# Opinion > District Court, M.D. Florida · June 10, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370994 ## Case - **Full name:** Yariel Jimenez Mayea v. Warden, Florida Soft Side Detention Center et al. - **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida - **Decided:** June 10, 2026 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370994 ## Opinion text UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION YARIEL JIMENEZ MAYEA, Petitioner, v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01757-SPC-NPM WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE DETENTION CENTER et al., Respondents, / OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Yariel Jimenez Mayea’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 6). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. Jimenez Mayea is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United States on February 2, 2022. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued a final administrative removal order on July 3, 2023. On September 8, 2023, ICE released Jimenez Mayea under an order of supervision. On January 10, 2026, Jimenez Mayea reported to ICE for a check-in appointment, and ICE revoked his release, arrested him, and detained him at Alligator Alcatraz. ICE scheduled Jimenez Mayea for removal to Mexico on January 30, 2026, but an ICE deportation officer reports the attempt failed because Jimenez Mayea stated he did not want to be removed to Mexico. ICE returned him to Alligator Alcatraz and has made no further removal efforts. “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing. Id. The government argues Jimenez Mayea’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume a six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention starts each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to arbitrarily detain noncitizens and avoid judicial scrutiny by limiting consecutive periods of detention to 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Jimenez Mayea has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was unable to remove him in 2023, there is no indication Cuba is likely to accept him now, and ICE was unable to remove him to Mexico. The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its January 2026 attempt to send Jimenez Mayea to Mexico. But the evidence before the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear- based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to show it can lawfully remove Jimenez Mayea in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Court finds no significant likelihood Jimenez Mayea will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, ICE can detain Jimenez Mayea to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Yariel Jimenez Mayea’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 1. The respondent shall release Jimenez Mayea within 24 hours of this Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his transportation from the facility. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 10, 2026. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370994. Public record. Not legal advice.