# Ridgeway

> District Court, E.D. California · April 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11380253

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Scott Ridgeway v. State of California, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11380253

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MICHAEL SCOTT RIDGEWAY, No. 2:25-cv-02164-DAD-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
IN PART
14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
(Doc. No. 9)
15 Defendants.

16
17 This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended
18 complaint (“FAC”) in its entirety only as to defendants State of California and the California
19 Highway Patrol (CHP). (Doc. No. 9.) On September 29, 2025, the pending motion was taken
20 under submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 11.) For the reasons
21 explained below, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss in part.
22 BACKGROUND
23 On May 8, 2025, plaintiff Michael Ridgeway filed his original complaint in the Sutter
24 County Superior Court initiating this civil action. (Doc. No. 1-3.) On July 24, 2025, plaintiff’s
25 counsel served defendants’ counsel with plaintiff’s operative FAC, indicating that it would be
26 filed on July 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) On August 1, 2025, defendants removed the action to
27 this federal court. (Id.) This case arises from plaintiff’s March 31, 2024 arrest by defendant CHP
28 officers Touchet and Gonzalez. (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 15, 17.)
1 In his FAC, plaintiff brings the following six claims against defendants: (1) a 42 U.S.C.
2 § 1983 claim for unwarranted entry into a private residence in violation of the Fourth and
3 Fourteenth Amendments brought against all defendants; (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
4 unlawful detention and arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments brought
5 against all defendants; (3) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell1 claim for failure to train brought against
6 defendants State of California and CHP; (4) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell claim for unconstitutional
7 custom or policy brought against defendants State of California and CHP; (5) intentional
8 infliction of emotional distress brought against all defendants; and (6) negligence brought against
9 all defendants. (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 34–74.)
10 On September 26, 2025, defendants filed their motion to dismiss certain claims asserted in
11 plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. No. 9.) Local Rule 230(c) provides that an opposition brief “shall be filed
12 and served no later than fourteen (14) days after the motion was filed.” L.R. 230(c). To date,
13 plaintiff has filed no opposition to the pending motion to dismiss and the time in which to do so
14 has long passed. Accordingly, the court construes plaintiff’s failure to oppose as a “non-
15 opposition to the motion.” L.R. 230(c) (“A failure to file a timely opposition may also be
16 construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.”).
17 On October 17, 2025, the court dismissed defendant California Highway Patrol from this
18 action, with prejudice, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. No. 13.)2 Accordingly, to the
19 extent defendants’ motion to dismiss seek dismissal of defendant California Highway Patrol from
20 this action, the motion will be denied as having been rendered moot. What remains before the
21 court is defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss all claims asserted by plaintiff against the
22 defendant State of California.
23 LEGAL STANDARD
24 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal
25 sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.
26
1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
27
2 On March 27, 2026, the court dismissed defendant CHP officer Brian Gonzalez from this
28 action, with prejudice, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. No. 21.)
1 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
2 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
3 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to
4 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
5 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
6 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
8 In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the
9 court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light
10 most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However,
11 the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
12 U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not
13 require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
14 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers
15 mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements
17 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). It is
18 inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the
19 defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen.
20 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
21 In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to
22 consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not
23 physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiffs’
24 complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
25 250 F.3d. 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 DISCUSSION
27 Defendants first argue that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against defendant State of California
28 are not cognizable because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. (Doc. No. 9 at
1 3–5.) The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
2 capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
3 (1989). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect
4 to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court and the Supreme Court has held that ‘§ 1983 was
5 not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity[.]’” Dittman v. California,
6 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Kentucky v.
7 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985)). Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims asserted against
8 the defendant State of California must be dismissed for failing to state a cognizable claim. See
