# Castello-Casali

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370687

## Case

- **Full name:** Arturo Castello-Casali v. Warden, Baker County Detention Center, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARTURO CASTELLO-CASALI,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-451-JEP-SJH

WARDEN, BAKER COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Respondents.
___________________________________/

ORDER
Petitioner, a detainee of the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, among other relief, an order directing Respondents
to release him or alternatively, provide him with a bond hearing. (Doc. 1 at 7).
Petitioner is a citizen of Cuba who entered the United States without
inspection on April 6, 2022; he was detained by immigration authorities but
then released on his own recognizance. (Doc. 8 at 2). ICE re-detained him on
December 9, 2025, following his arrest during a traffic stop. (Id.; see Doc. 8-3
at 2). He contends, among other things, that his detention without a bond
hearing is unlawful and violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
(Doc. 1 at 6; see Doc. 10 at 2 (“Petitioner has been in custody since December
8, 2025, and is being held without a bond hearing or an individualized
determination of flight risk.”).1

This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those
raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant
statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that
an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for

some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,
817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25-
cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026).2 However, on

1 In light of the Court’s obligation to liberally construe pro se filings, see United
States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024), the Court construes
Petitioner’s allegations as contesting his classification under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
(mandatory detention) instead of under § 1226 (opportunity for a bond), as well as
raising a due process challenge. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, --- F.4th ---, No.
25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *14 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026) (concluding that Ҥ 1225
applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens
unlawfully in the interior”). Indeed, the Federal Respondents addressed separately
whether Petitioner was properly held under § 1225 or § 1226 and whether his
detention violates due process. (Doc. 8 at 7-12).
2 To the extent the Federal Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing this case, the Court rejects their argument.
At the time Petitioner filed this case, any administrative request for a bond hearing
would have been futile, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had
conclusively determined that immigration judges had no authority to consider bond
requests from aliens like Petitioner. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
220-28 (BIA 2025). Because the BIA had “predetermined” the issue, requiring
Petitioner to pursue further administrative remedies before the Petition was filed
would have been futile. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (recognizing
that a petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies if “the administrative
body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it”); see,
May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite approach
on the substantive issue under the Immigration and Nationality Act,

concluding that Ҥ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border,
whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez
v. Warden, --- F.4th ---, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *14 (11th Cir. May
6, 2026).3 This Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case.

Therefore, it is ORDERED:
1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that his detention
without an individualized bond hearing is unlawful under the

e.g., Fonseca v. Ripa, No. 3:26-cv-309-MMH-MCR, 2026 WL 1072778, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 21, 2026) (“Requiring [the petitioner] to appeal [the immigration judge’s denial
of his request for a custody redetermination] to the BIA or make any further
administrative request for a bond hearing would be futile.”); Puga v. Assistant Field
Off. Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (“Since the result of [the p]etitioner’s custody
redetermination and any subsequent bond appeal to the BIA is nearly a foregone
conclusion under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, any prudential exhaustion requirements
are excused for futility.”).
3 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published
opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944,
945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit
unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the
Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and
that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit
to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding
authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published
opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does
not affect this result.”).
INA.‘ Within seven days of this Order, Respondents shall either
afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release
Petitioner, they shall provide Petitioner with access to a telephone
to arrange transportation from the detention facility.
2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is DENIED for the same

reasons stated in Lanvin- Valdez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft,
No. 3:26-CV-180-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 1004569, at *2—-8 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 14, 2026).
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the petition,
terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2026.

JORDAN E. PRATT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

C:
Counsel of Record

4 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, the
Court need not address Petitioner’s other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after
granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that
claim would be cumulative’).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11370687. Public record. Not legal advice.