# Alford

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370711

## Case

- **Full name:** Felicia Alford v. Pasco-Pinellas Hillsborough Community Health System, Inc. d/b/a AdventHealth Wesley Chapel
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

FELICIA ALFORD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-94-VMC-SPF

PASCO-PINELLAS HILLSBOROUGH
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.
d/b/a ADVENTHEALTH WESLEY
CHAPEL,

Defendant.
/

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
Defendant Pasco-Pinellas Hillsborough Community Health
System, Inc.’s (“AdventHealth”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 72), filed on March 9, 2026. Plaintiff Felicia Alford
responded on April 16, 2026 (Doc. # 80), AdventHealth filed
a reply on April 30, 2026 (Doc. # 84), and Ms. Alford filed
a sur-reply, with leave of Court, on May 8, 2026. (Doc. #
87). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I. Background:

A. The Parties
According to the complaint, Ms. Alford is a Black woman.
(Doc. # 45 at ¶ 3). Ms. Alford worked as a “PRN Social Work
Care Manager” at AdventHealth’s hospital in Wesley Chapel
from February 2021 until her termination in June 2024. (Doc.
# 72-2 at 23:2-9, 186:11-2; Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 5; Doc. # 72-
21 at ¶ 1). Ms. Alford’s immediate supervisor was Sheila
Hammond. (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 9). AdventHealth’s Director of

Care Management, Jennifer Iglesias, was Ms. Alford’s second-
level manager. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3).
B. AdventHealth’s Policies
AdventHealth’s Rules of Conduct require employees “to
observe all AdventHealth’s rules, policies, and procedures.”
(Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 7). Employees “can face discipline and
termination for insubordination, disrespectful behavior,
failure to follow a supervisor’s instructions or to perform
assigned work, or poor performance.” (Id.). “Pursuant to its
Corrective Action Policy, AdventHealth has discretion to
administer any level of discipline to correct violations or
performance concerns, and disciplinary steps may include a

Documented Discussion, a Written Warning, a Final Warning,
and termination, in any order.” (Id. at ¶ 8).
“PRN means pro re nata, or ‘as needed’ or ‘when
necessary.’” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 4). A PRN employee “is not
guaranteed shifts and may not always get her preferred
shifts.” (Id. at ¶ 29). It is undisputed that, pursuant to
AdventHealth’s written Policy CW HR 244, PRN employees are
required to “be available to work” at least four shifts per
month. (Doc. # 75-12 at 1). But the parties disagree as to
what being “available to work” means. According to
AdventHealth, PRN employees “are required to work at least
four shifts per month . . . in order to maintain their PRN

status.” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 29; Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 11). At her
deposition, Ms. Alford initially agreed that PRN employees
had to work “[f]our shifts per month.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-
10). However, Ms. Alford later testified that Policy CW HR
244 merely required PRN employees to submit four days in which
they were available to work during a month. (Id. at 235:12-
237:13). According to Ms. Alford, if she was not scheduled on
the dates she submitted, she did not have to pick up any
additional shifts offered to her to satisfy the four-shifts-
per-month requirement. (Id. at 236:19-237:13, 267:4-7,
268:16-24). However, Ms. Alford did not dispute that,
regardless of the language of Policy CW HR 244, AdventHealth

required PRN employees to work four shifts per month. See
(Id. at 306:13-23) (acknowledging that AdventHealth
terminated her for failing to comply with its requirement
that PRN employees work four shifts per month).
C. Ms. Alford’s Tenure at AdventHealth
Ms. Alford had various documented performance issues
while working for AdventHealth. In July 2021, Ms. Alford
received a written “corrective action” after she failed to
report for a scheduled shift and did not secure coverage.
(Doc. # 72-9 at 1; Doc. # 72-21 at ¶¶ 6-8). On May 24, 2022,
Ms. Alford told Ms. Iglesias that she needed to leave early
to take her father to a doctor’s appointment. (Doc. # 72-21

at ¶ 10). The situation became tense when Ms. Iglesias told
Ms. Alford that “there was no coverage that we could arrange
last minute,” and Ms. Alford ultimately left without securing
coverage. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12). On June 22, 2022, Ms. Alford
complained to HR that Ms. Iglesias was bullying and
retaliating against her, but did not identify any instances
of bullying or retaliation. (Doc. # 75-15 at 4-8). On June
24, 2022, Ms. Alford received a corrective action for the May
2022 incident. (Doc. # 72-10; Doc. 72-21 at ¶¶ 9-12). After
the June 2022 corrective action, Ms. Alford and Ms. Iglesias
had a conversation in which they discussed their issues and
“moved forward.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 170:2-25). Ms. Alford did

not have any conflict with Ms. Iglesias for approximately one
year and a half. (Id. at 170:2-171:7).
In fall 2023, Ms. Iglesias “issued Ms. Alford an annual
written performance evaluation,” which stated that Ms. Alford
and Ms. Iglesias had “an in-person performance discussion” on
November 5, 2023. (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 17). On December 17,
2023, Ms. Alford complained to HR that the evaluation
inaccurately stated that she and Ms. Iglesias had an in-
person conversation. (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 13). “Separately, Ms.
Alford also complained that Ms. Iglesias treated her
‘differently’ from other PRNs when Ms. Iglesias: (1) warned
Ms. Alford that she would be removed from the schedule if she

failed to complete her overdue [AdventHealth Learning Network
trainings], and (2) made her sit with Ms. Hammond for training
on an updated part of the initial evaluation within the
electronic health record software called EPIC.” (Id. at ¶
14). Regional Employee Relations Specialist Telia Dowdell
scheduled a meeting with Ms. Alford to discuss her complaints
after the holidays. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 14).
On January 4, 2024, Ms. Alford sarcastically told a
coworker that she was going to quit. (Doc. # 72-2 at 196:7-
197:7). Ms. Alford later overheard Ms. Iglesias discussing
the comment with the department’s scheduler. (Id. at 197:9-
14; Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 18). According to Ms. Alford, Ms.

