# Baker

> District Court, S.D. New York · January 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11378680

## Case

- **Full name:** Russell J. Baker, et al. v. Joseph Peters, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOC
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED: _ 1/9/2026
RUSSELL J. BAKER, ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
7:25 CV 2609 (NSR)
-against-
OPINION & ORDER
JOSEPH PETERS, ET AL.,
Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge:
Individuals Russell J. Baker and Wade St. Germain (together, “Individual Plaintiffs”) and
business entities Beaverkill Studio, Inc., R.J. Baker Corp., Exit 98 Corp., d/b/a/ Cabernet Frank’s
(together, “Entity Plaintiffs”; together with the Individual Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action
against Defendants Blake Starner, Michael Schiff, Victor Zayas, Michael Barrett, Rachel
Bitjeman, Onyxx Clarke, and the Sullivan County Sheriff's Office (collectively, “County
Defendants”) and against Joseph Peters and Joseph Peters Jr. (together, “Peters Defendants”),
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of their due process rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments by County Defendants and violations of section 3604(a) of the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”) by the Peters Defendants. The Complaint alleges that their neighbors, the
Peters Defendants, repeatedly harassed Plaintiffs on the basis of their sexual orientation and that
County Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and
Fourth Amendments by (a) withholding proper and expected protections from the Peters
Defendants, based on their sexual orientation and (b) false arrest and excessive force. (See
generally Complaint, ECF No. 1.)

' The Peters Defendants appear pro se in this action.

The County Defendants and the Peters Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). The County Defendants
further moved to dismiss the Entity Plaintiffs’ due process claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”) for lack of standing. For the following reasons, the

County Defendants’ and the Peters Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes
of resolving the motions filed by the County Defendants and the Peters Defendants.
The Individual Plaintiffs are a married same-sex couple. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs and the
Peters Defendants own neighboring properties in Parksville, Sullivan County, New York.
Plaintiffs use their properties as both a residence and place of business, including a production
studio, Beaverkill Studio, and a restaurant, Cabernet Frank’s (Exit 98 Corp.). (Id. ¶¶ 17–19.) The
Peters Defendants’ property benefits from a ten-foot right-of-way across one of Plaintiffs’
properties, the scope and limitations of which were adjudicated by the Sullivan County Supreme

Court. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Plaintiffs allege that the Peters Defendants have misused the right-of-way
as a staging area for anti-gay slurs and threats. (Id.)
According to the Complaint, beginning in 2017, the Peters Defendants engaged in repeated
verbal and physical threats and harassment of the Individual Plaintiffs based on their sexual
orientation. The Complaint details numerous incidents and exchanges between the parties that
occurred intermittently over several years and continued through 2024, when Plaintiffs were
allegedly forced to abandon their home and businesses due to the ongoing harassment. (Id. ¶¶ 20–
150.) During this period, police were summoned on numerous occasions, orders of protection
(“OOPs”) were issued, and Defendant Joseph Peters was charged and, in some instances convicted,
of multiple criminal offenses, including criminal contempt, harassment, disorderly conduct, and
stalking. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further allege that between 2017 and 2024, the County Defendants repeatedly
failed to enforce active OOPs, instead issuing verbal warnings to the Peters Defendants, crediting

