# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · March 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377790

## Case

- **Full name:** Carol Conyers v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 CAROL CONYERS, No. 2:25-cv-00552-DJC-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
15
Defendant.
16

17
18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
19 (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II
20 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401-34 (the “Act”). For the reasons that follow, the
21 undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be granted, that the
22 Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be denied, and this matter be REMANDED
23 for further consideration consistent with this these Findings and Recommendations.
24 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
25 Plaintiff applied for DIB in August 2021. Administrative Record (“AR”) 58.1 Plaintiff
26 alleged the disability onset date was March 15, 2021. AR 60. The applications were disapproved
27 initially and on reconsideration. On February 21, 2024, administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Trina

28 1 The AR is electronically filed at ECF No. 9-9.
1 Mengesha-Brown presided over a hearing on plaintiff’s challenge to the disapprovals. AR 35-56
2 (Transcript). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. Susanna Roche, a vocational
3 expert, also testified. AR 49-56.
4 On April 2, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding plaintiff had not been
5 “under a disability” from March 15, 2021, through the date of decision. AR 16-28 (decision). On
6 January 10, 2025, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s
7 decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-3 (decision).
8 Plaintiff filed this action in the Eastern District of California on February 19, 2025. ECF
9 No. 1. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record
10 filed by the Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 10 (Plaintiff’s summary judgment
11 motion), 12 (Commissioner’s summary judgment motion), 13 (Plaintiff’s reply).
12 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
13 Plaintiff was born in 1962, and was 61 years old at the time of her administrative hearing.
14 AR 39. Plaintiff has a high school education. AR 39. She testified that she became unable to
15 work in March 2021 after she had broken her ankle2. AR 42. It was during the Covid pandemic,
16 she was unable to get adequate physical therapy, and developed back pain. AR 42-43. Plaintiff
17 had prior work experience as an administrative assistant in the mortgage industry and as a general
18 office administrative assistant. AR 40-41. The VE categorized her past relevant work as a
19 mortgage clerk and administrative assistant. AR 50. Plaintiff offered no testimony at the hearing
20 about any mental health impairments
21 III. LEGAL STANDARDS
22 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is
23 supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.”
24 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the
25 Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]’” Andrews v.
26 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
27
2 Plaintiff’s testimony states March 2021, but the medical record and Plaintiff’s brief reflect that
28 she broke her ankle in March 2020 in a bicycle accident. AR 530-34.
1 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a
2 preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such relevant
3 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
4 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While inferences from
5 the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will
6 suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
7 Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the
8 Court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports
9 and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of
10 HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)
11 (“The court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s
12 conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”).
13 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
14 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th
15 Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of
16 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart,
17 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the
18 ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn
19 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.
20 2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on
21 evidence that the ALJ did not discuss.”).
22 The Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error,
23 which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the
24 ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.
25 2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v.
26 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
27 ////
28 ////
1 IV. RELEVANT LAW
2 Disability insurance benefits are available for eligible individuals who are “under a
3 disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). An individual is disabled if unable to “engage in any
4 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
5 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
6 for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d); see also Bowen v.
7 Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
8 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an
9 applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4);
10 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation
11 process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the
12 sequential evaluation:
13 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If
so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.
14
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).
15
Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so,
16 proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.
17 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c).
18 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404,
19 Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to
step four.
20
Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d).
21
Step four: Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity make him
22 capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not
disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
23
Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f); 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f).
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Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to
25 perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not,
the claimant is disabled.
26
Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g).
27

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1 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation
2 process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are
3 blind or disabled”); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential
4 analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled
5 and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v.
6 Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5.
7 V. THE ALJ’s DECISION
8 The ALJ made the following findings:
9 1. [Step 1] The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 15, 2021, the alleged onset date (AR 19).
10
2. [Step 2] The claimant has the following severe impairments:
11 complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) of the left ankle status-post
open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) and subsequent hardware
12 removal; and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (AR 19).
13 3. [Step 3] The claimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
14 the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(AR 22).
