# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · February 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11374538

## Case

- **Full name:** Gary Lee v. Igloo Products Corp.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** February 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GARY LEE, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-01526-JAM-CSK
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
14 IGLOO PRODUCTS CORP.,
15 Defendant.
16
17 Plaintiff alleges his finger was pinched and severely
18 injured by an Igloo-brand cooler while removing the cooler from
19 the bed of his truck. Plaintiff theorizes that the accident was
20 caused by an alleged design defect in the cooler and/or by
21 Igloo’s failure to warn of the risk of injury and asserts claims
22 for strict products liability and negligence as a result.
23 Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing they
24 are “long on generic conclusions” while being “woefully short on
25 supporting facts.”
26 As discussed further below, the Court agrees that
27 Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pled and dismisses
28 Plaintiff’s claims with leave to amend.
1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 Defendant Igloo Products Corp. designs and manufactures
3 numerous products intended to cool food and beverages, including
4 a “Latitude 90 Roller Cooler” (the “Cooler”). First Am. Compl.
5 (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 22. Plaintiff Gary Lee alleges that on or
6 about June 3, 2023, he was taking the Cooler out of his truck bed
7 when the tow handle pinched the fingers of his left hand against
8 the body of the Cooler (the “Accident”). Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff
9 alleges that the Accident occurred as a result of the defective
10 design of the Cooler, which allowed Plaintiff’s hand to be
11 pinched between the tow handle and Cooler during the normal,
12 foreseeable use of the product. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges
13 that he continues to have numbness and pain in this left index
14 finger, which is attributable to nerve damage. Id. ¶ 16.
15 Plaintiff also alleges that, on November 13, 2025, the
16 Consumer Products Safety Commission (“CPSC”) announced a recall
17 of more than 1,000,000 of Defendant’s coolers, which included the
18 subject Cooler, after receiving “12 reports of fingertip
19 injuries, including fingertip amputations, bone fractures, and
20 lacerations” as a result of the tow handle pinching consumers’
21 fingertips against the Coolers. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges
22 this indicates “Defendant knew or should have known of these
23 defects but has nevertheless put profit ahead of safety by
24 continuing to sell their Coolers to consumers, failing to warn
25 said consumers of the serious risks posed by the defects, and
26 failing to timely recall the dangerously defective Coolers
27 regardless of the risk of significant injuries to Plaintiff and
28 consumers like him.” Id. ¶ 18.
1 Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint on
2 September 22, 2025, alleging four causes of action for (1) Strict
3 Products Liability – Design Defect; (2) Strict Products Liability
4 – Failure to Warn; (3) Negligence/Negligent Products Liability –
5 Negligent Design Defect; and (4) Negligence/Negligent Products
6 Liability – Negligent Failure to Warn. Id. ¶¶ 25–60. In
7 response, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
8 23), Plaintiff filed a timely Opposition (ECF No. 24), and
9 Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 25). The matter was submitted
10 without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). ECF No. 27.
11 II. LEGAL STANDARD
12 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a
13 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
14 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted
15 only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or
16 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
17 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th
18 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true
19 and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
20 party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154,
21 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.
22 Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if
23 the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an
24 entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v.
25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
26 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement
27 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.”
1 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However,
2 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient
3 factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal,
4 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic
5 recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has
6 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
7 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
8 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
9 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide
10 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely
11 given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
12 motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the
13 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
14 futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
15 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052
16 (9th Cir. 2003).
17 III. OPINION
18 A. Plaintiff Has Inadequately Pled His Strict Liability
19 and Negligence Design Defect Claims (Counts I and III)
20 Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action are predicated
21 on the existence of a design defect in the Cooler. FAC ¶¶ 26–36,
22 45–50. Defendant argues that both causes of action fail at the
23 outset because Plaintiff does not adequately identify which
24 design defect theory he intends to plead, (1) the consumer
25 expectations test or (2) the risk-benefit test. Mot. Dismiss at
26 3–4, ECF No. 23. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed
27 to adequately plead either design defect theory, as he neither
28 describes how the Cooler failed to meet the minimum safety
1 expectations of an ordinary consumer as required by the consumer
2 expectations test, nor explains how the particular design defect
3 of the Cooler caused him harm as required by the risk-benefit
4 test. Id. at 4–6. Finally, Defendant contends Plaintiff
5 inadequately pleads causation. Id. at 6–8.
6 The Court finds Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a strict
7 liability design defect claim. California recognizes strict
8 liability for three types of product defects – manufacturing
9 defects, design defects, and warning defects (inadequate warnings
10 or failure to warn). Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Co., 53
11 Cal. 3d 987, 995 (1991). Under the “design defect” theory, a
12 design may be defective in one of two ways. Soule v. Gen. Motors
13 Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 566-67 (1994). First, under the “consumer
14 expectations test,” a product’s design is defective if it has
15 failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would
16 expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.
17 Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 (1978). Second,
18 under the “risk-benefit test,” a product’s design is defective if
19 the design embodies “excessive preventable danger,” that is, the
20 risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits of
21 such design. Id. “To meet the strictures of Twombly and Iqbal,
22 Plaintiffs should identify which design defect theory is being
23 utilized and allege facts to support that theory.” In re Toyota
24 Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Pracs. and