the Peters Defendants’ accounts over Plaintiffs’ in response to reported OOP violations, and
otherwise responding inadequately to Plaintiffs’ complaints of harassment. (Id. ¶¶ 47–50, 61–67,
80–88, 90–92, 96–108, 110–118, 128–131, 135–144, 148–150, 156–157.)
On October 14, 2024, the Peters Defendants filed a complaint alleging that Plaintiff Baker
violated an OOP by throwing a bucket of water on Defendant Joseph Peters. (Id. ¶ 158.) Plaintiffs
allege that this incident never occurred, and that the complaint was false. Nevertheless, Deputy
Sheriffs Clarke and Bitjeman arrested Plaintiff Baker. (Id. ¶ 159.) Plaintiffs allege that Clarke
forced Baker face-down onto the ground with a knee pressed against his back, while Bitjeman used
her baton against Baker’s back. (Id. ¶¶ 163–165.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert that the County Defendants violated their rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that the Peters Defendants violated their rights
under the FHA.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 31, 2025 with the filing of the Complaint. (ECF
No. 1.) The Peters Defendants moved to dismiss the FHA claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and
each filed a memorandum of law (“Peters MoL”, ECF No. 39; “Peters Jr. MoL”, ECF No. 40).
County Defendants also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ due process claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6)
and 12(b)(1) and filed a memorandum of law. (“County MoL”, ECF No. 51.) Plaintiffs filed an
opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss (“Pl. Opp.”, ECF No. 53) and County Defendants
filed a reply (“County Reply”, ECF No. 52).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court “must take all facts alleged
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, but jurisdiction
must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings
inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167,
170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]he plaintiff bears
the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). Courts “may
consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue, but
[they] may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits.” J.S. ex rel.
N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. While
the Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the
non-moving party’s favor, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation,” or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Second Circuit
“deem[s] a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any
statements or documents incorporated in it by reference ... and documents that plaintiffs either
possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit.” Rotham v. Gregor, 220

F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The critical inquiry is whether the Plaintiff
has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations “allow[ ] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant
part, that: “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive
rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United
States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144
n.3 (1979); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: “(1) that the defendants deprived him of a right
‘secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States’; and (2) that they did so ‘under color of
state law.’” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of their due process rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and for violations of the FHA. The Court addresses the County
Defendants’ and the Peters Defendants’ motions to dismiss in turn.

A. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs seek damages from the County Defendants for alleged violations of their
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim under § 1983; that Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims are time-barred and
barred by qualified immunity; that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts establishing the personal
involvement of Sheriff Michael Schiff or the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office in the alleged
violations; and that the Entity Plaintiffs lack standing.2 The Court agrees.
1F
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim Under State-Created Danger
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “as a general matter, a State’s failure to protect
an individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). The Second Circuit
recognizes two narrow exceptions to this rule: the “special relationship” exception and the “state-
created danger” exception. Tufaro v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7505 (AJN), 2014 WL
4290631, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014). “If a plaintiff’s claim satisfies one or both of these
theories, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant’s conduct was ‘so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience’ to sustain a
substantive due process claim.” Spiezio v. Martinez, 653 F. Supp. 3d 8, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)
(quoting Golian v. N.Y. City Admin. for Children Servs., 282 F. Supp. 3d 718, 728 (S.D.N.Y.

2 As the County Defendants challenged only Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims in their
memorandum of law, the Court does not address Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims in this Opinion.
2017)). “In order to shock the conscience and trigger a violation of substantive due process, official
conduct must be outrageous and egregious under the circumstances; it must be truly ‘brutal and
offensive to human dignity.’” Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith
v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiffs assert their Fourteenth Amendment claims only under the state-created danger
exception. That exception “requires…affirmative, rather than passive, conduct on the part of a
government actor that ‘communicates, explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private
violence.’” Tufaro v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7505 AJN, 2014 WL 4290631, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2014) (citing Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall–on–Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 429 (2d
Cir. 2009)).
Several Second Circuit cases illustrate the type of conduct sufficient to support application
of the state-created danger exception. In Okin, the complaint alleged that police officers repeatedly
ignored a woman’s complaints of domestic abuse by her partner, who was personally friendly with
the officers. 577 F.3d at 429–30. The abuser admitted to police that he had physically assaulted

