# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · May 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11383707

## Case

- **Full name:** Nigel Albert Marin v. California Department of Rehabilitation
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** May 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 NIGEL ALBERT MARIN, Case No. 1:26-cv-03774 JLT FJS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
13 v.
(Doc. 3)
14 California Department of Rehabilitation,

15 Defendant.
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17 I. INTRODUCTION
18 Nigel Albert Marin brings this action against the California Department of Rehabilitation,
19 alleging that DOR has failed to provide “legally mandated vocational rehabilitation services to
20 Plaintiff—a qualified individual with a disability” and that those failures have “cascaded,
21 predictably and preventably, into Plaintiff’s current homelessness, complete depletion of his
22 Social Security Disability Income, and imminent irreversible harm to his ability to sit for and pass
23 the July 28, 2026 California Bar Examination.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) Mr. Marin alleges that DOR issued
24 him an Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE) that identifies the vocational goal of passing
25 the California Bar Exam and obtaining licensure as a California attorney. (Id. at 4.)
26 Apparently, Mr. Marin challenged some aspects of his IPE (or the services DOR
27 determined were appropriate to provide under the IPE) in 2025, because the Complaint discusses
28 a December 2025 decision by an administrative law judge. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ
1 did not address certain issues he raised and/or improperly declined to order all the relief he
2 requested. (Id.)
3 Mr. Marin alleges that he was registered for the February 2026 California Bar Exam, but
4 that DOR failed to timely arrange for “compliant” hotel accommodations for that exam. (Id. at 6.)
5 As a result of that logistical problem as well as problems Plaintiff experienced with the ExamSoft
6 software for the exam, Plaintiff did not appear for the February 2026 examination. (Id.) Plaintiff
7 also complains that DOR improperly denied him: (1) a “high performance” laptop that he
8 required for his vocational workload (id. at 6–7); and (2) access (presumably at DOR expense) to
9 an “adequate office and study space during the February 2026 bar examination preparation
10 period, including securement of hotel accommodations during examination periods and . . .
11 workspace funding sufficient to support Plaintiff’s appellate practice and bar preparation
12 simultaneously.” (Id. at 7.)
13 In mid-April 2026, Plaintiff submitted a DOR Fair Hearing Request encompassing the
14 following issues: (1) DOR’s refusal to reimburse him for the laptop of his choice; (2) DOR’s
15 failure to arrange accommodations for the February 2026 bar exam; (3) “ADA Title II structural
16 inaccessibility in DOR’s service delivery model”; (4) DOR’s refusal to secure office and study
17 space for him; (5) “detrimental reliance and housing harm”; (6) “ongoing financial harm from
18 accommodation failures”; and (7) “judicial avoidance” by the ALJ who issued the December
19 2025 decision. (Id. at 5.)
20 Plaintiff contends that “as a direct and proximate result of the cascading failures described
21 above” he lost his housing and is now sleeping in his vehicle. (Id. at 7–8.) The Complaint
22 includes calculated “displacement costs” in the amount of $11,229.13 plus $306 in parking costs,
23 which Plaintiff estimates will cover his subsistence needs from May 1, 2026 through the July 28,
24 2026 bar examination. (Id. at 10.)
25 The first cause of action in the Complaint alleges that DOR violated § 504 of the
26 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by failing to provide Plaintiff with the services described
27 above; declining to “fund the documented displacement costs resulting from those failures”; and
28 failing to provide a meaningful hearing. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The second cause of action asserts a claim
1 under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, for DOR’s failure to
2 provide Plaintiff reasonable accommodations “necessary for Plaintiff’s meaningful participation
3 in the [Vocational Rehabilitation] program” based upon the denials discussed above. (Doc. 1 at
4 12.) The third cause of action advances a claim under California Welfare and Institutions Code
5 § 19000 et seq., based upon DOR’s failure to provide services necessary to achieve his
6 individualized vocational goal. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his procedural and substantive
7 Due Process rights have been violated. (Id. at 13.)
8 On May 18, 2026, the same day he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed an emergency
9 application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 3.) Therein Mr.
10 Marin requests that the Court order DOR to “immediately authorize and disburse subsistence
11 funding totaling $11,229.13 (plus $306 in monthly parking permits).” (Id. at 1.) For the reasons
12 set forth below, the motion for injunctive relief is DENIED.
13 II. STANDARD OF DECISION
14 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for
15 issuing a preliminary injunction. R.F. by Frankel v. Delano Union Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 3d
16 979, 987 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of
17 right.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). As such, the Court may only
18 grant such relief “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. To
19 prevail, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood
20 that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief; (3) that the
21 balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that preliminary injunctive relief is in
22 the public interest. Id. Local Rule 231 governs the filing of requests for TROs in this District.
23 A preliminary injunction “can take two forms,” either a “prohibitory injunction” or a
24 “mandatory injunction.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d
25 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). A “prohibitory injunction” simply “preserve[s] the status quo
26 pending a determination of the action on the merits,” while a “mandatory injunction” “orders a
27 responsible party to take action.” Id. (quotation omitted). In the context of injunctive relief, “[t]he
28 status quo means the last, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Garcia v.
