# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · May 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11382837

## Case

- **Full name:** Luis Reyes Gutierrez v. Warden of the Golden State Annex ICE Detention Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** May 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10

11 LUIS REYES GUTIERREZ, Case No. 1:25-cv-02025-KES-SAB-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
13 v. CORPUS

14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE
ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
15
Respondents.
16
17 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas
18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
19 I.
20 BACKGROUND
21 Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador who was previously removed from the United States
22 in 1998 and 1999. (ECF No. 13-1 at 3–4.1) Petitioner reentered the United States and on
23 February 22, 2000, Petitioner was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. Petitioner was
24 sentenced to an imprisonment term of twenty-five years to life. (Id. at 6.) On May 5, 2022, while
25 imprisoned at Avenal State Prison, Petitioner was referred to Immigration and Customs
26 Enforcement (“ICE”) for investigation into his immigration status and was placed in immigration
27 detention that same day. (ECF No. 13 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 3; ECF No. 1 at 5.)
1 On June 7, 2023, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal
2 proceedings against Petitioner by filing a notice to appear charging Petitioner as an immigrant
3 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, under 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (ECF No. 13-1 at 31, 32.) On December 13, 2023, Petitioner filed an
5 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
6 Torture (“CAT”). On April 25, 2024, an immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an oral decision
7 denying Petitioner’s applications for relief. On October 10, 2024, the Board of Immigration
8 Appeals (“BIA”) sustained Petitioner’s appeal and remanded the matter to the IJ for further
9 analysis of Petitioner’s CAT claim. (Id. at 32.) On June 10, 2025, the IJ issued another decision
10 denying Petitioner’s claims. (Id. at 31–63.) Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which dismissed the
11 appeal on March 25, 2026. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Automated Case
12 Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last visited May 12, 2026). Petitioner filed a
13 petition for review and a motion to stay removal in the Ninth Circuit, and a temporary stay of
14 removal is in effect. See Reyes Gutierrez v. Blanche, No. 26-2138 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 8, 2026).
15 Meanwhile, on February 9, 2024, an IJ conducted a bond hearing pursuant to Franco-
16 Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV10-02211, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013),2 and found
17 that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) met its burden in establishing by clear and
18 convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community. (ECF No. 13-1 at 71, 73.) On
19 May 10, 2024, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. (Id. at 71–72.)
20 On December 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging
21 his prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
22 (ECF No. 1.) On March 2, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) On
23 March 17, 2026, Petitioner filed an opposition. (ECF No. 15.)
24 ///
25 ///
26

27 2 The district court held that class members detained for more than 180 days are entitled to a custody
redetermination hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
1 II.
2 DISCUSSION
3 A. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes
4 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal
5 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory
6 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of
7 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-
8 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
9 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been
10 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection
11 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th
12 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in
13 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”
14 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under
15 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id.
16 “Subsection C provides for the detention of ‘criminal aliens’ and states that ‘[t]he Attorney
17 General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a
18 qualifying, enumerated offense.” Id. at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).
19 “[D]etention under Subsection C is mandatory,” and “[r]elease under Subsection C is limited to
20 certain witness protection purposes.” Id. “Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a
21 final order of removal” and “governs detention during a ninety-day ‘removal period’ after the
22 conclusion of removal proceedings.” Id. at 530–31.
23 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have
24 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize
25 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond
26 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
27 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis,
1 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries
2 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which
3 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional
4 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
5 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and
6 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
7 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
8 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention,
9 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to
10 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”
11 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
12 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
13 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing
14 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it
15 lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Id. at 529 (noting
16 that “in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal
17 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the
18 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the
19 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that
20 is slightly shorter”).3 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the
21

22 3 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and
which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors.’” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH,
2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citations omitted). Although the “Supreme Court had inferred
23 from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five
months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where
24 the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted).

25 [I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more
than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The
data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass
26 were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention
periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015,
27 the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450
days.
1 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted
2 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized
3 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
4 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention
6 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond
7 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins
8 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional
9 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is
10 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to
11 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural
12 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).4 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d
13 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.
14 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every
15 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . .
16 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II),
17 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).
18 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth
19 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on
20 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit
21 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
22 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear
23 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
24 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the]
25 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the
26