his partner, yet officers failed to arrest him or prepare domestic incident reports. Id. In upholding
plaintiff’s due process claim under the state-created danger exception, the Second Circuit
emphasized the well-known and acute risks inherent in domestic violence situations and concluded
that the officers’ “deliberate indifference”—combined with their repeated inaction in the face of
explicit admissions of abuse—amounted to conscience-shocking conduct that implicitly
sanctioned the abuse. Id. at 431–32.
Similarly, in Pearce v. Estate of Longo, the court upheld the plaintiff’s substantive due
process claims under the state-created danger exception, finding that a police officer’s supervisors
were “well-aware of the ongoing abuse and threatening behavior” he exhibited before ultimately
stabbing his wife to death and committing suicide. 766 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 2011),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Pearce v. Labella, 473 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012). In Pearce,
the complaint alleged that the victim had made multiple formal reports and repeatedly contacted
the police department to express her concerns, yet her husband’s supervisors discouraged her from

filing reports or seeking an OOP and failed to discipline or suspend him, confiscate his firearms,
or evaluate his mental condition. Id. The Court noted that “[t]he dangers of domestic violence are
well-established and should be known by the law enforcement defendants,” who had ample time
to respond to the victim’s repeated complaints appropriately. Id. The court further concluded that
the defendants’ conduct was conscience-shocking and, as in Okin, “had implicitly encouraged the
offender’s behavior and, thereby, increased the risk of danger to the victim in violation of the Due
Process Clause.” Id.
In Dwares v. City of New York, the complaint alleged, among other things, that one of the
defendant officers confirmed to a reporter that police officers had told a group of racist private
actors known as “skinheads” that “unless they got completely out of control the police would

neither interfere with their assaults nor arrest them.” 985 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1993). These prior
assurances were borne out when plaintiff was violently assaulted by members of the skinheads
during a protest in the presence of police officers who failed to intervene, resulting in injury. Id.
In reversing the lower court, the Second Circuit held that, unlike DeShaney, the factual allegations
in Dwares “went well beyond the allegations that the defendant officers merely stood by and did
nothing.” Id. at 99. Rather, the complaint alleged that the officers “conspired with the skinheads”
and provided “prior assurances” of noninterference, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
skinheads would assault protestors. Id. As the court explained, “[s]uch a prearranged official
sanction of privately inflicted injury would surely have violated the victim’s rights under the Due
Process Clause.” Id.
While these cases are not exhaustive, they illustrate the type of affirmative, conscience-
shocking conduct required to state a claim under the state-created danger exception. The inquiry

is inherently fact-specific and turns on whether state actors affirmatively increased a plaintiff’s
risk of harm. In opposing dismissal, Plaintiffs cited to several cases—Pena v. DePrisco, Okin,
Lombardi, Coleman v. County of Suffolk, and Eubanks v. Hansell—without meaningfully
comparing the allegations in those cases to the allegations here. Of those cases, only Okin and
Pena sustained claims under the state-created danger exception. Okin is distinguishable for the
reasons discussed above, and Pena is likewise inapposite. Pena involved a police officer with a
known history of alcohol abuse who struck and killed three pedestrians after a 12-hour drinking
binge with fellow officers and supervisors. The complaint alleged that throughout his tenure, the
officer was “never questioned, disciplined, or counseled regarding his alcohol use,” and, instead,
routinely drank alcohol with other officers at or near the police precinct house, openly and with

supervisors’ knowledge. Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F. 3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2005). The complaint further
alleged that fellow officers “hindered the investigation” of the incident by failing to administer
sobriety tests at the scene, delaying testing of the officer’s blood alcohol level for several hours,
sending his blood to an unauthorized laboratory rather than the medical examiner, failing to
develop photographs taken at the scene, losing or destroying inculpatory evidence, intimidating
witnesses, and suppressing the results of an alcohol sensor test. Pena, 432 F. 3d at 103–104.
Distinguishing between “conduct that is ‘passive’ as in DeShaney and that which is ‘affirmative’
as in Dwares,” the Second Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ state-created danger theory based on
allegations that certain officers “stood by and did nothing” to prevent the intoxicated officer’s
conduct, but upheld it on the basis that other officers encouraged the intoxicated officer “to drink
to excess and drive in that condition.” Id. at 110–111.
Here, the Complaint does not allege comparable affirmative conduct by the County
Defendants. Plaintiffs do not allege that the County Defendants collaborated with the Peters

