# Walker

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · July 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384177

## Case

- **Full name:** Sallie Walker v. Jackson Parish Correctional Center
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

SALLIE WALKER CASE NO. 3:25-CV-00339

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

JACKSON PARISH CORRECTIONAL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.
CENTER MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 23]
filed by Defendant, Jackson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”). Plaintiff, Sallie
Walker (“Walker”), opposes the Motion [Doc. No. 28]. JPCC filed a reply [Doc. No. 29],
and Walker filed a Sur-reply [Doc. No. 32].
After carefully considering parties’ filings and applicable law, the Motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Background
This is an employment discrimination case. JPCC hired Walker on May 30,
2008, as a deputy and corrections/detention officer.1 Walker worked for JPCC for
about fourteen and a half years before her discharge.2 On March 16, 2022, Walker’s
supervisor, Sergeant Lowring (“Lowring”), struck Walker in both arms during work
hours.3 Walker reported the assault to another supervisor, Lieutenant Jordan
(“Jordan”), the same day.4 JPCC then conducted its own internal investigation and

1 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 6].
2 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5].
3 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 66, 69]
4 [Id. at p. 66].
confirmed Lowring struck Walker and twice shook her chair while she sat on it.5 The
assault injured Walker, resulting in “adhesive capsulitis of [her] right shoulder.”6
Upon completing its investigation, JPCC fired Lowring on March 23 2022.7 On

February 13, 2023, Lowring pled guilty to simple battery for assaulting Walker and
received two years of probation.8
Following the assault, Walker’s physician placed her on medical leave under
the Family Medical and Leave Act (“FMLA”) due to her shoulder injury.9 Walker
claims she began FMLA leave on November 3, 2022.10 Yet the record reflects that
Walker’s FMLA leave started on November 16, 2022.11 Walker continued treating her
injury during her FMLA leave and did not physically return to work except when she

brought excuses from her treating physician. 12 On December 7, 2022, Walker brought
in an excuse that excused her from work for eight more weeks, through February 1,
2023.13 A month later, on January 17, 2023, Walker brought in another excuse that
sought to excuse her from work for six more weeks, through February 28, 2023.14 It
is unclear from the record whether JPCC accepted either excuse as an FMLA
extension. According to JPCC, Walker’s FMLA leave exhausted on or about January

31, 2023.15

5 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 69].
6 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 5].
7 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 67, 69].
8 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 28]; [Doc. No. 28 p. 10]. Neither party disputes that the assault occurred.
9 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 27].
10 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11].
11 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 33, 36].
12 [Id. at pp. 33, 38]; [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].
13 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].
14 [Doc. No. 28, p. 4]; [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 38].
15 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 33].
On February 6, 2023, JPCC sent Walker a letter, informing her that she
exhausted all of her FMLA leave.16 They also advised her that they could consider
giving her further extended leave under the Americans with Disabilities Act

reasonable accommodations if she provided additional medical information.17 JPCC
further stated in the letter that if Walker did not respond to the letter by February
21, 2023, they would have to separate her employment.18 Walker received this letter
on February 6, 2023, but did not respond.19
The record reflects the parties’ dispute the exact date of Walker’s discharge.
Walker claims JPCC fired her on February 22, 2023, one day after JPCC’s response
deadline and the day she received notice of termination from JPCC.20 The Louisiana

Workforce Commission’s Notice of Separation also lists Walker’s “Date of Separation”
as February 22, 2023,21 as does JPCC’s employee status change report.22 JPCC,
however, claims they fired Walker the following day on February 23, 2023.23
JPCC gave multiple reasons for Walker’s discharge. The first reason was that
Walker “[exhausted] all FMLA [leave]” and she did not respond to the ultimatum
letter sent on February 6, 2023.24 The next day, JPCC listed, in its own employee

status change report, that they fired Walker for “[e]xcessive absence/ [tardiness].”25