Iglesias stated that she wished Ms. Alford would quit because
Ms. Iglesias “was so over her.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 197:11-14).
Ms. Alford approached the scheduler’s cubicle and asked Ms.
Iglesias why she was discussing her “personal business with
the secretary.” (Id. at 197:15-17). Ms. Iglesias said they
were “talking about the schedules.” (Id. at 197:17-18). Ms.
Alford said they did not “have to go back and forth” and that
she would “just call HR.” (Id. at 197:18-21). Ms. Iglesias
told Ms. Alford to go upstairs and speak to HR in person.
(Id. at 197:21-24). Ms. Alford then “went to grab the phone
to call” HR, but Ms. Iglesias “grabbed [her] arm and said, I
told you to go upstairs.” (Id. at 197:25-198:3). Ms. Iglesias

“pushed [Ms. Alford] out of the way,” repeating that Ms.
Alford should go upstairs.” (Id. at 198:4-7).1 Ms. Iglesias
then called security and asked them “to escort Ms. Alford to
HR.” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 19). Ms. Alford reported the incident
to HR. (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 6).
Employee Relations investigated Ms. Alford’s claims
regarding the January 4, 2024, incident. (Id. at ¶ 7). On
January 17, 2024, Ms. Alford, Ms. Iglesias, Ms. Dowdell, and
Human Resources Director Jasmine Ramnarine met to discuss Ms.
Alford’s complaints. (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 18; Doc. # 72-22 at
¶ 2). Ms. Alford was told that AdventHealth “could not
substantiate her allegations that Ms. Iglesias had physically

assaulted her.” (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 18). However, AdventHealth
proposed that Ms. Alford “address her work-related concerns
directly with her immediate supervisor, Ms. Hammond, going
forward to cut out any unnecessary contact with Ms. Iglesias”

1 Ms. Iglesias disputes Ms. Alford’s characterization of the
incident. According to Ms. Iglesias, she “told the scheduler
something along the lines of that I wished Ms. Alford would
talk to me personally if she was planning to quit.” (Doc. #
72-21 at ¶ 18). Ms. Iglesias denies grabbing Ms. Alford’s arm
and claims that Ms. Alford “push[ed] her from behind to reach
the scheduler’s desk phone.” (Id. at ¶ 19).
and to involve Ms. Hammond or HR if Ms. Alford “needed to
address something with Ms. Iglesias directly.” (Id.). “As
part of the meeting, it was determined that Ms. Iglesias had

made a mistake with respect to the November 5, 2023
performance discussion date but that the discussion itself
had already taken place.” (Id. at ¶ 19). “With respect to ALN
trainings, it was determined that it was AdventHealth’s
standard procedure for employees to be taken off the schedule
for not timely completing ALNs, and Ms. Alford was not an
exception. With respect to EPIC trainings, it was determined
they were arranged for Ms. Alford’s benefit due to her limited
availability and resulting limited opportunity to learn the
IE update.” (Id.).
In February 2024, Ms. Alford received a written
“documented discussion” for: (1) clocking in prior to her

scheduled start time, (2) failing to complete all her
assignments, (3) failing to complete assignments correctly,
(4) lack of communication, and (5) dishonesty about when she
took her lunch break. (Doc. # 72-15).
Ms. Alford worked less than four shifts per month from
February 2024 through May 2024. (Doc. # 72-17 at 1). Ms.
Alford did not pick up additional shifts offered to her during
that period. (Id.).
On May 17, 2024, Ms. Alford, Ms. Hammond, Ms. Iglesias,
and Ms. Ramnarine met to discuss “the leadership’s concerns
around Ms. Alford’s performance and responsiveness.” (Doc. #

72-21 at ¶ 32). Ms. Alford did not work any shifts after May
17, 2024. (Doc. # 72-17 at 2).
On June 14, 2024, AdventHealth terminated Ms. Alford for
failing to comply with Policy CW HR 244, which requires PRN
employees “to work four (4) shifts in a four-week schedule
period,” since February 2024. (Id. at 1).
D. The EEOC and FCHR Charges
Ms. Alford filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) on
May 10, 2024. (Doc. # 72-18 at 1-2). The charge alleged only
that AdventHealth retaliated against Ms. Alford for filing
complaints about Ms. Iglesias. (Id.). Ms. Alford filed a

second charge with the EEOC and FCHR on July 8, 2024, which
elaborated on the retaliation alleged in the first charge
(Doc. # 72-19 at 1-2). Neither charge asserted claims of race
or sex discrimination or mentioned Ms. Alford’s membership in
any protected class. (Doc. # 72-18 at 1-2; Doc. # 72-19 at 1-
2).
E. Procedural History
Ms. Alford’s second amended complaint asserts five
claims against AdventHealth: race-based discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla.
Stat. § 760.01 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I);

hostile work environment based on race in violation of Title
VII, the FCRA, and Section 1981 (Count II); sex-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the FCRA (Count
III); hostile work environment based on sex in violation of
Title VII and the FCRA (Count IV); and retaliation in
violation of Title VII, the FCRA, and Section 1981 (Count V).
(Doc. # 45).
The Court granted AdventHealth’s motion to dismiss the
claims brought pursuant to Title VII and the FCRA in Counts
I through IV. (Doc. # 70). The Court dismissed with prejudice
Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of Title
VII and the FCRA, and Counts III and IV. (Id.). Thus, only

Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of
Section 1981, and Count V remain.
AdventHealth moves for summary judgment. (Doc. # 72).
The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. ## 80, 84, 87) and is ripe
for review.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations

or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
A. Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Section
1981

AdventHealth argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Count II as there is no evidence that the alleged
harassment of Ms. Alford was based upon her race. (Doc. # 72
at 25). In response, Ms. Alford explicitly abandons her
hostile work environment claim. (Doc. # 80 at 18).
As Ms. Alford has abandoned her hostile work environment
claim, AdventHealth is granted summary judgment on Count II
to the extent it alleges violation of Section 1981. See

Ekokotu v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 523 F. App’x 629, 632 (11th Cir.
2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment for the defendant
on national origin discrimination claims where plaintiff
“explicitly and unequivocally disavowed them in response to
[defendant’s] motion for summary judgment”).
B. Time-Barred Claims

AdventHealth argues that Ms. Alford’s retaliation claims
under Title VII and the FCRA are partially time-barred. (Doc.
# 72 at 18-19). In response, Ms. Alford acknowledges that she
“cannot recover for untimely events.” (Doc. # 80 at 15). In
its reply, AdventHealth argues for the first time that Ms.
Alford cannot rely on “these time-barred events” to establish
the prima facie elements of her Section 1981 race
discrimination and retaliation claims. (Doc. # 84 at 3).
Plaintiff does not address this argument in her sur-reply.
The Court agrees with AdventHealth as to the Title VII
and FCRA retaliation claims but not as to the Section 1981
discrimination and retaliation claims.
1. The Title VII and FCRA Retaliation Claims
“As a prerequisite to filing both a Title VII and a FCRA
action, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies
by filing a timely charge with the appropriate agency.” Jones
v. Bank of Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Since Florida is a

deferral state, a charge must be filed within 300 days of the
last discriminatory act.” Davis v. Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
170 F. App’x 598, 600 (11th Cir. 2005). “[U]nder the FCRA, an
employee may file an administrative complaint with the
Florida Civil Rights Commission within 365 days of the alleged
violation.” Essick v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-
cv-949-MMH-J_K, 2016 WL 3615677, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 6,
2016).
Here, Ms. Alford filed her first EEOC charge on May 10,
2024. (Doc. # 72-18). Accordingly, Ms. Alford’s Title VII
retaliation claim is time-barred to the extent it is based on
any allegedly retaliatory actions that occurred before July

15, 2023. See O’Hara v. Univ. of W. Fla., 494 F. App’x 972,
973 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming judgment dismissing Title VII
claims as time-barred because the alleged misconduct occurred
more than 300 days before plaintiff filed her charge of
discrimination). Ms. Alford’s FCRA retaliation claim cannot
be based on allegedly retaliatory actions that occurred
before May 11, 2023. See Bourne v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.,
508 F. App’x 907, 909 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal
of FCRA claim as time barred where plaintiff did not file
charge of discrimination until 367 days after her last day of
work).
2. The Section 1981 Discrimination and
Retaliation Claims

As an initial matter, AdventHealth improperly raises its
argument that Ms. Alford’s Section 1981 discrimination and
retaliation claims are partially time barred for the first
time in its reply. WBY, Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., Georgia, 695
F. App’x 486, 491–92 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Although Rutland did
raise his current theory of probable cause in a reply brief
in support of his motion for summary judgment, reply briefs
are not a vehicle to present new arguments or theories.”).
In any event, AdventHealth’s argument is meritless
because 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not require claimants to go
through the EEOC administrative process as a prerequisite of
suit. Minnifield v. City of Birmingham Dep’t of Police, 791
F. App’x 86, 88 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Mathis v.
Leggett & Platt, 263 F. App’x 9, 12 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“Mathis’s claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 survives despite Mathis’s untimely Title VII race
discrimination charge because § 1981 actions are not subject

to the administrative exhaustion requirement.”).
C. Race-Based Discrimination in Violation of Section
1981

Section 1981 “prohibit[s] intentional racial
discrimination in employment contracts.” Melton v. I-10 Truck
Ctr. Inc, 166 F.4th 905, 912 (11th Cir. 2026). “An employee
must prove ‘(1) intentional racial discrimination (2) that
caused a contractual injury.’” Id. at 912-13 (quoting Ziyadat
v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.
2021)). “To establish intentional racial discrimination, an
employee may rely on either direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence.” Id. at 913. Title VII claims and corresponding
Section 1981 claims “have the same requirements of proof and
utilize the same analytical framework.” Smelter v. S. Home
Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).
“In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff
alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient
facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.”
Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220
(11th Cir. 2019). “One way that she can do so is by satisfying
the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas
[Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, (1973)].” Id. A plaintiff

can also “demonstrate a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence that warrants an inference of intentional
discrimination.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms.
Alford cannot succeed under either avenue.
1. Ms. Alford Has Not Met Her Prima Facie Burden
Under the McDonnell Douglas Framework

