# Robinson

> District Court, E.D. California · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377645

## Case

- **Full name:** Arica Robinson v. Anna Haas, as an individual, and City of Roseville, as a municipality, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 ARICA ROBINSON, an No. 2:25-cv-02366-JAM-SCR
individual,
11
Plaintiff,
12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
v.
13
ANNA HAAS, as an individual,
14 CITY OF ROSEVILLE, as a
municipality, and DOES 1
15 through 10, inclusive,
16 Defendants.
17
18 Plaintiff was arrested by City of Roseville Police
19 Department Officers in August 2023 when her car was reported
20 stolen by her estranged husband as a form of domestic abuse.
21 Plaintiff brought suit against her arresting officers and the
22 City of Roseville, alleging her detention and subsequent arrest
23 were unlawful. The City of Roseville now moves to dismiss
24 Plaintiff’s sole claim against them for municipal liability under
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing Plaintiff has failed to adequately
26 plead any theory of liability recognized under Monell v.
27 Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.
28 658 (1978).
1 As discussed further below, the Court agrees and finds that
2 Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead Monell liability. Thus,
3 the Court grants dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against the City
4 of Roseville with leave to amend.
5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
6 Plaintiff Arica Robinson claims she was unlawfully detained
7 and arrested by Defendant City of Roseville Police Department
8 Officer Anna Haas and other officers on August 29, 2023. Compl.
9 ¶¶ 1, 15, ECF No. 1. At the time of her arrest, Plaintiff was
10 married to but estranged from her husband, Herschel Robinson
11 (“Herschel”), and had a restraining order against him due to a
12 documented history of abuse. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. The restraining order
13 explicitly protected a vehicle Plaintiff and her husband had
14 purchased approximately one month before the arrest. Id. ¶¶ 10–
15 12. The vehicle was placed in Herschel’s name for ease of
16 financial approval during the purchase but was purchased using
17 Plaintiff’s money. Id. ¶ 12. Further, Plaintiff and Herschel
18 verbally agreed that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff, as it was
19 going to be used exclusively for her personal and professional
20 purposes, and the vehicle was insured in Plaintiff’s name. Id.
21 ¶¶ 12–13.
22 On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff was driving the vehicle to
23 Grass Valley when she stopped at a gas station in Roseville to
24 refuel. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff was inside the gas station store
25 when Defendant Haas and another police officer entered the
26 premises and asked who Plaintiff’s vehicle belonged to. Id.
27 Plaintiff responded that the vehicle was hers, and the officers
28 escorted her outside. Id. Once outside, the officers informed
1 Plaintiff that the vehicle had been reported stolen. Id.
2 Plaintiff believed that her husband was responsible for reporting
3 the theft, as he had previously made similarly false reports to
4 the police in different counties in an ongoing pattern of abuse
5 and harassment. Id. ¶ 18.
6 The officers handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her in the back
7 of their patrol vehicle. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff remained
8 handcuffed in the backseat of the patrol car for approximately 45
9 minutes to an hour “while the officers stood outside conversing
10 and making no apparent effort to investigate the situation.” Id.
11 ¶ 21. At one point, one of the officers opened the door and
12 asked, “How did you get the keys to the vehicle?” to which
13 Plaintiff explained that the vehicle belonged to her, that it was
14 insured in her name, and that she used it for work. Id.
15 Plaintiff further informed the officer that she and her husband
16 had purchased the car together but that she had since obtained a
17 restraining order against him due to ongoing abuse. Id. ¶ 22.
18 Plaintiff offered to show the officer her marriage license and
19 restraining order, which were both in the vehicle. Id. The
20 officer briefly glanced at the documents before “appear[ing] to
21 dismiss their significance[.]” Id. ¶ 23.
22 Plaintiff was transported first to jail and later to a
23 hospital in Folsom after jail staff observed that her blood
24 pressure was elevated. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. After receiving medical
25 treatment, Plaintiff was taken back to the police station for
26 booking and was detained overnight in jail. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.
27 Plaintiff alleges she developed post-traumatic stress disorder as
28 a result of the incident and now lives in fear of law
1 enforcement. Id. ¶¶ 29–31.
2 Plaintiff filed suit on August 19, 2025, alleging three
3 causes of action for (1) Unreasonable Seizure of a Person
4 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Haas; (2) Denial
5 of Substantive Due Process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
6 Defendant Haas; and (3) Monell Liability against Defendant City
7 of Roseville (the “City”) and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to 42
8 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 32–56. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss
9 (ECF No. 6) Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Monell
10 liability on October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely
11 Opposition (ECF No. 8), and the City filed a Reply (ECF No. 9).
12 The matter was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule
13 230(g). ECF No. 11.
14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a
16 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
17 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted
18 only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or
19 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
20 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th
21 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true
22 and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
23 party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154,
24 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.
25 Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if
26 the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an
27 entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v.
28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
1 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement
2 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.”
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However,
5 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient
6 factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal,
7 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic
8 recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has
9 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
10 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
11 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
12 III. OPINION
13 “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach
14 under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
15 378, 392 (1989). Rather, government entities may be liable under
16 section 1983 “only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v.
17 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
18 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). Otherwise stated, a government entity
19 may be held liable under section 1983 only if a policy, practice,
20 or custom of that entity is a “moving force” behind a violation
21 of constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95.
22 To establish liability for governmental entities under
23 Monell, “a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that [the plaintiff]
24 possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived;
25 (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy
26 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
27 constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving
28 force behind the constitutional violation.’” Dougherty v. City
1 of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v.
2 Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.
3 1997)). Consistent with these principles, a local government may
4 be held liable under three distinct theories: (1) when the
5 “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by