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4. [Preparation for Step 4] After careful consideration of the entire
16 record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR
17 404.1567(a) with the following additional limitations: occasional
climbing ramps and stairs; no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
18 occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; the
avoidance of unprotected heights and workplace hazards; occasional
19 pushing and pulling with the upper and lower extremities; no work
with vibrations; no walking over uneven surfaces; and no operating
20 foot controls on left. (AR 22).
21 5. [Step 4] The claimant is able to perform past relevant work as an
administrative assistant and mortgage clerk as such work is not
22 precluded by the RFC. (AR 27).
23 6. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from March 15, 2021 through the date of the
24 ALJ’s decision. (AR 28).
25 VI. ANALYSIS
26 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) not providing clear and convincing reasons for
27 discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding allegations of pain and physical dysfunction; (2)
28 improperly evaluating the medical opinions of treating medical sources, Shivani Ruben, M.D.,
1 and Alexander Grand, M.D.; (3) improperly rejecting the opinions of consultative examiners
2 Meena Song, M.D., and Troy Singh, M.D., and (4) omitting mental work restrictions from the
3 RFC. ECF No. 10 at 14.
4 A. The ALJ’s Decision to Discount Plaintiff’s Testimony
5 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting
6 effects of her physical impairments. Evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s subjective
7 testimony is a two-step process: “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has
8 presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be
9 expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. In this analysis, the claimant is not
10 required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the
11 symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree
12 of the symptom.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations
13 omitted). Objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue itself is not required. Id. (internal
14 citations omitted).
15 Second, if the ALJ does not find evidence of malingering, the ALJ may only reject the
16 claimant’s testimony by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing
17 so.” Id. (internal citations omitted). While an ALJ’s credibility finding must be properly
18 supported and sufficiently specific to ensure a reviewing court the ALJ did not “arbitrarily
19 discredit” a claimant’s subjective statements, an ALJ is also not “required to believe every
20 allegation” of disability. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). In weighing a
21 claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, inconsistencies either in the
22 claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct, claimant’s daily activities, her
23 work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and
24 effect of the symptoms of which claimant complains. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
25 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in
26 the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959. “Ultimately, the ‘clear
27 and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to show his work . . . . The standard isn’t whether our
28 court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to
1 convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). The clear and convincing
2 standard is “not an easy requirement to meet” and the “most demanding requirement in Social
3 Security cases.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
4 Plaintiff testified that her past relevant work involved “sitting most of the day” and was
5 “8:00 to 5:00 of sitting down mostly.” AR 40-41. Plaintiff testified that she quit working after
6 she broke her ankle in March 2021. AR 42.3 Plaintiff described that she broke her ankle during
7 COVID, was unable to get proper physical therapy, wore a boot for six weeks, and began having
8 back pain. AR 42. She said she had shooting pains, would need to get up and walk around and
9 take extra breaks, which her employer didn’t like. AR 42. She testified the pain affects her sleep,
10 and although she often feels better in the mornings, in the afternoon she often has to lay down due
11 to back pain. AR 43. Plaintiff testified that she has pain when sitting, and would need to get up
12 and move around for 15 to 20 minutes after 20 minutes of sitting. AR 44-45.
13 Plaintiff testified that due to her vision she only drives during the day, “by landmarks,”
14 and that her husband usually drives and she only drives short distances. AR 46. Plaintiff testified
15 she is unable to do chores around the house, but could do a “little bit of cooking.” AR 48.
16 Although she testified she could do no chores, her testimony indicated she attempted such chores,
17 as she stated “it hurts” and “takes me at least three hours.” AR 48. She further testified that due
18 to her vision problems she would make mistakes when working on the computer and would get
19 headaches. AR 47.
