# (PC)Blanton

> District Court, E.D. California · May 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11383179

## Case

- **Full name:** Kenneth Wayne Blanton v. B. Mendoza, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** May 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 KENNETH WAYNE BLANTON, Case No.: 1:25-cv-00782-EGC (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT
13 v. PREJUDICE FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO
14 B. MENDOZA, et al., COMPLY, AND FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE
15 Defendants.
14-Day Objection Period
16
Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge
17

18 Plaintiff Kenneth Wayne Blanton is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil
19 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
20 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
21 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on June 27, 2025. (Doc. 1.)
22 On April 3, 2026, the Court issued its First Screening Order. (Doc. 8.) Specifically, the
23 Court found Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim
24 against any named Defendant. (Id. at 4-8.) Plaintiff was ordered to file a first amended complaint,
25 curing the deficiencies identified in the order, or a notice of dismissal within 21 days. (Id. at 8-9.)
26 On April 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address. (Doc. 9.) That same
27 date, the Clerk of the Court re-served the screening order to Plaintiff at his new address.
1 More than 21 days, plus time for mailing, have elapsed since Plaintiff was re-served on
2 April 17, 2026, with the First Screening Order. Because Plaintiff has failed to file a first amended
3 complaint, the undersigned will recommend this action be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state
4 a claim, failure to comply with orders, and failure to prosecute.
5 II. SCREENING FINDINGS
6 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
7 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
8 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
9 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
10 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if
11 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
12 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
13 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
14 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
15 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain
16 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
17 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
18 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal
19 quotation marks & citation omitted).
20 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
21 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
22 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must
23 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”
24 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal
25 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
26 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of
27 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the
1 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation
2 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially
3 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
4 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted
5 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
6 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not
7 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
8 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
9 B. Linkage and Causation
10 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal
11 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under
12 section 1983, a “plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual
13 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
14 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is
15 inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
16 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Leer v.
17 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized
18 and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions
19 are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation” (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
20 370-71, 375-77 (1976)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the
21 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative
22 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required
23 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
24 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
25 C. Supervisory Liability
26 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of
27 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g.,
1 adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act
2 unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v.
3 Cnty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934
4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section
5 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is
6 no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”).
7 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or
8 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
9 Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a
10 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to
11 inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Accord
12 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability may be based on
13 inaction in the training and supervision of subordinates).
14 Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official
15 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional
16 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942
17 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations & quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other
18 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
19 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his
20 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed
21 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707,
22 713 (9th Cir. 2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
23 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
24 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
25 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v.
26 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
27 //
1 D. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Its Claims
2 Plaintiff names Sergeant/Watch Commander B. Mendoza, Officer C. Perry, and “Visiting
3 [Secretary]” Dominic Ramos at the Madera County Jail as Defendants in this action. (Doc. 1 at 1-
4 2.) He seeks $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages from each
5 Defendant. (Id. at 6.)
6 The previously assigned magistrate determined the following:
7 Plaintiff claims the Defendants denied him an onsite visit in violation
of his constitutional rights.
8
Claim I: Factual Allegations
9
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Mendoza was the watch commander on
10 the day his on site visit was denied. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He notified
Defendant Perry “of the potential issue of which B. Mendoza was
11 then informed of.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that instead of
accommodating his visit Mendoza allowed Plaintiff’s visitor “to be
12 turned away for no reason other than ‘homewav’ has [him] ‘red
flagged.’” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “title 15” requires “a legitimate
13 safety concern to which there was none,” cites “Grievance #3510,”
and states jail staff have “refused to provide all names associated
14 with the denial.” (Id.)
15 Claim II: Factual Allegations
16 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Perry was “the deputy assigned to” his
May 3, 2025, visit and “was the officer that notified visiting and the
17 watch commander that [Plaintiff] was expecting a visit.” (Doc. 1 at
4.) Plaintiff contends Perry “was extremely rude and unprofessional”
18 and refused to allow him to speak with the watch commander, or
“relay [his] request to do so.” (Id.)
19
Claim III: Factual Allegations
20
Plaintiff states Defendant Ramos “is the visiting secretary and was
21 the individual who ultimately denied” his visit with Dahlia Hudson
on May 3, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff contends that “[a]fter review
22 ‘CSU’ Behe stated there was no legitimate operational or safety
concern.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges his “visiting was not restricted and
23 [he] was not on modified,” and his “rights were violated.” (Id.)
24 The Applicable Legal Standards
25 There must be a “mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of
26 general application.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
This principle applies equally to pretrial detainees and pretrial
27 detainees do not possess the full range of freedoms as unincarcerated
individuals. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
1 and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or
retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted
2 prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Id.
