# Guerra

> District Court, S.D. California · June 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11373054

## Case

- **Full name:** Alberto Cosme Guerra v. Officer Anthony Alvarez, Officer M. Crothers, and Doe Defendants 1–25
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** June 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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13 ALBERTO COSME GUERRA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-2453-CAB-SBC

14 Plaintiff,
ORDER:
15 v.
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
16 OFFICER ANTHONY ALVAREZ,
PROCEED IFP;
OFFICER M. CROTHERS, and DOE
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DEFENDANTS 1–25,
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
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Defendants.
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[Doc. No. 2]
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22 Before the Court is Plaintiff Alberto Cosme Guerra’s motion for leave to proceed in
23 forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc. No. 2.] Plaintiff filed his IFP motion in connection with a
24 complaint against Officer Anthony Alvarez, Officer M. Crothers, (together, “Defendants”),
25 and Doe Defendants 1–25. [Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”).] The Complaint brings claims
26 related to an incident that happened in San Diego County on July 4, 2024 where
27 Defendants, two California Highway Patrol officers, detained Plaintiff. [Complaint at 1.]
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1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion to proceed IFP and
2 DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice.
3 I. REQUEST TO PROCEED IFP
4 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
5 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
6 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the
7 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 28 U.S.C.
8 § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007). To satisfy the
9 requirements of § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one
10 cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to
11 provide himself and [his] dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E. I. DuPont
12 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
13 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2015).
14 Plaintiff has provided the Court with a sufficiently detailed application as required
15 by § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] Plaintiff has shown an inability to prepay fees and costs or to
16 give security for them. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion under 28
17 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and proceeds to screen the Complaint.
18 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
19 The Court still must screen the Complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that
20 it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are
21 immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir.
22 2000) (en banc). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is not limited to prisoners; instead, it applies to all
23 cases in which the plaintiff proceeds IFP. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th
24 Cir. 2001).
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27 1 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1,
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1 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
2 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
3 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
4 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient
5 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While
7 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
8 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim.
9 Id. “[U]nadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of
10 meeting this plausibility standard. Id. The Court considers Plaintiff’s position as a pro se
11 litigant at the pleading stage and construes the Complaint liberally. See Byrd v. Phoenix
12 Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018).
13 a. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
14 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a right secured by the
15 Constitution or a federal statute has been violated and the deprivation was committed by a
16 person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th
17 Cir. 1986); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). States and state officers sued in their
18 official capacity are not “persons” for the purposes of a § 1983 action, and generally, they
19 may not be sued under the statute. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
20 (1989). However, § 1983 does allow suits against state officers in their individual
21 capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Liability can attach to an officer in his
22 individual capacity if the plaintiff is able to establish: (1) that the official caused the
23 deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights while acting personally under color of state law, and (2)
24 that the official is not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. See Kentucky v.
25 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
26 Here, Plaintiff asserts his claims “under the Constitution . . . including section 1983.”
27 [Complaint at 1.]
28 ///
1 i. False Arrest
2 A claim for false arrest is “cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth
3 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.”
4 Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause exists
5 if, at the moment of arrest, ‘under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting
6 officers (or within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person would
7 believe the suspect had committed a crime.’” Perez-Morciglio v. Las Vegas Metro. Police
8 Dep’t, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1121 (D. Nev. 2011) (quoting Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,
9 485 F.3d 463, 471–72 (9th Cir. 2007)).
10 Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim for false arrest. Plaintiff asserts that
11 Defendants “unlawfully detained Plaintiff without adequate lawful basis.” [Complaint at