20 The ALJ found upon a review of the record “that it does not support the full extent of the
21 claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms.” AR 23. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements
22 about her physical condition were “not supported by the findings on physical examination or
23 imaging/testing, or the nature of claimant’s treatment.” AR 23. The ALJ discussed a November
24 2021 physical examination at which Plaintiff showed full strength, normal gait, and full range of
25 motion. AR 23, citing to Exhibit 4F. The ALJ also discussed a February 2023 consultative exam
26

27 3 There are some [INAUDIBLE] references in transcript, such as: “Well, I’d broken
[INAUDIBLE] in March of 2021.” AR 42. That Plaintiff broke her ankle is clear from the
28 overall record.
1 at which Plaintiff had normal gait, negative straight leg raising, and full strength. AR 23-24,
2 citing 12F. The ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
3 reasonably be expected to produce” the alleged symptoms. AR 26. However, as to the intensity,
4 persistence, and limiting effects, the ALJ found the testimony was not entirely consistent with the
5 medical evidence. AR 26.
6 The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s allegations were “not supported by the radiographic
7 and other objective evidence.” AR 24. The ALJ cited to objective evidence showing mild
8 degenerative disc disease (AR 445, 552 and 1159) and no nerve root compression or spinal
9 stenosis (AR 445). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living (ADLs) and
10 stated: “Furthermore, the claimant has described daily activities, which are not limited to the
11 extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” AR 27.
12 The ALJ stated that Plaintiff reported being able to shop, drive, prepare full meals, clean, do
13 laundry, and take care of personal care independently. AR 27.
14 It thus appears the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony for three reasons: 1) inconsistency
15 with objective medical record; 2) the “nature of claimant’s treatment”; and 3) inconsistency with
16 her activities of daily living.
17 First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective testimony because it was inconsistent with
18 the objective medical evidence. AR 23, 26-27 (stating “physical examination and imaging do not
19 support the degree of alleged limitation”). An ALJ must consider the objective medical evidence
20 along with other evidence when evaluating the reliability of symptom testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§
21 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4); see also Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022)
22 (“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective
23 testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.”) (emphasis in original).
24 However, an ALJ may not reject allegations of pain based solely on objective evidence. See
25 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Once the claimant produces medical
26 evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s
27 testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective
28 medical evidence.”).
1 In concluding that Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely consistent with the objective
2 evidence, the ALJ appears to rely heavily on imaging evidence. The ALJ states: “Imaging of the
3 lumbar spine shows mild multilevel degenerative disc disease and facet arthropathy. There is no
4 nerve root compression or high-grade spinal stenosis. MRI of the left ankle from February 2021
5 shows a nearly healed fracture and a chronic anterior syndesmotic ligament tear.” AR 24 (record
6 citations omitted). The ALJ repeats this statement—concerning mild degenerative disc disease
7 and no nerve root compression or high-grade spinal stenosis—three more times in the decision.
8 AR 25-27. The ALJ also relies on some physical exams showing normal gait and normal
9 strength. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ selectively emphasized sparse normal exam findings, while
10 ignoring other evidence of record. As Plaintiff points out, there are numerous references in the
11 record to antalgic gait (for example AR 468, 849, 1163) and some references to limited range of
12 motion (for example AR 993, 1182). Plaintiff also focuses on the assessment by NP Victoria Shu
13 Wah Flower of high-grade canal stenosis. ECF No. 10 at 16, citing AR 708. The January 26,
14 2022, office note from NP Flower states: “Independent review of the lumbar MRI shows high-
15 grade canal stenosis or significant foraminal stenosis. Facet joint hypertrophy is appreciated.”
16 AR 708. The ALJ does not discuss NP Flower’s assessment, and the Commissioner did not
17 respond to the argument raised by Plaintiff that NP Flower had conducted an independent review
18 of the MRI and assessed high-grade canal stenosis or significant foraminal stenosis. ECF No. 10
19 at 12, 16, & 21. The ALJ is not required to accept NP Flower’s assessment, but it does not appear
20 to have been considered.
