# Khurana

> District Court, N.D. California · April 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11372991

## Case

- **Full name:** Anita Khurana, et al. v. Clear Recon Corp, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** April 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 ANITA KHURANA, et al., Case No. 4:24-cv-01741-KAW

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING CENLAR'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
9 v. JUDGMENT

10 CLEAR RECON CORP, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 80
11 Defendants.

12
13 On February 26, 2026, Defendant Cenlar FSB (“Defendant” or “Cenlar”) filed a motion for
14 summary judgment. (Def.’s Mot. Dkt. No. 80.)
15 On April 2, 2026, the Court held a hearing, and, based on the arguments presented in the
16 briefing and at oral argument, GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
17 I. BACKGROUND
18 A. Factual Background
19 On or around September 27, 2001, Plaintiffs purchased a single-family home, located at
20 1114 S. Chanterella Dr. San Ramon, CA 94582, and have since resided on the Property.
21 On or about October 26, 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a loan modification in the amount of
22 $1,080,000.00 (the “Loan”) from Argent Mortgage Company, LLC (“Argent”), the repayment of
23 which was secured by a first-position Deed of Trust (“Argent DOT”) recorded against the
24 Property. (See Decl. of Pei-i Vernitsky, “Vernitsky Decl.,” Dkt. No. 82 ¶ 5, Ex. 1.)
25 On or about November 8, 2006, a Modification Agreement was recorded in the Contra
26 Costa County Recorder’s Office. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) The Modification Agreement
27 reflects that the Subject Note and Subject Deed of Trust were modified only to the extent of
1 Thereafter, the Subject Deed of Trust was assigned multiple times. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 7,
2 Ex. 4.) Ultimately, the Subject Deed of Trust was assigned to Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
3 Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AMC2, U.S. Bank National Association, as
4 Trustee (“U.S. Bank”), the current owner of record of the Subject Loan. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 7, Ex.
5 4.) On or about October 14, 2014, an Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded in the Contra
6 Costa County Recorder’s Office, reflecting the assignment of the Subject Deed of Trust to U.S.
7 Bank. Id.
8 Plaintiffs defaulted on their payment obligations under the Subject Note and the Subject
9 Deed of Trust and have been past due on the Subject Loan since June 2009. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶¶ 8,
10 14. Ex. 7.) Plaintiffs have not made a single payment since that date. See id.
11 On or about September 29, 2009, CitiMortgage (the then-servicer of the Subject Loan)
12 received a fax transmission—including cover sheet, letter and enclosure (“Special Power of
13 Attorney”)—from attorney Jacqueline C. Fagerlin of the Cardoza Law Offices regarding the
14 Subject Loan. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 5.) The cover sheet, in the comments section, referenced
15 the attached letter as a “Cease and Desist Letter.” Id. at CEN 001228. In the cover letter to
16 CitiMortgage, Ms. Fagerlin wrote:
Please be advised we represent Mahesh and Anita Khurana in the
17 above referenced loan modification. Please forward all
communication to [the Cardoza Law Offices] including, but not
18 limited to, phone calls, correspondences, and emails. Enclosed
please find our Power of Attorney previously submitted on July 22,
19 2009. Please do not contact our client in any way from this point
forward. Thank you for your cooperation.
20
21 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 5 at CEN 001229 (emphasis added).)
22 The “Special Power of Attorney” which was enclosed with the letter was signed by the
23 Plaintiffs and notarized on July 21, 2009. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. 5; Def.’s Anita Khurana Dep.,
24 “Anita Dep.,” Decl. of Libby Wong, Dkt. No. 83 ¶ 11, Ex. 21 at 59:1-4.) The “Special Power of
25 Attorney” states:

26 We, ANITA KHURANA and MAHESH KHURANA, residing at
1114 South Chanterella Drive, San Ramon, California hereby appoint
27 The Cardoza Law Offices, Inc. and its agents, Michael Cardoza, Esq.,
to negotiate with our mortgage holder, to perform any act necessary
1 to negotiate our mortgage, and to conduct any business with any
banking or financial institution with respect to our mortgage… This
2 power of attorney will become effective immediately. This Power of
Attorney may be revoked by us at any time by providing written
3 notice to our Attorney-In-Fact.
4 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. 5 at CEN 001230.)
5 On or about September 30, 2009, in response to the aforementioned September 29, 2009
6 letter and “Special Power of Attorney,” CitiMortgage sent a letter to Plaintiffs, c/o Cardoza Law
7 Offices, Inc., stating:

8 We are writing to inform you that we received your request to appoint a Power of
Attorney (POA). We have updated your mortgage account to reflect Cardoza Law
9 Offices, Inc as Power of Attorney.

