# (SS)Benavides

> District Court, E.D. California · March 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377133

## Case

- **Full name:** Rene Benavides, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 Rene Benavides, Jr. No. 1:25-cv-01488-GSA
12 Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
13 v. DEFENDANT COMMISSION OF SOCIAL
SECURITY AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF
14 Commissioner of Social Security,
(ECF Nos. 14, 15)
15 Defendant
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I. Introduction
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Plaintiff Rene Benavides seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
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Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
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income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
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II. Procedural Background
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On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff applied for social security disability insurance benefits and
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supplemental security income alleging disability commencing on June 15, 2021, due to seizures.
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AR 213–26, 257. On March 1, 2024, after being denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff
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requested a hearing. AR 146–47.
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On July 30, 2024, a hearing was held before an ALJ. AR 23–51. On November 27, 2024,
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the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 111–123. The Appeals Council denied the request for
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review on September 11, 2025. AR 1–6. On November 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this
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1 Court.
2 III. The Disability Standard
3 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), this court has the authority to review a decision by the
4 Commissioner denying a Claimant disability benefits. “This court may set aside the
5 Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal
6 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180
7 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence within the
8 record that could lead a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion regarding disability status. See
9 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a scintilla, but it is less than a
10 preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and
11 quotations omitted).
12 When performing this analysis, the court must “consider the entire record as a whole and
13 may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Social
14 Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). If the
15 evidence could reasonably support two conclusions, the court “may not substitute its judgment for
16 that of the Commissioner” and must affirm the Agency’s decision. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d
17 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[T]he court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for
18 harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was
19 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
20 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
21 To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or
22 she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or
23 mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
24 twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability
25 only if . . . his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
26 unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
27 engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
28 regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
1 job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 42 U.S.C.
2 §1382c(a)(3)(B).
3 To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established a
4 sequential five-step process for an ALJ to employ when evaluating the alleged disability of a
5 Claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon
6 reaching a dispositive finding that the Claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927,
7 416.929.
8 Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: 1- whether a Claimant has engaged in
9 substantial gainful activity during the period for which Plaintiff is alleging he or she experiences a
10 disability; 2- whether the Claimant had medically determinable “severe impairments” affecting the
11 claimants ability to perform basic work activities; 3- whether these impairments meet or are
12 medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in the agency’s regulations (20
13 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1); 4- whether the Claimant retained the residual functional
14 capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work; and 5- whether the Claimant had the ability to
15 perform other jobs existing in significant numbers at the national and regional level. 20 C.F.R. §
16 416.920(a)-(f). While the Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, the burden
17 shifts to the commissioner at step five to prove that Plaintiff can perform other work in the national
18 economy given the Claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience. Garrison v. Colvin, 759
19 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014).
20 IV. The ALJ’s Decision
21 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
22 the alleged onset date of June 15, 2021. AR 116. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
23 following severe impairments: left knee osteoarthritis with chondrocalcinosis and seizure disorder.
24 AR 116–17
25 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
26 thereof that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
27 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 117.
28 Prior to step four, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and
1 concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
2 416.967(b), except: 1- Plaintiff can occasionally climb ramps or climb stairs; 2- Plaintiff can never
3 climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; 3- Plaintiff can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
4 crawl, and 4- Plaintiff must avoid all exposure to hazards including unprotected heights and
5 dangerous moving machinery. AR 117–121.
6 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR 122. At step five,
7 relying on the Vocational Expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that considering the Plaintiff’s
8 vocational profile (age, education, work experience and RFC), the Plaintiff could perform the
9 following jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy: assembler, cleaner, and
10 marker. AR 122.
11 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff was not disabled since the alleged
12 disability onset date of June 15, 2021. AR 123.
13 V. Issues Presented
14 Plaintiff asserts one claim of error: the ALJ failed to articulate specific, clear and convincing
15 reasons in rejecting his subjective symptoms.
16 A. Subjective Symptoms, RFC
17 1. Applicable Law
18 Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual
19 functional capacity (RFC) which comprises the most that a Claimant is still capable of doing despite
20 the claimant’s particular limitations. This RFC represents an assessment “based on all the relevant
21 evidence” contained within the Certified Administrative Record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The
22 residual functional capacity must consider all of the Claimant’s impairments, whether those
23 impairments are severe or non-severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2). “The ALJ can meet
24 this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence,
25 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751
26 (9th Cir. 1989).
27 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to determine whether a Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
28 subjective pain or symptoms is credible. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir.
1 2014); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; S.S.R 16-3p at 3. First, the Claimant must produce objective
2 medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of
3 the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281–82. If the
4 Claimant satisfies the first step and the ALJ finds that there is no evidence of malingering in the
5 record, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the Claimant’s
6 symptoms to determine the extent to which those symptoms limit the individual’s ability to perform
7 work-related activities. S.S.R. 16-3p at 2.
8 An ALJ’s evaluation of a Claimant’s testimony must be supported by specific, clear and
9 convincing reasons. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014); see also S.S.R. 16-3p
10 at *10. Subjective testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the testimony is not
11 entirely corroborated by the objective medical evidence in the record. Nevertheless, medical
12 evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of Claimant’s pain and its disabling
13 effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R.
14 § 404.1529(c)(2)).
15 In addition to the objective evidence, the other factors considered are: 1- daily activities; 2-
16 the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 3- any applicable
17 precipitating and aggravating factors; 4- the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
18 prescribed medication; 5- the treatment other than medications that the claimant receives; 6- any
19 other measures the Claimant uses to relieve pain or other symptom; and 7- Other factors concerning
20 the Claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See, 20 C.F.R.
21 § 416.929(c)(3).
22 2. Analysis
23 a. Summary of Plaintiff’s Testimony
24 Plaintiff did not have a driver’s license as it was suspended due to Plaintiff experiencing
25 seizures. Plaintiff’s seizures also prevent Plaintiff from working. Plaintiff experiences two to four
26 seizures a week. Plaintiff could not describe the seizures. Plaintiff “ha[s] a feeling inside, and then
27 from there, it gets blank.” Plaintiff loses consciousness and “sleep for hours, even into the next
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1 day.”1 Plaintiff is unaware of any triggers to the seizures which are unpredictable. Plaintiff has
2 been on medication for “quite a while.” Plaintiff sees a neurologist about 3 to 4 times per month.
3 AR 29–37.