16 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 6].
17 [Doc. No. 28, p. 13]; [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 40, 49].
18 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 40].
19 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 41].
20 [Doc. No. 28, p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].
21 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 58].
22 [Id. at p. 61].
23 [Id. at p. 57].
24 [Id. at p. 58].
25 [Id. at p. 61].
On November 2, 2023, Walker filed a charge of race discrimination, retaliation,
harassment, and other forms of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).26 Then, on March 18, 2025, Walker filed suit in

this Court, alleging state and federal claims.27 The EEOC issued Walker a right-to-
sue notice in April 2025, about a month after she filed this suit.28
The parties briefed all relevant issues, and the matter is ripe.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
A court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If the movant meets their initial burden of
showing no genuine issue of material fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine
issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d
703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). A fact is “material” when proof of its
existence or nonexistence would affect the lawsuit’s outcome under applicable law in
the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words,
“the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48. And a dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

26 [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].
27 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 7].
28 [Doc. No. 23-5, p. 1].
While courts will “resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving
party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both parties have submitted evidence
of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

But summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is “merely colorable or is
not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (1986) (citation modified).
Moreover, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v.
Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Courts “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving

party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434
(5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Finally—and importantly—there can be no genuine dispute as to a material
fact when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof of trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

B. Analysis
Walker’s complaint brings multiple claims under different theories. The Court
analyzes the claims as follows: first, the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law-
based state law claim; second, the racial discrimination claims based on two theories
(failure to promote and termination); third, the hostile work environment claim; and
fourth, the retaliation claims under two theories (Title VII and FMLA).
1. Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law
Claims under Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”) are
subject to a one-year prescriptive period. La. Stat. Ann. § 23.303(D). As an exception,

the statute suspends prescription during the pendency of an administrative review
or investigation before the EEOC or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights,
but for no more than six months. Id. Thus, a plaintiff has up to eighteen months from
the date of the last alleged discriminatory act to file a claim under the LEDL. O’Neal
v. Cargill, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 408, 417 (E.D. La. 2016). Walker does not dispute
JPCC’s request to dismiss her LEDL claim for being untimely.29 Nevertheless,
applying § 23.303(D), the Court finds Walker’s LEDL claim is untimely and has

therefore prescribed.
Walker claims the last discriminatory act she faced occurred when JPCC
discharged her on or about February 22, 2023.30 But Walker did not file this action
until March 18, 2025—almost twenty-five months from the date of discharge and—
far beyond the one-year prescriptive period.31 Even if Walker’s EEOC filing
suspended the prescriptive period for six months, she still had to file her suit on or

before August 22, 2024, to not exceed the eighteen months allotted. She did not. Thus,
Walker’s LEDL claim has prescribed no matter what.
Walker’s claim is not only untimely, but there is also the question of whether
this claim was ever properly pled. Walker only references LEDL once in her first

29 [Doc. No. 28, p. 1].
30 [Id. at p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].
31 [Doc. No. 23.1, p. 7].
amended complaint’s jurisdictional statement.32 Because the claim does not appear
in any of Walker’s substantive pleadings, the Court finds that this strongly suggests
the claim was not properly pled.

Nonetheless, the Court need not decide the pleading issue because the claim is
certainly time-barred. JPCC’s Motion is therefore GRANTED as to Walker’s claim
of discriminatory discharge under the LEDL.
2. Title VII – Racial Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits workplace discrimination
based on protected characteristics, including race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. When a
discrimination claim relies on circumstantial evidence, courts may use the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework. Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir.
2021); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).
Walker argues, and the Court analyzes, her discrimination claim under two
theories: (1) Walker claims that she was denied a permanent position within the
booking department based on her race,33 and (2) that she was discriminatorily
discharged based on her race.34

a. Failure to Promote Based on Race
Walker argues that JPCC discriminated against her by denying her a position
within the booking department, despite her being more qualified than the woman
who received the position.35 She further asserts that the only difference between the

