# Davis

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384208

## Case

- **Full name:** Jamir Anree Davis I, et al. v. Walsh Kokosing Joint Venture, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

JAMIR ANREE DAVIS I, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:25-cv-393
v.
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
WALSH KOKOSING JOINT Magistrate Judge Litkovitz
VENTURE, et al.,

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On March 30, 2026, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (Doc. 32) granting
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 20, 21, 23). In that Opinion,1 the Court held
that: (1) Plaintiff Jamir Davis, proceeding pro se, cannot represent his law firm,
Plaintiff J. Davis Law Firm, PLLC (JDLF), (Doc. 32, #735–37), in this action; (2) res
judicata arising from a previous arbitration between JDLF and WEB Ventures bars
the claims against Defendant Icy Williams, who is an employee of WEB Ventures,
(id. at #737–44); (3) Defendants Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) and
Deborah Green enjoy immunity for Counts 5, 9, and 12, (id. at #744–51);2 (4) the
federal claims against Defendants Walsh Kokosing Joint Venture, Arik Quam,
ODOT, and Green (Counts 6, 7, 8, 10) fail as a matter of law, (id. at #752–62); and

1 There, the Court summarized the factual background giving rise to this lawsuit. (Doc. 32,
#722–32). The Court declines to repeat it here.
2 Two other ODOT employees named in those counts were not served as of the time of the
previous Opinion, (Doc. 32, #732), and so far as the Court can tell have not been served since.
(5) the state-law claims should be held in abeyance given the dismissal of the federal
claims, (id. at #762–64).
The Court dismissed some claims with prejudice: counts 1–5 against Williams,

counts 5 and 12 against Green in her official capacity, and counts 9 and 12 against
ODOT. (Id. at #764). And it dismissed others without prejudice: counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
and 12. (Id.). The Court held the remaining state claims against Walsh Kokosing (and
its employee Arik Quam) (counts 1–5 and 11 as asserted against those Defendants)
in abeyance. (Id. at #762). The Court noted that Plaintiffs could move for leave to
amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies for the claims dismissed without

prejudice. (Id. at #764). Since then, Davis has filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.
39) relating solely to one issue—the Court’s res judicata analysis involving Williams.3
For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Davis’s motion. (Doc. 39).
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion for
reconsideration, at least one directed at an order like the one Davis challenges here.

Davis requests reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e),
or Rule 60(b) “depending on the posture of the case.” (Doc. 39, #780). Rules 59 and 60
do not appear to be the relevant rules. Rule 59 allows a party to move the court to
alter or amend a judgment, specifically a final judgment. See Russell v. GTE Gov’t

3 As the Court noted in its previous Opinion and Order, Davis is a practicing attorney, but he
is not barred to practice in the Southern District of Ohio. (Doc. 32, #735–37). So Davis may
represent himself and proceed pro se, but he cannot represent the law firm. (Id.). JDLF must
secure counsel, which it seems to have done. (Not. of Appearance, Doc. 35). Despite that, only
Davis has signed the reconsideration motion, (Doc. 39, #784), so the Court will only review
its res judicata analysis with respect to Davis individually.
Sys. Corp., 141 F. App’x 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005). True, here the Court dismissed some
claims with prejudice, and so the Order is in some sense “final” as to those claims.
But the judgment to which Rule 59(e) refers is the final judgment disposing of all

claims, not merely some of them. See Blair v. Bd. of Trs. of Sugarcreek Twp., No. 3:07-
cv-56, 2008 WL 4372665, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 22, 2008) (holding Rule 59(e) did not
apply to the court’s order because it had “adjudicate[d] fewer than all of the claims,
entail[ed] a partial grant of summary judgment, and [was] not immediately
appealable”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of

fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”). Likewise, Rule 60 allows for relief
from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” That does not include interlocutory
orders, which is what the order here is absent certification of “no just reason for delay”
under Rule 54(b). Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc. v. Cap. Core, Inc.,
No. 2:10-cv-72, 2014 WL 12653727, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2014) (citation omitted).