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has
the initial burden of proving her prima facie case. McAlpin
v. Sneads, 61 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir. 2023). To do so, the
plaintiff must show that “(1) she belongs to a protected
class, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action,
(3) she was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4)
her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her
class more favorably.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88
F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The prima facie showing entitles the plaintiff to
a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination.” Id.
The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that
presumption “by offering evidence of a valid, non-
discriminatory justification for the adverse employment
action.” Id.
Ms. Alford belongs to a protected class. (Doc. # 72-2 at
186:11-12); Melton, 166 F.4th at 914. As Ms. Alford was

discharged from a previously held position, she does not need
to demonstrate she was qualified to perform the job in
question. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc.,
196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Our caselaw quite
clearly instructs that plaintiffs, who have been discharged
from a previously held position, do not need to satisfy the

McDonnell Douglas prong requiring proof of qualification.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, to meet her
prima facie burden, Ms. Alford must present evidence that she
was subjected to an adverse employment action and that
AdventHealth treated similarly situated employees outside her
class more favorably.
a. Adverse Employment Actions
Claims of race discrimination under Section 1981
“require a showing that the employer subjected the employee
to an adverse employment action.” Davis v. Legal Servs. Ala.,
Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “When, as here, we are not talking about a

hostile-work-environment claim, adverse employment actions
include ‘tangible employment actions,’ which are those
actions ‘that affect continued employment or pay — things
like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay, and
pay raises or cuts — as well as other things that are
similarly significant standing alone.’” Id. at 1266 (quoting
Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir.
2020)).
Ms. Alford claims that Ms. Iglesias subjected her to the
following adverse employment actions: (1) the issuance of
three write-ups and an allegedly falsified performance

evaluation, (2) harassment and physical assault, (3)
micromanagement and temporary relocation of her workstation,
and (4) reduction in hours and termination. Each will be
addressed in turn.
i. The Write-Ups and the Performance
Evaluation

Ms. Alford claims that she was “discipline[d]” for
“requiring time off for family emergencies” in 2021 and 2022
and for “coming in too early” in 2024. (Doc. # 80 at 16). Ms.
Alford does not elaborate on the “discipline” she received.
However, it appears Ms. Alford is referring to the following
documents: (1) the July 2021 corrective action she received
for failing to work a scheduled shift, (2) the June 2022
corrective action she received for leaving a shift early, and
(3) the February 2024 documented discussion she received for,
among other things, clocking in before the start of her
shifts. (Doc. # 80 at 9-11 ¶¶ 5-7, 10; 13 ¶ 16).
“The reprimand of an employee does not constitute an
adverse employment action when the employee suffers no
tangible harm as a result.” Summerlin v. M&H Valve Co., 167
F. App’x 93, 97 (11th Cir. 2006). “[M]emoranda of reprimand
or counseling that amount to no more than a mere scolding,
without any following disciplinary action, do not rise to the
level of adverse employment actions.” Barnett v. Athens Reg’l

Med. Ctr. Inc., 550 F. App’x 711, 713 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
Here, Ms. Alford does not allege that the corrective
actions or documented discussion had any effect on her
employment. Therefore, even if these documents are properly
deemed reprimands or “discipline,” Ms. Alford has not
established they are adverse employment actions. See Barnett,
550 F. App’x at 713 (“Barnett has failed to establish his
prima facie case of discrimination because he was not

subjected to an adverse employment action. The written
reprimands and negative performance review had no effect on
Barnett’s employment.”); Summerlin, 167 F. App’x at 97
(finding that written reprimand was not an adverse employment
action as plaintiff did not allege that it “affected any
important condition of his employment, such as salary,
benefits, title, or job duties”).
Ms. Alford further contends that the allegedly falsified
performance evaluation is an adverse employment action. (Doc.
# 80 at 16). However, Ms. Alford does not allege that the
evaluation impacted any condition of her employment. Rather,
Ms. Alford acknowledges that the performance review was
positive. (Doc. # 72-2 at 212:2-7; Doc. # 80 at 12 ¶ 15).
Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not demonstrated that the

allegedly false statement in the performance review is an
adverse employment action. See Lamont v. City of Albany, No.
1:12-CV-82 WLS, 2015 WL 93874, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2015)
(“[R]epeated false accusations alone, without accompanying
negative employment consequences, are not adverse employment
actions.”); Soloski v. Adams, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1356 (N.D.
Ga. 2009) (“False accusations without negative employment
consequences are not employment decisions actionable under
Title VII.”).
ii. Harassment and Physical Assault

Ms. Alford claims that she was “harassed about requiring
time off for family emergencies” in July 2021 and May 2022.
(Doc. # 80 at 16). As Ms. Alford does not provide details of
the alleged harassment, the nature of Ms. Alford’s contention
is unclear. Yet, Ms. Alford’s response only describes one
incident which could be considered harassment during this
period: when Ms. Iglesias stated that Ms. Alford’s job would
be in jeopardy if she did not come in as scheduled in July
2021. (Id. at 9-10 ¶ 5). Ms. Alford also alleges that Ms.
Iglesias “harassed her and physically assaulted her” on
January 4, 2024. (Id. at 16).
“Harassment and hostility are not, by themselves,
adverse employment actions.” Muse v. Jax 02 LLC, No. 3:25-
cv-1095-WWB-LLL, 2026 WL 776165, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19,