6 its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
7 to represent official policy, inflicted the injury”; (2) when a
8 local government “fail[s] to train employees in a manner that
9 amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right,
10 such that ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious,
11 and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
12 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can be
13 reasonably said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
14 need’”; or (3) when “the individual who committed the
15 constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making
16 authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s
17 unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.”
18 Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir.
19 2018) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
20 Here, the City argues Plaintiff has unsuccessfully pled
21 Monell liability under any theory. Mot. Dismiss at 3–7, ECF No.
22 6-1. In opposition, Plaintiff argues she has sufficiently pled a
23 Monell claim based on the City’s failure to adequately train
24 Defendant Haas and the other officer(s) who arrested Plaintiff
25 “to assess whether probable cause existed when investigating
26 claims of spouses stealing property from one another.” Opp’n
27 Mot. Dismiss at 5–6, ECF No. 8.
28 The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff has
1 inadequately pled Monell liability based on the City’s failure to
2 train Defendant Haas or other officers. To allege a failure to
3 train, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “a constitutional violation”;
4 (2) “a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate
5 indifference to constitutional rights”; and (3) “that the
6 constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality
7 properly trained their employees.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San
8 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff fails
9 to sufficiently allege the second requirement, namely that the
10 City maintained a training policy deliberately indifferent to her
11 constitutional rights. This prong requires Plaintiff to show
12 both that the City chose a training program inadequate to prevent
13 constitutional violations and that the City was deliberately
14 indifferent to such violations. See Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23
15 F.4th 863, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2022).
16 First, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the City’s
17 training policy was deficient. Plaintiff generally alleges that
18 the City was “on notice of the Constitutional defects in their
19 training of HAAS and other City of Roseville Police Department
20 officers, including but not limited to relying on false reports
21 without substantiating basic facts to establish reasonable
22 suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest members of the
23 public, including Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 55. However, Plaintiff
24 fails to plausibly allege any unlawful seizure incidents
25 involving domestic disputes beyond this case. See id. ¶¶ 9–31,
26 50–56. An “inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred
27 from a single incident.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875; see also City of
28 Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (“adequately trained officers
1 occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little
2 about the training program”). The Complaint offers no other
3 facts about the City’s training program or policies, instead
4 focusing only on the acts of individual officers towards
5 Plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 9–31, 50–56. As Plaintiff relies solely on
6 the single incident involved in this case, she has not
7 sufficiently established the City employs an inadequate training
8 policy. Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875 (holding plaintiffs did not state
9 a failure to train claim under Monell because they relied solely
10 on a single incident and pled no other facts to suggest a
11 deficient training policy); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91
12 (“[T]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained
13 will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the
14 officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than
15 a faulty training program.” (citations omitted)).
16 Second, when premising Monell liability on a failure to
17 train, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by
18 untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate
19 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”
20 Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v.
21 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). “Without notice that a course
22 of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers
23 can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
24 that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. Here,
25 Plaintiff generally alleges that the City had notice of and
26 “approved ratified, condoned, encouraged, sought to cover up,
27 and/or tacitly authorized the continuing pattern and practice of
28 misconduct and/or civil rights violations by HAAS and other City
1 of Roseville Police Department officers[.]” Compl. ¶ 53.
2 However, as discussed above, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege
3 facts supporting “[a] pattern of similar constitutional
4 violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; see also Oliveira v. Cnty.
5 of Madera, No. 1:16-cv-01626-DAD-SKO, 2017 WL 4151272, at *11
6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017) (dismissing failure to train claim
7 because “Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing a pre-existing
8 pattern of constitutional violations stemming from the alleged
9 failure to train officers regarding concurrent jurisdiction”).
10 “[E]vidence of the failure to train a single officer is
11 [generally] insufficient to establish a municipality’s deliberate
12 policy.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 485 (9th
13 Cir. 2007).
14 Nor is this one of the “rare” instances where a single
15 incident may suffice to establish deliberate indifference where
16 the violation of constitutional rights is a “highly predictable
17 consequence” of a failure to train because that failure to train
18 is “so patently obvious.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64. For
19 example, where a “city has armed its officers with firearms[,]
20 . . . the need to train officers in the constitutional
21 limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to be ‘so
22 obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be characterized
23 as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights.” City of
24 Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. By contrast, where, “as here,
25 [City] employees are not making life-threatening decisions . . .
26 and because micromanaging of municipal policies should be
27 avoided, the single incident exception is inapplicable.”
28 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1155. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
NEI IIE IE EINE IIE III OS IIE IEE IRR GUS OI ED Re

1 failure to train claim is inadequately pled.
2 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide
3 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely
4 given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
5 | motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the
6 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
7 futility of amendment ... .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
8 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052
9 (9th Cir. 2003). This is the Court’s first dismissal of
10 Plaintiff’s Monell claim, and the City has not demonstrated that
11 amendment is clearly futile. Thus, the Court dismisses
12 Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability against the City with
13 leave to amend.
14 Iv. ORDER
15 Defendant City of Roseville’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6)
16 Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
17 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, she must do so
18 within twenty (20) days of this Order. Defendants shall file
19 their response to the amended complaint within twenty (20) days
20 thereafter.
21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
22 Dated: March 16, 2026
23 Se Z J (Paras
HN A. MENDEZ.
24 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377645. Public record. Not legal advice.