# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · July 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11381903

## Case

- **Full name:** Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-03248-MRA-MRW Date July 18, 2024

Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable MÓNICA RAMÍREZ ALMADANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Gabriela Garcia None Present

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
REMAND AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS [ECF 13]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Antoinette Hanson’s Motion for Remand (the “Motion”)
and Request for Attorney Fees and Costs (the “Request”). ECF 13. The Court read and
considered the Motion and the Request and deemed the matters appropriate for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. The hearing was therefore
VACATED and removed from the Court’s calendar. ECF 25. For the reasons stated
herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and Request.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff Antoinette Hanson filed a lawsuit against Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), Equifax Information Solutions, Inc. (“Equifax”),
Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”), and Does 1-10 in Ventura County Superior Court.1
ECF 1 (Superior Ct. Compl.) at 13-21.
Plaintiff alleges that on several occasions in 2023 she gave notice in writing to
Defendants challenging the accuracy and completeness of certain information reported on
her consumer credit report. Id. ¶¶ 9-12, at 15. Plaintiff claims that Defendants have not
adequately responded to her correspondence, conducted a reasonable investigation into the
disputes, or updated Plaintiff’s credit report to reflect that the information is disputed. Id.
¶¶ 13-18, 20, at 15-16. Plaintiff’s credit score has purportedly lowered due to the allegedly

1 Plaintiff and Defendant Experian filed a Notice of Settlement on June 19, 2024.
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Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

erroneous reporting, causing her to suffer economic, emotional, and reputational harm. Id.
¶¶ 27, 30, at 17-18. On these allegations, Plaintiff brings a single claim under California’s
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.16, et seq.
Id. ¶ 1, at 13.
On April 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate complaint in federal court against
Experian, Trans Union, and Merrick Bank, alleging violations of the CCRAA, the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), and California Identity Theft Law (“CITA”). See Hanson v.
Merrick Bank, No. 2:24-cv-2534-MRA-JC [hereinafter, “Related Case”], ECF 1. Trans
Union was served with the federal complaint on April 4, 2024, and ascertained that the
state action was related to the federal action. ECF 1 (Pietrzak Decl.) ¶ 8, at 11.
On April 19, 2024, Trans Union, joined by Experian, removed the state action to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). ECF 1. Trans Union thereafter filed a
motion to consolidate the removed action with the earlier-filed federal action. See Related
Case, ECF 18. On May 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, noticed for hearing on
June 24, 2024. ECF 13. The Court (Hon. John A. Kronstadt presiding) continued the
hearing to July 15, 2024. ECF 14. On June 11, 2024, this case was transferred to the
undersigned judge. ECF 19. On June 24, 2024, Defendant filed an Opposition to the
instant Motion. ECF 23. Plaintiff did not file a timely reply. See L.R. 7-10 (permitting
a moving party to file a reply no later than 14 days before the hearing date).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”
Kokkonen v. Guardians Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations
omitted). Removal of a state action to federal court is therefore only proper if the district
court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “An order remanding the
case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal.” Id.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-03248-MRA-MRW Date July 18, 2024

Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“The threshold requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the
complaint contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district
court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ansley
v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)). A defendant may remove
an action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441. The defendant bears “the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant stated that the Court has federal question
jurisdiction over the removed action. ECF 1 at 4. “The presence or absence of federal-
question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987). The well-pleaded complaint rule “makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he
or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. To establish
federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish “either that [1] federal law
creates the cause of action or that [2] the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline
Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold and Easement in the Cloverly Subterranean,
Geological Formation, 524 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); accord Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); Gunn v. Minton, 568
U.S. 251, 257 (2013).
Defendant has not met its burden of establishing federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff only pleads a single state law cause of action under the CCRAA. ECF 1 ¶¶ 1, 31-
41, at 13, 18-19. Trans Union claims that Plaintiff “refers” to the FRCA in her Complaint
and “uses FCRA language.” ECF 23 at 3. Plaintiff does refer to the FCRA’s definitions
of “consumer” and “consumer credit reporting agencies,” see ECF 1 ¶¶ 5-6, at 14, but the
“the mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into
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Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law
claim and no preemption exists.” Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982
(9th Cir. 1997). The FCRA is not a necessary element of Plaintiff’s CCRAA claim, nor
is Plaintiff’s CCRAA claim preempted by the FCRA or any other federal law. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3)(A); Chinitz v. Experian Information Sols., Inc., No. 5:17-cv-06515-
EJD, 2017 WL 5560653, at *2 (“[T]he CCRAA and its federal counterpart, the [FCRA],
co-exist as separate statutory schemes.”). And the mere possibility that Plaintiff could
have brought her claims under either or both statutes is irrelevant. Plaintiff has not
brought a federal cause of action.
Moreover, the instant case does not depend on resolution of a “substantial federal
question” to confer federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction also exists if “a federal issue
is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn
v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). Only “[w]here all
four of these requirements are met” is jurisdiction proper. Id. Trans Union does not brief
the Gunn factors. Instead, it alludes to, without identifying, “FCRA language” and
“concepts not found in the CCRAA” in Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF 23 at 3. These
allegations fall woefully short of identifying any substantial federal issue that must be
resolved and is in dispute.
In a footnote, Defendant states that because the CCRAA is the state analog to the
FCRA, judicial interpretation of the FCRA is persuasive authority for interpreting the
CCRAA. Id. at 3, n.1 (citing Olson v. Six Rivers Nat’s Bank, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12
(2003) (citation omitted)). But the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the expansive
view that the “mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the
‘arising under’ door.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. That FCRA cases may be persuasive
authority in the CCRAA context does not demonstrate even a need to apply federal law.
Thus, Defendant has not shown that this case belongs among the “‘special and small
category’ of cases in which arising under jurisdiction still lies” despite the claim “find[ing]
its origins in state rather than federal law.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (quoting Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)).
It is clear that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint does not allege a federal cause of
action or a substantial federal question. To avoid this obvious outcome, Defendant invites
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Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

the Court to set aside the well-pleaded complaint rule. Defendant first directs the Court
to consider the parties’ Joint Report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), in
which Plaintiff references the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. ECF 23 at 3-4;
see ECF 21. Defendant also asserts that the well-pleaded complaint rule should not allow
Plaintiff to pursue identical claims simultaneously in state and federal court because it
“would be inefficient, unjust and create potential for inconsistent rulings or judgments.”
ECF 23 at 3. But judicial economy, convenience, and comity do not override the Court’s
foundational duty to ensure that it has jurisdiction over this case in the first instance.
Defendant requests that the Court look to Plaintiff’s federal complaint in the Related
Case to find a federal question in this matter and then, in the interest of efficiency,
consolidate the cases. ECF 23 at 3-4. In effect, what Defendant seeks is for the Court to
exercise supplemental, or ancillary, jurisdiction over the state law claims in this case
because they form part of the same case or controversy as federal claims in the Related
Case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Defendant does not provide any legal authority—and
indeed, the Court knows of none—in support of its position that original jurisdiction can
be based on ancillary jurisdiction. To the contrary, “[r]emoval is governed by statute, and
invocation of ancillary jurisdiction . . . does not dispense with the need for compliance with
statutory requirements.” Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34
(2002). The removal statute requires that the district court have original jurisdiction over
the state court action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). And it is well-established that ancillary
jurisdiction does not provide a basis for satisfying that requirement. See Syngenta, 537
U.S. at 34 (holding that a federal court’s retention of jurisdiction over settled class action
suit did not give it authority, under doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, to remove parallel
state court suit); see also Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (“The court must
have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction over ancillary
claims.”).
Although the Ninth Circuit has not spoken on this issue, other circuits applying
Supreme Court precedent have rejected the view that a related federal action provides a
basis for removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fabricius v. Freeman, 466 F.2d 689, 693 (7th
Cir. 1972) (“That a related case was pending in federal court was not in itself sufficient
grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”); Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield,
100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A] removal petition . . . may not base subject-matter
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Case No. 2:24-cv-03248-MRA-MRW Date July 18, 2024

Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

seeks to remove is related to another action over which the federal district court already
has subject-matter jurisdiction.” (internal citations omitted)); Motion Control Corp. v.
SICK, Inc., 354 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ahearn, 100 F.3d at 456); Energy
Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Fabricius, 466 F.2d at 693, and Motion Control Corp., 354 F.3d at 706). District courts
in the Ninth Circuit overwhelmingly agree that removal cannot be premised on federal
claims in a related case. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bridgeman, No. 10-CV-
02619-JAM-KJN, 2010 WL 5330499, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010); Flower v. Wachovia
Mortg. FSB, No. C 09-343-JF-HRL, 2009 WL 975811, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2009);
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Lasoff, No. 10-CV-00235-MMM-RC, 2010 WL 669239, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010); Perez v. City of Los Angeles, No. 23-CV-03381-SVW-AS, 2023
WL 8113258, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2023); Careco, LLC v. Miguel Solario, No. 24-
CV-00836-JVS-JDE, 2024 WL 3202324, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2024). Defendant’s
argument that Plaintiff’s state court case is eligible for removal because it is related to a
federal case therefore lacks merit.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action. Defendant’s removal was therefore improper, and remand to state court is in order.
B. Attorney Fees and Costs
“A district court may, in its discretion, ‘require payment of just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of [improper] removal.’” Jordan v.
Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
“The appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter
removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the
opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a
right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.” Martin v.
Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005). Thus, “[a]bsent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing
party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Id. at 141. In making
the reasonableness determination, courts look to whether case law “clearly foreclosed” the
defendant’s basis of removal. Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lott v. Pfizer, Inc., 492 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth
Circuit has further clarified that “removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because
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Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be
awarded whenever remand is granted.” Id.
The Court finds that Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal based on federal question jurisdiction. As discussed in Section III.A., supra, case
law clearly foreclosed jurisdiction based on either the “federal cause of action” or the
“substantial federal question” branch of federal question jurisdiction. Defendant also
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal based on a related federal
action. On this point, the Supreme Court was explicit that “[a]ncillary jurisdiction . . .
cannot provide the original jurisdiction that petitioners must show in order to qualify for
removal under § 1441.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34. Consistent with this precedent, sister
circuits and district courts in the Ninth Circuit have resoundingly rejected the view that a
defendant can seek removal simply because a state court action alleging only state law
claims is related to federal claims in a related federal action. See Section III.A., supra.
Defendant proffers no legal authority in support of its contrary position, which further
signals to the Court that it lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal.
Defendant’s removal implicates Congress’ desire to deter removals intended to
prolong litigation and impose costs on the opposing party. See Martin, 546 U.S. at 140.
The Court does not make any findings regarding Defendant’s motivations in removing this
action, but it does find that removal imposed unnecessary costs on Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s
Counsel declares that she was required to expend a total of 9.5 hours to bring the instant
Motion. ECF 13-1 (Robenzadeh Decl.) ¶ 21. She estimated expending an additional six
hours to review Defendant’s Opposition and drafting a reply. Id. ¶ 22. Since Plaintiff
did not file a reply, the Court disregards those additional estimations. Thus, based on
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s reduced hourly rate of $600, Plaintiff has expended $5,700.00 in
attorney fees. Id. ¶ 23. These costs were needlessly incurred based on Defendant’s
improper and objectively unreasonable removal. The Court therefore orders Defendant to
pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees.
///
///
///
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Case No. 2:24-cv-03248-MRA-MRW Date July 18, 2024

Title Antoinette Hanson v. Trans Union, LLC, et al.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand and
Request for Attorney Fees and Costs. ECF 13. The Court further ORDERS as follows:
1. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees in the sum of $5,700.00.
2. The Clerk shall REMAND this case to Ventura County Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Initials of Deputy Clerk gga

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11381903. Public record. Not legal advice.