2026); see Salyer v. AmSouth Bank, No. 8:04-cv-2543-EAK-MAP,
2007 WL 9723547, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2007)
(“[O]stracism and hostility by a supervisor is not an adverse
employment action.”). “Indeed, hostile work environment,
discrimination, and retaliation claims are each founded on a
separate transaction or occurrence and require the plaintiff
to establish different facts.” Muse, 2026 WL 776165, at *3
(internal quotation marks omitted). “When an employee
complains of ‘harassment’ by a supervisor, that claim is
actionable only if it rises to the level of a hostile work
environment, which requires ‘proof that the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.’” Amos v. Mobile Cnty. Health Dep’t, 767
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1272 (S.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d, 460 F. App’x
893 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan
Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Ms. Alford has abandoned her hostile work
environment claim and does not contend that the alleged
harassment and physical assault “rose to the level of a
hostile work environment.” Amos, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
Therefore, these incidents cannot be considered adverse
employment actions. See Id. (“Amos has made no attempt to

demonstrate that Stiegler’s treatment of her rose to the level
of a hostile work environment. Consequently, it cannot be
considered an adverse employment action.”).
In any event, Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms.
Iglesias’s statement that Ms. Alford’s job was in jeopardy
had any effect on her employment. See Howard v. Walgreen Co.,
605 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The only alleged
discrimination about which Howard complained was Krzastek’s
message threatening that Howard’s job was in jeopardy. An
allegation such as this falls well short of an adverse
action.”); Mistretta v. Volusia Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[T]hreats of

termination do not constitute adverse employment actions.”).
Ms. Alford further has not claimed that the alleged physical
altercation had a tangible effect on her employment. See
McNichols v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 02-23034-CIV, 2006 WL
1104336, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2006) (“McNichols further
alleged in her second EEOC charge that in retaliation for her
filing her first EEOC charge: 1) her assigned work truck was
vandalized; 2) she was intimidated; and 3) she was pushed.
These allegations do not establish adverse employment
actions.”); Smiley v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1377, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (“Plaintiff’s allegations
that Jeffries slapped him, verbally abused him, criticized

his job performance and demanded a doctor’s excuse are
insufficient for the Court to find that he suffered any
adverse employment action.”). Accordingly, even if Ms.
Alford’s claims that Ms. Iglesias threatened her job and
grabbed and pushed her are not deemed acts of harassment and
hostility that must rise to the level of a hostile work
environment, Ms. Alford still has not demonstrated that they
are adverse employment actions.
iii. Micromanagement and Temporary
Relocation of Workstation

Ms. Alford claims that she was micromanaged by being
“forced to sit with her immediate supervisor, [Ms.] Hammond,
or another employee designated by [Ms.] Iglesias,” while Ms.
Hammond “was ordered to document everything [Ms. Alford] did
during her shift.” (Doc. # 80 at 16-17). However, heightened
scrutiny of an employee’s work does not constitute an adverse
employment action. See Tamez v. A/C Storage Place, Ltd., No.
6:15-cv-1541-CEM-TBS, 2017 WL 10059003, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June
20, 2017) (“Plaintiff argues that Vance ‘micromanaged’ her by
instructing others to double check Plaintiff’s work,
particularly her banking and deposit related work. Such
heightened scrutiny does not constitute an
adverse employment action.”); Lamont v. City of Albany, No.
1:12-CV-82 WLS, 2015 WL 93874, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2015)

(“[T]he Court finds that increased supervision and monitoring
of LaMont’s work is not an adverse employment action.”).
Further, “[m]ere inconveniences, including dissatisfaction
with work spaces, do not constitute adverse employment
actions.” Scotton v. Nicholson, No. 8:04-cv-1440-JDW-EAJ,
2006 WL 8429880, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As Ms. Alford has not alleged any tangible, negative
effect on her employment other than increased supervision and
a temporary office relocation, she has not demonstrated that
she suffered adverse employment actions. See Id. (“The
location . . . of an office does not meet the requisite level

of substantiality to be considered adverse absent some other
tangible, negative effect on Plaintiff’s employment.”); Arora
v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., No. 23-cv-20962, 2024 WL 4286220,
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2024) (“In short, Mr. Arora’s claim
that he suffered an adverse employment action with regard to
Ms. Johnson’s increased supervision and scrutiny of his daily
tasks falls far short of serious and material changes in the
terms and conditions of employment.”).
iv. Reduction in Hours and Termination
Ms. Alford alleges that she suffered an adverse
employment action when Ms. Iglesias “refused to schedule [Ms.

Alford] for shifts on dates which she was available, although
she provided her availability well in advance of the schedule
being posted.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Ms. Alford claims that,
despite timely submitting her availability, she was not
scheduled for any shifts in March or June 2024 and was only
scheduled for two shifts in April 2024. (Doc. # 80 at 13-15
¶¶ 19-23; Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-20; Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 34-35,
37, 40). Ms. Alford further alleges that she “was terminated
for a pretextual reason, that she had violated the PRN policy
of working 4 shifts per month.” (Doc. # 80 at 17) (emphasis
in original); see (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 42, 44) (asserting that
Ms. Iglesias mischaracterized AdventHealth’s “PRN attendance

policy” in the June 2024 corrective action issued in
connection with Ms. Alford’s termination).
“A reduction in an employee’s hours, which reduces the
employee’s take-home pay, qualifies as a tangible employment
action.” Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.,
434 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). Termination also is an
adverse employment action. Melton, 166 F.4th at 914.
Accordingly, Ms. Alford has sufficiently alleged that she
suffered an adverse employment action by having her hours
reduced and, ultimately, by being terminated.
b. Treating Similarly Situated Employees
More Favorably