32 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 23].
33 [Id. at pp. 24, 28].
34 [Id. at p. 24].
35 [Id.].
less qualified selectee and herself was their skin color.36 JPCC responds that even
assuming that the alleged denial occurred, the claim is untimely.37 The Court agrees
with JPCC that Walker’s failure to promote claim fails for two reasons. First, Walker

never applied for the booking position, so she suffered no adverse employment action.
Second, even if a denial occurred, the claim is untimely.
Walker must satisfy two federal deadlines to bring her claim under Title VII
in Louisiana. First, Walker must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(1); EEOC v.
Council for Advancement of Soc. Servs. & Educ., 753 F. Supp. 3d 507, 512 (W.D. La.
2024). Second, Walker must file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A
Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). A failure to promote is a discrete act,
so the 300-day period runs from the date the promotion is denied. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 102–03 (2002).
Here, Walker concedes, in her deposition, that she never applied for the open
booking position.38 Thus, the Court finds that Walker was not denied the booking

position because she never applied for it. Even if the denial occurred, however,
Walker testified during her deposition that this incident occurred prior to 2020.39
Walker did not file her EEOC claim until November 2, 2023, three years after the

36 [Id.].
37 [Doc. No. 23-1, pp. 7–8].
38 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 11]; Walker confirms in her deposition that although she spoke to the head of the
booking department about the position, she never went through “proper procedure” to apply.
39 [Id. at pp. 11–12]; When asked by counsel about incident and if it was “[within] the last few years,
like ’20-’22,” Walker responded by clearly stating “[it] was before.”
alleged event.40 Since she filed her EEOC claim more than 300 days after the incident
occurred, it is untimely. Because the claim is time-barred, the Court does not address
the merits of her claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Walker also argues that the promotion denials are admissible as “background
evidence” in support of her hostile work environment claim, but that is misplaced.41
“The admissibility of past employment practices is an” evidentiary issue that is
“better addressed through motions in limine.” See Xu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Fla.,
833 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1345 n.2 (N.D. Fla. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis
v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court
does not address this issue further.

Therefore, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim of failure to
promote based on race.
b. Termination Based on Race
Walker claims that JPCC discharged her employment due to her race as a
black woman.42 Walker also claims her white supervisors treated her unfairly and
that “white employees were selected for advancement and key assignments over black

employees.”43 JPCC argues that Walker cannot establish a prima facie case because
she offers no competent evidence that race caused her discharge, and that they
terminated Walker’s employment because she “was unable to do her job after FMLA

40 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5]; [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].
41 [Doc. No. 28, p. 22].
42 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 24].
43 [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 10].
leave.”44 The Court agrees with JPCC that has Walker failed to establish a prima
facie case showing discriminatory discharge based on race.
Walker relies on circumstantial evidence for this claim, so the McDonnell

Douglas framework governs. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04. Walker must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Turner, 476 F.3d 337, 345. To do
so, Walker must show: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for
the position at issue; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she
was replaced by someone outside of the protected class, OR was treated less favorably
than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group. Ayorinde v.
Team Indus. Servs. Inc., 121 F.4th 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2024).

Applying this standard to the facts here, Walker satisfies the first three
elements. She belongs to a protected class as a black woman.45 She shows she is
qualified for her position based on her fifteen years of work experience at JPCC, and
she suffered an adverse employment action when she was discharged on February
23, 2023.46 The fourth element is where Walker’s claim fails. Because Walker does
not claim anyone outside of her protected class took her position as a correctional

officer, she must satisfy the second prong of the fourth element by establishing
someone who was similarly situated and outside of her protected class was treated
more favorably than her when under “nearly identical circumstances.” Id.; Lee v.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d. 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit

44 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 13]; [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].
45 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 28].
46 [Doc. No. 28, p. 6].
holds that employees are “similarly situated” when they: (1) hold the same job or
responsibilities, (2) share the same supervisor or have their employment status
determined by the same person, and (3) have essentially comparable violation

histories. Id.; see West v. City of Houston, Texas, 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020).
On this record, Walker has failed to identify any employee who is similarly
situated to her. Walker points to Jordan, her white supervisor, as a comparator, but
the Court finds that showing unpersuasive.47 Walker was a correctional officer and
had different jobs or responsibilities from her supervisor, Jordan.48 Additionally, their
conduct is not “nearly identical.” West, 960 F.3d at 740. JPCC asserts that Walker
was discharged because she failed to do her job after exhausting medical leave.49 If

JPCC fired Jordan, it would be due to his failure to supervise, not for his failure to
complete the job as a corrections officer. Finally, there is nothing in the record to
support that either party had similar violation histories. Because Walker failed to
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the Court need not address
the rest of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
For these reasons, the Court finds Jordan is not a similarly situated

comparator to Walker. Because Walker fails to identify a similarly situated
comparator outside of her protected class, she fails to meet her initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case. Therefore, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to
Walker’s claim of race-based discriminatory discharge.

47 [Id. at p. 17].
48 [Id. at p. 22].
49 [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].
3. Title VII – Hostile Work Environment
Walker alleges that she faced a hostile work environment at JPCC when
Lowring assaulted her in March 2022, and subsequent retaliatory ostracism by her

coworkers after she reported said assault.50 JPCC argues that Walker’s claim is time-
barred for two reasons: (1) she lacks competent evidence that her EEOC charge was
timely, and (2) the continuing violation doctrine cannot salvage her claim because she
fails to identify an act of harassment within the 300-day statutory window.51 Walker
responds that her claim is timely under the continuing violation doctrine.52
For Walker’s hostile work environment claim to survive summary judgment,
she must show (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she received unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to
take prompt remedial action. Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th, 422,
433 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)).
The Court need not decide if Walker has come forward with sufficient evidence

that the alleged ostracism occurred. Rather, assuming that the alleged ostracism
occurred, Walker’s claim fails on two independent grounds: (1) Walker’s EEOC charge
was untimely, and (2) the continuing violations doctrine does not save the claim
because the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive.

50 [Doc. No. 28, pp. 10, 11, 20].
51 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 8]; [Doc. No. 29, p. 2].
52 [Doc. No. 28, p. 19].
a. Walker’s EEOC charge was untimely
Before filing a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must file a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Walker filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC on November 2, 2023.
To be timely, Walker had to file the charge within 300 days of any act that contributed
to the hostile work environment. EEOC v. WC&M Enterprise, Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 398
(5th Cir. 2007). Counting back 300 days from the date of filing, only acts on or after
January 6, 2023, fall within that period. Walker does not dispute that the March 16,
2022, assault falls outside of this window, as it happened about twenty months prior

to Walker filing her EEOC charge.53 Standing alone, the assault cannot render the
charge timely, as it is years outside of the 300-day window. Walker’s claim only
survives if the continuing violation doctrine applies.
b. The continuing violation doctrine does not save
Walker’s claim because the alleged retaliatory
ostracism was not severe or pervasive.
Walker claims she is saved under the continuing violation doctrine because, in
addition the assault, she faced she faced retaliatory ostracism from coworkers from
“March 2022 through early 2023.”54 JPCC argues that Walker fails to save her claim
through the continuing violation doctrine because she has no evidence of an act of
harassment taking place within the standard 300-day window.55 The Court disagrees

53 [Doc. No. 28, p. 20]; [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5]; [Doc. No. 28, p. 6].
54 [Doc. No. 28, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 6].
55 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 8].
with Walker that the continuing violation doctrine makes the entire course of conduct
actionable, including both the March 2022 incident and the alleged retaliatory
ostracism56

