# Newsom

> District Court, E.D. California · April 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379961

## Case

- **Full name:** Jimmie Earl Jones, III v. Gavin Newsom, et. al
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JIMMIE EARL JONES, III, No. 2:25-cv-03253-CKD
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et. al,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19 I. In Forma Pauperis
20 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s
21 declaration in support of the motion makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
22 II. Screening Requirement
23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
25 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
26 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
28 /////
1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
3 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
7 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
9 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
10 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
12 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
13 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
16 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
17 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
18 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
19 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
20 III. Allegations in the Complaint
21 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at Mule
22 Creek State Prison. Plaintiff alleges he and another inmate, Gerardo Azpera, were not provided an
23 appropriate level of mental health care by Warden Garinica, Attorney General Bonta, or Governor
24 Newsom. Plaintiff alleges two violations of the Eighth Amendment based on cruel and unusual
25 punishment caused by a denial of mental health care, and a violation of the Fourteenth
26 Amendment based on allegations that he and plaintiff Asperza were discriminated against based
27 on their sexual orientation. ECR No. 1 at 4-6. Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical injuries
28 caused by his suicide attempts. Id.
1 IV. Legal Standards
2 A. Representation
3 Although non-attorneys can represent themselves pro se, non-attorneys have no authority
4 to represent or appear on behalf of others. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876
5 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, he has no authority
6 to appear as an attorney for others than himself”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see
7 also Jorss v. Schwarzenegger, 168 F. App'x 825, 826 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the district court
8 properly dismissed the complaint because the pro se prisoner plaintiff could not represent others).
9 B. Deliberate Indifference
10 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a
11 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
12 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is
13 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
14 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v.
15 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).
16 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439
17 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other
18 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the
19 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s
20 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
21 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he
22 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
23 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
24 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d
25 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.
26 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
27 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act
28 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the
1 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from
2 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person
3 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective
4 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A
5 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.
6 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A
7 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does
8 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical
9 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058
10 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of
11 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical
12 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).
13 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the
14 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have
15 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
16 C. Equal Protection
17 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated
18 alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), superseded by
19 statute on other grounds; Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123
20 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). It applies both inside and
21 outside of prison walls. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968). To state a claim, plaintiff
22 must show that defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a
23 protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff
24 must show that the defendant's actions were a result of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect
25 class, such as race, religion, or alienage. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 The Fourteenth Amendment also prevents disparate treatment based on sexual orientation. United
27 States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013).
28 /////
1 If the challenged action does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish
2 an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated
3 differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook
4 v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
5 (1973). To state an equal protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the
6 plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently
7 from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
8 Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.
9 D. Supervisory Liability
10 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
11 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)
12 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability,
13 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own
14 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between
15 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a
16 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or
17 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act
18 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
19 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).
20 E. Linkage Requirement
21 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a
22 federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person
23 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v.
24 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil
25 rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional
26 deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged
27 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v.
28 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).
1 V. Analysis
2 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
3 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory
4 and are insufficient for the Court to determine whether a claim has been sufficiently alleged.
5 While plaintiff’s pro se complaint is entitled to liberal construction by the court, mere conclusory
6 statements do not suffice to state a cognizable claim for relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 678.
7 Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended
8 complaint.
9 VI. Amended Complaint
10 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
11 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
12 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
13 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
14 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
15 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
16 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
17 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
18 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
19 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
20 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
21 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
22 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
23 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
24 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
25 VII. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party
26 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not
27 intended as legal advice.
28 /////
] The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that service of
2 || the complaint is not appropriate because you do not sufficiently describe what happened or
3 || explain your belief as to why it happened. Further, you are attempting to allege claims on behalf
4 | of yourself and another person which is not permitted. Your complaint is being dismissed, but
5 || you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.
6 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30
7 || days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular
8 || attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.
9 VII. CONCLUSION
10 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
11 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
12 2. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed.
13 3. Plaintiffis granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
14 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
15 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
16 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
17 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
18 || be dismissed.
19 | Dated: April 8, 2026 □□ I / dip Ze

21 | ckajones.3253screen. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379961. Public record. Not legal advice.