# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · April 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11381408

## Case

- **Full name:** Neeko Orlando Daniels v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 NEEKO ORLANDO DANIELS, Case No. 1:26-cv-00255-EPG (PC)

11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE

12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION
13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE
14 TO PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO
Defendant. COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER
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(ECF Nos. 1, 11).
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OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
17 THIRTY DAYS
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Plaintiff Neeko Orlando Daniels is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
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pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 10). He sues the
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for failing to protect him
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from being assaulted by other inmates.
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On March 11, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff
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failed to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 11). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file
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a first amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id.
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at 9). And the Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in the
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dismissal of this action.” (Id.).
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1 The deadline to respond to the screening order has expired, and Plaintiff has not filed an
2 amended complaint or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons
3 given below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, with prejudice, for
4 failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
5 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
6 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
8 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are
9 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
10 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
11 (2). Additionally, as Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 10), the Court may
12 screen the complaint on these same bases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
13 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
14 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
15 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
17 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
18 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
19 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
20 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts
21 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d
22 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a
23 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
24 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
25 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
26 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
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1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT1
2 Plaintiff names CDCR as the sole Defendant in this case. (ECF No. 1, p. 2). He alleges
3 the following facts:
4 On Tuesday, 01/23/24, the Plaintiff, Neeko Orlando Daniels inmate number
B18098 was raped, sexually abused, sexually assaulted, sexually fondled, and
5 sexually harassed by another inmate at Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran
California. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations
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Corcoran State Prison did not protect the Plaintiff from harm. The prison did not
7 remove or transfer the Plaintiff to another prison location immediately. On
01/23/24, Plaintiff was also attacked physically by another inmate in a holding
8 cell while handcuffed for an extended period of time, amounting to excessive
9 force. The Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s civil rights according to two
Federal Laws, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment of the United
10 States Constitution protection for incarcerated individuals.
11 (Id. at 8).
12 Following this statement of facts, Plaintiff alleges two claims.
13 Claim One states that a person may bring a civil rights lawsuit “when government
14 agencies abuse their authority to violate someone’s fundamental civil rights under color of the
15 law” and generally discusses the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). (Id. at 8-9).
16 Claim Two discusses the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that prison officials take
17 reasonable steps to protect prisoners from assaults by their fellow prisoners and alleges as
18 follows:
19 Letters were written for the Plaintiff to the Corcoran State Prison Warden
immediately by family members asking the Warden to protect the Plaintiff by
20 moving the Plaintiff to a different prison near his terminally ill grandmother.
Instead, the Plaintiff was moved to a California State Prison further from his
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terminally ill grandmother. The Plaintiff was not protected. The Plaintiff was
22 moved to a prison cell after the rape and was beat up by a different inmate after
being moved to a different cell.
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(Id. at 9-10).2
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Plaintiff attaches the referenced letters to his complaint along with prison grievance
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1 For readability, minor alterations, like omitting capitalization, have been made to some of Plaintiff’s
27 quotations without indicating each change.
2 Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over this case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
28 (FCRA). (ECF No. 1, p. 7). However, because he alleges no facts implicating the FCRA, and does not
list it as a claim, the Court will not further address it.
1 documents. (Id. at 12-20).
2 As for relief, Plaintiff seeks $10 million in monetary damages.
3 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
4 A. PREA
5 Plaintiff’s first claim refers to PREA, which one Court summarized as follows:
6 Congress enacted the PREA to address the problem of prison rape by: “(1)
developing national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and
7 punishment of prison rape”; (2) applying such national standards to
governmental agencies and departments that maintain correctional facilities; and
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(3) conditioning eligibility for federal grant money on compliance with such
9 standards.
10 Blair v. Herrera-Salazar, No. 3:19-CV-01261-DMS-KSC, 2019 WL 13448296, at *5 (S.D.
11 Cal. Sept. 5, 2019) (citation omitted). PREA authorizes the Attorney General to “publish a final
12 rule adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of
13 prison rape,” and then allows the federal government to reduce funding to prisons covered by
14 the statute unless the Attorney General receives proof of compliance with those standards. 34
15 U.S.C. § 30307.
16 However, nothing in the statute permits a private individual, such as Plaintiff, to file a
17 private lawsuit to enforce PREA. For this reason, many courts have held that private
18 individuals, like Plaintiff, cannot sue for violations of PREA. Hasha v. Gamboa, No. 1:24-CV-
19 00744-SAB (PC), 2025 WL 553049, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2025), report and
20 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1718056 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2025), appeal dismissed, No.
21 25-4227, 2025 WL 2895591 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (“PREA does not create a private right of
22 action for prisoners to sue based on a violation of PREAs terms.”); Martinez v. Scott, No. CV
23 18-8133-PA (PJW), 2019 WL 4391133, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2019), report and
24 recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6825742 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (concluding “that there
25 is no private right of action under the PREA”); Hatcher v. Harrington, No. 14-00554
26 JMS/KSC, 2015 WL 474313, at *5 (D. Haw. Feb. 5, 2015) (“Nothing in the PREA explicitly or
27 implicitly suggests that Congress intended to create a private right of action for inmates to sue
28 prison officials for noncompliance with the Act.”). This is because a private right of action “to
1 enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
2 (2001).
3 Because PREA does not create a private right of action for prisoners, like Plaintiff, to
4 sue under, Plaintiff’s claim under PREA is subject to dismissal.
5 B. Failure to Protect