A plaintiff meets her prima facie burden of
demonstrating that her employer treated similarly situated
employees outside her class more favorably “when the
plaintiff presents evidence of a comparator — someone who is
similarly situated in all material respects.” Tynes, 88 F.4th
at 944 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, this
means that a comparator will (1) have engaged in the same
basic conduct as the plaintiff; (2) have been subject to the
same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff;
(3) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor
as the plaintiff; and (4) share the plaintiff’s employment or
disciplinary history.” Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87 F.4th
1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2023). Ms. Alford has not met her
burden.
In her response, Ms. Alford claims that Ms. Iglesias
refused to schedule her “for shifts on dates which she was
available,” but “did not refuse to schedule non-black

employees for all dates for which they indicated
availability.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Yet Ms. Alford does not
cite any record evidence in support. In any event, a
conclusory allegation that Ms. Iglesias did not refuse to
schedule unnamed non-Black employees on dates they were
available is not sufficient. See Jones v. Saugahatchee

Country Club, No. 3:23-CV-34-ECM, 2026 WL 734415, at *3 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 16, 2026) (“Her suggestion that unnamed white
employees ‘were treated more favorably’ is not enough.”);
Wells v. Miami Dade Cnty., No. 15-22431-CIV, 2016 WL 7492560,
at *6 n.7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016) (“Wells’ discrimination
claim lacks merit also because she has not identified a
similarly situated, non-Black employee who received more
favorable treatment than she received.”). Further, Ms. Alford
does not even allege that any similarly situated employees
who failed to work at least four shifts per month were not
terminated.
Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not met her prima facie

burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Adewumi v.
Wellstar Med. Grp., No. 24-12243, 2025 WL 831584, at *6 (11th
Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) (finding that plaintiff failed to meet
his initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework as
he “failed to establish a proper comparator”); Moultrie v.
Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 703 F. App’x 900, 907 (11th Cir. 2017)
(same).
2. Ms. Alford Has Not Presented a Convincing
Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

“Aside from the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee
can still survive summary judgment by presenting
circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue
concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Jenkins v.
Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A triable issue of fact exists if the record,
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents
a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would
allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d
1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A convincing mosaic may be shown by evidence that
demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing,
ambiguous statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from
which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn,
(2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated
employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is
pretextual.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Ms. Alford argues that she has presented a convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence establishing discriminatory
intent. (Doc. # 80 at 17-18). Specifically, Ms. Alford
alleges as follows:
[Ms. Alford] was reliable, but harassed about
taking leave for family emergencies, while white
co-workers called out, arrived late or left early
with no consequences. When [Ms. Alford] reported
[Ms.] Iglesias to HR for misconduct, [Ms.] Iglesias
issued her discipline, physically assaulted her and
forced her supervisor to babysit and monitor her
while she worked. After the January 2024 meeting
with HR and [Ms.] Iglesias to report [Ms.] Iglesias
for falsifying documents and for physically
assaulting her, [Ms.] Iglesias refused to schedule
[Ms. Alford] for shifts which she reported her
availability. [Ms.] Iglesias then used [Ms.
Alford’s] lack of shifts to terminate her.

(Id. at 17).
“While evidence of ‘systematically better treatment of
similarly situated employees’ can support an inference of
discriminatory intent,” here, Ms. Alford has not presented
evidence that similarly situated non-Black employees
routinely received better treatment. Adewumi, 2025 WL 831584,
at *8 (quoting Jenkins, 26 F.4th 1250). Ms. Alford’s
circumstantial evidence, viewed as a whole, is insufficient
to survive summary judgment under the convincing mosaic
approach.
Ms. Alford testified at her deposition that unnamed
white employees called out of work on short notice, but she
did not know whether they were disciplined. (Doc. # 72-2 at
135:17-141:10). However, in her affidavit, Ms. Alford claimed
that unnamed “[n]on-Black employees were not subjected to
discipline for their failure to report for scheduled shifts
and were allowed to call out at the last minute without

consequences.” (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶ 12). Ms. Alford further
testified that non-Black employees Alicia Williams, Thuy
Kimbal, and Karen Schneider were allowed to leave work early
to handle personal appointments. (Doc. # 72-2 at 287:3-
288:5). In her affidavit, Ms. Alford identified only Ms.
Williams, Ms. Kimbal, and Amy Crow as employees who were
permitted to leave early. (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶ 15). Ms. Alford
averred that the following non-Black employees “under the
charge of [Ms.] Iglesias were not disciplined for arriving to
work early”: Ms. Hammond, Susan Beathler, McKenna Welton-
Rabe, Ms. Williams, Darla Durrett, Wilda Neifa, Ms. Kimbal,
Julie Hatchett, Cynthia Serota, and Sara Resch. (Id. at ¶

32). Finally, Ms. Alford averred that other “non-black
employees, including Leah Rabel, were regularly tardy for
shifts but received no discipline for the misconduct.” (Id.).
“[C]onclusory allegations have no probative value at
summary judgment unless supported by specific evidence.”
Kelley v. Howden, No. 21-13573, 2022 WL 17259720, at *1 (11th
Cir. Nov. 29, 2022); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d
1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Ms. Alford did not explain
the circumstances of any of these alleged instances of
disparate treatment or otherwise provide details that would
support a finding that similarly situated non-Black employees
were treated better than she was. Accordingly, her conclusory

allegations that certain named and unnamed non-Black
employees were allowed to call out on short notice, leave
early, and arrive early or late, without more, do not raise
a reasonable inference that AdventHealth intentionally
discriminated against her. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of
Georgia, 198 F. App’x 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’
EEOC affidavits were too conclusory and lacking in specific
facts to create genuine issues of material fact as to . . .
whether white employees were similarly situated.”).
In any event, even if Ms. Alford’s allegations were not
conclusory, they would still be insufficient as she failed to
establish that any of the non-Black employees were similarly

