# Jones

> District Court, E.D. California · April 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379658

## Case

- **Full name:** Dupree Lamont Adkins v. Gina Jones, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 DUPREE LAMONT ADKINS, No. 2:24-cv-03794-EFB (PC)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 GINA JONES, et al.,
15 Defendant.
16
17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in a state prison and brings this action, without counsel, under 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in
19 forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 2.
20 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
21 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2).
22 Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect
23 and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
24 1915(b)(1) and (2).
25 II. Legal Standards
26 A. Screening Requirement
27 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
28 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
1 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
2 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
3 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
4 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). “[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only
5 the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
6 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (discussing the predecessor to modern § 1915(e)(2), former § 1915(d)).
7 Thus, § 1915(e)(2) allows judges to dismiss a claim based on factual allegations that are clearly
8 baseless, such as facts describing “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-38.
9 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)
10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and
11 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
12 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
13 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
14 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8,
15 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
16 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
17 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked
18 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
19 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
20 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
21 678.
22 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility.
23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
24 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
25 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a
26 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.
27 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
28 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
1 B. Standard for Relief Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that a defendant, while
3 acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights. 42 U.S.C. §
4 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
5 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). There is no vicarious liability under section 1983. Iqbal,
6 556 U.S. at 676. (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436
7 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Hence, a government official may not be held liable under section 1983
8 unless that official’s own actions caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. OSU Student
9 Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). The plaintiff
10 bears the burden to establish both causation-in-fact and proximate (i.e., legal) causation. See
11 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). An individual “causes” a
12 constitutional deprivation when he (1) “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
13 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
14 deprivation”; or (2) “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or
15 reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Lacey v.
16 Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588
17 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)) (quotation marks omitted). Allegations regarding causation
18 “must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant
19 whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy,
20 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
21 III. Screening Order
22 A. Allegations of the Complaint
23 Plaintiff alleges two causes of action. In his first cause of action, he alleges that his First
24 Amendment rights were violated by the defendants’ interference with his ability to send mail. Per
25 plaintiff, these individual acts comprise a pattern of interference with plaintiff’s rights and that he
26 was targeted personally due to his history of raising grievances against prison staff. ECF No. 1 at
27 3G-3H. Plaintiff alleges that under prison regulations he was eligible to send mail at no cost due
28 to his indigent status, and that defendants’ actions prevented him from corresponding with his
1 attorney about his criminal case and with the Attorney General’s Office and Office of the District
2 Attorney. Id. at 3E-3H. Plaintiff raises both claims against all defendants and alleges that the
3 claims arise from the same transaction and occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences,
4 because each instance of improper action identified in the complaint is part of a pattern and policy
5 of interfering with plaintiff’s ability to send mail. ECF No. 1 at 3G-3H.
6 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on November 30, 2022; February 23, 2023; May 29,
7 2023; and June 6, 2023, defendants D. Potts and C. Davis worked in the mailroom at the
8 California Health Care Facility, where plaintiff was housed, and wrongly informed him not to
9 attach a Trust Withdrawal Form to his outgoing mail, thereby preventing his mail from being
10 sent. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-6. Plaintiff appears to allege that defendant Davis both personally caused
11 plaintiff to be unable to send mail, and also is liable as defendant Potts’ supervisor, for permitting
12 Potts’ unlawful conduct and failing to take corrective action for same. Id. ¶¶ 1-7. Plaintiff
13 alleges that defendant Gina Jones is liable for, on May 16, 2023, finding Potts and Davis not
14 culpable of misconduct relating to some of these incidents. Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
15 Plaintiff also alleges that, “[i]n an ongoing campaign of harassment,” defendant Montaño
16 unlawfully confiscated his outgoing legal mail, on July 11, 2023. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.
17 Also relative to his first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant J. Schultz
18 unlawfully prevented him from sending mail on December 20, 2022; April 15, 2022; July 17,
19 2023; and April 30, 2023. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10-12.
20 Plaintiff alleges that defendant J. Guajardo was responsible for investigating plaintiff’s
21 complaints about some of these incidents, including that involving defendant Montaño, and
22 wrongly failed to consider plaintiff’s corroborating evidence and, consequently, failed to act on
23 plaintiff’s allegations of staff misconduct. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-16. Plaintiff alleges that defendant J.