10 This authorization will remain in effect until you revoke the POA, or until the stated
expiration date on the POA. To revoke the POA, we must receive your written signed
11 notification. You may mail or fax this notification to the address or fax number below:

12 CitiMortgage, Inc.
Attn: Research Services
13 P.O. Box 9438
Gaithersburg, MD 20898-9438
14 Fax Number: 1-866-675-5772

15 We have also updated your mailing address to:

16 CARDOZA LAW OFFICES, INC.
1220 OAKLAND BLVD., SUITE 200
17 WALNUT CREEK CA 94596.
18 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 6 (emphasis added).) Ultimately, Plaintiffs did not retain Cardoza Law
19 Offices, but they did not realize that the mailing address for Plaintiffs on file at CitiMorgage had
20 been changed to the address for Cardoza Law Offices. (Decl. of Anita Khurana, “Anita Decl.,”
21 Dkt. No. 88-2 ¶ 10.)
22 To date, there is no record of CitiMortgage or Cenlar receiving any written signed
23 notification from Plaintiffs either revoking the Special Power of Attorney or requesting that
24 Plaintiffs’ mailing address of record be changed from the Cardoza Law Offices, Inc.’s address to a
25 different address. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 12.) As a result, since September 30, 2009, the mailing
26 address of record for Plaintiffs has remained the Cardoza Law Offices, Inc.’s address. (Vernitsky
27 Decl. ¶ 13.) When Cardoza’s Law Offices, Inc. later changed its mailing address to 1407 Oakland
1 accordingly. (Vernitsky Decl., ¶ 13, fn. 1.)
2 On or about May 8, 2015, a Notice of Default was recorded against the Subject Property.
3 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 7.) The Notice of Default reflects that Plaintiffs have been past due on
4 their payments for the Subject Loan since June 1, 2009 and that the arrears on the Subject Loan, as
5 of May 5, 2015, was approximately $546,287.94. Id.
6 Between September 2015 and January 2017, Plaintiffs filed at least two bankruptcy cases
7 in an attempt to postpone a foreclosure sale on the Subject Property. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 15; Def.’s
8 Req. for Judicial Notice,1 “Def.’s RJN,” Dkt. No. 81, Exs. E & F.) Both bankruptcies were later
9 dismissed or closed in 2017. Ids.
10 In 2016, Plaintiffs experienced a change in financial circumstances that they believed made
11 them potentially eligible for a loan modification. (Anita Decl. ¶ 11.) As such, Plaintiffs began
12 applying for a loan modification with CitiMortgage. Id. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs experienced
13 significant difficulties navigating the loan modification process with CitiMortgage, which resulted
14 in Plaintiffs filing a lawsuit against CitiMortgage in 2017. (Anita Decl. ¶ 12.) On or about January
15 11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the complaint against their then-servicer, CitiMortgage, in Contra Costa
16 County Superior Court, entitled Mahesh Khurana, et al. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., Case No. C17-
17 00101, seeking among other things, injunctive relief to prevent a foreclosure sale of the Subject
18 Property. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 16; Def.’s RJN ¶ 7, Ex. G.)
19 On March 15, 2019, CitiMortgage and Cenlar sent (by first-class mail) a joint notice to
20 Plaintiffs advising that, effective April 1, 2019, the servicing of the Subject Loan would be
21 transferred from CitiMortgage to Cenlar. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 8.) The notice of servicing
22 transfer was sent to Plaintiffs’ mailing address of record, which was to the Cardoza Law Offices,
23 Inc., 1407 Oakland Blvd. Suite 200, Walnut Creek, CA. Id.
24 Plaintiffs were unaware that the servicing rights were transferred to Cenlar, because the
25