situated to her. See Adewumi, 2025 WL 831584, at *8 (holding
that plaintiff’s allegations that his supervisor
“micromanaged him and subjected his medical errors to more
scrutiny than his white colleagues” did not establish
systemically better treatment of similarly situated employees
as plaintiff “failed to present evidence of how his white
counterparts within the practice group were managed or peer
reviewed”); Robert v. City of Boca Raton, No. 21-13779, 2024
WL 3066604, at *5 (11th Cir. June 20, 2024) (holding that
circumstantial evidence, including that two dissimilar
employees were not terminated or asked to resign, was
“insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer intentional race

discrimination”).
While it is apparent that Ms. Alford had a contentious
working relationship with Ms. Iglesias, Ms. Alford has not
explained why this suggests Ms. Iglesias had discriminatory
intent. As previously discussed, Ms. Alford has not offered
any record support for her conclusory claim that Ms. Iglesias
refused to schedule Ms. Alford “for shifts on dates which she
was available” but “did not refuse to schedule non-black
employees for all dates for which they indicated
availability.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Accordingly, Ms. Alford has
not presented evidence suggesting discriminatory intent. See
Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 986 (11th Cir. 1989)

(“Hawkins presented evidence that Rascoe did not like him,
but a dislike alone is not evidence of racial
discrimination.”); Hudson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp.
2d 1301, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“A mere personality clash
among co-workers, no matter how severe, is not grounds for a
Title VII discrimination complaint.”).
Finally, Ms. Alford does not offer any support for her
assertion that she “was terminated for a pretextual reason.”
(Doc. # 80 at 7). Even crediting Ms. Alford’s claim that Ms.
Iglesias required PRN employees to follow a staffing policy
more stringent than AdventHealth’s written policy (Doc. # 75-
7 at ¶ 42), Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms. Iglesias only

required Black PRN employees to work four shifts per month or
that only Black PRN employees were disciplined for failing to
work the minimum amount of shifts. In contrast, AdventHealth
has identified 12 non-Black PRN employees who, like Ms.
Alford, were terminated in 2024 and 2025 for “failure to keep
the four-shifts-per-month schedule.” (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 13).
Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not presented any evidence that
AdventHealth’s decision to terminate her was pretextual. See
Connell v. Postmaster Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., 518 F. App’x
702 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
defendant where plaintiff “failed to present evidence that
the legitimate reasons offered for her termination were

pretextual”); Decoste v. City of Boynton Beach, 818 F. Supp.
3d 1360, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2026) (“Decoste offers no evidence
that shows that the City’s decision to terminate her following
the Final Report was pretext, which is also fatal to her
convincing mosaic framework.”).
In sum, Ms. Alford has not presented “a convincing mosaic
of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644
F.3d at 1328. AdventHealth is granted summary judgment on
Count I to the extent it alleges violation of Section 1981.
D. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII, the FCRA,
and Section 1981

“Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee
because that employee has ‘opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].’” Gant v. Kash’n
Karry Food Stores, Inc., 390 F. App’x 943, 945 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). The FCRA and Section
1981 also prohibit employers from retaliating against
employees who engage in protected conduct. Michaels v.
Sasser’s Glass Works Inc., No. 23-11166, 2025 WL 588648, at
*2-3 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025). “Claims under both § 1981 and
the FCRA are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII.”
Gant, 390 F. App’x at 945. “Claims of retaliation can be
supported with either direct or circumstantial evidence.”
Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023).
Where, as in the instant case, “a plaintiff alleging
retaliation presents only circumstantial evidence and no
direct evidence,” courts apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Id.

To meet her initial burden of proving a prima facie case,
the plaintiff must show that: (1) she “engaged in statutorily
protected expression”; (2) she “suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there is some causal relation
between the two events.” McAlpin, 61 F.4th at 927 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff cannot establish

a prima facie case, she does not automatically lose on
summary judgment.” Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 764
(11th Cir. 2025). Rather, a court “should advance directly to
the convincing mosaic inquiry.” Id. at 765. Ms. Alford cannot
defeat summary judgment under either test.
1. Ms. Alford Has Not Established a Prima Facie
Case

Ms. Alford alleges that she engaged in the following
protected activity prior to her termination: (1) making
complaints to HR in June 2022 and December 2023 and (2) filing
an EEOC charge of discrimination in May 2024. (Doc. # 80 at
18-19). AdventHealth does not dispute that these actions are
protected activity. Accordingly, the Court will assume,
without deciding, that Ms. Alford has met her prima facie
burden of establishing that she engaged in protected
activity.
With respect to the second prong, Ms. Alford claims that
she suffered a materially adverse employment action as she
“was fired allegedly for failing to work a minimum number of
shifts, an impossibility when [Ms.] Iglesias refused to
schedule her to work.” (Doc. # 80 at 20). A reduction in hours
that results in a loss of pay is a materially adverse action.
Jones v. Aaron’s Inc., 748 F. App’x 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2018).
“Termination is a materially adverse action.” Jefferson v.

Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018).
Therefore, Ms. Alford has met her prima facie burden in this
regard.
Finally, Ms. Alford alleges that there is a causal
connection between her protected conduct and the adverse
action as she “made multiple verbal and written complaints
about [Ms.] Iglesias who then disciplined and fired her.”
(Doc. # 80 at 20).
“To establish a causal link for purposes of the third
element, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the protected
activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.”
Matamoros v. Broward Sheriff’s Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1336 (11th

Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff
makes this showing if she provides sufficient evidence that
the decisionmaker became aware of the protected conduct and
that there was a close temporal proximity between this
awareness and the adverse action.” Id. “If there is a delay
of more than three months between the two events, then the
temporal proximity is not close enough, and the plaintiff
must offer some other evidence tending to show causation.”
Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 F. App’x 502, 506 (11th Cir.
2011). “Moreover, there is no causal connection between a
protected act and an adverse action, where the adverse action
was caused by intervening act of misconduct.” Brisk v.