21 Instead, the ALJ relied heavily on an MRI of the back taken in December 2020 (AR 445),
22 and an MRI of the left ankle taken in January 2021. AR 330-31. The ALJ noted that the ankle
23 MRI showed a “nearly healed” fracture. AR 24. The MRI also showed “[c]hronic anterior
24 syndesmotic ligament tear” and probable “chronic deltoid ligament sprain.” AR 331. That
25 Plaintiff’s broken ankle had “nearly healed” almost a year after she broke it, and she still had a
26 chronic ligament tear does not undercut Plaintiff’s allegations of continuing pain. After that time
27 period, Plaintiff attempted several different forms of treatment to alleviate her pain, including: 1)
28 nerve block (AR 863); 2) trigger point injections (AR 1005); 3) lumbar facet joint injection (AR
1 1056); 4) implantation of dorsal root ganglion stimulator (AR 342); and 5) physical therapy.
2 An ALJ “cannot effectively render a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony
3 superfluous by demanding positive objective medical evidence fully corroborating every
4 allegation within the subjective testimony.” Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1204 (9th Cir.
5 2024), citing Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498. An ALJ “may not discredit the claimant’s subjective
6 complaints solely because the objective evidence fails to fully corroborate the degree of pain
7 alleged.” Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2020). The Court finds the ALJ has not
8 adequately provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons to explain why the medical evidence
9 is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. See Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1200.
10 Second, the ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms were not consistent with
11 the “nature of” her treatment, and in a concluding somewhat boilerplate paragraph stated a variety
12 of factors were considered, including “the dosage and effectiveness of medication.” AR 32. The
13 ALJ may of course consider the type and effectiveness of treatment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (9th
14 Cir. 2005). The effectiveness of medication is relevant to the evaluation of a claimant’s symptom
15 testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). An ALJ may reject a claimant’s allegations based
16 on “evidence suggesting that [the claimant] responded well to treatment.” Crane v. Shalala, 76
17 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996). Impairments that can be effectively controlled with medication are
18 not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for Social Security benefits. See Warre v.
19 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).
20 Here, it is unclear what role, if any, the effectiveness of treatment played in the ALJ’s
21 consideration. The Commissioner does not discuss this point in its brief. The ALJ does not
22 categorize Plaintiff’s treatment for her physical impairments as “conservative” or discuss that her
23 pain was adequately controlled with medication. In fact, although Plaintiff obtained some pain
24 relief from treatment, several of her attempts at treatment appeared unsuccessful. See for example
25 AR 1159 (zero pain relief from nerve stimulator implant and listing several medications Plaintiff
26 had “tried and failed”); AR 349 (50% pain relief from trial implantation of dorsal root ganglion
27 stimulator); AR 369 (injection in back did not provide any relief); AR 373 (lack of relief with
28 physical therapy); AR 378 (reporting “stabbing/cutting” pain and 30% relief from current
1 treatments); AR 388 (describing pain as disabling and “no relief” from nerve block); AR 872
2 (30% relief from sacroiliac joint injection); AR 880 (0% relief from lumbar intra-articular facet
3 joint injection); AR 991 (“claimant takes Tylenol for the pain which does not seem to offer much
4 relief); AR 1056 (trigger point injections did not provide “any significant relief to her pain”). The
5 ALJ did not adequately explain her consideration of treatment or provide a path for Court to
6 follow. Thus, this factor does not support discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. See Brown-Hunter v.
7 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ must provide “some reasoning” such that the
8 agency’s path can reasonably be discerned).
9 Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has described daily activities, which are not limited to
10 the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” AR
11 27. The ALJ states: “For example, although the claimant reports pain with these activities, she
12 shops in stores, drives (during the day), prepares full meals, cleans, does the laundry, and
13 performs personal care independently.” AR 27. An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective
14 symptom testimony when the limitations described are inconsistent with a claimant’s activities of
15 daily living. See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding that claimant’s
16 daily activities which included playing video games, watching TV, using library computer, using
17 public transport, shopping, preparing meals, and socializing constituted substantial evidence to
18 support the ALJ’s decision). The Ninth Circuit has also stated that “disability claimants should
19 not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick, 157
20 F.3d at 722. A disability claimant need not “vegetate in a dark room” in order to be deemed
21 eligible for benefits. Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1203 (citation omitted). “ALJs must be especially
22 cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because
23 impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace
24 environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day.” Id.,
25 citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016.