Because the Court’s previous Opinion and Order was not final on all claims and
parties, Rule 60(b) does not apply.
“However, ‘district courts have authority both under common law and Rule
54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry
of final judgment.’” Id. (bracket omitted) (quoting Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health
& Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)). As for the merits, the Court
has significant discretion and can “afford such relief from [interlocutory orders] as
justice requires.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959 (first citing Citibank N.A. v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 857 F. Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C. 1994); and then citing Melancon v.

Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1981)).
That is not to say there are no limits. For example, in deciding what “justice
requires,” courts often look to Rule 59 for guidance. See, e.g., id. at 959 n.8. So, in
deciding whether to reconsider interlocutory orders, courts still generally ask
whether there is “(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence
available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at

959 (citation omitted). And motions for reconsideration “may not be used to relitigate
old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5
(2008) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.
1995)).
What these principles recognize is that such motions should be granted
“sparingly because of the interests in finality and conservation of scarce judicial

resources,” United States ex rel. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 179
F.R.D. 541, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citation omitted), which are interests that apply
even with regard to interlocutory orders, Hagy v. Demers & Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-
cv-530, 2013 WL 5334106, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 23, 2013). “A movant has no right to
reconsideration of an interlocutory order simply because the movant makes the
motion in good faith.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959 n.7. Our judicial system is built
on the notions that litigants put their best arguments forward on the first go-around
and that judges do their best to decide the issues that the litigants have put before
them. Requests to reconsider rulings once rendered undermine both notions and thus

do little to advance the efficient handling of matters.
Davis also includes in his motion a request for leave to amend his complaint.
(Doc. 39, #783–84). Generally, Rule 15 applies and states that the “court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But when deciding
whether to grant leave to amend, courts may consider “undue delay in filing, lack of
notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility of amendment.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th
Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Court previously dismissed with prejudice all claims that Davis had
asserted against Williams here on the grounds that the preclusive effect of an earlier

arbitration decision barred them. Davis requests reconsideration, primarily arguing
that the previous arbitration only addressed JDLF’s claims against WEB Ventures
(Williams’ employer), and that the arbitrator prevented Davis from asserting any
individual claims there. (See generally Doc. 39). So Davis argues he did not receive a
“full and fair opportunity” to litigate his individual claims—a necessary prerequisite
for claim preclusion to apply. (Id. at #783). Indeed, Davis says, if he cannot proceed

on his claims here, that means he is left without any forum in which to vindicate his
rights. (Id. at #781–82). Beyond that, if the Court agrees with Davis that his
individual claims can proceed, he requests an opportunity to amend his complaint “to
reassert claims against Williams in her individual capacity, to add WEB Ventures as

a Defendant, and to clarify that these claims were not and could not have been
litigated in arbitration.” (Id. at #783). As discussed below, though, the Court again
concludes that claim preclusion bars the claims Davis seeks to assert against
Williams in this action (at least those he has sought to assert to date), and that even
if that were not the case, issue preclusion would bar almost all of them anyway. So
the Court ends up at the same spot, but expands its reasoning somewhat. As for

Davis’s request to add other new claims, the Court will address that in connection
with the recently filed Motion to Amend (Doc. 51).
A. Davis Does Not Present Newly Discovered Evidence.
Davis first argues for reconsideration on the basis of newly discovered evidence
that supposedly demonstrates that “he was expressly barred from” asserting his
individual claims in the arbitration. (Doc. 39, #781 (emphasis omitted)). That “newly

discovered evidence” consists of a series of emails between his former arbitration
counsel and WEB Ventures’ arbitration counsel. (Id.). In those emails, WEB
Ventures’ counsel argued it is not required to arbitrate Davis’s individual claims
because Davis was not a party to the Teaming Agreement. (Id.; Doc. 41-1 (emails)).
Thus, WEB Ventures contended the arbitration provision contained in that
Agreement did not extend to Davis personally. (Doc. 39, #781). Willliams does not

dispute the existence of those emails, but instead argues that they do not constitute
newly discovered evidence because Davis had access to them since 2024. (Resp., Doc.
44, #1537–39).
The Court finds that Williams has the better of the argument. “To constitute