24 Moeckly, on July 25, 2024, failed to preserve evidence relative to this investigation. ECF No. 1
25 at 3E.
26 Plaintiff also alleges that, on July 8, 2023 and October 18, 2023, defendant Howard
27 Moseley wrongfully prevented plaintiff from sending mail. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17-18.
28 ////
1 In his second cause of action, plaintiff alleges he was denied Equal Protection under the
2 Fourteen Amendment because, per plaintiff, in virtually every instance plaintiff identified in
3 Claim 1, the defendant was acting with animus towards plaintiff due to plaintiff’s membership in
4 the Coleman class, i.e., as a person with a mental disability.1 ECF No. 1 at 4, 4A-4I. Per
5 plaintiff, non-disabled, similarly situated persons were permitted to send outgoing mail upon a
6 demonstration of their indigence. Id. Plaintiff also alleges in this claim that the defendants’
7 actions constitute a failure to provide him a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with
8 Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, and that some of the defendants’ acts were retaliatory due
9 to his past filing of grievances. Id. at 4, 4A.
10 B. Analysis
11 1. Defects Common to Both Claims
12 a. Allegations Against California Department of Corrections and
13 Rehabilitation
14 Plaintiff names as a defendant the California Department of Corrections and
15 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). ECF No. 1 at 1, 1A, 2. CDCR is an agency of the State of California
16 and, as such, enjoys immunity from suit under the 11th Amendment. Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of
17 Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against CDCR are not
18 cognizable and CDCR is dismissed from this action.
19 b. Allegations Against Supervisors
20 In some of his allegations, plaintiff indicates that certain defendants are liable through
21 their role as the supervisors of other defendants. ECF No. 1 at 3, 3E, 4D, 4H. Generally,
22 supervisory personnel are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a
23

24 1 Plaintiff appears rely on the same factual allegations for Claim Two that he set forth for
Claim One, with the following exceptions: Claim Two makes no reference to the alleged
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wrongful acts of defendants Potts and Davis on November 30, 2022; February 23, 2023; May 29,
26 2023; and June 6, 2023, that were pled relative to Claim One; Claim Two omits allegations
concerning defendant Montaño on July 11, 2023, and instead raises allegations against defendants
27 Montaño, Potts, and Davis for conduct occurring on July 12, 2023; and Claim One omits
allegations against defendant Moseley for events occurring on August 14, 2023, which plaintiff
28 raises in Claim Two. See ECF No. 1 at 3-4I.
1 theory of “respondeat superior” but may be liable where plaintiff shows a causal link between the
2 supervisor and the claimed constitutional violation. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th
3 Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941
4 (1979). When pleading, the plaintiff cannot rely on merely vague and conclusory allegations
5 concerning the involvement of official personnel in his civil rights violations, but must allege
6 facts showing the defendant’s personal participation in a violation of plaintiff’s rights. See Ivey v.
7 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
8 Here, it appears that plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Davis and defendant
9 Moeckly allege merely that these persons are liable for failing to take corrective action when their
10 subordinates violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 at 3, 3E, 4D, 4H. To the extent
11 this advances a theory of their liability as “respondeat superior,” these allegations fail as a matter
12 of law. Should plaintiff amend his complaint to include allegations against these defendants, the
13 allegations must specifically allege the conduct undertaken by these defendants that caused
14 plaintiff’s constitutional deprivations. See Fayle, 607 F.2d at 862. As currently pled, the
15 allegations against defendant Davis and Moeckly must be dismissed for failing to set forth
16 specific acts they committed that caused plaintiff’s rights violations.
17 2. Claim One
18 Because plaintiff’s first claim fails to meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of providing each
19 defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” see Twombly,
20 550 U.S. at 554, dismissal of this claim is proper. In Claim One, plaintiff alleges multiple
21 instances, perpetrated by different defendants, that each constituted a violation of his First
22 Amendment rights, when he was inhibited from sending outgoing mail to his attorney, the
23 Attorney General, and the District Attorney. Plaintiff alleges that each instance of improper
24 action identified in the complaint is part of a pattern and policy of interfering with his ability to
25 send mail. ECF No. 1 at 3G-3H. Under this theory, joinder of the defendants is proper. See, e.g.,
26 Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff’s allegations, however,
27 implicate distinct theories of First Amendment violations, which have differing legal standards
28 that a plaintiff must meet to prove his case. For the reasons set forth below, Claim One must be
1 dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a).