1 Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Mandatory
2 injunctions are “particularly disfavored,” and a plaintiff’s burden is “doubly demanding” when
3 seeking one. Id. “In general, mandatory injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious
4 damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 879
5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, in seeking a mandatory injunction,
6 plaintiffs must “establish that the law and facts clearly favor” their position. Garcia, 786 F.3d at
7 740 (emphasis in original). The nature of the relief sought here—an order requiring action in the
8 form of payments by the Defendants—triggers the heightened mandatory injunction standard.
9 III. ANALYSIS
10 Plaintiff’s motion must be denied because the Court is unable to find likelihood of success
11 on the merits, let alone that “the law and facts clearly favor” Plaintiff.
12 First, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his Due Process claim because there is no private right
13 of action under the Due Process Clause. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704,
14 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States
15 Constitution.”). Instead, “a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize
16 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not attempt to frame his Due Process
17 claim as one arising under § 1983 and he cannot do so. This is because the only named defendant,
18 DOR, is an agency of the State of California and therefore is immune from a suit for damages
19 under § 1983. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Catham County, Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006); see also
20 Lett v. California Dep’t of Rehab., No. 2:12-CV-2265 MCE GGH, 2012 WL 5880440, at *3
21 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) (“The California Department of Rehabilitation cannot be sued for
22 damages in federal court because of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
23 As for Plaintiffs’ other federal claims arising under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the
24 Court has serious doubts as to their viability. Plaintiff’s complaint focuses on services that DOR
25 has refused to provide as part of his IPE. However, to make out a claim under the ADA, Mr.
26 Marin must allege facts to support a plausible inference that “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with
27 a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public
28 entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
1 entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his
2 disability.” Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
3 Similarly, Section 504 requires allegations that suggest Mr. Marin was prevented from enjoying
4 “‘meaningful access’ to a benefit because of [his] disability.” Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922,
5 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.
6 2002) (to establish Rehabilitation Act violation a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he
7 was “denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his disability]”).
8 The difficulty here is that Plaintiff is attempting to bring these claims against DOR for
9 administering a program that is only available to individuals with disabilities, and it remains
10 unclear what, if any, program benefit Mr. Martin has been denied due to his disability. For
11 example, in Avila v. California, No. 8:19-00613 JVS (ADS), 2021 WL 518710, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
12 Jan. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted No. 8:19-00613 JVS (ADS), 2021 WL
13 515385, *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), the plaintiff alleged that DOR denied him Vocational
14 Rehabilitation Services to attend law school “because he took 20 years to complete a Masters
15 Degree because he is disabled.” Even that allegation was insufficient to survive a motion to
16 dismiss because the record revealed multiple, nondiscriminatory reasons existed for DOR’s
17 decision not to fund law school for the Plaintiff. Id; see also Wildey v. California, No. 07CV1154
18 JM (JMA), 2010 WL 1031211, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (refusing to find an ADA or
19 Rehabilitation Act violation for DOR employee who participated in vocational training program
20 that was only available to disabled individuals, but separately evaluating whether the vocational
21 training program provider reasonably accommodated employee’s disability by providing a
22 flexible schedule).
23 Unlike in Avila, the present allegations provide absolutely no insight into how DOR’s
24 decisions to deny Mr. Marin’s requests for benefits were “because of” a disability. For one thing,
25 the Complaint does not attach a copy of any decision from DOR about his benefits. Nor is it
26 apparent on this record why Mr. Marin’s disability would have factored into DOR’s
27 determination that it is inappropriate to purchase Mr. Marin a performance laptop or provide him
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1 | with a subsistence stipend for the period from May 1 through July 28.!
2 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s “written admission” eliminates any core factual dispute
3 | and renders his success “near-certain.” (Doc. 3 at 3-4.) But the written admission to which
4 | Plaintiff refers (see Doc. 3 at 4, 11) is a May 11, 2026 email from his DOR Counselor that
5 || appears to indicate DOR plans to pay for Plaintiff's food, hotel, and travel accommodations
6 | during the July 2026 bar exam itself. (Doc. 1 at 16.) This email confirms DOR’s willingness to
7 | provide a benefit that is not in dispute; it does not justify a finding that Plaintiff entitled to the
8 | additional benefits and payments he demands as part of this request for injunctive relief.
9 For these reasons, the Court cannot find likelihood of success on the merits. Thus, the
10 | request for injunctive relief (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
1]
D IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 Dated: _ May 20, 2026 Cerin | Tower
TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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27 ' Though the Complaint also contains a state law claim arising under California Welfare and Institutions Code
28 § 19000, Plaintiff does not mention that claim in his TRO request. Moreover, should the Court ultimately dismiss the
federal claims, it likely would decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11383707. Public record. Not legal advice.