# Hixson

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371367

## Case

- **Full name:** Seab Hixson, Jr. v. Everybody in Medical
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SEAB HIXSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-740-MMH-SJH

EVERYBODY IN MEDICAL,

Defendants.
_________________________________

ORDER
Plaintiff Seab Hixson, Jr., an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections, initiated this case by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1) in the Fort Myers Division. A judge of the
Fort Myers Division transferred the case to this Court because Hixson
complains about the conditions of his confinement at Florida State Prison. See
Order (Doc. 2). Hixson asserts he needs stomach surgery because officers “keep
put[t]ing [things] in [his] food,” but his requests for surgery have been denied.
See Complaint at 3. He also asserts officers are putting HIV in his food, but
the medical department will not order bloodwork. Id. Finally, Hixson claims
he has lost about fifty-five pounds in three months because he has not been
given a 3,000-calorie diet. Id. at 6. Hixson does not name any individual
medical providers as Defendants, but instead seeks to sue “everybody in
medical.” Id. at 1, 2. As relief, he asks that the Court help him get the surgery
he needs and “millions of dollars.” Id. at 6.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

1 Hixson requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 17).
2
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further, the plaintiff
must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must
allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Hixson’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

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drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A plaintiff must
allege “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions
and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d
397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294,

1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must
provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

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526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834).
As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “[T]he deliberate-indifference standard sets
an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. For decades, the Eleventh

Circuit described that “high bar” inconsistently as a “more than mere
negligence” or “more than gross negligence standard.” See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and
(3) acted with more than gross negligence.” (internal quotations omitted)); see
also Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). However, in 2024,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit
should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as used in the criminal

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law. Id. at 1253. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to
establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the

plaintiff must show:
First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a
deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective
recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so
he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware
that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to
the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant
“actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he
“cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3
The law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the
negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process
Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of
due care by prison officials.”). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently
emphasized that the subjective recklessness standard requires a plaintiff to

3 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to
the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit
deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue
to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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show a prison official had “more than a generalized or abstract knowledge” of
a risk. See McClinton v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 172 F.4th 1276, 1283

(11th Cir. 2026). “Put simply, a constitutional violation occurs only when
prison officials act ‘consciously’ such that their acts or omissions knowingly
have the effect of inflicting a punishment.” Id. at 1283, 1286 (holding that
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because, even though some

were aware of a “risk in the abstract,” the plaintiffs’ arguments “invoke[d] a
negligence standard, premised on a violation of a duty owed to [their son],” who
was killed by a known gang member).
The Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would

derive a constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to
subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the
contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does
not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892,

897 (11th Cir. 2007)4 (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th
Cir. 1989)). Similarly, “the question of whether governmental actors should

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th
Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
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have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a
classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.”
Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 107).
Hixson’s Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to this Court’s

screening obligation because he fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983.
Aside from the fact that he does not identify by name any individual who
allegedly violated his constitutional rights, Hixson does not assert facts
permitting the reasonable inference that a serious medical need is being

ignored. His assertions that he needs surgery and bloodwork because officers
are contaminating his food with unidentified items and viruses “describ[e] [a]
fantastic or delusional scenario[]” that are not to be credited. See Bilal, 251
F.3d at 1349. Moreover, to the extent Hixson asserts that “medical refus[es] to

put [him] on the 3,000 [calorie] tray,” Complaint at 6, a mere disagreement
with the decisions of medical providers “is an inappropriate basis for attaching
[§] 1983 liability,” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545.
Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

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2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of June,
2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-6
C:
Seab Hixson, Jr.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371367. Public record. Not legal advice.