2 As a general matter, persons who are incarcerated have a First Amendment interest in
3 sending mail and prison officials cannot interfere with that right unless such interference is
4 reasonably related to legitimate penological interests:

5 Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v.
Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). . . . “[C]ensorship of prisoner
6 mail is justified only if ‘the regulation or practice in question [ ] further[s] an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
7 expression’ and ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
8 involved.’” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224
(1974) (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104
9 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135
L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (“[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional
10 rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
(internal quotations omitted)). Prison officials do not need to show that there is no
11 less restrictive mail policy that could serve the same penological interests. See
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 412; Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265.
12
Challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment
13 interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the
corrections system. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Prison officials must
14 show that “a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.”
15 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413. “Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that
furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will
16 nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.” Id. at 413-14. As a
rule, the courts closely examine the fit between asserted penological interest and
17 the particular outgoing mail being censored, rather than accept at face-value an
assertion by prison officials that the confiscation serves security or rehabilitation
18 interests. Woodard v. Haviland, No. 2:11-cv-1807 LKK JFM, 2013 WL 753458,
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) report and recommendation adopted in part,
19 rejected in part, No. CIV. S–11–1807 LKK, 2013 WL 5305759 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
19, 2013). Because a balancing of those rights and interests requires the parties to
20 make an evidentiary showing as to their positions, the court is not in a position to
make a determination at the pleading stage. Barrett, 544 F.3d at 1062. Isolated
21 incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section
1983 for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320
22 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th
Cir.1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990).
23
24 K’Napp v. Adams, No. 1:06-CV-01701-LJO, 2015 WL 5138237, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1,
25 2015). Here, all of plaintiff’s allegations for Claim One appear to implicate this standard, as
26 plaintiff’s complaints center on instances where the individual defendants, in their respective
27 roles, prevented him from sending mail through the “indigent trust withdrawal” program. ECF
28 No. 1 at 3, 3A-3I.
1 In some of the allegations of Claim One, however, plaintiff alleges that defendants
2 impeded his mail communications with his counsel concerning his criminal case and with the
3 Attorney General and District Attorney’s offices concerning, possibly, grievances against prison
4 officials. ECF No. 1 at 3, 3A-3B, 3G-3H. These allegations may implicate not only plaintiff’s
5 First Amendment rights to communicate with others generally, but also his rights under the First
6 Amendment to access to the courts. In order to prove a prison official denied him access to the
7 courts in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s acts or
8 omissions frustrated or hindered him in litigating his criminal appeal, habeas corpus action, or
9 conditions of confinement suit, and that he suffered an actual injury as a result, i.e., that he had “a
10 nonfrivolous legal claim [that] had been frustrated or was being impeded.” Lewis v. Casey, 518
11 U.S. 343, 353 (1996); see also Rodriguez v. Stone, No. 1:06-cv-00663-OWW-SMS-PC, 2007 WL
12 4287818, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007). “Actual injury” means “actual prejudice with respect to
13 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a
14 claim.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr., 648 F.3d at 1018 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349).
15 Some of plaintiff’s allegations suggest this theory. Plaintiff alleges that defendant
16 Guajardo, on October 10, 2023, January 22, 2024, and/or May 1, 2024, impeded plaintiff’s
17 communications with his defense counsel concerning a claim of actual innocence Superior Court
18 proceedings, and that defendant Moeckly is liable, in part, for his failure to discipline defendant
19 Guarjardo for this act. ECF No. 1 at 3C, 3E. Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that, on November
20 30, 2022; February 23, 2023; May 29, 2023; and/or June 6, 2023, defendants Potts and Davis
21 impeded plaintiff’s ability to send mail to “various Attorney General and government claims civil
22 division, San Diego County District, Office of Appeals Department of Corrections and
23 Rehabilitation,” ECF No. 1 at 3A, and that defendants’ Schultz’s and Jones’s liabilities arise from
24 their facilitation of Schultz’s and Jones’s conduct. ECF No. 1 at 3, 3B. The complaint also
25 alleges that defendant Montaño prevented plaintiff from sending a letter to plaintiff’s defense
26 counsel on July 11, 2023, ECF No. 1 at 3A-3B, and appears to allege that defendant Guajardo has
27 additional liability from his relationship to this event, and that defendant Moeckly is also liable
28 through his participation in this event. ECF No. 1 at 3C, 3E. The complaint also alleges that
1 defendant Moseley, on July 8, 2023, prevented plaintiff from mailing a letter to the Department of
2 General Services for exhaustion of a legal claim, and on October 18, 2023, prevented plaintiff
3 from mailing a letter to the Office of the Attorney General. ECF No. 1 at 3D.