26 Plaintiff testified that due to her vision she only drives during the day, “by landmarks,”
27 and that her husband usually drives and she only drives short distances. AR 46. Plaintiff testified
28 she is unable to do chores around the house, but could do a “little bit of cooking.” AR 48.
1 Although she testified she could do no chores, her testimony indicated she attempted such chores,
2 as she stated “it hurts” and “takes me at least three hours.” AR 48. This testimony about ADLs
3 does not establish that Plaintiff could function in the workplace. Nor did the ALJ explain how
4 being able to engage in these fairly minimal ADLs undercut Plaintiff’s allegations as to her
5 limitations. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the
6 ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
7 complaints.”).
8 The ALJ did not identify what specific testimony was not credible. The Commissioner in
9 its brief to this Court, attempts to identify the testimony of Plaintiff’s “extreme complaints” as
10 being that she could only lift about 3 pounds, and walk 200 feet. ECF No. 12 at 5-6. The
11 Commissioner identifies these complaints from Plaintiff’s function report.4 Id., citing AR 265.
12 The ALJ mentioned these limitations in her summary of Plaintiff’s testimony (AR 23), but it is
13 not clear that the ALJ found these limitations incredible or inconsistent with the ADLs. The
14 Commissioner states: “In contrast to Conyer’s allegations about being incapable of lifting
15 basically anything or walking more than a couple hundred feet, she handled all her personal care
16 including dressing and bathing, cooked meals … cleaned the house, did laundry, and shopped for
17 groceries.” ECF No. 12 at 6. Dressing and bathing and cooking generally do not require lifting
18 more than 3 pounds or walking more than 200 feet. Cleaning the house and doing laundry, would
19 also likely not require walking of long duration, and may not involve lifting more than 3 pounds
20 depending on what cleaning was undertaken. Importantly, the ALJ did not explain why these
21 ADLs were inconsistent with claimed limitations. See Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1203 (“[T]he ALJ
22 did not explain how, in his view, Ferguson’s testimony about those daily activities is inconsistent
23 with his testimony about the severity and frequency of his headaches. And we see no reasonable
24 inference that such an inconsistency exists.”).
25 Plaintiff testified that she could “start” cooking, but her husband would usually finish it.
26 AR 48. She stated that she could not do mopping, sweeping, or dusting. AR 48. She testified
27
4 The copy of the function report submitted in the record is of poor quality and at times barely
28 legible. AR 260-67.
1 that “my husband will bring the laundry to me and load it – put it in the dryer.” AR 49. So once
2 again, Plaintiff would not be lifting any significant amount of weight in doing the laundry
3 because her husband carries the clothes and she folds it while sitting on bed. AR 49. Grocery
4 shopping would typically involve lifting more than three pounds and walking more than 200 feet,
5 however no testimony was elicited concerning what “shopping” entails. The function report also
6 stated that her husband would drive her to the store, thus he would be available to lift heavy
7 items. Thus, even the Commissioner’s examples of “extreme” limitations are not inherently
8 contradicted by Plaintiff’s limited ADLs. The Commissioner characterizes Plaintiff’s complaints
9 as “extreme,” “drastic,” and “out of step with the medical evidence” (ECF No. 12 at 5).
10 However, in March 2021, Plaintiff attended physical therapy and the assessment reads: “Patient
11 has an MD appt today for follow up on Lowback pain – had a flareup yesterday after picking up a
12 vinegar bottle off floor – she related unable to walk yesterday – today she is very guarded with
13 transitional movement and bed mobility.” AR 409. There is accordingly evidence of significant
14 ADL limitations.
15 The ALJ did not adequately explain which of Plaintiff’s allegations she found inconsistent
16 with Plaintiff’s ADLs, or how the ADLs undercut Plaintiff’s allegations. Thus, consideration of
17 the ADLs was not a specific, clear, and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. In
18 sum, the ALJ did not articulate specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s
19 subjective symptom testimony concerning her pain and limitations, and accordingly the matter
20 should be remanded.