To save a hostile work environment claim under the continuing violation
doctrine, Walker must: 1) file an EEOC charge within 300 days of any action that
contributed to the hostile work environment, and (2) if this requirement is met, then
the court may consider all acts alleged to have contributed to the hostile environment,
even those outside the 300-day period. WC&M, 496 F.3d at 398 (citing Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 535 U.S. at 117, 122.) The doctrine does not lower the substantive
threshold of a hostile work environment claim. The conduct must still be severe or

pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work
environment. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 433. This determination is fact-intensive and
considers the totality of the circumstances, including the conduct’s frequency,
severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it
unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance. Id. Isolated incidents,
unless extremely serious, are not of the kind of harassment that alters the terms and

conditions of employment. Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th
990, 1003 (5th Cir. 2022).
Here, only the alleged retaliatory ostracism could potentially fall within the
300-day window. Walker contends that her coworkers excluded her and occasionally-
made disparaging comments that she was “faking [her injury]” and was “not really

56 [Doc. No. 28, p. 18].
hurt.”57 Even crediting this testimony, such behavior amounts at most to “simple
teasing,” and “offhand comments,” that are “isolated incidents,” which do not arise to
the level of harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and

conditions of employment to create an abusive working environment, unless
extremely serious. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 433. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
continuing violation doctrine does not save the claim because the alleged retaliatory
ostracism fails to reach the level of severity or pervasiveness needed to alter the
conditions of her employment to create an abusive working environment.58 Id.
The record further shows that much of the alleged retaliatory ostracism
occurred while Walker was on her FMLA leave and largely absent from JPCC. Walker

began FMLA leave in November 2022, and did not return to JPCC, except for
sporadic, brief visits to JPCC’s human resources department to drop off doctor’s
excuses.59 The type of harassment Walker describes is not severe or pervasive enough
to interfere with someone’s employment, especially when they are not working in or
regularly exposed to the workplace environment.60 See Kurth v. Gonzales, 472 F.
Supp. 2d 874, 883 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing that harassment outside the

workplace may be actionable but rejecting hostile work environment theories where
plaintiff was on extended leave such that there was “no existing work environment”);
see also Oliver v. Roehm Am., LLC, No. 21-CV-1831, 2022 WL 11763644, at *15 (E.D.
La. Oct. 20, 2022) (dismissing a hostile work environment claim at the pleading stage

57 [Id.].
58 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].
59 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 6].
60 [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].
where alleged conduct could not have interfered with work performance because
plaintiff was on FMLA leave).
Therefore, the Court finds Walker’s hostile work environment claim

unavailing. It is not only untimely but the alleged acts are also not severe or
pervasive. Walker has not provided sufficient evidence to meet her burden of making
a prima facie case. Accordingly, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim of
a hostile work environment.
4. Retaliation
Retaliation claims under both Title VII and the FMLA are analyzed using the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when a plaintiff’s claims are based

on circumstantial evidence. Wheat v. Florida. Par. Juvenile Justice Comm’n, 811 F.3d
702, 705 (5th Cir. 2016); see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04.
McDonnell Douglas provides a three-step framework used for analyzing
retaliation claims. First, Walker must establish a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020). The
requirements of a prima facie case vary depending on the type of claim that is being

brought. Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004). If Walker establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the JPCC to rebut the presumption by giving a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Brown, 969 F.3d at 577.
Finally, if JPCC makes this showing, the burden shifts again to Walker to prove that
the proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Walker advances two retaliation theories: (1) retaliatory discharge under Title
VII for engaging in protected activity by reporting assault by her supervisor; and (2)
retaliatory discharge under the FMLA based on protected activity by taking leave

under the FMLA.61 The Court analyzes each in turn.
a. Title VII Retaliation
Title VII “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in a Title
VII proceeding or investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Ladner v. Walmart, 834 F.
App’x. 893, 895–96 (5th Cir. 2020). Because Walker relies on circumstantial evidence,
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework governs. Ladner, 834 F. App’x. at

896.
To establish a prima facie case, Walker must show: (1) she engaged in a
protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) a
causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Wright v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). Walker contends
that she faced “unlawful retaliation” for reporting discriminatory conduct she faced

during work hours.62 JPCC argues that Walker cannot meet her prima facie case, as
she cannot establish a causal link because she cannot show close temporal proximity
between the adverse action and protected activity.63 Thus, there is no dispute from
either party that Walker engaged in a protected activity or suffered an adverse action.