4 If plaintiff intended to plead a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by
5 defendants’ impeding his access to the courts, his allegations are insufficient for failing to plead
6 the actual injury he suffered for any of the defendants’ alleged acts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353.
7 If, instead or additionally, plaintiff intended to plead that his First Amendment rights were
8 violated by defendants’ interference with his outgoing mail, his allegations failed to indicate that
9 with sufficient clarity to give the defendants notice of the nature of the legal claim against them.
10 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
11 Regardless of the particular legal theory advanced in Claim One, plaintiff’s allegations fail
12 to give the defendants proper notice of the facts on which the claim is based. Plaintiff’s
13 allegations against defendants Guajardo, Moeckley, Potts, Davis, Schulz, and Jones identify
14 multiple dates on which events occurred, without specifying what allegedly-wrongful act
15 occurred on what date. ECF No. 1 at 3A-3E. Plaintiff’s allegations against defendants Jones,
16 Guarjado, and Mosley fail to specify what particular acts they committed that form the basis of
17 their liability. Id. These omissions stymie the defendants’ ability to respond to these allegations,
18 making the complaint defective under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. For all these reasons, Claim One is dismissed with leave to amend.
20 3. Claim Two
21 In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that his rights to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
22 Amendment were violated by the defendants’ acts identified in Claim One, because these acts
23 reflected discrimination against plaintiff on the basis of his mental disability. ECF No. 1 at 4, 4A.
24 Per plaintiff, nondisabled persons were given access to the “indigent trust withdrawal” mail
25 program, and defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s access reflective arbitrary and capricious action
26 without legitimate penological purpose. Id. at 4A-4I. Under this claim heading, plaintiff also
27 alleges that the defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act
28 and Rehabilitation Act, by failing to provide him reasonable accommodations, namely, access to
1 the “indigent trust withdrawal” mail program. Id. at 4, 4A-4I. In this claim, plaintiff also alleges
2 that defendants Potts’, Davis’, Guarjardo’s, and Jones’ acts constituted unlawful retaliation
3 against him, due to his having filed grievances in the past. Id. at 4D, 4E, 4G.
4 Plaintiff’s allegations in Claim Two implicate different legal rights and are resolved under
5 differing legal standards. To plead a claim of a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Equal
6 Protection rights, plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that defendants acted with the intent
7 and purpose to discriminate against him based upon membership in a protected class, or that
8 defendants purposefully treated him differently than similarly situated individuals without any
9 rational basis for the disparate treatment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.
10 2001); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Here, plaintiff alleges
11 that the latter standard is met by acts committed by the defendants in specific instances. ECF No.
12 1 at 4A-4I. Nonetheless, these factual allegations have the same defects as those in Claim One:
13 plaintiff, in certain instances, alleges violations occurred on particular dates, without alleging any
14 facts identifying what wrongful acts occurred on which dates, see ECF No. 1 at 4B, 4E, 4F; and
15 plaintiff fails to allege the specific acts undertaken by defendants Jones, Guarjado, or Mosley that
16 plaintiff believes violated his rights. See ECF No. 1 at 4D-4G.
17 In Claim Two, plaintiff also alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the
18 Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. ECF No. 1 at 4, 4H-4I. To state a claim
19 of disability discrimination in the provision of inmate services, programs, or activities under the
20 ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must plead either (1) discrimination based on
21 disparate treatment or impact, or (2) denial of reasonable modifications or accommodations.
