# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · May 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377307

## Case

- **Full name:** Joshua Hurd v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** May 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:26-cv-05090-MWF (SK) Date: May 27, 2026
Title Joshua Hurd v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County

Present: The Honorable: Steve Kim, United States Magistrate Judge

Connie Chung n/a
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Attorneys Present for
Plaintiff(s)/Petitioner(s): Defendant(s)/Respondent(s):
None present None present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner Joshua Hurd is a pretrial detainee at North County Correctional
Facility on state criminal charges for burglary. (ECF 1 at 1). According to petitioner,
satanic cult members broke into his music production studio, called the police, and
reported petitioner for burglary. (Id.). He alleges that the cult members have since
ransacked the building, stolen equipment and cargo trailers filled with “treasures,” and
stolen the identities of various individuals who worked at or rented space at the studio.
(Id. at 2–4). Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming he is
being detained without due process because his arrest was not prompted by an “owner
complaint.” (Id. at 4–5). But as alleged, his petition is subject to summary dismissal for
two separate procedural deficiencies. See L.R. 72-3.2.
First, federal courts may not intervene in pending state court proceedings under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Indeed, “Younger exemplifies one class of
cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending
state criminal proceeding[.]” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).
And nothing in the petition credibly suggests that one of the narrow exceptions to this
rule might apply: when a prosecution is “undertaken for harassment purposes or in bad
faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or if there are “other extraordinary
circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899,
902–03 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The Court has no authority to derail petitioner’s
pending state criminal prosecution “until after the jury comes in, judgment has been
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:26-cv-05090-MWF (SK) Date: May 27, 2026
Title Joshua Hurd v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County
appealed from and the case [is] concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d
764, 764–65 (9th Cir. 1972); see, e.g., Bautista v. People of California, 2016 WL
5661861, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016) (dismissing habeas petition sua sponte based
on Younger abstention).
Second, even if Younger abstention was not required, dismissal would still be
proper because petitioner has not exhausted his federal claims in state court. See, e.g.,
Lobato v. San Bernardino Cnty., 2020 WL 1166996, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020)
(dismissing § 2241 petition for lack of exhaustion because there was “no indication that
[the petitioner had] presented any of his claims to the California Supreme Court”);
Neter v. Villanueva, 2020 WL 442992, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2020) (same). To be
sure, the exhaustion requirement for § 2241 actions is only a prudential one. See Ward
v.Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). But there is hardly any more fitting
situation for federal judicial prudence than when a state criminal defendant tries to
short-circuit his pending prosecution with premature federal habeas claims. Petitioner
has not explained (nor is the Court aware of any reason) why he cannot raise his claims
first in state court, whether that be through pretrial motion practice, defenses at trial, or
available appellate remedies.
For all these reasons, petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or before
June 18, 2026, why the Court should not dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
and lack of exhaustion. Petitioner may discharge this order by voluntarily dismissing
the entire action using the attached Form CV-09y. Failure to respond to this order,
however, may lead to involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute and obey court
orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); L.R. 41-1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377307. Public record. Not legal advice.