4 b. The ALJ’s reasoning for discrediting testimony
5 The following comes from Plaintiff’s 3-page analysis which begins at page 5 of the opening
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brief:
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Here, the ALJ rejects Benavides’s testimony . . . that he experienced two to
8 three seizures per week. (A.R. 118). However, the medical evidence does, in fact,
support Benavides’s testimony. On September 14, 2021, Benavides presented to
9 Kern County Neurological for a follow-up evaluation. (A.R. 322) . . . he reported
experiencing seizures one to two times per week. Id. He further reported post-seizure
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symptoms including sleepiness, fatigue, and memory problems. Id. This report is
11 consistent with Benavides’s hearing testimony.

12 Although subsequent treatment notes reflect some variation and imprecision
in Benavides’s reports of seizure frequency, they nonetheless document ongoing
13 and significant seizure activity. See (A.R. 403 (March 22, 2022 visit – reporting
seizures every two to three weeks, including two seizures occurring back-to-back
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the day before the visit); 407 (July 25, 2022 visit – last seizure on July 12, 2022);
15 460 (April 5, 2023 visit – reporting two to three seizures in the prior month); 464
(August 1 2023 visit – reporting periodic seizures during the month, with the most
16 recent occurring one week prior to the visit); and 469 (February 7, 2024 visit
reporting two to three seizures per month, with the most recent occurring three days
17 before the visit).

