# Bondi

> District Court, E.D. California · March 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377880

## Case

- **Full name:** Rudimildo Mendez Roblero v. Pamela Bondi, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 RUDIMILDO MENDEZ ROBLERO, No. 1:26-cv-01550-DC-CSK (HC)
12 Petitioner,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A
14 PAMELA BONDI, et al. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
15 Respondents. (Doc. No. 2)
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17 This matter is before the court on Petitioner Rudimildo Mendez Roblero’s motion for a
18 preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 2), filed in conjunction with his petition for writ of habeas
19 corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing immigration detention. (Doc.
20 No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary
21 injunction in part.
22 BACKGROUND
23 A. Factual Background
24 Petitioner Rudimildo Mendez Roblero is a native and citizen of Guatemala. (Doc. No. 1 at
25 ¶ 1.) Petitioner entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor on February 14, 2018. (Doc.
26 No. 1 at ¶ 30.) Upon Petitioner’s entry, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
27 issued a notice to appear charging him as an alien present in the United States without being
28 admitted or paroled in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 31; 1-2 at 1.) On
1 September 9, 2018, Petitioner was released into the custody of his father pursuant to section 462
2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2022 and section 235 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking
3 Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.) On December 19, 2019, an
4 immigration judge terminated Petitioner’s removal proceedings because he was the beneficiary of
5 an approved petition from his father, a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 31; 1-3.)
6 Although Petitioner was approved for an immigrant visa through approval of his petition for alien
7 relative, that approval was destroyed by the National Visa Center after Petitioner failed to apply
8 for the immigration visa within a year of availability. (Doc. No. 1 at 8 n.1.)
9 On September 13, 2025, Petitioner was arrested incident to a traffic stop and was charged
10 for driving without a valid driver’s license. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Petitioner was detained by U.S. Customs
11 and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) on that same day. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Petitioner has no criminal
12 history in the United States besides that arrest. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
13 On October 23, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a new
14 notice to appear again charging Petitioner as an alien in the United States without being admitted
15 or paroled in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 33; 1-6.) Petitioner has
16 remained in ICE custody since his re-arrest on September 13, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner
17 argues he is detained without any opportunity for release on bond pursuant to Board of
18 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) policy. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Petitioner is currently detained in the
19 California City Corrections Center in California City, California. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
20 B. Procedural Background
21 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a habeas petition asserting the following claims
22 against Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Sergio Albarran, and Warden of the California
23 City Corrections Center: (1) unlawful detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 relating to Respondents’
24 assertion that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under that statute rather than
25 discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226; and (2) violation of Petitioner’s right to due
26 process relating to Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at 10–
27 12.) In the petition, Petitioner seeks an order mandating his immediate relief, or in the alternative,
28 requiring Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
1 within seven days, and awarding Petitioner with attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access
2 to Justice Act. (Id. at 12–13.) On that same day, Petitioner filed the pending motion for a
3 preliminary injunction making the same argument and seeking the same relief as in his habeas
4 petition. (Doc. No. 2.)
5 On February 24, 2026, the court issued an order setting a briefing schedule and directing
6 Respondents to distinguish Petitioner’s claim from other similar claims that the court recently
7 addressed in Selis Tinoco v. Noem, 1:25-cv-01762-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
8 14, 2025), Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 1:25-cv-01598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL 3458802 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
9 2, 2025), and D.L.C. v. Wofford, 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP, 2026 WL 25511 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
10 2026). (Doc. No. 5.) Additionally, the court converted Petitioner’s motion for a temporary
11 restraining order to a motion for preliminary injunction due to Petitioner’s lengthy detention
12 period before seeking injunctive relief. (Id.)
13 On March 1, 2026, Respondents filed their opposition to Petitioner’s motion for a
14 preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 8.) On March 5, 2026, Petitioner filed his reply thereto. (Doc.
15 No. 9.)
16 LEGAL STANDARD
17 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
18 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
19 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary
20 restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.
21 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To
22 obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on
23 the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary
24 relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction
25 is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is
26 the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th
27 Cir. 2017).
28 A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter
1 factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th
2 Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction
3 is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a
4 clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,
5 972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits, and
6 exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle
7 & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024);
8 see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues
9 “properly go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los
10 Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
11 DISCUSSION
12 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
13 Petitioner argues that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) “does not apply to
14 individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States, such
15 individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional
16 parole or bond.” (Doc. No. 2 at 3.) Thus, Petitioner contends, his continued detention is unlawful
17 under both the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 6.)
18 In their opposition, Respondents make three arguments as to why Petitioner’s claim is
19 materially distinguishable from the claims in Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, and D.L.C., and
20 therefore why Petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief unlike the petitioners in those cases.
21 First, Respondents argue that, unlike the petitioners in the above cases, Petitioner “did not
22 have pending applications for relief or pending removal proceedings when he was placed back in
23 immigration custody,” thus any liberty interest Petitioner maintained in his freedom following his
24 initial release “terminated upon the denial of Petitioner’s visa petition.” (Doc. No. 8 at 3.) This
25 court, noting that the government’s “argument that [mandatory detention under] § 1225 applies to
26 all noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection has been consistently rejected by
27 a majority of courts in this district and courts across the county,” recently determined that a
