary work pressure.” Tr. 1880. However, the ALJ

reasonably concluded that these areas of limitation are “adequately accommodated
by the mental residual functional capacity, which specifically limits interactions with
the public, changes in the work setting, and provides for low stress work.” Id.
In sum, the Court finds the ALJ’s conclusions as to the weight afforded Dr.
Gannon’s opinion are well-supported by substantial evidence in the record.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s benefits
determination. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R is ADOPTED, Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors is
OVERRULED, the Commissioner’s finding that Plaintiff did not become disabled
until December 31, 2020 is AFFIRMED, and this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge

DATE: July 6, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384271. Public record. Not legal advice.