# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · April 24, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379228

## Case

- **Full name:** Johnny Ray Butler v. David Shinn, Warden
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** April 24, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379228

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JOHNNY RAY BUTLER, ) Case No. CV 18-3011-PA (SP)
)
12 Petitioner, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
) DISMISSING PETITION FOR
13 v. ) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
)
14 DAVID SHINN, Warden, )
)
15 Respondent. )
)
16 )
17
18 I.
19 INTRODUCTION
20 On April 10, 2018, petitioner Johnny Ray Butler, a federal prisoner
21 proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
22 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), challenging his criminal conviction and sentence in the
23 United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. Petitioner is currently
24 incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Complex at Victorville, California. In the
25 Petition, petitioner claims he is actually innocent of his conviction for engaging in
26 a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), and therefore his life sentence violates
27 his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
28
1 Petitioner further seems to argue the jury instructions were deficient in light of
2 Richardson v. U.S., 526 U.S. 813, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1999).
3 This is petitioner’s fourth attempt to challenge his conviction by way of
4 § 2241 petition to this Court. As with his previous three petitions, the Court finds
5 the instant Petition must be dismissed because petitioner has failed to demonstrate
6 that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides an inadequate or ineffective remedy to test the
7 legality of his detention.
8 II.
9 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
10 Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of
11 Nebraska in 1993, petitioner was found guilty of: (1) money laundering involving
12 drug proceeds (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)); (2) knowingly engaging in a continuing
13 criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848); and (3) conspiracy to distribute cocaine
14 base (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846). See Petition at 2-3;1 U.S. v. Johnson, 28 F.3d
15 1487, 1492 (8th Cir. 1994). Because the conspiracy to distribute count is a lesser
16 included offense to the CCE count, the trial court vacated the jury’s verdict on the
17 conspiracy to distribute count. See Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1492 n.3. The trial court
18 sentenced petitioner to life in prison. Id. at 1492. Petitioner appealed, and the
19 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction on
20 July 11, 1994. Id. at 1492, 1501; see Petition, App. C.
21 On April 4, 1997, petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the United
22 States District Court for the District of Nebraska in case number CV 97-169,
23 which was denied on January 21, 1998. See Petition at 4-5, App. D; Motion, U.S.
24 v. Butler, No. 8:92-cr-00014-LES-1 (D. Neb. Apr. 4, 1997), docket no. 866; Order,
25 U.S. v. Butler, No. 8:92-cr-00014-LES-1 (D. Neb. Jan. 21, 1998), docket no. 894.
26
27
1 For references to the Petition, the Court refers to page numbers provided by
28 the Court’s electronic case management system.
1 On appeal of that denial, petitioner challenged his CCE conviction arguing: (1) he
2 is actually innocent as there was insufficient evidence to support the CCE
3 conviction; (2) that Richardson – decided after his § 2255 motion – should apply
4 retroactively to his case; (3) the jury instructions on CCE were inappropriate in
5 light of Richardson; and (4) that his attorney was ineffective for failing to make
6 various arguments with respect to the jury instructions. U.S. v. Scott, 218 F.3d
7 835, 837 (8th Cir. 2000). On July 7, 2000, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
8 Nebraska District Court’s judgment. See Petition at 5, App. E; Scott, 218 F.3d at
9 840. On May 14, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for authorization to file a second
10 or successive § 2255 motion, which was denied by the Eighth Circuit on July 9,
11 2001. Mandate/Judgment, U.S. v. Butler, No. 8:92-cr-00014-LES-1 (D. Neb. July
12 9, 2001), docket no. 934.
13 On August 5, 2003, petitioner filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
14 § 2241 in this Court in case number CV 03-5578-GAF (CT). In the petition,
15 petitioner argued that he is actually innocent of the CCE conviction, and that, in
16 light of Richardson, the trial court violated his constitutional rights. On August
17 13, 2003, judgment was entered dismissing the § 2241 petition because petitioner
18 failed to demonstrate that § 2255 was an inadequate or ineffective remedy to test
19 the legality of his detention. On October 6, 2003, this Court denied petitioner’s
20 request for a certificate of appealability. On December 23, 2003, the Ninth Circuit
21 denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.
22 Petitioner filed a second request to file a successive § 2255 motion in the
23 Nebraska District Court, which was denied by the Eighth Circuit on September 3,
24 2004. See Mandate/Judgment, U.S. v. Butler, No. 8:92-cr-00014-LES-1 (D. Neb.