61 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 29, 30].
62 [Id. at p. 29].
63 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].
Rather, the claim turns on the third element, whether there is a sufficient causal
link between the report of the assault and the discharge.64
Here, Walker was discharged from JPCC on or around February 22, 2023,

approximately eleven months after reporting the March 2022 assault to her
supervisors.65 JPCC claims that this gap of eleven months is “too long to sustain a
prima facie claim of causation based solely on temporal proximity.”66 JPCC cites
Ganheart v. Brown, to argue that a five month interval between the protected activity
and adverse employment action is too long of a period to show a causal link solely on
temporal proximity. See 740 F. App’x. 386, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2018). At the prima facie
stage, temporal proximity can support an inference of causation, but only when the

timing between the protected activity and adverse employment action is “very close”
and connected to the “decisionmaker’s knowledge of the protected activity.” Clark
County. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam); Thompson v.
Somervell Cnty., Tex., 431 Fed. App’x. 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2011).
The Court finds that even assuming JPCC knew that Walker reported the
assault, the eleven-month lapse is far outside the “very close” temporal proximity

required to establish a causal link on its own. See Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964
F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding a five-month gap is insufficient to establish a
causal link based on timing alone); Ganheart, 740 Fed. App’x. at 391 (same); Brown
v. AT&T Servs. Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding a seven-

64 [Id. at p. 13].
65 [Doc. No. 28, p. 7].
66 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].
month gap is insufficient to show a causal link based on timing alone). Since the Fifth
Circuit repeatedly finds gaps of five to seven months too remote to support causation,
Walker’s eleven-month gap cannot, by itself, establish the required causal link.

In such cases, the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff point to other evidence of
a causal link to consider in addition to temporal proximity, such as employment
records that do not support dismissal, or an employer’s departure from typical policies
and procedures. Feist v. Louisiana, Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d
450, 454–55 (5th Cir. 2013). Walker fails to make this showing as she did not point
any additional evidence for the Court to consider. While Walker makes this argument
to support her FMLA retaliation claim, she does not make such an argument (or any

argument) for her Title VII retaliation claim.67
The Court notes that Walker failed to effectively argue this claim due to poor
briefing, as her first amended complaint only mentioned Title VII once in the
jurisdictional statement. The Court reached the above conclusion after scouring
through the record. Nonetheless, the Court agrees with JPCC that Walker failed to
establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, so the remaining steps of

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework are not applicable and do not need to
be addressed further. Accordingly, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim
of Title VII retaliation.

67 [Doc. No. 28, p. 25].
b. FMLA
The FMLA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
exercise their FMLA rights. Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 527 (5th

Cir. 2021) (citing Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574,
580 (5th Cir. 2006). Because Walker relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework governs. Campos, 10 F.4th at 527.
To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, Walker must show: (1) she
was engaged in a protected activity under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) she was treated less favorably than an employee who had
not requested leave under the FMLA OR the adverse decision was made because she

sought protection under the FMLA. Id. If Walker makes this showing, the burden
shifts to JPCC to offer a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Houston v. Texas Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 582 (5th Cir.
2021). If JPCC gives such reasons, the burden shifts back to Walker to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that JPCC’s stated reason is pretext for retaliation.
Id.

Walker contends that JPCC discharged her for “[failing] to return to work,”
even though her medical team had not authorized her to do so.68 JPCC responds that
Walker cannot establish a prima facie case, nor can she establish that the reason for
discharge was pretext for retaliation.69 The Court disagrees.