26
1 The Court grants the request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 81). Exhibits E, F, G are court records
and an unpublished California appellate opinion reported on Westlaw. The remaining exhibits are
27
true and correct copies of official public records, whose authenticity is capable of accurate and
1 notice was sent to the Cardoza Law Offices. (Anita Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.) The Notice of Transfer sent to
2 the address for Cardoza Law Offices was eventually returned as undeliverable. (Dep. of Raymond
3 Crawford, “Crawford Dep.,” Decl. of Sarah Shapero, “Shapero Decl.,” Dkt. No. 88-1, Ex. B at
4 14:2-15:192.) No notice was ever sent to the Property address. Id. The total amount due on the
5 Loan as of June 2019 was $1,875,028.11. (Shapero Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C.)
6 By the time that the loan servicing was transferred to Cenlar, Plaintiffs had already been
7 delinquent on the Subject Loan for almost 10 years. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 18.)
8 After the loan servicing was transferred to Cenlar, Cenlar sent numerous notices and letters
9 to Plaintiffs at their mailing address of record. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 19, Exs. 9 & 10.) In addition,
10 Cenlar also regularly sent monthly statements to Plaintiffs at their mailing address of record.
11 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. 11.) This correspondence was often returned as undeliverable.
12 (Crawford Dep. at 23-27.)
13 In June 2020, CitiMortgage obtained summary judgment in its favor in the Superior Court
14 action, which the California Court of Appeal affirmed on appeal in June 2022. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶
15 16; Def.’s RJN, Ex. G; Anita Decl. ¶ 17.) Throughout the litigation, Plaintiffs were never
16 informed that the servicing rights for the Subject Loan had been transferred. (Anita Decl. ¶ 17.)
17 On or about July 21, 2022, Plaintiffs tried to contact Citigroup Management regarding their
18 loan after realizing that Plaintiffs’ online portal on Citigroup’s website was no longer active.
19 (Anita Decl. ¶ 18.) It was then that Plaintiffs were informed that the servicing rights for the Loan
20 had been transferred to Cenlar. Id. At that time the total amount due on the Subject Loan was
21 approximately $1,976,508.00. (Shapero Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C at 3.)
22 ///
23 ///
24

25
2 The Court notes that Plaintiffs did not attach the deposition cover page or the court reporter’s
certification, so the exhibit is not properly authenticated. (See Shapero Decl., Ex. B.) At the
26
hearing, the Court gave Plaintiffs the opportunity to refile the deposition transcript over Cenlar’s
objection. (See Suppl. Shapero Decl., Dkt. No. 95 ¶, Ex. B.) Moreover, Defendant failed to object
27
to this exhibit in the reply, and, in fact, cited to it in support of its arguments. (See Def.’s Reply at
1 On or about July 31, 2022, Plaintiffs contacted Cenlar to find more information about the
2 loan on the Property. (Anita Decl. ¶ 19.) Cenlar sent Plaintiffs an application email and
3 verification that the loan had been transferred from Citigroup to Cenlar. Id.
4 On or about August 1, 2022, Cenlar provided Plaintiffs with a loan number. (Anita Decl. ¶
5 20.) Plaintiffs continued to try to contact Cenlar to receive more information regarding the
6 Subject Loan. Id. Plaintiffs were advised by a Cenlar representative to look out for “important
7 papers” that would be sent in the mail from Cenlar. Id.
8 On or about October 3, 2022, Plaintiffs received a loan statement in the mail from Cenlar
9 detailing the loan amount on the account. (Anita Decl. ¶ 21.) The loan statement also contained
10 contact information for payment and further correspondence with the bank. Id. Plaintiffs
11 attempted to call Defendant Cenlar, but the number provided to Plaintiffs went to a voicemail box
12 rather than to a representative. Id.
13 From August 2, 2023, to January 4, 2024, Plaintiff sent monthly letters to the provided
14 P.O. Box requesting a loan modification application and a single point of contact to assist with
15 applying for a foreclosure prevention alternative. (Anita Decl. ¶ 22.) On or around October 29,
16 2023, Plaintiffs submitted a facially complete Loan Modification Application, which was then
17 submitted to an underwriter at Cenlar. (Crawford Dep. at 33-35.) The underwriter thereafter
18 requested additional documents, but that request was sent to the address for Cardoza Law Offices
19 and was returned as undeliverable. Id. As such, Plaintiffs’ application was never considered. Id.
20 On or about December 26, 2023, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded against the
21 Subject Property. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. 12.) On or about January 3, 2024, Plaintiffs received
22 a notice posted on the front door of the Property regarding a Trustee Sale scheduled for February
23 12, 2024. (Anita Decl. ¶ 24.)
24 B. Procedural Background
25 On January 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant action in Contra Costa County Superior
26 Court. On March 20, 2024, Defendant Cenlar removed this action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.)
27 In connection with the instant lawsuit, Plaintiffs submitted a Loan Modification
1 Plaintiffs were denied a modification based on their debt-to-income ratio. (Anita Decl. ¶ 26, Ex.
2 A.3)
3 On March 20, 2025, the Court dismissed the first cause of action with leave to amend and
4 the second cause of action with prejudice. (3/20/25 Order, Dkt. No. 59 at 9.) The first cause of
5 action for violation of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights was later dismissed with
6 prejudice. (Dkt. No. 69.) Thus, only the third and fourth causes of action remain. (See First Am.
7 Compl., “FAC,” Dkt. No. 61.)
8 On February 26, 2026, Defendant Cenlar filed a motion for summary judgment. (Def.’s
9 Mot., Dkt. No. 80.) On March 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an administrative motion requesting an
10 extension of time to file their opposition, which was granted. (Dkt. Nos. 84, 91.) On March 16,
11 2026, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. (Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 88.) On March 23, 2026, Defendant
12 filed a reply. (Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 92.)
13 On April 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental declaration to correct the previously
14 unauthenticated deposition transcript of Raymond Crawford. (Suppl. Decl. of Sarah Shapero,
15 “Suppl. Shapero Decl.,” Dkt. No. 95.)
16 II. LEGAL STANDARD
17 A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of... a claim or
18 defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate
19 discovery, there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to
20 judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
21 Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
22 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient
23 evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
24 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the
25 basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses
26

