# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11372425

## Case

- **Full name:** Herman Hawkins et al v. Crunch, LLC et al
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

No. 2:25-cv-05313-WLH-MAR Date March 30, 2026
Title Herman Hawkins et al v. Crunch, LLC et al
Present: The Honorable WESLEY L. HSU, United States District Judge
Lesbith Castillo None
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Curt Reporters=
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None None
Proceedings: (INCHAMBERS) ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO
REMAND [26]
The Court 1s in receipt of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (the “Motion”). (Mot.,
Dkt. No. 26). No party filed a written request for oral argument stating that an attorney
with five years or less of experience would be arguing the matter. (See Standing Order,
Dkt. No. 12 at 16). Further, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local
Rule 7-15, the Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument.
The hearing calendared for April 3, 2026, is VACATED, and the matter taken off
calendar. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs Herman Hawkins and Amani Jackson (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) filed a putative wage-and-hour class action against Defendants Crunch,
LLC, Casey Callagan, Jonathan Mosoff, and Mayra Cortez, and Does | through 10,
inclusive (collectively, “Defendants”) in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles. (Notice of Removal (“Notice”), Dkt. No. 1 at 4); see also Compl. § 16-20, Dkt.
No. 1-2, Ex. A). The Complaint asserts fifteen causes of action for: (1) “Failure to Pay
All Hours Worked Including Overtime”; (2) “Failure to Pay Minimum Wage”;

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(3) “Failure to Provide Meal Periods”; (4) “Failure to Provide Rest Periods”;
(5) “Improper Wage Statements”; (6) “Waiting Time Penalties”; (7) “Failure to Pay
Business Expenses”; (8) “Improper Deductions from Wages”; (9) “Unfair Competition”;
(10) “PAGA, Labor Code Section 2698”; (11) “Failure to Maintain Records”;
(12) “Failure to Provide Records”; (13) “Retaliation, Gov. Code § 12940(h)”;
(14) “Hostile Work Environment”; (15) “Failure to Take Steps to Prevent
Discrimination.” (See generally, id.). The Summons and Complaint were served on
May 12, 2025. (Notice ¶ 2).
On June 11, 2025, Defendants removed the action to this Court, stating that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). (Id.
at 5). Defendants allege that three if the fifteen claims in the Complaint alone exceeds
$5,297,887.” (Notice ¶ 53). In support of their removal, Defendants submitted a
declaration of Pamela Brown, the Vice President, Head of People and Culture employed
by Defendant Crunch, LLC, who declared the following based on a review of employee
personnel files and employment records relating to employees of Crunch, LLC:

a. “Based on Crunch’s personnel and payroll data, there were
approximately 318 non-exempt employees working at Crunch’s West
Hollywood location in California from April 17, 2021 to May 30,
2025”;

b. “Of those 318 employees, 247 are former employees and 71 are
current employees”;

c. “Employees worked at least six to eight hours per day, five days per
week”; and

d. “Employees (a) worked approximately 19,220 workweeks during
the time period of April 17, 2021 to approximately May 30, 2025; (b)
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received approximately 2,054 pay periods during the time period of
April 17, 2024 to May 30, 2025; and (c) were paid an average hourly
rate of $16.75 per hour.”

(Declaration of Pamela Brown in Support of Notice of Removal (“Brown Decl.”), Dkt.
No. 1-2).
On February 25, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion. (See generally Mot.).
Defendants filed an opposition brief on March 13, 2026. (Opp’n, Dkt. No. 29). On
March 18, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of the Motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The CAFA evinces “a strong preference that interstate class actions should be
heard in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.” Jauregui v. Roadrunner
Transportation Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)). As such “no antiremoval
presumption attends cases invoking CAFA[.]” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89. Still, a
case may only be removed pursuant to CAFA when certain jurisdictional requirements
are met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Under the CAFA, federal courts have “jurisdiction over class actions where there
are at least 100 class members, at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from any
defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.” Lopez v. Advanced
Drainage Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B)). CAFA requires a removing defendant to provide a “short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87 (2014); 28
U.S.C. § 1446(a). The notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation that
the amount-in-controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574
U.S. at 89. “[D]efendant’s amount in controversy allegation is normally accepted when
invoking CAFA jurisdiction, unless it is ‘contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the
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court.’” Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 992 (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87). However,
“[w]hen a plaintiff contests the amount in controversy allegation, ‘both sides submit
proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-
controversy requirement has been satisfied.’” (Id. (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at
88)). A defendant “must be able to rely ‘on a chain of reasoning that includes
assumptions to satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,’ as long as the reasoning and underlying
assumptions are reasonable.” Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 993 (quoting LaCross v. Knight
Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015)). A defendant’s assumptions, however,
“cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground underlying them.”
Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on February 25, 2026, arguing that the case
should be remanded because the amount in controversy does not exceed $5,000,000
under the CAFA. (Mot. at 6-7). Plaintiffs only contest the amount-in-controversy
requirements and concede as to the citizenship requirement and the class size
requirements. (Id. at 12). Plaintiffs primarily argue that Defendants’ amount-in-
controversy calculation is unsupported by reasonable assumptions. The Court therefore
must determine whether Defendants’ assumptions justifying their amount in controversy
estimates are reasonable—namely, the calculations of (1) meal and rest break premiums,
(2) unpaid overtime, (3) waiting time penalties; and (4) wage statement penalties incurred
by Defendants.1 The Court need only address Plaintiffs’ objections to the competency of