68 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 30].
69 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].
The Court finds that Walker can establish a prima facie case of FMLA
retaliation. Walker satisfies the first two elements of her prima facie case: she
engaged in protective activity under the FMLA (taking leave due to her shoulder

injury) and suffered an adverse employment action when JPCC discharged her on or
around February 22, 2023.70 The dispute centers on the second prong of the third
element. Because the record contains no evidence of similarly situated employees who
requested FMLA leave, the Court considers whether the discharge occurred because
Walker sought protection under the FMLA. Campos, 10 F.4th at 527.
Causation may be inferred from temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the adverse action, but only when the timing is “very close” and the

relevant decisionmaker knew of the protected activity. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273;
Thompson, 431 Fed. App’x. at 342. Here, the timing of Walker’s discharge in relation
to her FMLA leave, together with JPCC’s knowledge of the FMLA leave, supports an
inference of causation at the prima facie stage.
The record reflects that Walker began FMLA leave on November 16, 2022,71
and JPCC fired her on February 22, 2023.72 Although the FMLA generally provides

eligible employees up to twelve workweeks of leave, Mauder, 446 F.3d at 579,
Walker’s physician certified her leave until or around January 31, 2023, regardless
of when she started.73 Walker’s termination occurred approximately one month after

70 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 33]; [Doc. No. 28, p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].
71 Although Walker claims she start FMLA on November 3, 2022, the record unequivocally shows she
started FMLA leave on November 16, 2022. [Doc. No. 28, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 33, 36].
72 [Doc. No. 28, p. 4]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].
73 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 34, 36].
her certified FMLA leave ended. This very close temporal proximity is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case under Campos, where the Fifth Circuit held an adverse
action occurring about one month after FMLA leave expired was sufficiently close in

time to create a causal link. Campos, 10 F.4th at 528. The burden therefore shifts to
JPCC to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the discharge. Id.
Even assuming JPCC meets that burden, the Court finds evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that an
employer’s shifting or post hoc explanations for discharge can support an inference of
pretext. See Campos, 10 F.4th at 530 (holding an employer’s shifting reasons for
termination created an inference for pretext”); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor,

Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 238 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding employers’ explanations for discharge
postdating the decision are “potentially manufactured”).
Here, the record shows that JPCC gave various reasons for Walker’s discharge.
First, Walker’s Termination Information sheet, dated February 23, 2023, lists
“[e]xcessive absence/[tardiness].”74 Second, JPCC’s Separation Notice to the
Louisiana Workforce Commission states that Walker “exhausted all FMLA” and did

not respond to JPCC’s February 6, 2023, letter, which they sent by certified mail and
which Walker received on February 7, 2023.75 Third, JPCC’s reply brief asserts
Walker was discharged because she “remained unable to do her job after exhausting
FMLA leave,”76 a reason that does not appear outside this Motion. These shifting

74 [Id. at p. 62].
75 [Id. at p. 58].
76 [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].
reasons for Walker’s discharge create a genuine dispute of fact over JPCC’s true
rationale for firing Walker.
While JPCC may argue that its stated reasons are merely variations on the

same theme, the Court cannot weigh that characterization. Campos, 10 F.4th at 530.
The record reflects multiple, differing explanations for Walker’s termination, and
under Campos, such inconsistencies create “ample fact questions for consideration.”
Id. Accordingly, the record shows a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext.
Therefore, the Court finds Walker has established a prima facie case of FMLA
retaliation. Although JPCC offers seemingly legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for
firing Walker, their reasons are shifting and are post hoc explanations that suggests

pretext. As such, JPCC’s Motion is DENIED as to Walker’s FMLA retaliation claim.
III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s

Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim under the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s
Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s Title VII-based race discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation claims, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JPCC’s Motion is DENIED as to Walker’s
claim for retaliation under the FMLA.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 6th day of July 2026

TERRY A. Dour ry/
U D STATES DISTRICT JUD

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11384177. Public record. Not legal advice.