25 Sept. 3, 2004), docket no. 983.
26 On August 1, 2005, petitioner filed a second § 2241 petition in this Court in
27 case number CV 05-5558-GAF (CT), raising the same claims as in the August 5,
28
1 2003 § 2241 petition. On August 8, 2005, judgment was entered dismissing the
2 petition because petitioner again had not demonstrated that § 2255 was an
3 inadequate or ineffective remedy to test the legality of his detention.
4 Petitioner filed a third § 2241 petition in this Court on July 1, 2011, in case
5 number CV 11-5487-GAF (SP), raising the same claims as in the August 5, 2003
6 § 2241 petition – that he is actually innocent of the CCE conviction and that
7 Richardson should apply retroactively to his case. On August 5, 2011, judgment
8 was entered dismissing the petition because petitioner once again had failed to
9 demonstrate that § 2255 was an inadequate or ineffective remedy to test the
10 legality of his detention.
11 On April 10, 2018, petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition in this Court,
12 raising the same claims he raised in his previous petitions.
13 III.
14 DISCUSSION
15 Petitioner seeks to challenge his conviction and sentence pursuant to a
16 § 2241 habeas petition. Petitioner contends he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C.
17 § 2241 because he is actually innocent and because Richardson was not in
18 existence when he filed his initial § 2255 motion. See Petition at 29, 31.
19 Petitioner asserts the witness testimony and surveillance evidence presented at
20 trial failed to prove the existence of a continuing criminal enterprise, which makes
21 him factually innocent. Id. at 29. In Richardson, the Supreme Court held that a
22 jury in a CCE case must unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed
23 some continuing series of violations, but also must unanimously agree which
24 specific violations make up that continuing series. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815,
25 824. Petitioner asserts Richardson applies retroactively, and argues the jury was
26 not instructed on which specific violations they had to find. Petition at 3, 31. But
27 petitioner’s “actual innocence” and Richardson claims fail to meet the criteria to
28
1 qualify for the savings clause provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and therefore he
2 may not raise them in a § 2241 petition.
3 A. Section 2255 Generally Provides the Exclusive Remedy for Federal
4 Prisoners to Collaterally Attack Their Convictions
5 Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner claiming that his sentence was
6 imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” to “move
7 the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
8 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence
9 must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge
10 the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought
11 pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861,
12 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). A prisoner may not bring a second or successive
13 § 2255 motion in district court without first seeking and obtaining certification
14 from “a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Harrison
15 v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2008).
16 Petitioner here has already filed a § 2255 motion, and there is no indication
17 he has received permission from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to file
18 another at this time. Indeed, as recounted above, he has previously been denied
19 such permission. Yet he seeks to challenge his conviction and sentence in the
20 instant § 2241 Petition, something he may ordinarily do only in a § 2255 motion.
21 There is, however, an exception – a “savings clause” or “escape hatch” – to
22 this general rule. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956; Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864 n.2;
23 Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner may file
24 a habeas petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality of a sentence when the
25 prisoner’s remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
26 his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
27 The exception under § 2255(e) is “narrow” and will not apply “merely
28
1 because § 2255’s gatekeeping provisions,” such as the statute of limitations or the
2 limitation on successive petitions, now prevent the courts from considering a
3 § 2255 motion. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
4 Lorentson, 223 F.3d at 953 (ban on unauthorized successive petitions does not per
5 se make § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective”); Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055
6 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 2255 not inadequate or ineffective simply because
7 the district court dismissed the § 2255 motion as successive and court of appeals
8 did not authorize a successive motion). A petition meets the “escape hatch”
9 criteria of § 2255(e) “when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and
10 (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.”
11 Harrison, 519 F.3d at 959 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12 B. Petitioner Does Not Qualify for § 2255’s Savings Clause
13 To demonstrate that he never had an “unobstructed procedural shot,” a
14 petitioner must show that he never had an opportunity to raise the claim of actual
15 innocence on appeal or in a § 2255 motion. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. In
16 making this determination, the Court considers “(1) whether the legal basis for
17 petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and
18 first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to
19 petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
20 citation omitted). Petitioner’s assertion of insufficient evidence is not an actual
21 innocence claim, and in any event is plainly not based on any new evidence; he
22 only provides a thorough presentation of the witness testimony from his trial. See
23 Petition at 6-29. He details the testimony of Ivory Mitchell, Keith Johnson,
24 Charles Morrison, and Clifford Wayne Jameson. Id. But he does not provide any
25 new evidence that has surfaced since the trial. Petitioner’s Richardson claim,
26 however, is new law, as it did not arise until two years after he filed his initial
27 § 2255 petition. Accordingly, petitioner arguably has not had an opportunity to
28
1 present his Richardson claim in a § 2255 motion. But petitioner’s Richardson
2 claim does nothing to establish his actual innocence.