1 Defendants estimate the total amount in controversy to be $8,517,238. This amount comprises
of: (1) meal and rest premiums ($3,219,350); (2) unpaid overtime ($2,412,000); (3) waiting time
penalties ($992,940); wage statement penalties ($189,500); and attorney’s fees ($1,703,447).
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Defendants’ evidence supporting their Notice and the reasonableness of Defendants’
meal and rest break premiums violation and overtime violation assumptions.
A. Assumptions Related to Meal and Rest Break Premiums
California Labor Code § 226.7(b) provides that “[a]n employer shall not require an
employee to work during a meal or rest or recovery period.” The penalty for violation of
section 226.7(b) is “one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of
compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.”
Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(c). “Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees
after a work period of not more than five (5) hours to take a meal period of not less than
thirty (30) minutes.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11140. Employers must be provided rest
breaks at the rate of ten minutes for every four hours—or major fraction thereof—
worked. Id.
The Complaint alleges that:
Plaintiffs and the Class members consistently worked more than 5 hour
shifts, but Plaintiffs and the Class Members were not provided with
additional compensation for meal periods which were missed, truncated or
tardy due to the failure of one or more of the Defendants to provide a
compliant meal period. Plaintiffs and the Class members consistently
worked more than 10 hour shifts, but Plaintiffs and the Class Members
were not provided with additional compensation for second meal periods
which were missed, truncated or tardy due to the failure of one or more of
the Defendants to provide a compliant meal period.
(Compl. ¶ 69).
The Complaint also alleges that:

rest premiums and alleged unpaid overtime exceed the requisite amount in controversy, the
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Each Plaintiff and the Class members consistently worked over four hour
shifts, but defendant failed to provide them with the requisite ten minute
rest period. Pursuant to Labor Code section 226.7, Plaintiff and the Class
Members are entitled to damages in an amount equal to one hour of wages
per missed rest period, in an amount to be proven at trial.
(Id. ¶ 73).
Here, Defendants calculated initially in their removal that the amount in
controversy for these claims alone to be “$643,870 when assuming only two premiums a
week” but now argue in their opposition that they are entitled to a 100% violation rate for
both meal and rest break claims, estimating the amount in controversy for both in total to
be $3,219,350. (Opp’n at 13-14). Defendants argue that this assumption is reasonable
because the allegations in the Complaint states that the class members were denied meal
and rest breaks “consistent[ly].” (Opp’n at 12-13). The Court agrees. While the Ninth
Circuit in Ibarra, the has stated that “‘a pattern and practice’ of doing something does not
necessarily mean always doing something” and that even “an institutionalized unwritten
policy that mandates the employment violations ... including the denial of meal and rest
periods, does not mean that such violations occurred in each and every shift,” Ibarra, 775
F.3d at 1198-99, the Complaint alleges that class members were consistently denied rest
and meal breaks. Having reviewed Paragraph 69 and 73, the Court concludes the
Complaint effectively alleges Defendants did not permit their employees to take meal
periods or rest breaks. Assuming these allegations were true, the Court concludes that the
Complaint could support a 100% violation rate. Accordingly, the Court accepts
Defendants’ estimated violation rate and violation of meal and rest premiums
calculations.
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B. Assumptions Related to Violations of Overtime Pay
California Labor Code § 1194 provides that “any employee receiving less than the
legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is
entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum
wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon[.]” See Cal. Labor Code
§§ 218.5(a), 1194(a). The Complaint alleges that “employees typically work more than
40 hours per week and more than eight hours per day, and sometimes have to work seven
days per week.” (Compl. ¶ 22). It further alleges that “Plaintiff and the members of the
Class worked more than 40 hours per week and/or more than 8 hours per day, but they
did not receive compensation for this time at their regularly hourly rate or did they
receive overtime compensation.” (Id. ¶ 60).
Defendants specifically interpret Plaintiffs’ unpaid overtime allegations to mean
five hours of overtime per week per putative class member because the Complaint alleges
that class members “worked more than 8 hours per day and sometimes work seven days
per week.” (Notice ¶ 48). Defendants ascertained their unpaid overtime calculations by
assuming that at least one hour of overtime per workweek (and conservatively excludes
weekends) per putative class member went unpaid. The Court views Defendants’
assumptions as reasonable given that the Complaint alleges that class members “worked
more than 40 hours per week and/or more than 8 hours per day.” (Compl. ¶ 60). It
therefore follows that an assumption of at least one hour of unpaid per workday is
properly “founded on the allegations of the complaint.” Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131
F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025). “[A]ssumptions made part of the defendant’s chain of
reasoning need not be proven.” Id. Holding otherwise would require defendants to
“prove [they] actually violated the law at the assumed rate” while simultaneously
maintaining they did not commit the alleged violations. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds
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that Defendants have proven the unpaid wage claim amount of $2,412,000 ($16.75/hour
x 1.5 overtime multiplier x 19,220 x 5) by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because the amount in controversy associated with Plaintiffs’ meals and rest
premiums and unpaid overtime claims —exceeds CAFA’s requirement of $5,000,000,2
the Court declines to scrutinize Defendants’ assumptions underlying Plaintiffs’ remaining
claims and related damages. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’
Motion to Remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 The Court further finds that attorney’s fees at the benchmark rate of 25% may be added to the
assumptions expressly addressed in this Order, pushing the amount in controversy far above

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11372425. Public record. Not legal advice.