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While Benavides’s testimony regarding the precise frequency of his seizures
19 may not have been entirely consistent over time, the medical records more closely
align with his testimony than with the ALJ’s conclusion that the record fails to
20 substantiate his seizure activity. Indeed, the ALJ makes no finding with respect to
the frequency of Benavides’ seizures. He just finds that the report of two to three a
21 week is uncorroborated. (A.R. 118-119). The ALJ’s assertion is not a specific, clear
and convincing reason supported by substantial evidence . . .
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23 In addition, the ALJ finding regarding the frequency of seizures does not
obviate his responsibility to articulate reasons as to Benavides’ testimony regarding
24 the impact of his seizures. Specifically, his testimony that he suffers memory
problems and experiences blankness for hours after a seizure. (A.R. 32 and 37). The
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ALJ provides no rationale for rejecting this portion of Benavides’ testimony and the
26 impact on his condition. “An ALJ must clearly identify each subjective statement
being rejected and the particular evidence in the record which purportedly
27 undermines the statement.” . . .

28 1 However, in a seizure questionnaire Plaintiff reported they last 10 to 15 minutes. AR 306.
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The ALJ’s only other discernible reason for discounting Benavides’
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testimony is the absence of emergency room visits or hospitalizations, which the
ALJ characterizes as evidence of “conservative” treatment. This rationale is a red
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herring. Benavides has experienced seizures for virtually his entire life, and his
4 current difficulty controlling them began after a car accident in 2021. (A.R. 36). He
is consistently surrounded by family and remains compliant with his medication
5 regimen. (A.R. 42). Benavides never alleged that his condition required emergency
treatment, and the fact that his type of seizures does not necessitate emergency room
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care or hospitalization does not undermine his testimony. See, e.g., Nichole K. v.
7 Saul, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82591, at *6 (D. Or. May 11, 2020) (“[T]here is no
indication that more aggressive treatment options were available or appropriate to
8 treat Plaintiff’s migraines and syncopal episodes.”). As his aunt testified at the
hearing, the physician’s instruction following a seizure was simply to ensure that
9 Benavides takes his medication. (A.R. 43). Which he does on a regular basis and
despite this fact, he still experiences seizures.
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11 Moreover, the ALJ never questioned Benavides regarding the absence of
emergency room visits or hospitalizations. The Commissioner’s binding ruling
12 expressly provides that he “will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with
the evidence in the record on this basis without considering possible reasons he or
13 she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the degree of
his or her complaints.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p. If the ALJ believed that
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Benavides’s course of treatment was inconsistent with the severity of the symptoms
15 alleged – which it was not – he was required to inquire into the reasons for that
treatment history. See Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992, as
16 amended Sept. 17, 1992) (per curiam) (“[T]he ALJ is not a mere umpire at [an
administrative proceeding], but has an independent duty to fully develop the
17 record[.]"); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 147 L.
Ed. 2d 80 (2000) ("Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
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adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments
19 both for and against granting benefits[.]"). Therefore, the ALJ’s reliance on a lack
of emergency room visits or hospitalizations is not a specific, clear and convincing
20 reason to reject Benavides’ testimony regarding his seizures and resultant
limitations. Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1136–37.
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To begin, Plaintiff places emphasis on the ALJ’s alleged failure to make any finding as to
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23 the frequency with which Plaintiff experiences seizures. However, this argument turns the burden
24 of proof on its head as it is Plaintiff’s obligation to prove disability (applicable here, seizure
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frequency), not the ALJ’s obligation to disprove Plaintiff’s alleged disability. The caselaw
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supporting this proposition is extensive. See, e.g., Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th
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Cir. 2005) (“The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability.”). SSR 17-4p
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1 (“Although we take a role in developing the evidentiary record . . . claimants . . . have the primary
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responsibility under the Act to provide evidence in support of their disability or blindness claims.”);
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Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987) (“It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who
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is in a better position to provide information about his own medical condition, to do so.”).
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Equally of note is Plaintiff’s own claim regarding his seizure frequency, which is not
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7 altogether consistent with the record. For instance, contrary to Plaintiff’s testimony that he was
8 having seizures 2-3 times per week (AR 32, 306), the ALJ noted that the record reflected less
9 frequent seizures, namely 1 seizure every 2-3 weeks (AR 403). Other records suggest that the latter
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statement better approximates the seizure frequency. See AR 460 (reported about 2-3 seizures in
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the last month); AR 469 (same).
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In addition, despite Plaintiff’s testimony that following a seizure he would sleep for hours