22 Dunlap v. Ass'n of Bay Area Gov'ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[T]he ADA not
23 only protects against disparate treatment, it also creates an affirmative duty in some
24 circumstances to provide special, preferred treatment, or ‘reasonable accommodation.’”). Here,
25 plaintiff pleads that his rights under these Acts were violated pursuant to both theories,
26 incorporating his earlier-pled factual allegations. ECF No. 1 at 4H-4I. These factual allegations
27 are defective for the reasons explained above, in that they cite dates on which an alleged violation
28 occurred, without stating the facts of what occurred on those dates, and they fail to set forth
1 particular factual allegations for how each defendant caused the complained-of violation,
2 particularly those defendants identified to have acted in supervisory roles. Moreover, by raising
3 allegations under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in Claim Two, plaintiff fails to give the
4 defendants proper notice of the particular right they are alleged to have violated. In order to state
5 a claim for relief, a plaintiff must allege facts that show the violation of a single legal right.
6 Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927); see Dern v. Tanner, 96 F.2d 401, 403
7 (9th Cir. 1938); see, e.g., McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A cause of
8 action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show.”).
9 Thus, if plaintiff seeks to allege that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth
10 Amendment, his rights under the ADA, and his rights under the Rehabilitation Act, these should
11 be pled as separate claims. See Phillips, 274 U.S. at 321. This is true even where the plaintiff
12 relies on the same facts to support each claim, or relies on various theories in support of any
13 particular claim that a specific legal right was violated. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Bd. of Trs. of
14 Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1986). As currently pled, Claim Two
15 fails to give the defendants notice of the right plaintiff asserts they transgressed, and as such
16 should be dismissed. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding dismissal
17 proper under Rule 8(a) where complaint does not contain “sufficient allegations of underlying
18 facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively”); Nevijel v.
19 N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding court may dismiss a complaint
20 for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if it is “confusing”); see, e.g., Debbs v. Valley Convalescent
21 Hosp., No. 1:22-CV-00248-AWI-BAK, 2022 WL 2873055, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2022)
22 (dismissing complaint under Rule 8(a) where “it is not clear what claims Plaintiff is attempting to
23 bring as he lists multiple legal theories in a single paragraph”).
24 The same defects require dismissal of plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation. A claim of
25 retaliation arises under the First Amendment: the First Amendment guarantees incarcerated
26 persons the right to file grievances against a prison and a state actor’s retaliation against the
27 incarcerated person for filing grievances serves to undermine the First Amendment protections.
28 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). To state a claim for retaliation in
1 violation of the First Amendment, an incarcerated plaintiff must allege five elements: “(1) An
2 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
3 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First
4 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”
5 Id.; see also Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations
6 against defendants Potts, Davis, Guarjardo, and Jones for unlawful retaliation, see ECF No. 1 at
7 4D, 4E, 4G, are inadequate under Rule 8(a) because, as discussed above, they fail to identify what
8 wrongful acts occurred on which dates that plaintiff cites; fail to identify particular acts
9 undertaken by persons in supervisory roles, which would render them liable; and improperly join
10 in a single claim allegations of violations of distinct legal rights. For these additional reasons,
11 dismissal of Claim Two is proper.
12 Leave to Amend. The court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
13 complaint to attempt to cure the defects identified in this order.
14 Any amended complaint must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s
15 direction to state each claim in a short and plain manner. The amended complaint must contain
16 facts – not legal conclusions – supporting each element of the claims alleged.
17 Any amended complaint must not join unrelated claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
18 18(a) allows a plaintiff to assert multiple claims when they are against a single defendant.
19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants to a lawsuit
20 where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
21 or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
22 action.” Unrelated claims against different defendants must therefore be pursued in separate
23 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only
24 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to
25 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees— for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to
26 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the
27 required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id.
28 ////
1 Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally
2 participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v.
3 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a
4 constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is
5 legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).
6 It must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
7 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims in the
8 amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
9 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself
10 without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended
11 complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the
12 earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114
13 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter
14 being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.
15 1967)).
16 The court cautions plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
17 Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed.
18 See Local Rule 110.
19 IV. Summary of Order
20 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
21 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
22 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in
23 accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and
24 Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
25 3. The complaint is dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of
26 this order. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case
27 and be titled “Amended Complaint.”
28 4. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be
1 dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or failure to prosecute.
2 Dated: April 6, 2026
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379658. Public record. Not legal advice.