27
3 The supporting declaration indicates that the loan modification was sought on July 8, 2024, but
1 that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where
2 the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no
3 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. City
4 of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003).
5 On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, it may
6 discharge its burden of production by either (1) by “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential
7 element of the nonmoving party's case” or (2) after suitable discovery “show[ing] that the
8 nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to
9 discharge its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz
10 Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. 324-25.
11 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth
12 specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “A party opposing summary judgment may not
14 simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S.
15 at 254. “Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence set
16 forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar,
17 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). The non-moving party must
18 produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
19 dispute exists.” Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or
20 speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
21 material fact to defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics
22 Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).
23 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
24 most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson,
25 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).
26 III. DISCUSSION
27 The only remaining claims are the third and fourth causes of action. (See Dkt. Nos. 59 &
1 A. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33 and California Civil Code § 2937
2 The third cause of action is for violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33 and California Civil Code
3 § 2937 for failure to timely provide notice of the transfer of the loan servicing.
4 i. Standing
5 As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they
6 have Article III standing. (Def.’s Mot. at 13.) “[T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a
7 plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and
8 (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
9 challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
10 injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
11 Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing these
12 elements. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
13 Cenlar argues that the evidence shows that Plaintiffs have not suffered any concrete harm
14 that can be traceable to Cenlar’s conduct. (Def.’s Mot. at 14.)
15 a. Injury in fact
16 Various intangible harms can be sufficiently concrete to constitute an injury-in-fact,
17 including reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion.
18 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204, 210 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2021).
19 Defendant cites to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses, in which they limited their damages suffered
20 to “loss of reputation and goodwill, severe emotional distress, loss of appetite, frustration, fear,
21 anger, helplessness, nervousness, anxiety, sleeplessness, sadness, and depression.” (Def.’s Mot. at
22 14 (citing Pls.’ Suppl. Resp. to Interrogatories, Resp. No. 23, Wong Decl., ¶¶ 9-10, Exs. 19 & 20.)
23 Despite their interrogatory responses, Plaintiffs do not argue in their opposition that they suffered
24 any intangible harm let alone provide any evidence be it in the form of a declaration, testimony, or
25 other exhibit.
26 For the first time in opposition, Plaintiffs argue that were economically damaged because
27 they would have applied for a loan modification in 2019 had they known that their servicing rights
1 did not apply for a loan modification until 2022 because they were actively engaged in litigation
2 against CitiMortgage at that time. (Anita Decl. ¶ 27.) At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that there
3 was no guarantee that they would have received a loan modification had they applied in 2019, but
4 that they would have had a better chance due to a lower debt-to-income ratio. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at
5 10.) The Court notes that in June 2019, the accelerated amount due on the Subject Loan was
6 $1,875,028.11, which increased to $1,976,508.15 as of July 2022. (See Shapero Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C at
7 CEN 000001, CEN 000075.) That is a difference of $101,480.04. See id. In denying the 2024
8 loan modification application, Cenlar explained multiple grounds for the denial, including that
9 “[t]he modified payment will cause your debt-to-income ratio to exceed the targeted debt-to-
10 income ratio per program guidelines.” (Anita Decl., Ex. A.) While Plaintiff cannot possibly know
11 if they would have been approved for a modification three years earlier, they do not even attempt
12 to explain how they could have satisfied the debt-to-income ratio guidelines had they applied in
13 2019. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not address their income at all in connection with this argument or
14 anywhere else in their opposition beyond vague claims of a positive change in financial
15 circumstances in 2016. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 5; Anita Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs further argue that even
16 if they had been denied a loan modification in 2019, the combination of the lower amount of debt
17 owed and lower interest rates would have created an opportunity to refinance the loan. (Pls.’
18 Opp’n at 10.)4 Plaintiffs cite to no evidence in support of the refinancing argument, nor do they
19 attempt to reconcile the lost opportunity theory with their prior discovery responses limiting their
20 damages to intangible harms. At the hearing, Plaintiffs confirmed that the lost opportunity in 2019
21 was the only source of damages that they are now claiming.
22 In support of this new theory, Mrs. Khurana’s declaration states that Plaintiffs would have
23 applied for a loan modification or attempted to refinance the property in 2019 had they had notice
24 of the transfer in servicing. (Anita Decl. ¶ 27.) Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits
25 are generally insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact to defeat summary judgment. See
26