‘newly discovered evidence,’ the evidence must have been previously unavailable.”
GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). But “[e]vidence is considered unavailable only if it could not, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, have been submitted earlier.” Whatever It Takes
Transmission & Parts, 2014 WL 12653727, at *5 (citation omitted).
Here, Davis claims that he “was not a participant in the original email chain,

was not copied on the underlying communications, and did not maintain independent
possession of the correspondence.” (Reply, Doc. 47, #1622). Looking at the emails that
Davis submitted, though, Davis’s counsel forwarded him the email exchange on April
9, 2024, and specifically asked him “Do you want to evaluate this or should I?”. (Doc.
41-1, #1151). So Davis cannot reasonably claim that he discovered the emails since
the Court’s Opinion and Order on March 30, 2026. Even if he had not maintained
possession of them, he could have acquired the emails from his former counsel with

reasonable diligence. Indeed, Davis himself admits that the emails were “previously
overlooked.” (Doc. 39, #781). Furthermore, as Williams argues, the underlying fact is
not new to this case either. (Doc. 44, #1539). Williams stated in her original Motion
to Dismiss that “the arbitrator dismissed Davis’s claims in his personal capacity.”
(Doc. 21, #433). Davis, then, cannot rely on this evidence to support his motion for
reconsideration.
B. Res Judicata of One Form or Another Bars Davis’s Individual Claims.
That said, newly discovered evidence is not a prerequisite to the Court
revisiting an interlocutory order. As such orders are necessarily not final, the Court

can grant reconsideration whenever “justice requires.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959
(citations omitted). Beyond the emails, Davis argues that he “did not have a full and
fair opportunity to litigate” his individual claims in the arbitration, which is one of
the four elements that is a prerequisite to applying claim preclusion. (Doc. 39, #781–
82). Specifically, Davis notes that the arbitrator found Davis was not personally a
party to the Teaming Agreement, so the arbitration provision in the Agreement did
not extend to his individual claims. (Id.). Williams largely agrees on the factual

predicate for Davis’s argument—she does not contest that the arbitrator dismissed
Davis’s individual claims because Davis personally was not a party to the contract.
In fact, Williams herself said that to the Court. (Doc. 21, #433). Instead, Williams
argues that the alleged distinction between Davis’s individual claims and JDLF’s
claims does not change the outcome. The Court concludes that she is correct. The five
claims that Davis assets here are advanced under the same labels (with one minor

exception) and based on the same alleged conduct; the only difference is that it is
Davis (who is in privity with JDLF) who advances them, and he directs them against
Williams (who is in privity with WEB Ventures). But as discussed below, that is a
distinction without a difference. So, as the Court previously found, claim preclusion
bars all five claims. And, even if that were not so, a different aspect of res judicata
under Ohio law, issue preclusion, leads to largely the same result.
1. Claim Preclusion Bars the Five Claims on Which Davis Seeks
Reconsideration.
Generally, Ohio’s res judicata doctrine covers two forms of preclusion: claim
preclusion (which Ohio law calls estoppel by judgment) and issue preclusion
(otherwise known as collateral estoppel). Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226,
228 (Ohio 1995). In its previous Opinion and Order, the Court broadly referred to res
judicata under Ohio law, but did not expressly identify on which of those two

subcategories it relied. That said, the Court applied the elements of claim preclusion.
(See Doc. 32, #737–39). Specifically, the Court stated “a party invoking res judicata
must establish four elements: (1) a final decision on the merits; (2) the prior action
involved the same parties (or their privies) as the parties currently before the Court;
(3) the current action raises ‘claims that were or could have been litigated in the first
action’; and (4) both actions ‘arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.’” (Id. at
#737 (citing William Powell Co. v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 18 F.4th 856, 869–70 (6th Cir.