21 B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
22 Plaintiff’s second and third points of error challenge the medical opinions of four
23 providers. In her second point, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical
24 opinions of treating medical sources, Shivani Ruben, M.D., and Alexander Grand, M.D. ECF No.
25 10 at 18. Then in her third point, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of
26 consultative examiners Meena Song, M.D., and Troy Singh, M.D. ECF No. 10 at 23.
27 Consideration of medication opinions is governed by the regulations that became effective in
28 2017, which changed the framework for such consideration. Revisions to Rules Regarding the
1 Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20
2 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer “give any specific
3 evidentiary weight ... to any medical opinion(s)” but instead must consider and evaluate the
4 persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from medical
5 sources and evaluate their persuasiveness. Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg.
6 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b), 416.920c(a) and (b); see also Woods v.
7 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022) (“For claims subject to the new regulations, the former
8 hierarchy of medical opinions—in which we assign presumptive weight based on the extent of the
9 doctor’s relationship with the claimant—no longer applies. Now an ALJ’s decision, including the
10 decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.”).
11 The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of a physician opinion include
12 supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant (including length of the treatment,
13 frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of
14 an examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict
15 a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to,
16 “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
17 understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. §§
18 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). Supportability and consistency are the most important
19 factors, and therefore the ALJ is required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R.
20 §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
21 The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that the new regulatory framework eliminates the
22 “treating physician rule” and displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide
23 “specific and legitimate” or “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting a treating or examining
24 doctor’s opinion. Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92. Still, in rejecting any medical opinion as
25 unsupported or inconsistent, an ALJ must provide an explanation supported by substantial
26 evidence. Id. In sum, the ALJ “must ‘articulate ... how persuasive’ [he or she] finds ‘all of
27 the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source ... and ‘explain how [he or she] considered
28 the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
1 404.1520c(b), 404.1520(b)(2)). The Court will now discuss the ALJ’s consideration of the four
2 medical opinions.
3 1. Shivani Ruben, M.D
4 Dr. Ruben completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire for Plaintiff
5 in December 2023. AR 1107 to 1110. Dr. Ruben indicated that Plaintiff could only sit for 5-10
6 minutes before needing to get up, and could only stand for 5-10 minutes before needing to sit
7 down. AR 1108. She checked the box indicating that Plaintiff could only sit for less than two
8 hours total in an 8 hour workday. AR 1109. She wrote that Plaintiff would need to take a 30
9 minute break every 15 to 30 minutes to lie down or walk. AR 1109. She indicated that Plaintiff
10 must use a cane or other assistive device. AR 1109. She further opined that Plaintiff was likely
11 to miss more than four days of work per month. AR 1110.
12 The ALJ considered Dr. Rueben’s opinion and found it unpersuasive. AR 25. The ALJ
13 found Dr. Rueben’s opinion was not supported by her own mental and physical examination
14 findings. Id. The ALJ also found Dr. Rueben’s opinion to be inconsistent “with the degree of
15 abnormality present on imaging.” Id. The ALJ cited to several portions of the medical record to
16 support this assessment. Dr. Rueben’s assessment finds Plaintiff more limited than Plaintiff’s
17 own testimony. Plaintiff testified she could sit for 20 minutes and walk for 30 minutes. AR 44.
18 In contrast, Dr. Rueben found Plaintiff could only sit or stand for 5 to 10 minutes at a time. AR
19 1108. Dr. Rueben also opined that Plaintiff required an assistive device, which was not supported
20 by the medical record. The ALJ considered the supportability and consistency of Dr. Rueben’s
21 opinion, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated error in the ALJ’s evaluation.