25 Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1220 (2010). A bare
26 allegation that the product suffered from a “design defect” is an
27 insufficient legal conclusion. Lucas v. City of Visalia, 726 F.
28 Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
1 Here, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff fails to adequately
2 identify which design defect theory he wishes to utilize.
3 Although Plaintiff’s allegations contain vague language akin to
4 both the consumer expectations and risk-benefit test such as
5 “ordinary consumer” and “purported benefits,” see FAC ¶ 33, he
6 fails to explicitly identify which test(s) he intends to plead
7 and which allegations support each theory.
8 Moreover, Plaintiff’s design defect allegations are
9 generally couched in conclusory language. For example, “[u]nder
10 the consumer expectations test, [a plaintiff] should describe how
11 the [product] failed to meet the minimum safety expectations of
12 an ordinary consumer of [the product].” Lucas, 726 F. Supp. at
13 1155 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here,
14 Plaintiff merely alleges “the Igloo cooler contained a design
15 defect,” and “[d]ue to its defective design, the cooler failed to
16 perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used
17 in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” FAC ¶¶ 29, 33.
18 These allegations plainly fail to describe how, under the
19 circumstances Plaintiff was handling the Cooler, the Cooler
20 failed to meet the minimum safety expectations of an ordinary
21 consumer. Moreover, “[u]nder the risk-benefits test, [a
22 plaintiff] should allege that the risks of the design outweigh
23 the benefits, and then explain how the particular design of the
24 [product] caused [plaintiffs] harm.” Lucas, 726 F. Supp. at 1155
25 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here,
26 Plaintiff alleges the Accident “occurred as a result of the
27 defective design of the subject cooler, which allowed Plaintiff’s
28 hand to [be] pinched between the tow handle and cooler during the
1 normal, foreseeable use of the product.” FAC ¶ 15. Missing from
2 these allegations is any identification of which aspect of the
3 Cooler’s design made it defective. As such, the Court finds
4 there are insufficient facts to support a design defect claim.
5 Cf., e.g., In re Toyota, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1220-21 (denying
6 motion to dismiss design defect claim because plaintiff
7 identified three design defects and described how they made
8 certain vehicles unable to perform as an ordinary consumer would
9 expect and in a way that the risks were not outweighed by the
10 benefits). Plaintiff’s lack of specificity about which
11 allegations pertain to which theory of strict products liability
12 is fatal to the survival of this claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s strict
13 liability design defect claim is not “plausible on its face.”
14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
15 Plaintiff also fails to plead a negligent design defect
16 claim. California permits a negligent products liability claim
17 predicated upon an alleged design defect, manufacturing defect,
18 or failure to warn. Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 5th
19 110, 125 (2017). To establish negligent design or manufacturing,
20 a plaintiff must prove (1) a defect caused injury, and (2) the
21 defect was due to negligence of the defendant. Id. With respect
22 to an alleged design defect, the plaintiff “must identify what
23 aspect of [the product] makes it defective.” Marroquin v.
24 Pfizer, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2019). As
25 explained above, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege which
26 aspect of the Cooler makes it defective.
27 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s First and Third
28 Causes of Action with leave to amend.
1 B. Plaintiff Has Inadequately Pled His Strict Liability
2 and Negligence Failure to Warn Claims (Counts II and
3 IV)
4 Plaintiff’s Second and Fourth Causes of Action are premised
5 on Defendant’s failure to warn of the Cooler’s hazardous tow
6 handle. FAC ¶¶ 38–43, 52–60. Defendant argues that these claims
7 fail because Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that Defendant knew
8 or should have known of the hazard prior to the Accident. Mot.
9 Dismiss at 8–9.
10 The Court agrees. A strict liability failure to warn claim
11 under California law requires a plaintiff to prove the “defendant
12 did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or
13 knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best
14 scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of
15 manufacture and distribution.” Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002.
16 Whether the risk was known or knowable is assessed at the time
17 the product was distributed. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 43
18 Cal. 4th 56, 64 (2008) (“Typically, under California law, we hold
19 manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their
20 failure to warn of dangers that were known to the scientific
21 community at the time they manufactured and distributed their
22 product.”); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1060 n.8
23 (1988) (“[A] manufacturer’s knowledge should be measured at the
24 time a [product] is distributed because it is at this point that
25 the manufacturer relinquishes control of the product.”).
26 Similarly, a negligent failure to warn claim under California law
27 requires a plaintiff to establish “a manufacturer or distributor
28 did not warn of a particular risk for reasons that fell below the
1 acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent
2 manufacturer would have known and warned about.” Anderson, 53
3 Cal. 3d at 1002. In either case, strict liability or negligence,
4 the plaintiff must show the defendant had some level of awareness
5 — i.e., the defendant knew, or should have known — of a
6 “particular risk.”
7 Here, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that
8 Defendant knew or should have known of the alleged Cooler defect
9 at the time of the Accident. At most, Plaintiff alleges that
10 Defendant should have known because the CPSC recalled more than
11 1,000,000 of Defendant’s coolers, including the subject Cooler,
12 on “November 13, 2025”[sic], and prior to the recall, Defendant
13 had received multiple reports of injuries involving the same or
14 similar cooler model. FAC ¶¶ 17, 57. However, Plaintiff fails to
15 allege when Defendant received these complaints. As the Ninth
16 Circuit has observed, courts often “reject[] undated customer
17 complaints offered as a factual basis for a manufacturer’s
18 knowledge of a defect because they provide no indication whether
19 the manufacturer was aware of the defect at the time of sale.”
20 Wilson v. Hewlitt-Packard Co., 668 F. 3d 1141, 1147-48 (9th Cir.
21 2012) (emphasis in original). Apart from these complaints,
22 Plaintiff offers no other reason why Defendant “knew or should
23 have known” of the alleged defect before the Accident.
24 Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Second and Fourth
25 Causes of Action with leave to amend.
26 IV. ORDER
27 For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
28 No. 23) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First through Fourth Causes of
ee nee ene ee ne non nn nen ne en non nnn nnn enn ON ED eee

1 Action are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff elects to
2 file an amended complaint, he must do so within twenty (20) days
3 of this Order. Defendant shall file their response to the
4 amended complaint within twenty (20) days thereafter.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: February 20, 2026

8 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11374538. Public record. Not legal advice.