2021))). And, as William Powell makes clear, those are the elements of claim
preclusion under Ohio law. 18 F.4th at 869–70 (citing Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127
F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Davis says that claim preclusion does not apply here, though, because the third
element in that list is lacking—Davis did not and could not have litigated his personal
claims in the earlier arbitration. (Doc. 39, #782). At first glance, he seems to be on to

something. As both sides admit, the arbitrator held that Davis was not personally a
party to the Agreement, so his individual claims were outside the scope of the
arbitration provision. (Id.; Doc. 44, #1536; see also Doc. 21-3 (arbitrator’s opinion)).
In other words, the arbitrator determined that Davis could not litigate those claims
in that forum. So, if Davis was seeking to advance in the arbitration, and is seeking
to advance here, a distinct set of personal claims, claims that were separate and apart

from those claims Davis asserted on behalf of JDLF in the arbitration, he would be
correct that claim preclusion would not bar those claims, as he did not have an
opportunity to litigate them in the earlier proceeding.
But that is a big if. Deciding whether that premise is met requires the Court
to compare the claims actually asserted and decided in the arbitration against those
Davis seeks to advance here, to see if they are in fact different. If instead they are the

same claims, merely advanced through a person in privity with JDLF, rather that
JDLF itself, and directed at a person in privity with WEB Ventures, rather than WEB
Ventures itself, then claim preclusion—which extends to actions between those in
privity with the original litigants—bars them.
So how does the comparison shake out? In the current action, Davis asserts
five claims against Williams: (1) tortious interference with a prospective business
advantage, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) fraudulent

concealment, and (5) negligence. (Doc. 1-25, #357–61). The earlier arbitration, by
contrast, involved ten counts against WEB Ventures, Williams’ employer. JDLF alone
brought seven of the ten: (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) tortious
interference with a prospective business advantage, (4) fraudulent concealment,
(5) constructive fraud, (6) implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
(7) negligent misrepresentation. (Doc. 21-4, #502–08). Davis and JDLF were both
named as plaintiffs on one of the remaining claims—negligence. (Id. at #508–09). And
then Davis raised two counts solely on behalf of himself: negligent infliction of
emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at #509–12).

Then, in response to WEB Ventures’ motion to dismiss, the arbitrator dismissed
Davis individually as a party because he was not party to the Teaming Agreement
and thus the arbitration provision did not extend to him. (Doc. 21-2, #468–70). So
that resulted in dismissal of both the negligent and intentional infliction claims in
their entirety, as well as the portion of the negligence claim that Davis advanced on
his own behalf. (See id. at #471). That left JDLF and WEB Ventures to arbitrate to

judgment the remaining eight claims (the JDLF portion of the negligence claim and
the seven JDLF-only claims).4
The claims Davis seeks to assert here match the causes of action that JDLF
previously advanced in the arbitration. In particular, four of the five claims he asserts
here bear the identical label to claims JDLF advanced there—tortious interference,
unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, and negligence. (Compare Doc. 1-25,
#357–61, with Doc. 21-4, #503–06, 508–08). And while it is admittedly Davis (rather

than JDLF) who advances them, and he does so against Williams (rather than against
WEB Ventures, Williams’ employer), a comparison of the factual allegations shows

4 It is not entirely clear to the Court why the arbitrator would have jurisdiction over the
negligence claim. Negligence claims, after all, arise under common law, while an arbitrator’s
jurisdiction under a contractual arbitration provision typically is limited to claims that arise
under that contract. That said, parties can agree to arbitrate non-contract claims. And here,
it appears that both parties (WEB Ventures and JDLF) sought an arbitral ruling on the
negligence claim. In the Court’s view, that suffices to provide the arbitrator authority to
decide that claim.
that Davis seeks to hold Williams personally liable to him here based on the exact
same conduct, and the exact same alleged harm, for which JDLF sought to hold WEB
Ventures liable in the arbitration.