28 noncitizen who had been living freely in the United States for an extended period of time without
1 a pending application for relief or pending removal proceeding demonstrated a likelihood of
2 succeeding on his claim that he was “entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).” Maciel v.
3 Noem, No. 1:26-cv-01318-DC-CKD, 2026 WL 496948, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2026); see also
4 Barajas Ortiz v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01167-DC-SCR, 2026 WL 508419, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
5 24, 2026) (holding that petitioner who had lived in United States for 34 years without
6 encountering immigration authorities was entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a)). Thus, for
7 the reasons discussed in Maciel and Barajas Ortiz, the court finds that Petitioner has shown a
8 likelihood of success on his claim that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
9 despite not having a pending application for relief or pending removal proceeding.
10 Second, Respondents argue that “in none of the [cases cited in the court’s order] did State
11 law enforcement arrest the petitioner and then transfer that petitioner into immigration custody”
12 such that Petitioner’s “constitutional immigration detention was a direct result [of] a likewise
13 constitutional arrest by state law enforcement, for a violation of state law.” (Doc. No. 8 at 3.) This
14 court recently considered a noncitizen’s entitlement to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) following
15 their arrest by state authorities and subsequent immediate detention by ICE in Chateauneuf v.
16 Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01073-DC-JDP, 2026 WL 523695, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026). In
17 Chateauneuf, as here, the petitioner was detained by immigration authorities immediately
18 following her arrest for driving without a license. Chateauneuf, 2026 WL 523695, at *1. This
19 court found that “where the government adequately alleges that a changed circumstance warrants
20 a petitioner’s immigration detention, the proper remedy for a failure to provide a bond hearing is
21 a post-deprivation bond hearing, not immediate release.” Id. at *4. Thus, here, as in Chateauneuf,
22 the court will order that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, not immediate release.
23 Third, Respondents argue that the court should deny Petitioner’s motion because
24 Petitioner has not alleged that he requested and was denied a bond hearing, therefore he failed to
25 exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his habeas petition. (Doc. No. 8 at 5.) The court
26 also addressed this issue in Chateauneuf, where it found that the purposes of prudential
27 exhaustion were satisfied where “the relief that the court will grant by this order—a hearing in
28 front of an immigration judge at which Petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered—is
1 precisely the relief that prudential exhaustion would require.” Chateauneuf, 2026 WL 523695, at
2 *3. Here, as in Chateauneuf, the court will order that Petitioner be provided a bond hearing, not
3 that Petitioner be immediately released. Thus, as in Chateauneuf, the very purpose for prudential
4 exhaustion will be obviated by this order.
5 For these reasons, Respondents do not distinguish Petitioner’s claim from previous
6 decisions by this court in which the court determined that a petitioner who has resided in the
7 Untied States for an extended period of time is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and
8 is therefore statutorily entitled to a bond hearing under that section. Petitioner is therefore likely
9 to succeed on the merits of his claim that he is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
10 judge.
11 B. Irreparable Harm
12 Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order.
13 Broadly speaking, “[d]eprivation of physical liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”
14 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Further, the Ninth
15 Circuit has recognized the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration
16 detention” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of
17 detention.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
18 Therefore, the second Winter factor weighs in favor of granting Petitioner's request for
19 injunctive relief.
20 C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest
21 The court now turns to the last two Winter factors. The balance of the equities and public
22 interest analyses merge when the government is the opposing party, as is the case in this action.
23 See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder,
24 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
25 “Just as the public has an interest in the orderly and efficient administration of this
26 country’s immigration laws, [ ] the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural
27 protections against unlawful detention.” Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL
28 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020) (internal quotation omitted). Though Respondents have
1 an interest in enforcing immigration laws, Respondents cannot reasonably assert that the public
2 and government will be harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from detaining
3 Petitioner in violation of the applicable law, which is the case here. This relief also benefits the
4 public because “neither equity nor the public’s interest are furthered by allowing violations of
5 federal law to continue.” Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the
6 court finds that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of injunctive relief and
7 consequently, all four Winter factors weigh in favor of Petitioner.
8 D. Security
9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive relief
10 ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs
11 and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.’”
12 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)).
13 “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion
14 as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Id. (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906,
15 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). “In particular, ‘[t]he district court may dispense with the filing of a bond
16 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or
17 her conduct.’” Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Jorgensen, 320 F.3d at 919). Neither party
18 addresses the issue of security in their briefing.
19 The court finds that no security is required here. Courts regularly waive security in cases
20 like this one. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
21 05632- RMI-RFL, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 4, 2025).
22 CONCLUSION
23 For the reasons stated above:
24 1. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED in part
25 as follows:
26 a. Within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this order, Respondents shall
27 provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and
28 its implementing regulations at which Petitioner shall bear the burden of
] showing that he is not a flight risk or a risk to community safety;!
2 b. If Petitioner is not provided a bond hearing within ten (10) days of the date
3 of entry of this order, he shall be released from Respondents’ custody;
4 c. Petitioner’s request for immediate release is DENIED;
5 2. This order does not address the circumstances in which Respondents may detain
6 Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of
7 removal and Petitioner receives notice of that final order of removal; and
8 3. This matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings.
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IT IS SO ORDERED. :
1 | Dated: __Mareh 18, 2026 _ RUC
Dena Coggins
13 United States District Judge
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76 In their opposition, Respondents argue that because DHS has not previously made a
27 || determination regarding Petitioner’s flight or safety risk, Petitioner should bear the burden of
showing that he is not a flight risk or a safety risk. This is consistent with this court’s prior orders.
28 | See, e.g., Chateauneuf, 2026 WL 523695, at *5.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377880. Public record. Not legal advice.