Defendants, sanctioned their harassment, provided assurances of noninterference, obstructed
investigations, ignored harassment while witnessing it, or otherwise took actions that increased
Plaintiffs’ risk of harm. Nor do the allegations support conduct that is “outrageous and egregious”
enough to shock the conscience. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 81. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges
that County Defendants responded to multiple complaints, made arrests, and obtained several
OOPs. (Compl. ¶¶ 29–36, 42–46, 47–48, 54–56, 61–64, 71, 82, 84–85, 90–92, 114–15.)
Plaintiffs’ contention that the County Defendants should have taken additional measures
does not, without more, create liability under the state-created danger doctrine. It is well settled
that allegations that officials “stood by and did nothing,” or should have done more, are insufficient
absent conscience-shocking affirmative conduct. Pena, 432 F.3d at 110.

Accordingly, County Defendants’ conduct does not rise to the level required to shock the
conscience and Plaintiffs fail to state a substantive due process claim under the state-created danger
exception.
2. Statute of Limitations
The County Defendants further argue that, even if the state-created danger exception
applied, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The Court agrees.
This action was commenced on March 31, 2025. The vast majority of the incidents alleged
in the Complaint occurred between 2017 and 2020. See Compl. ¶¶ 20–127. In New York, § 1983
claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214(5). Accordingly, any
claims accruing prior to March 31, 2022 are time-barred.
Plaintiffs contend that the continuing violation doctrine renders their § 1983 claims timely.
That doctrine permits otherwise untimely claims to proceed where they arise from a discriminatory

policy or practice and are continuous in time with at least one timely act. Plumey v. New York
State, 389 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Courts in this Circuit, however, disfavor
application of the continuing violation doctrine and reserve it for “compelling circumstances.” Id.
Here, the allegations in the Complaint do not warrant application of the continuing
violation doctrine. First, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the County Defendants acted
pursuant to a specific discriminatory policy or practice. “A simple declaration that defendant’s
conduct violated the ultimate legal standard (e.g., it was ‘because of sex’ or ‘severe and pervasive’)
does not suffice.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Second, even assuming Plaintiffs had
adequately alleged a policy or practice, the untimely incidents—those accruing prior to March 31,
2022—are not sufficiently continuous in time with any timely conduct. Plaintiffs argue that from

2017 through 2024, the County Defendants engaged in a “sustained pattern of inaction” in response
to complaints regarding the Peters Defendants’ harassment. Pl. Opp. at 17. The Complaint,
however, alleges multiple instances during this period in which County Defendants responded to
Plaintiffs’ complaints, issued OOPs, and made arrests. See Compl. ¶¶ 29–36, 42–46, 47–48, 54–
56, 61–64, 71, 82, 84–85, 90–92, 114–15. Such allegations undermine any claim of the type of
uninterrupted, ongoing conduct required to invoke the continuing violation doctrine. Cf. Fitzgerald
v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 363 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a continuing violation where there was a
“constant stream” of “day-to-day” abuse with “no interruption”). Finally, Plaintiffs do not allege
any basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims pursuant to § 1983 is time-barred.
3. Qualified Immunity
The County Defendants further argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity shields government officials from civil liability where “their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step framework for
resolving qualified immunity claims: courts were first required to determine whether the facts
alleged establish a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, then determine whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In
Pearson, however, the Court made clear that this sequence was no longer mandatory and that
courts may exercise discretion in deciding which prong of the analysis to address first. 555 U.S. at
236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that…it should no longer
be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be

permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.”).
Here, given the multi-year timeframe of the alleged conduct, the Court exercised its
discretion to first determine whether Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a substantive due process violation
under the state-created danger doctrine. Having concluded that they did not, the Court further finds
that the Complaint points to no “clearly established” law or constitutional right of which County
Defendants ran afoul based on the alleged conduct.
Plaintiffs argue that County Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity by
attempting to draw comparisons to Okin, but as discussed supra, Okin —which involved
allegations that police officers implicitly sanctioned domestic abuse by repeatedly ignoring a
victim’s complaints while maintaining a friendly relationship with the abuser—is fundamentally

distinguishable from the allegations here. Pl. Opp. at 22-24. Without more, Plaintiffs therefore fail
to show that County Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law.
Accordingly, County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
4. Personal Involvement of Defendants Sheriff Michael Schiff and the
Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office