As to the remaining claim, misrepresentation, there is admittedly at least a
small difference. In the arbitration, JDLF advanced a negligent misrepresentation
claim, whereas here, Davis advances an intentional misrepresentation claim. (Doc. 1-
25, #358–59; Doc. 21-4, #508). But again, the alleged conduct, and the alleged harm,
underlying both claims is identical. And there was nothing preventing JDLF from
advancing an intentional misrepresentation claim in the arbitral forum to go along

with its negligent misrepresentation claim.
At bottom then, Davis seeks to litigate here the same claims, based on the same
factual allegations, that JDLF arbitrated (or could have arbitrated in the case of the
intentional misrepresentation claim) previously. See William Powell, 18 F.4th at 870
(citation omitted). And Davis does not dispute that the arbitrator rendered a final
decision on the merits with regard to those claims. Moreover, as the Court determined
previously, and reviews below, Davis is clearly in privity with JDLF as his solo law

firm, and Williams is in privity with WEB Ventures. Taken together, that means
Davis cannot escape the claim preclusive effect of the previous arbitral award.
True, if his individual claims against Williams were somehow distinct from
JDLF’s claims against WEB Ventures, perhaps a different result would follow. Then,
the arbitrator’s refusal to hear any of his individual claims (either those that he
actually asserted, like his negligence claim, or those he may have wanted to assert,
like the tortious interference claim here) would mean that he did not have a “full and
fair opportunity” to litigate them. And that in turn would rob the arbitral award of
its claim-preclusive effect as to those claims. See W.J. O’Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bulfinch,

Richardson & Abbott, Inc., 765 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that, under
similar Michigan preclusion law, claim preclusion does not bar the litigation of claims
that were not subject to the previous arbitration). But Davis has failed to show how
his claims here are in fact different in any meaningful sense from JDLF’s claims in
the arbitration. To the contrary, as noted above, he relies on the same alleged facts,
the same alleged duties, the same alleged harms, and the same alleged labels (e.g.,

tortious interference) in support of his claims here as those that JDLF previously
advanced there. So the claims are the same, even though it is Davis who now seeks
to advance them, rather than JDLF. But claim preclusion applies not only to the
parties who participated in the previous litigation, but also their privies. Williams v.
Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., No. 2:25-cv-70, 2026 WL 1615269, at
*4, 6 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2026) (applying claim preclusion to privies). So the distinction
between JDLF and Davis does not matter, rather, only the similarity in claims does,

at least so long as the parties here are in privity with the parties there.
And, as the Court already found, privity in fact exists, both between Davis and
JDLF and between Williams and WEB Ventures. (Doc. 32, #740–41). To briefly recap,
“[w]hat constitutes privity in the context of res judicata is somewhat amorphous.”
Brown v. Dayton, 730 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ohio 2000). But, “[a]s a general matter, privity
is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a party on
the record and another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As particularly relevant here,
privity exists when a party “had the right to control the [earlier] proceedings.” O’Nesti

v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 862 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio 2007) (citation omitted).
Similarly, “[a]n interest in the result of and active participation in the original
lawsuit may also establish privity.” Id.
Here, as the Court found previously, “[w]hile they are distinct legal entities,
Davis is the president of JDLF and, so far as the Court can tell, the only lawyer at
the firm.” (Doc. 32, #741). So while JDLF technically was the party that invoked the

arbitration provision previously and litigated in that forum, Davis was the man
pulling the strings. Davis attempts to disclaim responsibility for the prior litigation
decisions by alleging that he “was not making the arguments and was not responsible
for responding” to opposing counsel. (Doc. 47, #1623). But in the emails Davis
submitted to the Court, his counsel specifically inquired, “Do you want to evaluate
this or should I?” (Doc. 41-1, #1151). That does not suggest that Davis was uninvolved
in JDLF’s litigation strategy. And, in any event, whether he actually exercised control

over the litigation or not, he clearly had the right to control it. As Williams argues,
“[i]t is hard to conceive a relationship more deserving of the moniker ‘privity’ than
that of Jamir Davis and his solo law practice.” (Doc. 44, #1541). So the Court
concludes, again, that there is privity between Davis and JDLF. “To find otherwise
would be to allow the [defendants] to come under constant attack simply by
replenishing the ranks of plaintiffs.” Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962.
So, at bottom, Davis, as a privity of JDLF, is seeking to advance claims against
Williams, who is in privity with WEB Venture, that are identical to claims already
asserted in the arbitration. Claim preclusion bars such efforts. Indeed, if all a party

needed to do to escape such preclusion is change the nominal identity of the person
advancing the claim, or the defendant named in it, claim preclusion would have no
meaningful scope of application at all. That is precisely why the doctrine extends to
those in privity. So claim preclusion bars Davis efforts to (re)assert those claims here.
2. Issue Preclusion Also Bars Four of the Five Claims.