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or into the next day, his seizure questionnaire only noted that his seizures would last 10–15 minutes,
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15 and even more importantly did not identify longer periods even though the form specifically asked,
16 “how long until you can resume normal activity.” AR 306.
17 Returning to seizure frequency, Plaintiff appears to concede that although “treatment notes
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reflect some variation and imprecision in Benavides’s reports of seizure frequency, they
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nonetheless document ongoing and significant seizure activity. See (A.R. 403 (March 22, 2022 visit
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– reporting seizures every two to three weeks, including two seizures occurring back-to-back the
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day before the visit).” Br. at 6, Doc. 14 (emphasis added). Plaintiff continues stating that “while
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23 Benavides’s testimony regarding the precise frequency of his seizures may not have been entirely
24 consistent over time, the medical records more closely align with his testimony than with the ALJ’s
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conclusion that the record fails to substantiate his seizure activity.” Br. at 6 (emphasis added).
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However, even should Plaintiff be correct that the medical records “more closely align” with the
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seizure frequency identified in his testimony, his argument still falls short of demonstrating harmful
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1 error. Specifically, when evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation it is the
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ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld, not the plaintiff’s conclusion even if the plaintiff’s
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conclusion is a rational one. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Put another
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way, the primary question for the Court here is not whether there is substantial evidence that could
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support a finding of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the contrary
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7 conclusion: non-disability. See Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1997). This
8 deferential “substantial evidence” standard applies to an ALJ’s reasonably supported conclusion,
9 not to Plaintiff’s contrary conclusion even if that conclusion is equally reasonable.
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As an aside, Plaintiff’s reply brief warrants addressing. In it, Plaintiff understandably takes
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issue with Defendant’s partial reliance on Plaintiff’s successful knee surgery and minimal
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outpatient treatment for his knee condition. Reply at 3. Indeed, the knee condition was not the
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subject of Plaintiff’s appeal and thus Defendant’s reliance on same is not relevant.
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15 Notwithstanding, this non relevancy does not undermine the ALJ’s conclusions regarding
16 Plaintiff’s seizures and their non-disabling effects.
17 Plaintiff further explains that while objective medical evidence is a relevant consideration,
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it cannot be the sole consideration. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (An ALJ
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may not "reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to
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fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain."). Reply at 2. Here, Plaintiff asserts that “The
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Commissioner’s response seeming[ly] concedes that the ALJ did not consider anything but a
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23 purported lack of objective support – thus “render[ing] [Benavides’] subjective symptom testimony
24 superfluous…” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 495 (9th Cir. 2022). Id. Plaintiff contends that
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“the Commissioner’s responses, couching, treatment with objective support is no more than a
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backdoor finding of a lack of objective support . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s argument
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here is misplaced because the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective account of seizure frequency, 1 every
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1 2-3 weeks, happens to appear in a medical record (AR 403) under “HPI” (history of present illness),
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simply does not transform it into an objective finding. Furthermore, not only was this Plaintiff’s
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own subjective account of seizure frequency reported to a clinician, this account is also not
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consistent with other subjective statements Plaintiff made regarding seizure frequency. Hence,
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Plaintiff’s own varying subjective accounts of seizure frequency supports the non-disability
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7 finding.
8 In sum then, given the deferential “substantial evidence” standard on appeal, the ALJ’s
9 reasonable interpretation of the evidence must control.
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VI. Conclusion and Order
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Substantial evidence and applicable law support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not
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disabled.
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Accordingly, it is ordered that:
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15 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is DENIED.
16 2. Defendant’s cross motion (Doc. 15) is GRANTED.
17 3. The Commissioner’s Decision is AFFIRMED
18 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant
19 Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff.
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22 IT IS SO ORDERED.

23 Dated: March 13, 2026 /s/ Gary S. Austin
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11377133. Public record. Not legal advice.