The County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts establishing the
personal involvement of Sheriff Michael Schiff or the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office in the
alleged constitutional violations. The Court agrees.
As clarified by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “vicarious liability is inapplicable
to § 1983 suits.” 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Accordingly, “Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”
and “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official Defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Further, under Monell, “[i]n order to prevail on a claim
against a municipality under section 1983 based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required
to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right;
(3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the
constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91).
With respect to Defendant Sheriff Michael Schiff, the Complaint fails to allege facts
demonstrating his direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations.
Defendant Schiff is mentioned only once in connection with a specific action: paragraph 56 alleges
that, on September 5, 2017, he called Sergeant Baker to inform him that the Sheriff’s Office was

appointing Sergeant Starner as a liaison in Plaintiffs’ ongoing matter with the Peters Defendants.
Compl. ¶ 56. As a general matter, such action clearly does not violate Plaintiffs’ rights, but even
if it did, the allegation predates March 31, 2022, and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs’ remaining references to Defendant Schiff merely allege that he took “no action” with
regards to Plaintiffs’ complaints of the Peters Defendants’ harassment. As discussed supra, such
inaction, without conscience-shocking conduct, fails to establish liability for a § 1983 claim under
the state-created danger doctrine. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 103, 108, 149, 151.
Similarly, the Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating the Sullivan County Sheriff’s
Office’s direct and personal involvement in any constitutional deprivation. Plaintiffs do not assert
a Monell claim for municipal liability; even if they had, they would fail under the applicable

standard because they do not allege that the County Defendants acted pursuant to any official
policy. See White v. Westchester Cnty., No. 18-CV-730 (KMK), 2018 WL 6726555, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018) (“A plaintiff may satisfy the policy, custom[,] or practice requirement
by alleging one of the following: (1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)
actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that
caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that,
although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-
maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or
supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.”).
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs fail to allege any personal involvement by Defendant
Schiff or to assert a Monell claim, the claims against Michael Schiff and the Sullivan County

Sheriff’s Office are dismissed.
5. Standing of Entity Plaintiffs
The County Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue § 1983 substantive
due process claims under the state-created danger doctrine. The Court agrees.
Although corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
and have Article III standing, every circuit to recognize the state-created danger doctrine has
limited its application to situations involving risks of physical or emotional harm to individuals.3
2F
As the County Defendants correctly observe, the cases relied upon by both parties uniformly
involve allegations that the state failed to protect individual persons—not business entities—from
private violence. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Okin v. Village
of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009); Matican v. City of New York,
524 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2008); Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005); Dwares v. City of New
York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993); Eubanks v. Hansell, No. 23-CV-1234, 2024 WL 1308672
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2024); Tufaro v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7505, 2014 WL 4290631
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014).
Because a corporate entity cannot suffer the type of physical or emotional injury that
DeShaney and its progeny seek to remedy through the state-created danger doctrine, the Entity

3 Since DeShaney, all circuit courts of appeals, except for the Fifth Circuit, have adopted the state-created danger
doctrine.
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert such a claim. Accordingly, the Entity Plaintiffs’ substantive due
process claims under the state-created danger exception are dismissed with prejudice.
B. Peters Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs seek damages from the Peters Defendants for alleged violations of § 3604(a) of

the FHA. Each of the Peters Defendants moved to dismiss the FHA claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), arguing that the claim is time-barred, that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege harassment
based on sexual orientation, that the allegations are false or inaccurate, and that the conflict
amounts to a “bitter neighbor dispute” rather than actionable harassment based on sex
discrimination. See generally Peters MoL; Peters Jr. MoL. The Court agrees with respect to the
statute of limitations.
1. FHA Statute of Limitations
Claims brought under the FHA are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See 42
U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). The statute provides that an aggrieved person must commence a civil
action “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory

