# Mull

> District Court, E.D. California · May 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11382763

## Case

- **Full name:** Henry Ortiz v. Doug V. Mull, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** May 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 HENRY ORTIZ, No. 2:25-cv-0028-DC-CKD (PS)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 DOUG V. MULL, et al.
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff Henry Ortiz proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. This case is referred to the
18 undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s third amended
19 complaint (“TAC”) is before the court for screening. The TAC states a disability discrimination
20 claim and no other claims. The undersigned recommends this case proceed on the disability
21 discrimination claim only and that all other claims be dismissed without leave to amend.
22 I. Screening Requirement
23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis
24 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a
25 claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
26 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27
27 (2000). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings.
28 See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). To survive screening, a claim must
1 be facially plausible with sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that a
2 named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
3 (2009); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
4 II. Allegations in the TAC
5 Plaintiff is an individual residing in Sacramento County, California. (ECF No. 19 at 2.)
6 Defendants are the property management company that owned and operated plaintiff’s residential
7 housing during the relevant period (Lewis Management Corp.), the on-site property manager
8 (defendant Hailer), the regional manager with supervisory authority and responsibility for
9 approving or ratifying enforcement and eviction related actions (defendant Mull), and Doe
10 defendants. (Id.)
11 Plaintiff is a “qualified individual with disabilities” including Post-Traumatic Stress
12 Disorder (“PTSD”), a chronic back injury, and mobility impairment due to a broken leg. (ECF
13 No. 19 at 2.) These conditions substantially limit his major life activities, including walking,
14 standing, stress regulation, and daily functioning. (Id. at 2.)
15 In or around May 2024, plaintiff provided medical documentation confirming his
16 disabilities to defendant Hailer, both electronically and through in-person communications. (ECF
17 No. 19 at 2.) Plaintiff requested the following reasonable accommodations: (a) “Accommodation
18 related to accessible parking and vehicle use”; (b) “Consideration of mobility limitations” (c)
19 “Protection from enforcement actions that would exacerbate his PTSD[.]” (Id. at 2.) Defendant
20 Hailer acknowledged receipt of plaintiff’s disability-related information and informed the other
21 defendants. (Id. at 3.) Defendants refused to provide reasonable accommodations. (Id. at 5.)
22 Plaintiff filed complaints with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
23 (HUD) and the California Civil Rights Department. (ECF No. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff also engaged in
24 petitioning activity through public advocacy concerning housing and civil rights issues. (Id.)
25 After the defendants became aware of plaintiff’s protected activity though “direct
26 communications, notices from advocates, and internal management discussions[,]” defendants
27 subjected plaintiff to adverse actions, including (a) disabling plaintiff’s online rent payment
28 portal; (b) issuing pretextual three-day notices; and (c) initiating disproportionate enforcement
1 actions not imposed on similarly situated tenants. (ECF No. 19 at 3.)
2 In addition, defendants “acted jointly” with Sacramento Police Department officers and/or
3 the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department by knowingly providing false information with the
4 intention of having law enforcement take adverse action against plaintiff as a means of retaliation,
5 including through vehicle towing, citations, and investigatory contact. (ECF No. 19 at 4.)
6 The TAC asserts claims for (1) Disability Discrimination [42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)]; (2)
7 Retaliation [42 U.S.C. § 3617]; and (3) First Amendment Retaliation – Joint Action [42 U.S.C. §
8 1983]. (ECF No. 19 at 4-5.) Plaintiff seeks damages. (Id. at 6.)
9 III. Discussion
10 A. Retaliation (FHA)
11 A prima facie retaliation claim under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) requires a plaintiff to
12 show the following: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) an adverse housing consequence
13 causally linked to that activity and (3) resulting damage. See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272
14 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001). Although causation may be inferred from circumstantial
15 evidence such as temporal proximity between protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory
16 conduct, see, e.g., Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing
17 retaliation claim in Title VII context), the court does not infer alleged retaliation was motivated
18 by prior events solely on the basis of a chronology of events. See generally Huskey v. City of San
19 Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting “the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter
20 hoc, literally, ‘after this, therefore because of this’”). The facts alleged are insufficient for the
21 court to plausibly infer a causal link between plaintiff’s protected acts and defendants’ alleged
22 misconduct. The TAC lacks sufficient factual content to “nudg[e] [the retaliation] claim… across
23 the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
24 B. First Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
25 Private conduct by private individuals or entities is only actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
26 1983 if there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly
27 private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. See Brentwood Academy v.
28 Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Courts start with the
1 presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action, and a plaintiff bears
2 the burden of establishing state action. See Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639
3 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). A bare allegation of joint action does not suffice to plead state
4 action. See Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (conclusory
5 allegations are insufficient to establish state action).
6 Plaintiff alleges the private actor defendants acted jointly with state officers when they
7 engaged law enforcement to ticket and tow plaintiff’s vehicle and knowingly gave false
8 information resulting in investigatory contact. The TAC does not adequately allege state action.
9 See Augustus v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 2:20-CV-11255-FLA-RAO-X, 2023 WL 2799117, at
10 *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2023) (complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to show defendants were
11 joint actors with the County based on allegations they made false reports and participated in
12 unwarranted seizure) (aff’d, No. 23-55312, 2024 WL 743783 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2024)). Plaintiff
13 fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
14 C. Disability Discrimination (FHA)
15 The FHA makes it illegal “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
16 privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
17 with such dwelling, because of a handicap of [¶]...that person[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). A prima
18 facie failure to accommodate claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) he suffers from a
19 handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h);1 (2) the defendants knew or reasonably should have
20 known of his handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap “may be necessary” to afford the
21 plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) the defendants refused to
22 make such accommodation. United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt., 107 F.3d 1374,
23 1380 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case
25 determination. DuBois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179
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27 1 The FHA defines a handicap as: “(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or
28 (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
1 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff adequately alleges he suffered from a handicap of which defendants
2 knew or reasonably should have known. For screening purposes, plaintiff adequately alleges he
3 requested and defendants refused to provide at least one reasonable accommodation which may
4 have been necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling. See
5 generally, e.g., Ling v. City of Los Angeles, No. 11-CV-07774-SVW, 2012 WL 12845147, at *2
6 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Mei Ling v. City of Los Angeles, Cal., 596 F. App’x 559
7 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding reasonableness of the plaintiff’s requested accommodation for a specific
8 floor plan could not be resolved at motion to dismiss stage due to the highly fact-specific nature
9 of the inquiry).
10 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
11 For the reasons set forth above, the TAC states a disability discrimination claim under the
12 FHA and no other claims. Three times previously, the court advised plaintiff of deficiencies in the
13 claims pleaded based on these underlying events. (ECF Nos. 6, 11, 16.) It now clearly appears
14 granting further leave to amend the other claims would be futile. See Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n
15 v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (leave to amend shall be
16 freely given, but the court does not have to allow futile amendments).
17 In accordance with the above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this case proceed on
18 plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim under the FHA in the third amended complaint and all
19 other claims be dismissed without further leave to amend for failure to state a claim.
20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
21 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
22 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
23 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
24 /////
25 /////
26 /////
27 /////
28 /////
1 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections
2 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.
3 || Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 | Dated: May 11, 2026 Card ke Lg a

6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11382763. Public record. Not legal advice.