27
4 The Court notes that Plaintiffs could have pursued refinancing at anytime during this time period
1 Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). “Similarly,
2 ‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony that ‘flatly contradicts [ ] prior sworn statements’
3 cannot create a genuine issue of fact.” Muench Photography, Inc. v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 12-
4 CV-01927-WHO, 2013 WL 12440999, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013) (quoting Kennedy v.
5 Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiffs’ attempt to use Mrs. Khurana’s
6 declaration as evidence of the lost opportunity to defeat summary judgment suffers from at least
7 two fatal flaws. First, Mrs. Khurana’s declaration is contradicted by Plaintiffs’ discovery
8 responses which only specified intangible injuries, which cannot create a triable issue of fact. See
9 Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (deposition testimony found
10 insufficient to create triable issue of fact because it contradicted statements on disability claim
11 forms claiming total disability). Any evidence in support of the lost opportunity theory is also
12 subject to preclusion under Federal of Civil Procedure 37. See Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264
13 F.R.D. 541, 556–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (plaintiffs’ failure to inform defendants they were seeking
14 different category of damages for more than two years without “substantial justification”
15 mandated preclusion under Rule 37).
16 Second, as Cenlar argues in reply, Plaintiffs have not provided any credible evidence that
17 their income could have qualified them for a modification, rendering the assertion entirely
18 conclusory and speculative. (Def.’s Reply at 8.) At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their
19 repeated attempts to contact Cenlar once notified of the servicing transfer indicates that they
20 would have applied for a loan modification in 2019, and that they had a better chance of obtaining
21 a modification. As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs have made no attempt to explain how the
22 Court could reasonably infer that their debt-to-income ratio in 2019 could have resulted in
23 obtaining a loan modification. In the absence of a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs would have
24 been granted a loan modification in 2019, they were in no worse position when they applied three
25 years later. Moreover, the fact that Plaintiffs did not remit a single loan payment since 2009 and
26 did not attempt to even access their online loan account until July 21, 2022 makes it even less
27 likely that Plaintiffs would have applied for a loan modification prior to the conclusion of the
1 Paragraph 27 of Mrs. Khurana’s declaration is both speculative and entirely self-serving. Since a
2 self-serving declaration cannot be used to create a triable issue of fact, the Court finds that Mrs.
3 Khurana’s declaration is not enough to create a genuine factual dispute necessary to successfully
4 oppose summary judgment. Even if Mrs. Khurana’s declaration was not found to be speculative,
5 that Plaintiffs never raised the lost opportunity theory in response to multiple discovery devices is
6 separately fatal.
7 Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ failure to point to any evidence to support a
8 reasonable inference that they sustained an injury-in-fact negates Article III standing and requires
9 that summary judgment be granted in Cenlar’s favor.
10 b. Whether the injury was fairly traceable to Cenlar’s conduct.
11 Defendant argues that even if even if Plaintiffs could provide evidence of injury, they
12 cannot show that they suffered due to Cenlar’s purported failure to give notice of the servicing
13 transfer in 2019. (Def.’s Mot. at 15.) Specifically, Defendant points out that it is undisputed that
14 Plaintiffs have been past due on the Subject Loan since June 1, 2009, which is nearly 17 years ago
15 and almost 10 years before Cenlar even started servicing the Subject Loan. Id. (citing Vernitsky
16 Decl. ¶ 14, 18, 24; Wong Decl., ¶¶ 7-10, 11; Anita Dep. at 91:16-19; Pls.’ Suppl. Resp. to
17 Interrogatory Resp. No. 18, Wong Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 20; Pls.’ Resp. to Req. for Admis. Nos. 14, 15,
18 16, 17, Wong Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 17-18.) As a result, Cenlar argues that “whatever alleged damages
19 Plaintiffs contend they suffered would have been caused by their not making payments on the
20 Subject Loan, not due to any acts or omissions of Cenlar.” (Def.’s Mot. at 15.)
21 The only argument Plaintiffs raise in response is the lost opportunity to either modify or
22 refinance the loan discussed above, which is entirely speculative and flatly contradicts their
23 discovery responses, such that it cannot create a genuine factual dispute. Even if Plaintiffs
24 provided evidence to support the existence of the intangible harms vaguely described in their
25 interrogatory responses, there would be no way to separate that injury from the same intangible
26 harms suffered from not paying their mortgage for the past 17 years, including the almost-decade
27 before servicing was transferred to Cenlar.
1 be granted on that basis.
2 ii. RESPA5
3 While Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, the Court will still address the claims on the
4 merits. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the evidence shows that they complied with
5 RESPA. (Def.’s Mot. at 16.) “The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) provides an
6 action for damages against mortgage-loan servicers who fail to respond to certain types of
7 inquiries from borrowers.” Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2012).
8 RESPA’s notification provision provides that “[e]ach servicer of any federally related mortgage
9 loan shall notify the borrower in writing of any assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the
10 loan to any other person.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1).
11 Regulation X (24 C.F.R. § 3500.1 et seq.) was promulgated by the U.S. Department of
12 Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) as the implementing regulation for RESPA. Wanger v.
13 EMC Mortg. Corp., 103 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1129 (2002). “Regulation X provides that ‘each
14 transferor servicer and transferee servicer of any mortgage servicing loan shall deliver to the
15 borrower a written Notice of Transfer, containing’ the required information about the servicer and
16 the transfer.” Id. at 1130 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 3500.21(d)(1)(i) (2002) (emphasis in original)).
17 Additionally, to prevail on a RESPA claim, a plaintiff must establish a causal link between
18 the alleged damages and Defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct. “12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A) states
19 that any injury must be ‘a result of the failure’ to comply with RESPA.” Wilde v. Select Portfolio
20 Servicing, Inc., No. 20-CV-06863-SVK, 2021 WL 6062869, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021). In
21 sum, a plaintiff must “point to some colorable relationship between his injury and the actions or
22 omissions that allegedly violated RESPA.” Allen v. United Fin. Mortg. Corp., No. 09-2507 SC,
23 2010 WL 1135787, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s RESPA claim where he
24 alleged that he suffered damages of falling behind on his mortgage payments, negative credit
25 impact, and emotional distress, but failed to allege the causal relationship of the damages to
26