3 To establish actual innocence for the purposes of § 2255’s savings clause, a
4 petitioner “must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than
5 not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Stephens v. Herrera, 464
6 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.
7 Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)). “A petitioner is actually innocent when he
8 was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” Alaimalo v. U.S., 645 F.3d
9 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
10 The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a “Richardson claim is not, by itself, a
11 claim of actual innocence.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 899. Moreover, “Richardson
12 does not render defendants who were convicted of conducting a [continuing
13 criminal enterprise] not guilty, or actually innocent, merely because the trial court
14 gave instructions that did not comply with the rule announced therein.” Id.
15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Other courts to consider this issue
16 have also held that a petitioner may not raise a Richardson claim in a § 2241
17 petition based upon § 2255’s savings clause. See Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d
18 827, 831 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (while the lack of a jury instruction in
19 accordance with Richardson may have been error in the petitioner’s trial, it was
20 “not the sort of defect that can support a claim under the savings clause of
21 § 2255”); Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 2003) ( “Richardson claim
22 is not the sort that will permit passage through the narrow opening of § 2255’s
23 savings clause”); Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
24 Richardson claim is not the type of defect that opens the portal to a § 2241
25 proceeding.”).
26 In this case, the evidence against petitioner was sufficiently strong. At trial,
27 the government presented the following evidence:
28
1 [Petitioner] and [Christopher] Scott set up a crack distribution ring in
2 Omaha, Nebraska and recruited Ivory Mitchell and [Errol] Skeete to
3 run a twenty-four-hour-per-day crack house. Further evidence
4 indicated that [petitioner] and Scott provided Mitchell and Skeete
5 with the cocaine, collected the proceeds from the sales, and monitored
6 the sales. The crack house apparently serviced several hundred
7 people each day. Mitchell, testifying for the government, claimed
8 that [petitioner] and Scott employed an array of street dealers.
9 According to Mitchell, the street dealers occasionally would receive
10 their supply of crack from Skeete and Mitchell at the crack house and
11 give the proceeds of their sales directly to Skeete and Mitchell for
12 conveyance to [petitioner] and Scott.
13 Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1492. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that, in light of all the
14 evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror, properly instructed as
15 to the elements of the crime, would have found petitioner guilty of CCE.
16 Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, petitioner’s remedy under § 2255
17 was not “inadequate or ineffective” so as to permit the assertion of his Richardson
18 claim in a § 2241 petition.
19 C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction
20 For the reasons stated above, petitioner may only bring his claims in a
21 § 2255 motion. This raises the question of whether the Court should
22 recharacterize the Petition as a § 2255 motion. If it did so, this Court would lack
23 jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d
24 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ҥ 2255 motions must be filed in the district where the
25 petitioner was sentenced”). As petitioner is serving a sentence imposed by the
26 United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, only that court has
27 jurisdiction to entertain a § 2255 motion.
28
1 The Court must therefore determine whether to transfer the action to the
2 sentencing court or to simply dismiss it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Transfer is
3 appropriate if three conditions are met: (1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction;
4 (2) the transferee could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed;
5 and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d
6 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Kolek v. Engen, 869 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir.
7 1989)). The first condition is met here, as discussed above, but the other two are
8 not.
9 If the Petition were brought as a § 2255 motion in the District of Nebraska,
10 it would be a successive motion, since petitioner has previously filed and was
11 denied relief on a § 2255 motion. Petitioner would have to move for authorization
12 to file a successive motion from the Eighth Circuit. Petitioner apparently does not
13 have the requisite authorization, and the Eighth Circuit has already denied
14 petitioner authorization to assert previous successive § 2255 motions. This
15 motion, if filed in the District of Nebraska, would clearly be barred as successive,
16 as well as untimely, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f) and (h). Thus, the second
17 condition, that the Nebraska District Court could exercise jurisdiction, is not met.
18 The third condition is also not met. Because the transferee court would not
19 be able to exercise jurisdiction over the instant Petition, transfer of the case would
20 not further the interests of justice. Accordingly, dismissal of the instant § 2241
21 Petition is warranted.
22 //
23 //
24
25
26
27
28
l IV.
2 ORDER
3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered dismissing the
4 || Petition without prejudice.
5
6
7 || DATED: April 24, 2018
g gee _

10 UNITED ST TES DISTRICT JUDGE
i Presented eh ¥Y
12
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11379228. Public record. Not legal advice.