3 Inmates do not have a clearly established constitutional right to
receive visits, in particular contact visits. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d
4 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,
1114 (9th Cir. 1986) (“To the extent that denial of contact visitation
5 is restrictive and even harsh, it is part of the penalty that criminals
pay for their offenses against society”). The Supreme Court has
6 upheld a variety of restrictions on visitation (including denials of
contact visitation, as well as limitations on the people allowed to visit
7 an inmate) against First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003); Block v.
8 Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984). Only where all visitation
privileges have been revoked permanently or for a substantial period
9 will the deprivation take on constitutional proportions. Overton, at
130; Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1204.
10
Analysis
11
Liberally construing the complaint and accepting all facts as true,
12 Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim.
13 a. Defendant Mendoza
14 Although Plaintiff contends Mendoza improperly “turned away” his
visit “for no reason,” Plaintiff also states “‘homewav’” had Plaintiff
15 “‘red flagged.’” Therefore, it appears Mendoza had a legitimate basis
to deny Plaintiff’s contact visit. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546; Block, 468
16 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he Constitution does not require that detainees be
allowed contact visits when responsible, experienced administrators
17 have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits will
jeopardize the security of the facility”). Plaintiff also alleges that a
18 single visit was denied by Mendoza; a one-time denial is insufficient
to state a claim. See, e.g., Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190,
19 1212 (9th Cir. 2008) (criminal detainee’s length of stay in jail was
one factor in determining whether Fourteenth Amendment violation
20 had occurred); Diaz v. Gonzalez, No. 2:24-cv-1507 CKD P, 2024
WL 4121907, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2024) (“Plaintiff alleges that
21 he was denied a single visit with an attorney by defendant, a
correctional officer. While prisoners are entitled to contact visits with
22 legal counsel as a part of the right to access courts … denial of one
visit does not amount to denial of contact visits per se, or the denial
23 of access to courts. For these reasons, plaintiff's complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under federal law”);
24 Jenkins v. Tilton, No. 1:10-cv-00122-SKO PC, 2010 WL 4024920,
at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010) (finding the “denial of a single family
25 visit” insufficient to state a claim); Sisneroz v. Whitman, No. CV F
01-5058 2008 WL 4966220, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008) (finding
26 that “constitutional deprivation arises from systematic, substantial
deprivation” and that some amenities “may be unavailable [to SVPs]
27 for short periods of time for various reasons” without taking on
constitutional proportions). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff
1 only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally
protected rights. In other words, even if jail officials violated “title
2 15,” no federal constitution violation has occurred. See e.g., Nible v.
Fink, 828 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of
3 the California Code of Regulations do not create private right of
action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009)
4 (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal
constitutional right); Prock v. Warden, No. 1:13-cv-01572-MJS
5 (PC), 2013 WL 5553349, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (noting
that several district courts have found no implied private right of
6 action under title 15 and stating that “no § 1983 claim arises for
[violations of title 15] even if they occurred”); Parra v. Hernandez,
7 No. 08cv0191-H (CAB), 2009 WL 3818376, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
13, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss prisoner's claims brought
8 pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations); Chappell
v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW (PC), 2009 WL
9 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no
private right of action under Title 15 of the California Code of
10 Regulations).
11 b. Defendant Perry
12 Plaintiff alleges that Perry advised Mendoza of Plaintiff’s
forthcoming visit, “was extremely rude and unprofessional,” and
13 refused to allow him to speak directly with Mendoza. None of those
facts state a claim for relief. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d
14 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations of verbal harassment do not
generally state a viable claim under section 1983); Overton, 539 U.S.
15 at 130; Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1204. Presumably, although not expressly
stated, Perry’s conduct is associated only with the denial occurring
16 May 3, 2025; therefore, it too concerns but a single visit. Pierce, 526
F.3d at 1212; Diaz, 2024 WL 4121907, at *1; Jenkins, 2010 WL
17 4024920, at *3; Sisneroz, 2008 WL 4966220, at *9.
18 c. Defendant Ramos
19 Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant Ramos.
Although he alleges “‘CSU’ Behe stated there was no legitimate
20 operational or safety concern,” and his “visiting was not restricted”
or modified, Plaintiff was denied only a single visit on May 3, 2025.
21 Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1212; Diaz, 2024 WL 4121907, at *1; Jenkins,
2010 WL 4024920, at *3; Sisneroz, 2008 WL 4966220, at *9. These
22 facts also conflict with Plaintiff’s allegation that he was purportedly
“’red flagged’” on “‘homewav’” on the day in question, as set forth
23 in Claim I.