6 Plaintiff’s complaint also brings an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual
7 punishment based on a failure to protect him.
8 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
9 inhumane ones . . . . ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation and quotation
10 marks omitted). Among other things, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take
11 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Id. (citation omitted). “Being
12 violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
13 their offenses against society.” Id. at 834 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To establish a
14 failure to protect claim, a prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately
15 indifferent to a sufficiently serious threat to the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 837.
16 “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v.
17 Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner must show that “the
18 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must
19 both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
20 serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
21 “Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
22 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’”
23 Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). “[I]n order to satisfy the
24 objective prong, it is enough for the inmate to demonstrate that he was exposed to a substantial
25 risk of some range of serious harms; the harm he actually suffered need not have been the most
26 likely result among this range of outcomes.” Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726
27 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013).
28 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under these legal standards. Although Plaintiff
1 alleges that he was assaulted in prison, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any individual
2 person acted with deliberate indifference to his safety because he or she knew of an excessive
3 risk to his safety and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
4 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his family wrote letters to the Warden of Corcoran
5 State Prison asking that Plaintiff be moved to be closer to his terminally ill grandmother. But
6 Plaintiff does not name the Warden, or any other specific person, as a defendant in the case.
7 Moreover, asking to be moved closer to Plaintiff’s grandmother would not have notified the
8 Warden, or any other prison official, there was an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety that
9 required that the prison take actions to protect Plaintiff from assault. Indeed, the complaint does
10 not allege that any prison official had any reason to believe that Plaintiff would be assaulted.
11 Plaintiff thus fails to allege that any prison official violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
12 rights by failing to protect him from assault.
13 C. Improper Defendant
14 Plaintiff’s complaint is also subject to dismissal because it only names CDCR as a
15 defendant, rather than any individual prison official who Plaintiff believes violated his
16 constitutional rights.
17 The CDCR is not a proper defendant under 1983. First, the CDCR is immune from such
18 a claim because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive
19 relief against a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v.
20 Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26
21 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
22 with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court”); Brown v. California Dep’t of
23 Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The district court correctly held that the California
24 Department of Corrections and the California Board of Prison Terms were entitled to Eleventh
25 Amendment immunity.”); Est. of Sumner v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 2:22-CV-
26 01638-JAM-DB, 2023 WL 3304233, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2023) (“CDCR did not waive, nor
27 has Congress abrogated, its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In turn, the Eleventh
28 Amendment unequivocally precludes Plaintiffs claims against CDCR. The Court therefore
1 finds Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible cause of action against CDCR and dismisses their
2 claims accordingly.”). Second, as noted above, § 1983 prohibits “persons” from violating
3 another’s Federal rights. However, “[s]tate agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of
4 § 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370
5 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004); see Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365
6 (1990) (“[A]n entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a ‘person’ within the meaning
7 of § 1983.”). Accordingly, “CDCR cannot be held liable under § 1983 as a matter of law.” Est.
8 of Sumner, 2023 WL 3304233, at *2 (concluding that CDCR was not a “person” within the
9 meaning of § 1983).
10 In short, because CDCR is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and is not a
11 “person” subject to suit under § 1983, it is not a proper defendant in this case and must be
12 dismissed.
13 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
14 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
15 this case and failure to comply with the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 11).
16 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure
to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the
17 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the
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availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring
19 disposition of cases on their merits.
20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
21 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).
22 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”
23 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the
24 first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
25 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to
26 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the
27 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to
28 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to
1 the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 11). This failure to respond is delaying the case and
2 interfering with docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in
4 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at
5 991). However, “[u]nnecessary delay inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories
6 will fade and evidence will become stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with
7 a court order and to prosecute this case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs
8 in favor of dismissal.
9 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to
10 prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of
11 possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory
12 lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce
13 resources. Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions
14 are of little use to prompt him to comply with future orders. And given the stage of these
15 proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available. Further, as noted above,
16 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or respond to the Court’s screening order despite being given
17 the relevant legal standards and the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Thus, the lack of
18 any viable claim supports a dismissal with prejudice rather than a lesser sanction. Therefore,
19 the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
20 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs
21 against dismissal. Id.
22 After weighing the factors, the Court concludes that dismissal with prejudice is
23 appropriate.
24 V. ORDER, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
25 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a District
26 Judge to this case.
27 And, for the reasons given above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
28 1. This action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to
] prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
2 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
3 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
4 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty
5 || (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file
6 || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
7 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no
8 || more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits.
9 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in
10 || the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)
11 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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B IT IS SO ORDERED.
14 | Dated: _ April 27, 2026 [Je Fahey —
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11381408. Public record. Not legal advice.