housing practice.” Id. The limitations period may be equitably tolled where a plaintiff demonstrates
that the defendant concealed the existence of the cause of action and that the plaintiff remained
unaware of it until a point within the statutory period. Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 785
F.Supp.2d 269, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Cardiello v. Money Store, Inc., No. 00-CV-7332,
2001 WL 604007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001)). Tolling of the statute of limitations period may
be delayed “until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of it.” Shomo v. City of New N.Y., 579
F.3d. 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). As with Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment claims, FHA claims may also be extended under the continuing violation
doctrine. Tejada v. LittleCity Realty LLC, 308 F.Supp.3d 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Havens
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982).
Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 31, 2025, asserting FHA claims against the
Peters Defendants based on conduct dating back to 2017. As a general matter, the majority of the

alleged incidents occurred between 2017 and 2020. See Compl. ¶¶ 20–127. The sole allegation
from 2021 is that Plaintiffs, through counsel, advised the Peters Defendants to cease trespassing
on Plaintiffs’ easement. Id. ¶ 128. The 2022 allegations include claims that Defendant Peters
followed Plaintiff St. Germain in May 2022; that the Peters Defendants filed a baseless noise
complaint against Cabernet Frank’s on August 13, 2022; and that beginning on October 5, 2022,
the Peters Defendants violated a state-court settlement agreement by trespassing, playing loud
music, making homophobic remarks, taunting Plaintiffs, and spreading defamatory statements. Id.
¶¶ 129, 131, 135–37.
The remaining allegations that potentially fall within the limitations period concern
conduct in 2023 and 2024, including alleged violations of an order of protection through repeated

entries onto Plaintiffs’ property, harassment from the easement, blasting music, leaving debris and
cat litter on Plaintiffs’ property, throwing a board against Beaverkill Studio, and urinating on
Plaintiffs’ property. Id. ¶¶ 138–139, 141–143, 156, 172.
Any FHA claims accruing prior to March 31, 2023 are time-barred. Plaintiffs have not
alleged that the Peters Defendants concealed the existence of the cause of action or identified any
other basis for equitable tolling. Nor does the continuing violation doctrine apply to the allegations
as asserted. That doctrine permits otherwise untimely FHA claims to proceed only where they are
part of a single, ongoing pattern of discrimination and at least one discriminatory act occurred
within the limitations period. Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent … or
otherwise make unavailable or deny[] a dwelling to any person because of [protected
characteristics].” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege
that the foregoing incidents occurring in 2023 and 2024—i.e., the only conduct within the
limitations period—were motivated by discrimination based on sexual orientation. Because the

timely allegations do not support a viable FHA claim, they cannot serve as a basis for applying the
continuing violation doctrine to revive earlier, time-barred conduct.
Accordingly, even assuming the truth of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Peters Defendants
engaged in harassment and other misconduct, the Court must dismiss the FHA claim against the
Peters Defendants as time-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims against the County Defendants are dismissed without
prejudice, except for those claims asserted on behalf of the Entity Plaintiffs which are dismissed
with prejudice. The Peters Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ FHA

claims against the Peters Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an Amended Complaint consistent with this opinion,
including to substitute Sullivan County for the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office as requested, on
or before February 13, 2026. Should Plaintiff not file an Amended Complaint by this date,
Plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed with prejudice. In the event Plaintiffs file an Amended
Complaint by February 13, 2026, Defendants are directed to answer, or otherwise respond to, the
Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days following Plaintiffs’ filing of the Amended
Complaint.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 39, 40, and 51.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 09, 2026 ( (eee
White Plains, New York ee eS
Hon. Nelson S. Roman
U.S. District Court Judge, $.D.N.Y.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11378680. Public record. Not legal advice.