24 In sum, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible due process violation
against Defendants Mendoza, Perry, and Ramos. Plaintiff is
25 reminded that only where all visitation privileges have been revoked
permanently or for a substantial period will the deprivation take on
26 constitutional proportions. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court
will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint to
27 cure the deficiencies identified in this order, assuming he can do so
in good faith.
1 (Doc. 8 at 4-8.) Because Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
2 granted, he was ordered to file a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within
3 21 days. (Id. at 8-9. )
4 III. DISCUSSION
5 A. Legal Standards Concerning Dismissal
6 Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits courts to involuntarily dismiss
7 an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with a court order. See
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir.
9 2019) (citations omitted); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689
10 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he consensus among our sister circuits, with which we agree, is that courts
11 may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances”).
12 The Local Rules, corresponding with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide,
13 “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . . any order of the Court may be grounds for
14 the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.”
15 Local Rule 110. “District courts have inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising
16 that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth.,
17 City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a
18 party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g.,
19 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a
20 court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir.
21 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421,
22 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local rules).
23 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors:
24 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its
25 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of
26 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at
27 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).
1 B. Analysis
2 Here, Plaintiff has failed to file a first amended complaint, or notice of voluntary
3 dismissal, as directed in the First Screening Order. The screening order specifically identified the
4 deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint and provided the relevant legal standards applicable to his
5 potentially cognizable claims. (See Doc. 8 at 4-8.) The Court cannot effectively manage its docket
6 if Plaintiff ignores Court orders and ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds that both the
7 first and second factors—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the
8 Court’s need to manage its docket—weigh in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440.
9 The third factor weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the
10 occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524
11 (9th Cir. 1976). Here, the Court’s screening order provided Plaintiff with 21 days within which to
12 file a first amended complaint (Doc. 8 at 8-9) and was re-served following Plaintiff’s change of
13 address, ensuring his receipt of the screening order and allowing for his response within 21 days
14 of the date of that re-service. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s orders
15 and the time to do so has now passed. Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in
16 prosecuting this action resulting in a presumption of injury. Therefore, the third factor—a risk of
17 prejudice to defendants—also weighs in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440.
18 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors
19 disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However,
20 “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward
21 disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” In re
22 Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006)
23 (citation omitted). By failing to file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in
24 the screening order, Plaintiff is not moving this case forward and is impeding its progress. As it
25 stands, Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim and the Court is required to dismiss his
26 complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Thus, the fourth factor—the public policy favoring
27 disposition of cases on their merits—weighs in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440.
1 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262.
2 Here, in the Court’s First Informational Order in Prisoner/Civil Detainee Civil Rights Case,
3 issued June 27, 2025, Plaintiff was advised, in relevant part: “In litigating this action, the parties
4 must comply with this Order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (‘Fed. R. Civ. P.’), and the
5 Local Rules of the United States District Court, Eastern District of California (‘Local Rules’), as
6 modified by this Order. Failure to so comply will be grounds for imposition of sanctions which
7 may include dismissal of the case. Local Rule 110; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” (Doc. 3 at 1.) That
8 same order advised Plaintiff that “all Court deadlines are strictly enforced.” (Id. at 5.) Further, in
9 the First Screening Order, Plaintiff was advised as follows: “If Plaintiff fails to comply with this
10 order, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for
11 failure to obey a court order and for failure to prosecute.” (Doc. 8 at 9, emphasis in original.)
12 Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance.
13 Therefore, the fifth factor—the availability of less drastic sanctions—also weighs in favor of
14 dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440.
15 In sum, because Plaintiff has not filed a first amended complaint, he has failed to state a
16 claim upon which relief can be granted and the complaint should be dismissed. Additionally,
17 Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s orders, and in doing so, has failed to prosecute this
18 action. Whether Plaintiff has done so intentionally or mistakenly is inconsequential. It is
19 Plaintiff’s responsibility to comply with the Court’s orders and to prosecute this action. The Court
20 declines to expend its limited resources on a case that Plaintiff has chosen to ignore.
21 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
22 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a
23 district judge to this action.
24 Further, for the reasons given above, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this
25 action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, failure to obey
26 court orders, and failure to prosecute.
27 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
1 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
2 | objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to
3 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages
4 | without leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to
5 | the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference
6 || the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise
7 || reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation
8 | may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations
9 | under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time
10 | may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839
11 | (9th Cir. 2014).
12
IT IS SO ORDERED. .
14 | Dated: _ May 15, 2026 C Liy du
UNITED STATES MWGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11383179. Public record. Not legal advice.