Shoreline Found., Inc., 654 F. App’x 415, 417 (11th Cir.
2016).
Although there is a close proximity between the May 2024
EEOC charge and Ms. Alford’s termination, it is insufficient
to demonstrate a causal connection because there is no
evidence that Ms. Iglesias knew of the charge while Ms. Alford
was employed at AdventHealth. See Matamoros, 2 F.4th at 1337
(“Without some showing of awareness, the causal chain falls
apart and the claim fails.”). Therefore, Ms. Alford must
establish a causal connection between her June 2022 and
December 2023 HR complaints and the alleged retaliation.
Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms. Iglesias refused to

schedule her on her available dates prior to March 2024. (Doc.
# 80 at 13-15 ¶¶ 19-23; Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-20; Doc. # 75-7
at ¶¶ 34-35, 37, 40). Accordingly, the nearly two-year gap
between Ms. Alford’s June 2022 HR complaint and the alleged
retaliation is insufficient, in and of itself, to show a
causal connection. Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 506.
Regarding the December 2023 HR complaint, Ms. Alford
alleges that her reduction in hours began slightly more than
two months later, when she sent her availability for March
2024 but was told that she “was not needed on any of [her]
available days.” (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 23, 34). Two months may
be a sufficiently close temporal proximity to establish

causation. See Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 506 (stating that
a delay of more than three months is not sufficiently close
proximity to establish causation, without more). However, Ms.
Alford’s intervening misconduct severed any causal connection
between the complaint and the alleged retaliation. Brisk, 654
F. App’x at 417.
It is undisputed that Ms. Alford did not comply with the
PRN staffing policy enforced by AdventHealth from February
2024 through May 2024 by failing to work four shifts per
month. (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶¶ 11-13). Ms. Alford merely claims
that, based on her interpretation of AdventHealth’s written
policy, she only needed to provide four dates per month that

she was available to work, which she did. (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶
44-45). However, Ms. Alford’s personal interpretation of the
language of the written policy is irrelevant. She does not
dispute that AdventHealth interpreted the policy as requiring
PRN employees to work four shifts per month and that
AdventHealth enforced the policy accordingly. (Doc. # 72-21
at ¶ 29; Doc.# 72-22 ¶¶ 11-13).
Further, Ms. Alford does not offer any record support
for her claim that Ms. Iglesias refused to schedule her “for
shifts on dates which she was available.” (Doc. # 80 at 17).
The fact that Ms. Alford was not scheduled on all her
available dates is not evidence that PRN employees such as

Ms. Alford were needed on such dates and that Ms. Iglesias
intentionally chose not to schedule Ms. Alford. Moreover, Ms.
Alford does not dispute that AdventHealth offered her
additional shifts to pick up from February 2024 through May
2024 so that she could comply with the four-shifts-per-month-
requirement, which she declined. (Doc. # 72-17 at 1); See
(Doc. # 72-2 at 102:24-103:7) (explaining that Ms. Alford did
not pick up additional shifts offered to her in 2024 because
of family and personal obligations). Without record support,
the Court cannot credit Ms. Alford’s conclusory claim that
Ms. Iglesias intentionally refused to schedule her.
Due to Ms. Alford’s intervening failure to work the

required number of shifts, she has not demonstrated a causal
connection between her protected activity and the adverse
action. See Brisk, 654 F. App’x at 417 (“With regard to
Brisk’s retaliation claim based on his termination, the
district court correctly granted summary judgment because
there was no causal connection between the protected conduct
— Brisk taking FMLA leave — and the adverse event,
termination, when the temporal proximity of four months was
tenuous and there was an intervening cause of poor work
performance.”); Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 507 (“Henderson’s
falsification of his time card was an intervening act of
misconduct that diminished any inference of causation that

may have arisen out of the temporal proximity between his
September 14 interview and his termination.”). Accordingly,
Ms. Alford has not established a prima facie retaliation
claim.
2. Ms. Alford Has Not Presented a Convincing
Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

Ms. Alford also “fails to establish a convincing mosaic
of circumstantial evidence to create a triable issue as to”
AdventHealth’s retaliatory intent for any of her retaliation
claims. Nevins v. DCH Health Sys., No. 25-12124, 2026 WL
1103517, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026). Ms. Alford has not
presented any evidence in support of her conclusory claim
that she “was regularly denied the opportunity to work . . .
in retaliation for [her] protected activity.” (Doc. # 75-7 at
¶ 45). Ms. Alford also has not shown that AdventHealth’s
stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual, such as
by revealing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies or contradictions in [the employer’s] proffered
legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v.
Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing the
record cumulatively and in the light most favorable to Ms.
Alford, the “shards of evidence do not come together to

produce an image of retaliation.” Johnson v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 169 F.4th 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2026). Therefore,
“there is no evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional retaliation by” AdventHealth. Nevins, 2026 WL
1103517, at *5.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 72) is
GRANTED.
(2) Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is granted on
Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of
Section 1981, and Count V.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff.
(4) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to cancel all
hearings, the trial scheduled for August 2026, terminate
all deadlines, and CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th
day of June, 2026.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

42

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370711. Public record. Not legal advice.