# Lyons

> District Court, E.D. California · February 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11375124

## Case

- **Full name:** Vileyby B.R. v. Todd M. Lyons, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** February 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 VILEYBY B.R.,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-00512-TLN-AC

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14 v. ORDER
TODD M. LYONS, et al.,
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Respondents.
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18 This matter is before the Court on an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
19 should not issue (ECF No. 11) after granting Petitioner Vileyby B.R.’s1 (“Petitioner”) Motion for
20 a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 7). Respondents filed an opposition. (ECF
21 No. 13.) Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 14.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court issues
22 a preliminary injunction.
23 ///
24 ///

25 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only
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her first name and last initials, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum re:
27 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018),
28 https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf.
1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
2 Petitioner is an asylum seeker from Guatemala. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) She entered the United
3 States on November 6, 2021, and was apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security at
4 the border. (Id.) On November 8, 2021, Petitioner was released into the United States on an
5 Order of Release on Recognizance. (ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 5; ECF No. 3-6.)
6 Petitioner settled in Bakersfield with her husband and four-year-old son. (ECF No. 3-1
7 ¶ 6.) As part of the conditions of her release, Petitioner enrolled in the Alternatives to Detention
8 program and was required to attend appointments with Immigration and Customs Enforcement
9 (“ICE”). (Id. ¶ 5.) Petitioner maintains that she never missed an ICE check-in, court appearance,
10 or otherwise violated the terms of her release. (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner has no criminal record. (Id.)
11 On November 7, 2022, Petitioner applied for asylum. (Id. ¶ 3.) Her application was denied on
12 July 28, 2025, and she appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Id.) Petitioner’s appeal
13 remains pending, and she has no final order of removal. (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 11.)
14 On October 28, 2025, Petitioner went to the ICE facility in Bakersfield for her routine
15 check-in. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) She was suddenly detained. (Id.) ICE did not provide justification.
16 (Id.) She had no prior notice or warning that she would be detained. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was
17 then transferred to the California City Detention Facility. (ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 6.) On November 26,
18 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to redetermine bond. (Id. ¶ 7.) An Immigration Judge denied the
19 motion for lack of jurisdiction on December 4, 2025. (Id.)
20 On January 21, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging her
21 detention as violating her due process rights. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner also filed a motion for a
22 TRO. (ECF No. 7.) On January 22, 2026, this Court granted Petitioner’s request for a TRO and
23 ordered her immediate release. (ECF No. 11.) The Court further enjoined and restrained
24 Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional
25 protections. (Id.) The Court now determines whether the relief provided in the TRO should
26 continue as a preliminary injunction.
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2 These facts come from Petitioner’s habeas petition and motion for TRO. (ECF Nos. 1, 3–
28 3-6, 7.) Respondents do not dispute these facts. (See generally ECF No. 13.)
1 II. STANDARD OF LAW
2 For a preliminary injunction to issue, courts consider whether Petitioner has established
3 “[1] that [she] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm
4 in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and [4] that
5 an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
6 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the
7 Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court may weigh Petitioner’s
8 showing on each of the Winter factors using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on
9 the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where there are
10 “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood
11 of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, if “serious
12 questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in
13 Petitioner’s favor in order to issue a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35.
14 III. ANALYSIS
15 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
16 As the Court already found, Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on her due
17 process claim. (ECF No. 11.) The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government
18 deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v.
19 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons”
20 within the borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
21 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United
22 States, including noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
23 permanent.”). These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94; see
24 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
25 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
26 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
27 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
28 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989);
1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies,
2 the question remains what process is due.”).
3 i. Liberty Interest
4 “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of
5 physical restrain — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
6 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or
7 over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
8 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in
9 some circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the
10 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates
11 ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only
12 if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
13 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a noncitizen release from custody pending
14 immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo
15 Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12,
16 2025). To determine whether a specific individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a
17 protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case
18 before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v.
19 Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025).
20 Here, Petitioner gained a protected liberty interest in her continued freedom when she was
21 released from immigration custody on her own recognizance and allowed to reside in the United
22 States for approximately four years. (ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 5; ECF No. 3-6.) Under Morrissey, this
23 release was an implied promise that Petitioner would not be re-detained during the pendency of
24 her immigration proceedings if she abided by the terms of her release. Petitioner indeed complied
25 with all conditions of release, did not miss any ICE check-ins, and has no criminal record. (ECF
26 No. 3-1 ¶ 8.) Respondents do not dispute this. (See generally ECF No. 13.) As this Court has
27 found previously, along with many other courts in this district when confronted with similar
28 circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in her continued freedom as she awaits the outcome
1 of her immigration and asylum proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083,
2 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the
3 community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest).
4 Respondents identify no authority for Petitioner’s detention. (See generally ECF No. 13.)
5 Instead, in response to the order to show cause, Respondents only assert generally that “the
6 detention authority in this case is lawful under the Constitution and applicable provisions of the
7 Immigration and Nationality Act.” (Id. at 1.) In the absence of substantive argument to the
8 contrary, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Petitioner has a liberty interest in her
9 continued freedom protected by the Due Process Clause.
10 ii. Procedural Due Process
11 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to
12 ensure any deprivation of that interest accords with the Constitution. The Court considers three
13 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an
