# Powers

> District Court, S.D. California · June 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11376175

## Case

- **Full name:** Christin Powers v. Apple
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** June 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CHRISTIN POWERS, Case No.: 26-cv-03050-DMS-JAC
Plaintiff,
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v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;
APPLE,
DISMISSING COMPLAINT SUA
14 Defendant.
SPONTE; DENYING OMNIBUS
15 MOTION

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[ECF Nos. 1–3]
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Plaintiff Christin Powers, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Defendant
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Apple on May 15, 2026. (Compl., ECF No 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to
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proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2), and an omnibus motion,
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wherein she makes miscellaneous requests (“Omnibus Motion”), (Omnibus Mot., ECF No.
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3). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, dismisses
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the Complaint sua sponte, and denies all requests in the Omnibus Motion.
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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to
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be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets
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which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Plaintiff
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1 receives $2,040 a month in alimony payments. (IFP Mot. 1.) She reportedly is unemployed
2 and does not receive income from another source. (Id. at 1–2.) She has less than $4.00 in
3 her checking accounts and is $150,000 in debt. (Id. at 3–4.) In light of Plaintiff’s financial
4 standing, the Court finds Plaintiff is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a).
5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion.
6 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
7 A. Legal Standard
8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28
9 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous
10 or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
11 immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)
12 (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to
13 prisoners”).
14 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under
15 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure
16 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6)
17 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
18 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
19 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
20 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the
21 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
22 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not
23 initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
24 1982).
25 In addition, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
26 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to
27 state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 if the factual assertions in
28 it, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable
1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2 “[T]he pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands
3 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A complaint that is too verbose,
5 long, confusing, redundant, irrelevant, or conclusory may be dismissed for failure to
6 comply with Rule 8.” Alexis v. Contreras, No. 25-CV-1625, 2025 WL 1811819, at *2
7 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2025) (citing Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–
8 59 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases upholding dismissals for those reasons)).
9 B. Discussion
10 Plaintiff asserts that her “Apple card” and Goldman Sachs have provided
11 inconsistent banking opportunities over several years. (Compl. 2.) She claims the most
12 recent grievance occurred a week prior to filing suit. (Id.) It appears Plaintiff’s card was
13 shut down. (Id.) When she attempted to contact a “human banker,” she was prompted to
14 input her phone number during the call; however, upon entering her phone number, the call
15 would drop. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff wishes to “own and control all of Apple,” as well
16 as JPMorgan Chase. (Id. at 2–3.)
17 Plaintiff fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard. The Complaint does not allege
18 any cause of action and fails to plausibly allege facts to support the elements of any claim.
19 See Rashidiasl v. MEP, No. 23-CV-0325-GPC-DEB, 2023 WL 3728685, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
20 May 30, 2023). Plaintiff states she “defer[s] to Judge to assign proper legal clauses [and]
21 law” for this alleged harm. (Compl. 3.) However, the Court cannot tell Plaintiff what
22 causes of action to bring. Cf. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (holding a court cannot “supply essential
23 elements of [claims] that were not initially pled”). Further, the allegations pled are unclear
24 and confusing. It is difficult to understand what harm Plaintiff suffered and how that harm
25 allegedly occurred. As pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not afford Defendant a fair
26 opportunity to defend itself. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with
27 leave to amend.
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I TIT. OMNIBUS MOTION
2 Plaintiff requests the Court (1) transfer this case to “Chief Justice”; (2) make a ruling
3 or before May 22, 2026; (3) schedule a settlement conference attended by a
4 ||representative for each company; and (4) if needed, contact “the bank or the board” about
5 settlement” on or before May 20, 2026. (Omnibus Mot. 1.) First, because the
6 ||Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint on which to base
7 || Plaintiff's requests. See Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25-CV-01437-RBM-
8 || DEB, 2025 WL 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). Second, these requests are vague
9 || and lack any legal basis for the Court to take such actions. The Court DENIES the requests
10 |/in the Omnibus Motion.
11 IV. CONCLUSION
12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP,
13 || DISMISSES the Complaint, and DENIES the Omnibus Motion. Plaintiff may file an
14 || Amended Complaint to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21)
15 || days from the date this Order is entered.
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 || Dated: June 8, 2026
Ig Jrrn Yn « LA
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
19 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11376175. Public record. Not legal advice.