# Ingles

> District Court, E.D. California · April 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379805

## Case

- **Full name:** Ryan Purry v. K. Ingles
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 RYAN PURRY, No. 2:25-cv-03057-CKD P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 K. INGLES,
15 Defendant.
16
17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19 I. In Forma Pauperis
20 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s
21 declaration in support of the motion makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The
22 motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in
23 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate
24 agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the
25 Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent
26 of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will
27 be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in
28 plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
1 II. Screening Requirement
2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
26 III. Allegations in the Complaint
27 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at CSP-
28 Sac and defendant was a correctional officer employed at CSP-Sac. Plaintiff alleges that
1 excessive force was used against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment by defendant Ingles
2 on July 26, 2025, when the officer shoved him “in an area he shouldn’t have been in.” ECF No. 1
3 at 3. Plaintiff alleges he suffered “emotional distress and physical trauma.” Id. Plaintiff also
4 alleges that defendant Ingles retaliated against him on the same day by taking his hearing aid in
5 violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 4.
6 IV. Legal Standards
7 A. Excessive Force
8 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual
9 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
10 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused
11 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the
12 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
13 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7
14 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s
15 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of
16 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to
17 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and
18 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment
19 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to
20 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth
21 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327.
22 B. Retaliation
23 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five
24 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
25 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's
26 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
27 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
28 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351
1 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See
2 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and
3 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate
4 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison
5 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First
6 Amendment).
7 C. Fourth Amendment
8 Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure of property “occurs when there is some
9 meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property.” United States v.
10 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. However, the Supreme Court has held that “the Fourth Amendment
11 has no applicability to a prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984). In doing so,
12 the Court noted, “[p]rison officials must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their
13 view, disserve legitimate institutional interests.” Id. at 528 n. 8
14 V. Analysis
15 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
16 which relief can be granted under federal law. The court cannot determine, even at the screening
17 stage, whether defendant Ingles engaged in conduct that amounted to excessive force because
18 there are no details provided on how he injured plaintiff on July 26, 2025. Further, there are no
19 details as to why plaintiff asserts that defendant Ingles retaliated against him by taking his hearing
20 aid, nor how the seizure occurred. Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will,
21 however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.
22 VI. Amended Complaint
23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
24 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
25 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
26 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
27 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
28 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
1 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
2 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
3 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
4 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
5 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
6 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
7 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
8 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
9 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
10 VII. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party
11 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not
12 intended as legal advice.
13 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that service of
14 the complaint is not appropriate because you do not sufficiently describe what happened or
15 explain your belief as to why it happened. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being
16 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.
17 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30
18 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular
19 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.
20 VIII. CONCLUSION
21 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
22 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
23 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees
24 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the California Department of
25 Corrections filed concurrently herewith.
26 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
27 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
28 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
1 | Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
2 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
3 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
4 || be dismissed.
5 | Dated: April 7, 2026 Card ft 4 LA g. ae
6 CAROLYN K.DELANEY
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8 | Ckd.purry.3057screen.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379805. Public record. Not legal advice.