But that is not all. Even if the Court were to find Davis correct as to claim
preclusion, a related route leads Davis to basically the same dead end, at least as to
four of the five claims. As noted, res judicata under Ohio law includes not only claim
preclusion, but also issue preclusion. Issue preclusion “serves to prevent relitigation
of any fact or point that was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a
previous action between the same parties or their privies.” O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at
806. As that description suggests, it applies when three elements are present: (1) the

issue “was actually and directly litigated in the prior action,” (2) “‘a court of competent
jurisdiction’ decided the issue,” and (3) “the party against whom collateral estoppel
[i.e., issue preclusion] is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior
action.” In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 54 F.4th 912, 921
(6th Cir. 2022) (quoting State ex rel. Jefferson v. Russo, 150 N.E.3d 873, 875 (Ohio
2020)). Importantly, unlike claim preclusion, “[i]ssue preclusion applies even if the

causes of action differ.” O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at 806 (citation omitted). That is because
issue preclusion goes to the “fact or point that was determined,” as opposed to the
specific claim at issue in the earlier matter. Id. (emphasis added). The elements of
issue preclusion are present here. The Court takes them in reverse order.

Start with privity. The test for privity in issue preclusion is the same as the
test for privity in claim preclusion. State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret.
Bd., 2008-Ohio-3624, ¶19 (10th Dist.) (stating privity standard for res judicata
generally and citing both claim and issue preclusion cases). So Davis is in privity with
JDLF, and Williams is in privity with WEB Ventures, for the reasons the Court
articulated in its first opinion, (Doc. 32, #740–41), and above.

Next, turn to whether the arbitral forum constituted a “court of competent
jurisdiction” for issue preclusion purposes. True, arbitration does not involve a “court”
per se. But neither party disputes that the arbitrator had authority to decide the
issues before him—i.e., that the arbitrator had jurisdiction.5 And as the Court found
previously (in deciding the similar issue of whether arbitral awards constitute final
decisions on the merits), “federal courts ordinarily give preclusive effect to
arbitrations.” (Doc. 32, #739 (first quoting Cent. Transp., Inc. v. Four Phase Sys., Inc.,

936 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1991); and then citing In re Robinson, 256 B.R. 482, 488
(Bankr. S. D. Ohio 2000))). So the Court concludes this element is met.
Last, turning to whether the same issues were litigated and decided on the
merits, Williams’ original Motion to Dismiss expressly listed all five counts asserted

5 As noted above, see supra note 4, questions perhaps could be raised regarding the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear JDLF’s freestanding negligence claim. But no one raised
them during the arbitration, or indeed even here. And parties are free to commit noncontract
claims to arbitration if they wish.
against her here and pointed to how the arbitrator ruled on the factual predicate for
each. (Doc. 21, #448). For example, Count One here raises a claim for tortious
interference with a prospective business advantage, (Doc. 1-25, #357–58), and the