14 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
15 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
16 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
17 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due
18 process rights in the immigration context “must account for the government’s countervailing
19 interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir.
20 2022).
21 As to the first Mathews factor — Petitioner’s private interest — Petitioner has a
22 substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. Petitioner lived in the United States
23 for approximately four years and established a life in Bakersfield with her husband and son.
24 (ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 4–6.) The time Petitioner spent released on recognizance and the life she
25 appears to have built in that time have created a powerful interest in her continued liberty. See
26 Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093–94 (finding similarly).
27 As to the second Mathews factor — the risk of erroneous deprivation — the risk here is
28 considerable as Petitioner has received virtually no procedural safeguards such as a bond or
1 custody redetermination hearing. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL
2 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). “Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in
3 purpose and effect,’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the
4 community.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2686866, at *6
5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025) (“R.D.T.M.”). Petitioner has no criminal history and was released on
6 recognizance after the Government determined she posed little if any flight risk or danger to the
7 community. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 11.) After she was detained by ICE, Petitioner requested a bond
8 hearing and that request was denied. (ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 7.) The risk that Petitioner has been
9 erroneously deprived of her liberty by Respondents’ lack of process is therefore significant.
10 As to the third Mathews factor, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without
11 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is negligible. R.D.T.M., 2025
12 WL 2686866 at *6. Where removal is not imminent under a final order of removal, “[t]he
13 government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to
14 be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be
15 reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994. Here,
16 Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal, she has consistently appeared at her ICE
17 check-ins and court hearings, and Respondents have identified no legitimate interest in detaining
18 her. (ECF No. 1 at 11; ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 8; see generally ECF No. 13.)
19 The cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal. Notice and custody
20 determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents, and any delay in re-detention (if
21 justified) for time to provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. It would also be less of a
22 fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner home to await a
23 determination on her immigration proceedings than to continue to detain her. See Diaz v. Kaiser,
24 No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit
25 has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.”).
26 In their response to the order to show cause, Respondents admit they “do not have legal
27 arguments to distinguish this case from previous orders issued by the Court, nor do Respondents
28 identify material factual differences between this case and those identified by the Court in the
1 Order to Show Cause.” (ECF No. 13 at 1.) The case cited in the Order to Show Cause was
2 Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11,
3 2025). There, this Court found Respondents’ interest in placing the petitioner in detention
4 without a hearing was low and did not outweigh the petitioner’s substantial liberty interest or the
5 risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. Morales-Flores, 2025 WL 3552841 at *6. Due process
6 thus required that the petitioner receive a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that complies
7 with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and related laws and regulations if he were to be re-detained. Id. In light
8 of Respondents’ admission, the Court adopts that same finding to the facts presented here.
9 Thus, on balance, Petitioner was owed notice and hearing before a neutral decisionmaker
10 prior to re-detention. She was denied this process. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown she is
11 likely to succeed on the merits of his due process claim.
12 B. Irreparable Harm
13 Petitioner has also established she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
14 preliminary relief. The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to
15 immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention
16 facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention,
17 and the collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here.
18 (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Without relief, Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional time in
19 detention and continued harm while she awaits a determination on her immigration and asylum
20 proceedings. Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights
21 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th
22 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). “When an alleged deprivation of
23 a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is
24 necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Arevalo v.
25 Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical liberty by detention
26 constitutes irreparable harm.”). In addition to harms imposed by detention, Petitioner has shown
27 she is likely to succeed on the merits of her constitutional claim. The Court thus finds Petitioner
28 has demonstrated irreparable harm.
1 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
2 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the
3 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F.
4 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092
5 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. The Government “cannot
6 reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from
7 constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir.
8 1983). Rather, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s
9 constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. Additionally, and as noted above, “the Ninth
10 Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz
11 v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (internal
12 citation omitted). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in Petitioner’s favor.
13 Having found Petitioner has satisfied each of the Winter factors, the Court issues a
14 preliminary injunction as set forth below.
15 D. Request for Extended Briefing
16 Finally, the Court declines Respondents’ request for a 180-day extended briefing schedule
17 to oppose Petitioner’s habeas petition. (ECF No. 13 at 2.) Respondents are capable of presenting
18 “informed briefing” on the schedule set forth below, particularly as they admit they do not have
19 legal arguments to distinguish this case from previous orders of this Court. (Id.) The Court has
20 found Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of her constitutional claim and will not delay
21 issuing relief on the prospect that an appeal in a different matter could have precedential effect at
22 some point in the future.
23 IV. CONCLUSION
24 The Court issues a preliminary injunction. Respondents are ENJOINED AND
25 RESTRAINED from imposing additional restrictions on Petitioner’s terms of release, unless such
26 restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
27 Respondents are further ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining
28 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice and a
1 | pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show material
2 | changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the
3 || reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
4 | that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner
5 || shall be allowed to have counsel present.
6 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not enter final
7 | judgment on the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition. Respondents shall file responsive papers
8 | within five court days from the date of this order. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, within eight
9 | court days from the date of this order. The matter is not set for a hearing, though the Court may
10 | set one should it later be determined that a hearing is necessary.
1] IT IS SO ORDERED.
12 | Date: February 23, 2026
Leal ey
14 TROY L. NUNLEY
15 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11375124. Public record. Not legal advice.