# Keating

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371320

## Case

- **Full name:** Douglas P. Keating, Jr. v. Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, in his official capacity, Deputy Christian Tulbure, individually, Deputy Christopher Karam, individually, Deputy Ryan Williams, individually, Deputy Austin Robinson, individually, Sergeant Patrick J. Stubbe, individually, John Doe 1 (Booking Area Deputy), individually, John Doe 2 (Booking Area Deputy), individually, John Doe 3 (Booking Area Supervisor), individually, John Doe 4 (Transport/Control Deputy), individually, John Doe 5 (Infirmary Escort Deputy), individually, and Any
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

DOUGLAS P. KEATING, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00598-JES-KRH

SHERIFF KEVIN RAMBOSK, in
his official capacity,
DEPUTY CHRISTIAN TULBURE,
individually, DEPUTY
CHRISTOPHER KARAM,
individually, DEPUTY RYAN
WILLIAMS, individually,
DEPUTY AUSTIN ROBINSON,
individually, SERGEANT
PATRICK J. STUBBE,
individually, JOHN DOE 1
(BOOKING AREA DEPUTY),
individually, JOHN DOE 2
(BOOKING AREA DEPUTY),
individually, JOHN DOE
3(BOOKING AREA SUPERVISOR),
individually, JOHN DOE 4
(TRANSPORT/CONTROL DEPUTY),
individually, JOHN DOE 5
(INFIRMARY ESCORT DEPUTY),
individually, and ANY
ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS OR
ENTITIES LATER IDENTIFIED,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of Defendant
Sheriff Kevin Rambosk’s (“Sheriff Rambosk”) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #42) filed on April 22,
2026. Plaintiff, Douglas Keating, Jr. (“Keating”), filed his
Response in Opposition (Doc. #46) on April 30, 2026. For the
reasons set forth below, Sheriff Rambosk’s motion is granted in

part and denied in part.
I.
From August 1 to August 2, 2025, Keating was detained at the
Collier County Jail. (Doc. #28, ¶ 18.) While detained, Keating
used the inmate phone and was ordered by Deputy Christian Tulbure
(“Deputy Tulbure”) to end the call. (Id. ¶ 19.) Rather than end
the call Keating objected, prompting Deputies Tulbure and
Christopher Karam (“Deputy Karam”) to strike Keating in the head
and upper body. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) As Deputies Tulbure and Karam
were hitting Keating, Deputies Ryan Williams (“Deputy Williams”)
and Austin Robinson (“Deputy Robinson”) restrained Keating, but
did not object to Deputies Tulbure’s or Karam’s use of force. (Id.

¶¶ 23, 26-28.)
Keating exhibited visible injuries, including head trauma,
chest pain, and other physical injuries. (Id. ¶ 29.) Deputies
Tulbure, Karam, Robinson, and Williams were all aware of these
visible injuries and were present, alongside Sergeant Patrick J.
Stubbe (“Sergeant Stubbe”), when Keating requested medical
attention. (Id. ¶ 30-31.) Sergeant Stubbe, however, failed to
obtain timely and adequate medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Instead, Deputies Tulbure, Karam, Williams, and Robinson placed
Keating into a different holding cell with standing water. (Id.
¶¶ 34-37.)

After being released, Keating obtained medical treatment
costing $4,273. (Id. ¶ 33.) Keating now brings the instant action
against the deputies in their individual capacities and Sheriff
Rambosk in his official capacity.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(citation
omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit has recently summarized:

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept the
plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim is facially
plausible if the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. This
plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. When
making the determination of whether a complaint states
a plausible claim, we draw on our judicial experience
and common sense.
. . .
We use a two-step process to determine whether a
claim survives Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. At the outset, we
determine what must be pled for each cause of action. .
. . Then, we consider the well-pleaded factual
allegations ... to determine whether they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.

Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp., 147
F.4th 1341, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2025)(citations and internal
punctuation omitted).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
counseled pleadings and, therefore, are liberally construed.
Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).
Nevertheless, this liberal construction does not entitle a court
to serve as de facto counsel to a pro se party or rewrite deficient
pleadings. See id. at 1168-69. Pro se litigants, however, are
still required to conform to procedural rules. See Albra v. Advan,
Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007); Goldsboro v. Ivey, No.
25-11394, 2026 WL 507421, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026).
III.
A. The Court Strikes the Paragraphs Rendering the Third
Amended Complaint a Shotgun Pleading

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b),
or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun
pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Of the four categories outlined in
Weiland, the most prominent shotgun pleading occurs where a party
incorporates preceding paragraphs from the previous counts,
thereby causing most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) to

contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions. Id.
at 1324 (citations omitted).
Counts II through V “reallege[] and incorporate[] all
preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.” (Doc. #28, ¶¶
67, 72, 76, 81.) By doing so, the Third Amended Complaint is a
“quintessential ‘shotgun’ pleading — the sort of pleading we have
been roundly condemning for 30 years.” See Keith v. DeKalb Cnty.,
749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir. 2013)(collecting cases). As
a result, each count is now “replete with factual allegations that
could not possibly be material to that count, and that any
allegations that are material are buried beneath innumerable pages
of rambling irrelevancies.” Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282,

1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
To Keating’s credit, the Third Amended Complaint is not so
long — nor so filled with factual allegations — to make it nearly
impossible to parse through the facts. However, this aspect of
the Third Amended Complaint must be addressed. Rather than dismiss
the Third Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading, the Court will
instead strike the paragraphs that render it a shotgun pleading,
i.e., Doc. #28, ¶¶ 67, 72, 76, 81.
B. Keating Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts Establishing a
Policy or Custom

Keating claims Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity is
liable because the policies and customs of the Collier County
Sheriff’s Office caused various constitutional violations. (Doc.
#28, ¶¶ 81-83.) Sheriff Rambosk argues Count V should be dismissed
because Keating fails to allege either a policy or a custom that
caused any alleged constitutional violation. (Doc. #42, pp. 4-
7.) Keating contends he sufficiently pled facts that create a
reasonable inference to support any of his underlying theories.
(Doc. #46, pp. 2-3.) The Court agrees with Sheriff Rambosk that
Keating failed to allege sufficient facts establishing a policy or
custom under either Keating’s failure to train or supervise theory
or ratification of the constitutional violations theory.
A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the
constitutional violations of its employee. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The government as an entity
may be responsible, however, “when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury.” See id. at 694. To impose such liability,

a plaintiff must show that: (1) “his constitutional rights were
violated;” (2) “the municipality had a custom or policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right;”
and (3) “the policy or custom caused the violation.” See Underwood
v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2021)(quoting

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Liability may be based on an official policy or “a practice
or custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent
of a policy adopted by the final policymaker.” Khoury v. Miami-
Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1131 (11th Cir. 2021)(quoting
Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342-43 (11th Cir.
1994)). “[A] policy is a decision that is officially adopted by
the municipality or created by an official of such rank that he or
she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality,”
while a “custom is an unwritten practice that is applied
consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the
force of law.” See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th

Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
(1) Failure to Train and Supervise Deputies
When a plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise they
must allege facts showing the failure “evidences a deliberate
indifference” to the municipality’s inhabitants’ rights. See
Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir.
2009)(citation omitted); Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346,
1350 (11th Cir. 1998)(applying same analysis to failure to
supervise claims). There must be “some evidence that the
municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a
particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not

to take any action.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293 (citation omitted).
A plaintiff can show this in two ways. First, there exists “[a]
pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees . . ..” See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
Second, even without prior events, the plaintiff can establish
deliberate indifference if “if the likelihood for constitutional
violation is so high that the need for training would be obvious.”
See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. Keating only relies upon the first
premise.
Keating presents two conclusory allegations to support his
Monell claim. First, Keating claims “the constitutional violation
suffered by Plaintiff were caused by policies, customs, or

practices of the Sheriff’s Office.” (Doc. #28, ¶ 55.) Second,
Keating alleges “similar incidents involving excessive force and
punitive conditions occurred prior to Plaintiff’s incident and
were known to supervisory personnel.” (Id. ¶ 57.) These
allegations fail to provide the who, what, when, or where of
previous similar constitutional violations by untrained or
unsupervised employees and therefore are insufficient to support
a failure to train or supervise theory of liability. See Twombly,
544 U.S. at 555 (holding that conclusory allegations are
insufficient to plausibly state a claim). Without such
allegations, Keating is only left with his own single-incident,
1
which fails to plausibly state a policy or custom. See Craig v.
Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting City of
Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)).
(2) Failure to Discipline Deputies
Where a plaintiff alleges a failure to take disciplinary
action against officers, it can be used to establish a custom if
the facts support a finding that “a persistent failure to take
disciplinary action against officers” resulted in the municipality
ratifying the conduct. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777
F.2d 1436, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1985); Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th
1241, 1256 (11th Cir. 2022)(quoting Fundiller, 777 F.2d at 1443)).

