# Opinion > District Court, M.D. Florida · June 23, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371814 ## Case - **Full name:** Marlon Jhoan Mendez Rojas v. Warden, Florida Soft Side Facility South, Attorney General of the United States - **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida - **Decided:** June 23, 2026 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371814 ## Opinion text UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION MARLON JHOAN MENDEZ ROJAS, Case No. 2:26-cv-1907-KCD-NPM Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE FACILITY SOUTH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Respondents. / ORDER Petitioner Marlon Jhoan Mendez Rojas is a citizen of Venezuela currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He asks this Court to release him, arguing that his bond hearing was inadequate and his detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1.)1 Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons below, Rojas’s pro se habeas corpus petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The underlying facts are straightforward. Rojas entered the United States in 2021 and was released on parole. ICE took him into custody on February 10, 2026. Then, on April 30, 2026, he was ordered removed from the United States to Venezuela. (Doc. 3-3.) 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Rojas cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on February 10, 2026, and his removal order just became final. (Doc. 3-6.) As such, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Finally, as Rojas acknowledges, he also already received a bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Doc. 1.) He has thus received process. The Court does not have jurisdiction to overturn the immigration judge’s bond decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Rojas has avenues available to challenge a bond determination made by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(7) (allowing Board of Immigration Appeals jurisdiction over appeals of bond determinations made under 8 C.F.R. § 1236). He also may seek a new bond hearing before the immigration judge if he can demonstrate a material change in circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). But this Court does not sit in appellate review of the bond hearing, which is what Rojas asks. See Guerrero v. Decker, No. 19-CV-8092 (RA), 2019 WL 5683372, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2019); Mugiraneza v. Whitaker, No. 6:19-CV-06140-MAT, 2019 WL 2395316, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 6, 2019) (“District courts sitting in habeas review therefore have no jurisdiction to review an IJ's discretionary decision denying bond.”). Rojas’s due process claim under Zaduydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 28, 2026. Kyle C. Dudek os ot United States District Judge --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371814. Public record. Not legal advice.