12 2.] Plaintiff also makes the conclusory allegation that “a warrant connected to the incident
13 reflected irregular preparation, review, authorship, execution, or correction.” [Id. at 1.]
14 But Plaintiff does not explain what he was arrested for or why Defendants had no lawful
15 basis to arrest him. Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest is therefore DISMISSED.
16 ii. Unlawful Detention
17 Plaintiff also brings a claim for “unlawful detention.” The Court construes
18 Plaintiff’s claim for “unlawful detention” to be a claim for false imprisonment. Under
19 California law, false arrest is the same tort as false imprisonment. Martinez v. City of L.A.,
20 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting false arrest is “one way of committing a false
21 imprisonment”) (quoting Collins v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975)).
22 Because false arrest and false imprisonment are the same tort under California law and the
23 Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, Plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim is
24 also DISMISSED.
25 iii. Malicious Prosecution
26 Generally, a malicious prosecution claim is not cognizable under § 1983 if process
27 is available in the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles,
28 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “[A]n exception exists . . . when a malicious prosecution
1 is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is
2 otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Bretz v. Kelman,
3 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). A malicious prosecution claim under
4 § 1983 is based on state law elements. See Usher, 828 F.2d at 562. To proceed on a
5 malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show he was prosecuted “with
6 malice and without probable cause,” and “for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection
7 or another specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189
8 (9th Cir. 1995).
9 Plaintiff has not established a claim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff does not
10 specify which constitutional right Defendants denied him. Plaintiff also does not allege
11 why Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff merely makes the
12 conclusory allegations that “Defendants initiated, caused, encouraged, or continued a
13 criminal prosecution despite defective records, missing evidence, and exculpatory
14 information” and “[t]he criminal proceeding terminated in Plaintiff’s favor.” [Complaint
15 at 2.] Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution is therefore DISMISSED.
16 iv. Fabrication of Evidence
17 A plaintiff can bring a cause of action for the fabrication of evidence where
18 “(1) [d]efendants continued their investigation of [a plaintiff] despite the fact that they
19 knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) [d]efendants used investigative
20 techniques that were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have known that
21 those techniques would yield false information.” See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070,
22 1076 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Model Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 9.38 (2025). “To prevail on
23 a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official
24 deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s
25 deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). “To establish
26 the second element of causation, the plaintiff must show that (a) the act was the cause in
27 fact of the deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury would not have occurred in the
28 absence of the conduct; and (b) the act was the ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause’ of the
1 injury, meaning that the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely
2 result of the conduct in question.” Id.
3 Plaintiff has not established a claim for fabrication of evidence. Plaintiff makes the
4 conclusory allegations that “Defendants created, used, approved, relied upon, or failed to
5 correct materially inaccurate, misleading, or unreliable reports, records, identifiers,
6 timelines, or evidentiary summaries[,]” and this “false or misleading material deprived
7 Plaintiff of due process and contributed to unlawful restraint and prosecution.” [Complaint
8 at 3.] Plaintiff also alleges that “the blood result was below the legal limit, yet prosecution
9 nevertheless continued for an extended period.” [Id. at 2.] Taking Plaintiff’s allegations
10 as true, Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants’ alleged conduct deprived him of his
11 liberty. Plaintiff’s claim for fabrication of evidence is therefore DISMISSED.
12 v. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
13 Plaintiff has not established a claim for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Due
14 process requires that the prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence within its possession.
15 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 924 (9th Cir.
16 2007). Plaintiff merely makes the conclusory allegations that “Defendants failed to
17 disclose, preserve, or timely produce material exculpatory information . . .” and “[s]uch
18 conduct violated due process rights and impaired his ability to defend against the charges.”
19 [Complaint at 3.] Again, Plaintiff fails to explain what evidence Defendants allegedly
20 withheld or how that conduct impacted Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s claim
21 for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is therefore DISMISSED.
22 III. CONCLUSION
23 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED and his Complaint is
24 DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by June 23,
25 2026. Failure to file an amended complaint by June 23, 2026 will result in dismissal of the
26 case.
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| || If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it must be complete by itself and must not refer in
2 ||any manner to the initial Complaint.
3 Itis SO ORDERED.
4 || Dated: June 2, 2026 € Z
5
Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
6 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11373054. Public record. Not legal advice.