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5 For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s third cause of action
1 RESPA violations).
2 Even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing and the claim was considered timely,6 the
3 RESPA claim fails on the merits for at least two reasons.
4 a. Adequacy of Notice
5 First, the notice was adequate. On March 15, 2019, Cenlar and CitiMortgage sent a notice
6 by first-class mail informing Plaintiffs that, as of April 1, 2019, their loan servicing was
7 transferred to Cenlar. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 8.) Thus, the mailing occurred at least 15 days
8 before the effective date of the transfer in compliance with 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33. Plaintiffs did not
9 receive it, however, because Plaintiffs transmitted a signed Special Power of Attorney (“POA”) to
10 CitiMortgage (the prior servicer) via fax transmission on September 29, 2009 informing
11 CitiMortage that all notices should be mailed to the Cardoza Law Firm. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶¶ 9-10,
12 Ex. 5.)
13 In opposition, while Plaintiffs acknowledge that the notice of servicing transfer was sent to
14 the address for Cardoza Law Firm, they argue that Cenlar was under an obligation to exercise
15 reasonable diligence in determining their correct address once the notice was returned as
16 undeliverable. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 15.) Plaintiffs cite Wanger v. EMC Mortg. Corp., for the
17 proposition that, to comply with RESPA, “a servicer must exercise reasonable care and diligence
18 in determining the correct address of the borrower when mailing a notice of transfer. 103 Cal.
19 App. 4th 1125, 1135 (2002). As such, Plaintiffs contend that Cenlar should have attempted to call
20 them after the notice of transfer was returned as undeliverable or sent a copy of the notice to the
21 Property address. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 6.)
22 In reply, Cenlar argues that its corporate witness, Raymond Crawford, explained at his
23 deposition that, due to Plaintiffs’ pending lawsuit against CitiMortgage, there was a litigation hold
24 on the account which did not end until July 26, 2023. (Def.’s Reply at 13 (citing Crawford Dep. at
25 31:2-13.) After the litigation hold ended, Cenlar attempted to call Plaintiffs. Id.
26 Additionally, Cenlar argues that Rodriguez v. Countrywide Homes, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1239
27
1 (E.D. Cal. 2009) is instructive and is factually distinct from Wanger. (Def.’s Reply at 10.) In
2 Rodriguez, the district court noted that it was clearly distinguished from Wanger case, which
3 involved a plaintiff who sent her lender a letter with a new mailing address, but the lender still sent
4 the notice of transfer to the old address. Rodriguez, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (citing Wanger, 103
5 Cal. App. 4th at 1135). Thus, the discussion of duty in Wanger “arose in a context where there
6 was reason to believe that the lender should have known of the plaintiff's address change because
7 of her letter.” Rodriguez, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (emphasis in original).
8 The Court finds the facts in Rodriguez much more analogous to the instant case, and
9 persuasive in its reasoning. In Rodriguez, Countrywide sent the plaintiff borrowers a “Good Bye
10 Letter” at their property address, which was their last address of record. Id. at 1243. The “Good
11 Bye Letter” informed the borrowers that, effective October 1, 2006, a new servicer would be
12 servicing the loan, but after the letter was mailed, it was returned to Countrywide as undeliverable.
13 Id. The borrowers never expressly requested Countrywide to change their mailing address from
14 the property address to the P.O. Box address, even though their deed of trust specified that if a
15 borrower wants the mailing address to be changed, the borrower must notify the lender in writing.
16 Id. at 1242-43. The district court found that money orders or other documents listing the
17 plaintiffs’ P.O. Box was insufficient to impart knowledge that the mailing address had changed.
18 Id. at 1247. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that Countrywide should have used reasonable
19 diligence to search for their address, the district court found that:

20 To impose such a duty … ignores the straightforward language of
Regulation X and would require the lender to undertake a detailed
21 investigation where the borrowers failed to abide by their
responsibilities to (1) ensure that the documents they signed under
22 penalty of perjury were accurate; and (2) abide by the lender's
policies. Neither the specific language of RESPA nor any reasonable
23 interpretation requires such a result.
24 Id. Based on the foregoing facts, the Court granted Countrywide’s motion for summary judgment
25 because there was no dispute that the plaintiffs provided Countrywide with only the property
26 address as their mailing address, they did not inform Countrywide of a change in address, and
27 Countrywide sent the “Good Bye Letter” to the property address. Id. at 1245-47.
1 Plaintiffs signed a Special Power of Attorney instructing that all future notices pertaining to the
2 Subject Loan be sent to the Cardoza Law Offices. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, Ex. 5.) The cover
3 letter instructed CitiMortgage not to “contact our client in any way from this point forward.” Id.
4 After receiving the fax transmission, on September 30, 2009, CitiMortgage sent a letter to
5 Plaintiffs, c/o the Cardoza Law Offices, notifying them that pursuant to Plaintiffs’ instructions,
6 CitiMortgage had updated Plaintiffs’ mailing address to the Cardoza Law Offices’ address.
7 (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 6.) Plaintiffs were advised that the Special Power of Attorney
8 authorization would remain in effect until expressly revoked in writing by Plaintiffs. Id.
9 CitiMortgage’s letter stated that to revoke the Special Power of Attorney, CitiMortgage must
10 receive Plaintiffs’ written signed notification, which may be mailed or faxed to the specific
11 address or fax number referenced in CitiMortgage’s September 29, 2009 letter. Id. It is undisputed
12 that, to date, Plaintiffs have never provided CitiMortgage or Cenlar with any written signed
13 notification to either revoke the Special Power of Attorney or change the mailing address to a
14 different address. (Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 12.)
15 Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs may argue that Cenlar did not follow its internal
16 policies regarding contacting borrowers whose communications are returned undeliverable, the
17 Court finds that argument unavailing. The Rodriguez court also considered the argument that
18 Countrywide failed to follow its internal policies and procedures and found it unavailing on the
19 grounds that “Countrywide’[s] internal policies are distinct from the RESPA requirements and are
20 irrelevant to the RESPA analysis.” 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1247. The same is true here. Indeed, the
21 Special Power of Attorney instructed Cenlar to send all correspondence through the Cardoza Law
22 Offices, and it was never revoked, so Cenlar satisfied its obligation under RESPA by sending the
23 notice to the address it had on file, which the Court notes, was even later updated after the Cardoza
24 Law Offices moved. (See Vernitsky Decl. ¶ 13, n. 1.) The fact that Plaintiffs did not receive any
25 mortgage statements or notices from CitiMortgage or Cenlar for more than 10 years is of no fault
26 of Cenlar, and Cenlar was under no obligation to undertake an investigation to determine whether
27 Plaintiffs’ address had changed.
1 a reasonable inference that the notice of transfer failed to comply with RESPA.
2 b. No causal link
3 Second, Plaintiffs provide no evidence to support that there is a causal link between any
4 damages—tangible or intangible— and the alleged RESPA violation. (See Def.’s Mot. at 15, 20.)7
5 There is no dispute that Plaintiffs have not made a mortgage payment since 2009, and Plaintiffs’
6 contention that they would have applied for a loan modification in 2019 had they known is merely
7 speculative, only supported by a self-serving declaration, and contradicted by Plaintiffs’ sworn
8 interrogatory responses. See discussion, supra, Part III.A.i.a.
9 Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had Article III standing, Cenlar would be entitled to
10 summary judgment on the RESPA claim, because there is no evidence to create a reasonable
11 inference that Defendant failed to comply with the notice requirement.
12 iii. California Civil Code § 2937
13 Defendant argues that Civil Code § 2937 is expressly preempted by RESPA. (Def.’s Mot.
14 at 23.) RESPA provides that compliance with its rules preempts “[a]ny State law requiring notice
15 to the borrower at the time of application or at the time of transfer of servicing of the loan is
16 preempted, and there shall be no additional borrower disclosure requirements.” 12 C.F.R. §
17 1024.33(d). Since Cenlar complied with RESPA’s notice requirement in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33, it
18 has also complied with § 2937.
19 Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to the third cause of action.
20 B. UCL Claim
21 The fourth cause of action is for violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200.
22 While Plaintiffs fail to address this claim in their opposition, the parties previously agreed that this
23 claim was derivative in nature. (See 3/20/25 Order at 8.) A derivative UCL claim must only be
24 dismissed if the underlying claims are also subject to dismissal. See Avila v. Bank of Am., No. 17-
25