27 4 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings.
Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger
to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous
1 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted
2 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without
3 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect
4 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d
5 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).
6 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require
7 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is
8 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a
9 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762,
10 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman
11 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising
12 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213
13 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory
14 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.
15 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the
16 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,
17 with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a
18 detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Arteaga-Martinez, 596
19 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583.
20 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed]
21 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any
22 immigration detention statute” until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, which
23 concerned a petitioner detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who sought a second bond
24 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and
25 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due
26 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because
27 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez
1 B. Procedural Due Process
2 The petition asserts a prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1 at 6–17.) Here,
3 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A). Although the Ninth
4 Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens
5 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that “the
6 Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of
7 detention . . . under [section 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations
8 in original) (citation omitted). Accord Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen’s
9 constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section
10 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d
11 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained
12 pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due process
13 affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable). Contra Banyee v. Garland,
14 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). Additionally, “essentially all district courts that have considered
15 the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a
16 bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No.
17 C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019) (citation omitted),
18 report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019).
19 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged
20 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing violates
21 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably
22 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing.
23 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural
24 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-
25 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in
26 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six-
27 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
1 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood
2 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez
3 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight-
4 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in
5 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the
6 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context
7 (alteration in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash.
8 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D.
9 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim
10 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context).
11 This Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become
12 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of
13 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the
14 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). However, in Lopez,
15 this Court specifically noted that it was “by no means providing any insight as to whether a
16 failure to provide a ‘second bond hearing’ violates due process. That analysis would be much
17 different than the present analysis of whether due process is implicated in providing an initial
18 bond hearing.” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.6.
19 Here, as Petitioner has already received a bond hearing and is seeking a second bond
20 hearing, the Court finds that the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
21 (1976), is applicable. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1206 (“assum[ing] without
22 deciding,” in context of petitioner detained under to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) seeking a second bond
23 hearing, that Mathews test applied, noting the Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to
24 due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test
25 that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention
26 context”); id. at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“agree[ing] that the test developed in Mathews v.
27 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework
1 Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 225 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying Mathews test in the context of
2 § 1231(a)), abrogated by Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573; Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118
3 (noting that “the Mathews factors may be well-suited to determining whether due process
4 requires a second bond hearing”).

5 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors. First, the private interest that will be
6 affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
7 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
8 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
9 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
10 1. Private Interest
11 “As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is
12 expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d
13 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner has been detained for four years. It “is beyond
14 dispute” that Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
15 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). “Freedom from
16 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
17 the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See
18 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an individual’s
19 private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” (quoting
20 Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Petitioner “has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty
21 interest under Mathews.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly, the Court finds the first
22 Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
23 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
24 As set forth above, on February 9, 2024, an IJ conducted a bond hearing pursuant to and
25 found that DHS met its burden in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is
26 a danger to the community, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on May 10, 2024. (ECF No.
27 13-1 at 71–73.) Like the petitioner in Rodriguez Diaz, the determination to detain Petitioner “was
1 neutral decisionmaker. These procedures ensured that the risk of erroneous deprivation would be
2 ‘relatively small.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1210 (quoting Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859,
3 865 (9th Cir. 2017)). Further, Petitioner does not establish “the probable value, if any” of an
4 additional bond hearing. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. For example, Petitioner does not argue that
5 there are changed circumstances or additional evidence not previously available that would likely
6 result in a different outcome. Accordingly, the second Mathews factor weighs against Petitioner.
7 3. Government Interest
8 “[T]he government clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in
9 the United States in violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public
10 from dangerous criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S.
11 at 518, 515). “These are interests of the highest order that only increase with the passage of
12 time.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. “The longer detention lasts and the longer the
13 challenges to an IJ’s order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to
14 securing an alien’s ultimate removal. The risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates
15 as the time for removal becomes more imminent.” Id. “For all these reasons,” the Ninth Circuit
16 has held that the government’s interests in immigration detention cases “are significant.” Id. In
17 accordance with Rodriguez Diaz, the Court finds the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of
18 Respondent.5
19 4. Conclusion
20 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that one of the Mathews factors weighs in favor
21 of Petitioner and two weigh against Petitioner. On balance, the Mathews test supports a finding
22 that Petitioner is not entitled to a second bond hearing. Accordingly, the Court recommends
23 finding that procedural due process does not compel a second bond hearing at this time. Should
24 circumstances change, however, due process may dictate a different outcome.

25
5 The Court notes that it is important not to overstate the strength of Respondent’s showing under this factor. “The
government interest in immigration enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the
26
government’s interest in immigration enforcement [in general] but its interest in” detaining Petitioner without
providing him with another bond hearing. Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955 F.3d 802,
27 810 (9th Cir. 2020). Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he governmental issue
at stake [here] is the ability to detain Petitioner without providing him with another bond hearing, not whether the
1 Hil.
2 RECOMMENDATION
3 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of
4 | habeas corpus be DENIED.
5 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District
6 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
7 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within
8 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file
9 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any
10 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
11 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days
12 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate
13 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file
14 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
15 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d
16 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
17
18 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le
19 | Dated: _May 12, 2026_ ef
STANLEY A. BOONE
20 United States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11382837. Public record. Not legal advice.