22 2. Alexander Grand, M.D.
23 Dr. Grand completed a “Vision Impairment Assessment Form” in December 2023. AR
24 1189-1191. Dr. Grand assessed Plaintiff as having 20/80 vision in both eyes. Dr. Grand found
25 some “mild” contraction of peripheral vision. AR 1189. Dr. Grand opined that Plaintiff could
26 work “with small objects such as those involved in doing sedentary work”. AR 1190. He found
27 that Plaintiff would need to take unscheduled breaks during the workday due to headache, eye
28
1 strain, and lower back pain. AR 1191. He stated that Plaintiff would “occasionally”5 experience
2 symptoms severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration. Id.
3 The ALJ considered Dr. Grand’s opinion and did not find it to be persuasive. AR 25. The
4 ALJ noted that it was “internally inconsistent” and not consistent with other evidence of record
5 showing that Plaintiff had mild glaucoma and repaired cataracts. AR 25, citing AR 655 and AR
6 782. Plaintiff’s brief acknowledges that Dr. Grand’s opinion was inconsistent and attempts to
7 explain it away. ECF No. 10 at 22 (“this inconsistency may have simply been a clerical error”).
8 Thus, the ALJ’s supportability finding, that the report was not supported because it was internally
9 inconsistent, is supported by the record. However, the fact that Plaintiff had cataract surgery in
10 December 2021, is not necessarily inconsistent with Dr. Grand’s evaluation in December 2023.
11 Nor is the fact that she had an assessment for glaucoma in November 2021, in which Plaintiff
12 reported “worsening vision,” and which led to the cataract surgery, inconsistent with Dr. Grand’s
13 assessment of her vision two years later. AR 655.
14 Plaintiff argues that remand is necessary to discuss and evaluate the persuasiveness of the
15 medical opinions. ECF No. 10 at 22. As the Court is recommending remand to further consider
16 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ will also be able to consider these issues.
17 3. Meena Song, M.D.
18 Dr. Song conducted a consultative examination in November 2021. AR 627-631. Dr.
19 Song’s observations include that Plaintiff did not require an ambulatory device and
20 “demonstrated no notable difficulties walking down the hall” and “[n]o notable difficulties sitting
21 in chair while history was collected.” AR 628. Plaintiff’s muscle tone and bulk was normal with
22 5/5 motor strength in both the upper and lower extremities. AR 629. Dr. Song found Plaintiff
23 had tenderness to palpation on her left leg and lower back. AR 631. She found Plaintiff “should
24 be able to stand and walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour day” and “remain seated for
25 approximately six hours”. AR 632. Dr. Song assessed no visual limitations. AR 632.
26 The ALJ found this opinion not fully persuasive. AR 25. In discussing supportability, the
27

28 5 “Occasionally” was defined on the form as “6% to 33% of an 8-hour working day”.
1 ALJ noted that while the physical examination revealed tenderness, it also showed full strength,
2 normal gait, and full range of motion. AR 25. Thus, the ALJ found the standing/walking
3 limitation was not supported. The ALJ also found the standing/walking limitation was not
4 supported by other medical records which showed that Plaintiff did not need an assistive device
5 or have trouble with balance. AR 25. Plaintiff argues that the fact she is not using an assistive
6 device is not inconsistent, because her “primary symptoms were extreme and debilitating pain,
7 not balance issues.” ECF No. 10 at 24. The ALJ may have reasonably assumed that someone
8 experiencing extreme pain while walking would benefit from an assistive device. On the other
9 hand, Dr. Song’s conclusion that Plaintiff could not stand and walk for more than two hours in an
10 eight-hour work day due to left ankle complex regional pain syndrome, is not necessarily
11 inconsistent with the fact that Plaintiff does not use an assistive device to walk. The ALJ will
12 have the opportunity to reevaluate this opinion on remand.