Where there are sufficient facts showing this persistent failure,
it also “provide[s] the causal link between the challenged conduct

1 Keating argues his allegations are not a “single incident,” but rather
a “multi-stage sequence of constitutional violations involving multiple
officers, multiple decision points, supervisory awareness, post-incident
review, and continued non-corrective institutional inaction.” (Doc.
#46, p. 2.) Though correct that he alleges multiple constitutional
violations over his day-long detention, Keating’s argument misses the
point. To support the Monell claim, Keating must show similar incidents
involving other detainees, since the violations at issue in this case
constitute a single incident, which generally cannot establish a policy
or custom. See Craig, 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (discussing how a single
constitutional violation involving several employees is insufficient to
prove a policy or custom).
and the policy, because [the officer] would have been acting in
accordance with the policy of allowing or encouraging [violating
constitutional rights].” See Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1256 (quoting

Fundiller, 777 F.2d at 1443). Just as Keating’s failure to train
or supervise theory fails, so too does his failure to discipline
theory.
Keating’s only allegations relating to previous actions are:
(1) “similar incidents involving excessive force and punitive
conditions occurred prior to Plaintiff’s incident and were known
to supervisory personnel[;]” and (2) “[t]he Sheriff’s Office had
notice of these practices and failed to take corrective action. .
.. ” (Doc. #28, ¶¶ 57, 59.) These allegations are conclusory,
failing to provide the who, what, when, or where of the prior
incidents. See Twombly, 544 U.S. at 555 (holding that conclusory
allegations are insufficient to plausibly state a claim). This

again leaves Keating with his own incident, which is insufficient
to show a widespread custom or policy that allows or encourages
deputies to violate constitutional rights. See Craig, 643 F.3d at
1310. Accordingly, Keating fails to allege sufficient facts to
plausibly show a persistent failure to take disciplinary action
against officers.
C. The Fictitious Parties Will Not Be Dismissed at this
Time

Finally, Sheriff Rambosk argues the fictitious parties should
be dismissed because Keating has failed to describe the defendants
with sufficient specificity. (Doc. #42, p. 7.) Keating contends
dismissal of the fictitious parties is premature since “the
identities of involved officers remain uniquely within Defendants’
control and are reasonably expected to be identified through
discovery.” The Court agrees with Keating at this time.
Generally, “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in
federal court.” See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th
Cir. 2010)(citing New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092,
1094 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997)). A limited exception applies “when the
plaintiff’s description of the defendant is so specific as to be
‘at the very worst, surplusage.’” See id. (quoting Dean v. Barber,
951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Here, the Court finds it premature to dismiss the fictitious
parties. Keating identifies two individuals as “Booking Area
Deput[ies]” and three other individuals as “Booking Area
Supervisor,” “Transport/Control Deputy,” and “Infirmary Escort
Deputy.” This is sufficient for purposes of the instant motion.

Through the discovery process, Keating will have the ability to
obtain the identities of the deputies.? Accordingly, the motion
to dismiss the fictitious parties will be denied without prejudice.
For the reasons set forth in this order, the motion to dismiss
will be granted in part and denied in part.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
(1) Paragraphs 67, 72, 76, and 81 are STRUCK from the Third
Amended Complaint.
(2) Defendant Sheriff Kevin Rambosk’s (“Sheriff Rambosk”)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
(Doc. #42) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Count
V is DISMISSED without prejudice. The motion to dismiss
the fictitious-parties is DENIED without prejudice.
(3) The Clerk shall withhold judgment until the conclusion
of the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 16th day of
June 2026.

4 pol
E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Parties of record
* The Court notes that should this occur, Keating must seek leave to file
an amended complaint, either from opposing parties or the Court, as he
will not be able to amend as of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11371320. Public record. Not legal advice.