9 White v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 09-cv-02198-VBF-AGR, 2009 WL 10698882, at *1
10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2009) (dismissing § 1983 claim against state agency because the state is not a
11 person within the meaning of § 1983).
12 Defendants next argue that plaintiff’s remaining state law tort claims against defendant
13 State of California are barred by California Government Code § 815. (Doc. No. 9 at 5–6.)
14 California Government Code § 815(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] public entity is not
15 liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a
16 public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. “In other words, direct tort
17 liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at
18 least creating some specific duty of care[.]” Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175,
19 1183 (2003). Nevertheless, “[t]he California Tort Claims Act does allow for vicarious liability of
20 a public entity for harm caused by an employee acting within the scope of his or her
21 employment.” Barcelo v. City of San Diego, No. 25-cv-00329-BAS-AHG, 2025 WL 2917176, at
22 *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025).
23 A review of plaintiff’s FAC reveals that his intentional infliction of emotional distress
24 claim does not specify any theory under which the defendant State of California is purportedly
25 liable. (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 65–69.) Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based on a direct theory of
26 liability that the defendant State of California was negligent by failing to “formulate,
27 implement[,] and enforce proper, reasonable, adequate[,] and safe procedures” for California
28 Highway Patrol officers. (Id. at ¶ 74.) Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim for relief as to
1 these claims based on direct theories of liability, including negligent hiring or training. See
2 Strawn v. Sokoloff, No. 1:22-cv-01245-AWI-EPG, 2023 WL 2760904, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3,
3 2023) (dismissing claims against the defendant city for negligent hiring and training because such
4 claims were barred by California Government Code § 815); see also Bauer v. City of Pleasanton,
5 No. 3:19-cv-04593-LB, 2020 WL 1478328, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (dismissing claims
6 against the defendant city for negligent hiring based on both direct and vicarious liability as both
7 theories are barred by § 815 in the context of negligent hiring). In light of plaintiff’s failure to
8 oppose the pending motion and the lack of a clear allegation of vicarious liability in plaintiff’s
9 FAC, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fifth and sixth state law tort
10 claims asserted against the State of California.
11 Leave to amend should be granted “freely” when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ.
12 P. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit maintains a policy of “extreme liberality generally in favoring
13 amendments to pleadings.” Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406, 406 (9th Cir. 1960).
14 Reasons “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . repeated failure to cure
15 deficiencies . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [or] futility” may support denial of
16 leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Brown v. Stored Value
17 Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). A district court “should grant leave to
18 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading
19 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N.
20 Cal. Collection Servs., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d
21 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (same).
22 As to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against defendant State of California, granting leave to
23 amend would be futile because that defendant is immune from such claims. See Ramos v. Cal.
24 Dep’t of Fair Emp., No. 2:17-cv-01610-TLN-AC, 2018 WL 466262, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan 18,
25 2018) (dismissing § 1983 claims without leave to amend against the defendant state agency as
26 barred by the Eleventh Amendment), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Ramos v.
27 Cal. Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Hous., 2018 WL 1382359 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018); see also
28 Robicheaux v. County of Orange, 750 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (same). As to
1 | plaintiffs state law tort claims, as discussed above, plaintiff could feasibly state a cognizable
2 | claim for relief based on a vicarious liability theory. See McCullough v. City and Cnty. of San
3 | Francisco, Case No. 24-cv-03260-JCS, 2024 WL 4353061, at *12—-14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024)
4 | (discussing the requirements for stating a cognizable claim against a public entity for negligent
5 | hiring, retention and supervision by its employees under a vicarious liability theory).
6 | Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to amend those claims.
7 CONCLUSION
8 For the reasons above,
9 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs first amended complaint (Doc. No. 9) is
10 GRANTED IN PART;
1] 2. Plaintiff's first, second, third, and fourth claims asserted against defendant State of
12 California are DISMISSED without leave to amend;
13 3. Plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims asserted against defendant State of California are
14 DISMISSED with leave to amend;
15 4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint as to defendant
16 CHP is DENIED as having been rendered moot by the court’s October 17, 2025
17 order dismissing that defendant from this action, with prejudice, pursuant to the
18 parties’ stipulation; and
19 5. Plaintiff shall file any second amended complaint, or alternatively, a notice of his
20 intent not to do so, within twenty-one (21) days from the date of entry of this order
21 and any failure on his part to do so will result in the dismissal of those claims
22 without further leave to amend.
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
| Dated: _ April 9, 2026 Dal A. 2, axel
25 DALE A. DROZD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27
28

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11380253. Public record. Not legal advice.