13 4. Dr. Singh
14 Plaintiff saw Dr. Singh for a consultative exam in February 2023. AR 991-995. Plaintiff
15 reported suffering from back and left ankle pain, that worsens with lifting and movement. AR
16 991. Plaintiff also reported experiencing vision loss in her left eye. AR 991. Plaintiff stated her
17 symptoms negatively impact her activities of daily living. AR 991. On exam, Plaintiff’s back
18 was non-tender, but she had some decreased range of motion. AR 993. She had no tenderness on
19 palpation in her lower extremities. AR 993. Her gait was normal, and no assistive device was
20 utilized. AR 993. Plaintiff demonstrated some difficulty squatting and rising. AR 993.
21 Dr. Singh opined that upon physical examination “orthopedic deficits are noted which
22 diminish functional capacity and ability to perform job duties and ADLs.” AR 994. Dr. Singh
23 found Plaintiff could stand and walk for two to four hours in an eight-hour day, and remain seated
24 for four to six hours. AR 994-95. Dr. Singh noted that “visual acuity is not limited.” AR 995.
25 The ALJ found Dr. Singh’s opinion to be partially persuasive. AR 25. As to
26 supportability, the ALJ found the opinion partially supported by the examination findings that
27 showed decreased range of motion and difficulty squatting/rising. AR 25. On the issue of
28 consistency, the ALJ found that Dr. Singh’s postural limitations and limitations on sitting were
1 not consistent with the imaging of Plaintiff’s spine. AR 25.
2 Plaintiff requests remand for reevaluation of Dr. Song’s opinion, and as the matter is
3 being remanded, the ALJ will have the opportunity to reevaluate this opinion on remand.
4 C. Mental Work Restrictions and the Residual Functional Capacity
5 Plaintiff’s fourth and final point of error, is that the ALJ erroneously omitted mental work
6 restrictions from Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. The ALJ found at Step Two that
7 Plaintiff does not have any severe mental impairments, and Plaintiff does not challenge that
8 conclusion. Instead, Plaintiff argues that even non-severe impairments must be considered, and
9 that she had “mild limitations” due to her anxiety and depression that were not accounted for in
10 the RFC. ECF No. 10 at 25.
11 An RFC is, in short, “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.”
12 Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)). In
13 assessing RFC, the ALJ must “consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an
14 individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040,
15 1049 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) (“We will consider all of your
16 medically determinable impairments of which we are aware, including your medically
17 determinable impairments that are not ‘severe,’ . . . when we assess your [RFC].”). “While
18 [disability] regulations require the ALJ to consider the effect of all plaintiff’s impairments in
19 formulating the RFC, they do not require him to translate every non-severe impairment into a
20 functional limitation in the RFC.” Rania v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-cv-1541 MCE CKD SS, 2021 WL
21 5771663, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2021) (emphasis in original). An ALJ is not necessarily
22 required to include mild mental limitations in the RFC. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 794
23 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming ALJ’s decision where the ALJ included no mental limitations in the
24 RFC despite finding “mild” limitations in two of the four Paragraph B criteria).
25 Here, the ALJ found no limitation in the four Paragraph B criteria. AR 20-21. Thus,
26 Plaintiff’s argument may be that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of state agency consultant,
27 Nicole Robicheau, Psy.D., who assessed mild limitations in the four areas. AR 89-90. The
28 Commissioner argues the ALJ’s consideration is supported by substantial evidence in the record
1 || and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Woods. As the matter is being remanded, if the parties desire,
2 || they can revisit this issue on remand and the ALJ may reconsider it.
3 VII. CONCLUSION
4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMENDED that:
5 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 10) be GRANTED;
6 2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) be DENIED;
7 3. This matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner for further consideration consistent
8 with this Order; and
9 4. The Clerk of the Court enter judgment for Plaintiff and close this case upon the
10 adoption of these findings and recommendations.
11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
12 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
13 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
14 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. /d.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a
15 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
16 || Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
17 | appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez
18 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
19 | DATED: March 18, 2026.
20
21 )

22 SEAN C. RIORDAN
33 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377790. Public record. Not legal advice.