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7 The Court notes that Defendant’s argument that pecuniary damages are necessary to maintain a
statutory RESPA claim (see Def.’s Mot. at 20) is not well taken, as there is a recognized split
27
among the district courts, which remains unresolved by the Ninth Circuit. See Wilde v. Select
1 CV-00222-HSG, 2017 WL 4168534, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2017) (dismissing UCL claim to
2 the extent it is derivative of other claim dismissed in same order). Thus, Cenlar is entitled to
3 summary judgment due to the dismissal of the third cause of action.
4 Alternatively, summary judgment is also proper due to Plaintiffs’ failure to provide
5 evidence of economic damages. (See Def.’s Mot. at 23.) In order to establish standing for the
6 UCL Claim, plaintiffs must show that they personally lost money or property “as a result of the
7 unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.
8 4th 310, 330 (2011). Under California law:
[t]here are innumerable ways in which economic injury from unfair
9 competition may be shown. A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a
transaction more, or acquire in a transaction less, than he or she
10 otherwise would have; (2) have a present or future property interest
diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to which he or she
11 has a cognizable claim; (4) be required to enter into a transaction,
costing money or property, that would otherwise have been
12 unnecessary.
13 Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 323. As discussed above, Plaintiffs provide no evidence to support a
14 reasonable inference that they sustained economic damages. See discussion, supra, Part III.A.i.a.
15 In the Court’s March 20, 2025 Order on the motion to dismiss, the Court acknowledged the
16 inherent difficulty Plaintiffs may have in showing that any economic damages could be attributed
17 to Cenlar’s conduct:

18 Given the several yearslong delinquency prior to Cenlar becoming
their servicer, to ultimately prevail, Plaintiffs will need to explain how
19 they were injured by Cenlar’s actions rather than by not making
mortgage payments for 10+ years. The issue of causation, however,
20 is not to be decided at the pleadings stage.
21 (3/20/25 Order at 9, n. 2.) Despite this forewarning, Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence that
22 they sustained economic damages beyond Mrs. Khurana’s self-serving declaration. See discussion,
23 supra, Part III.A.i.a.
24 Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is separately warranted on the UCL
25 claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding economic damages.
26 IV. CONCLUSION
27 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Cenlar FSB’s motion for summary judgment is
] As the parties agreed at the hearing that Defendant Clear Recon is a non-monetary
2 || defendant against whom no claims are alleged, the Clerk is directed to close the case, and the
3 Court will enter judgment separately in favor of Cenlar FSB.
4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
5 || Dated: April 27, 2026 .
6 KANDIS A. WESTMORE
7 United States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11372991. Public record. Not legal advice.