arbitrator had ruled that, on the facts presented, WEB Ventures did not intentionally
interfere with JDLF’s prospective business advantage, (Doc. 21, #448). But Davis now
asks this Court to decide that same issue based on the same facts, but to reach a
different result. That is also true as to at least three of the other four claims Davis
presses in this suit:
• Unjust Enrichment—the arbitrator ruled in favor of JDLF and held it
entitled to damages of $8,212.50 because, while JDLF did not establish
WEB Ventures would not have received the subcontract from Walsh
Kokosing but for its involvement, it did establish that WEB Ventures
was unjustly enriched by JDLF’s work preparing the bid, (Doc. 21-1,
#462), which are the same theories for the unjust enrichment claim here,
(Doc. 1-25, #359). And Davis provides no explanation for why he would
be entitled to recover twice for the same harm, or as to how Williams
was somehow unjustly enriched apart from WEB Ventures.
• Fraudulent Concealment—the arbitrator specifically credited the
testimony of WEB Ventures’ owners over Davis’s to find that WEB
Ventures did not commit fraud but rather “truly misunderstood” how its
budget from Walsh Kokosing worked, (Doc. 21-1, #462–64), and that is
the same alleged “fraud” for which Davis seeks to hold Williams liable
here, (Doc. 1-25, #360).
• Negligence—the arbitrator determined that there is no duty arising out
of 49 C.F.R. Part 26 because the regulations do not create a private right
of action, (Doc. 21-3, #481), but that same alleged basis for Defendants’
duty is what underlies Davis’s negligence claim here, (Doc. 1-25, #361).
As to each of these claims then, he asks the Court to revisit factual or legal
determinations that the arbitrator directly and necessarily addressed in resolving the
claims before him. So the Court concludes, for at least these four counts, that
Williams has established the relevant issues were actually litigated and decided in
the previous arbitration such that issue preclusion applies.
In his reply, Davis seeks to avoid this by claiming that the Teaming

Agreement, the principal subject of the arbitration, was not the only source of
Williams’ (and really WEB Ventures’) duties to him. (Doc. 47, #1617). Instead, Davis
argues his claims “arise from duties voluntarily undertaken by WEB Ventures and
its employees through their participation in a federally funded DBE compliance,
outreach, inclusion, and utilization program governed by 49 C.F.R. Part 26.” (Id.).
Critically, though, Davis omits that the arbitrator addressed this question of law

already, too, and did so without any objection from Davis as to the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction to consider it. Specifically, in deciding whether JDLF could pursue a
negligence claim based on that alleged duty, the arbitrator found “there is no
indication that … Congress intended to create a private right of action for individuals
seeking to enforce [these] provisions of the law.” (Doc. 21-3, #481 (quoting Richmond
Transp., Inc. v. Departmental Off. of C.R. of the U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 11-13771,
2013 WL 425357, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2013))). And that no-private-right-of-action

finding demonstrates that the issue was actually litigated and decided previously,
such that issue preclusion applies.
True, all of that leaves the intentional misrepresentation claim untouched.
Issue preclusion does not come to bear as to that claim because, in ruling against
JDLF in the arbitration, the arbitrator determined that, as a matter of law, a
negligent representation claim cannot be based on “a party’s intent to perform a
promise.” (See Doc. 21-3, #481–82 (citing GPH Louisville Hill Creek LLC v. Redwood
Holdings, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-63, 2022 WL 855292, at *11 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2022))).
That legal proposition does not necessarily apply to intentional misrepresentation

claims. See PCR Contractors, Inc. v. Danial, 354 S.W.3d 613–17 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).
So the factual or legal basis for the intentional misrepresentation claim was not
actually litigated in the earlier arbitration such that issue preclusion would apply.
But as to that claim, as already discussed above, claim preclusion applies as it arose
out of the same facts and JDLF could have advanced it in arbitration—it just chose
not to do so.

In sum, claim preclusion bars all five of Davis’s claims, and issue preclusion
separately ends up dooming four of them. So, even after reviewing the matter anew,
the Court finds that Davis’s claims against Williams here must be dismissed with
prejudice on res judicata grounds.
C. The Court Denies the Motion to Amend.
Davis concludes his reconsideration motion by also requesting leave to amend.

(Doc. 39, #783). As noted above, the claims that Davis has advanced against Williams
to date are still precluded, so he cannot replead those. Davis also states that he wishes
to add WEB Ventures as a party here. The Court’s preclusion analysis, however,
applies just as much, if not more so, to WEB Ventures directly. So the Court finds
that any attempt to add WEB Ventures is likely futile. That said, the Court extended
Davis and JDLF an opportunity to file a new motion to amend, (see 6/22/26 Min. Entry

& Order), which they have done, (Doc. 51). So to the extent Davis wishes to remedy
any other deficiencies identified in the Court’s previous Opinion & Order, or advance
claims based on theories not already litigated in the arbitration, the Court will review
such attempts in connection with that motion.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Davis’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 39).
SO ORDERED.

July 6, 2026
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384208. Public record. Not legal advice.