# Larose

> District Court, S.D. California · April 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11369930

## Case

- **Full name:** Juana Perla Zamudio Rangel v. Christopher J. LaRose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; and Gregory J. Archambeault, Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** April 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JUANA PERLA ZAMUDIO RANGEL, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01505-BTM-BJW

12 Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
13 v. DISMISSING IN PART PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
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15 Christopher J. LaRose, Warden, Otay [ECF NO. 1]
Mesa Detention Center; IMMIGRATION
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AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
17 Department of Homeland Security; and
GREGORY J. ARCHAMBEAULT, Field
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Office Director, Enforcement and
19 Removal Operations;
20 Respondents.
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23 Pending before the Court is Juana Perla Zamudio Rangel’s petition for the writ of
24 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated below, the Court
25 GRANTS IN PART and DISMISSES IN PART the petition and orders Zamudio Rangel’s
26 immediate release from custody.
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1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Zamudio Rangel came to the United States in November 2023. (ECF No. 4-1
3 (“Decl.”), ¶ 1.) She used the CBP One app to enter the country. (Id.) She was released
4 into the country with no conditions or requirements. (Id.) Within the year, she filed an
5 asylum application. (Id.)
6 Zamudio Rangel later received a notice requiring her to attend an immigration court
7 proceeding on August 26, 2025. (Id. ¶ 2.) When she arrived, Immigration and Customs
8 Enforcement officials asked her, “Can you accompany us?” (Id.) The officials then took
9 Zamudio Rangel to the basement of the courthouse and arrested her. (Id.) They did not
10 explain why she was being detained, provide her paperwork, or allow her an opportunity
11 to contest her arrest. (Id. ¶ 3.) The officials tried to have Zamudio Rangel “sign for [her]
12 deportation,” but she refused. (Id. ¶ 2.)
13 Zamudio Rangel has remained in detention since August 2025. (ECF No. 4 (“Am.
14 Pet.”), at 9 (“Ms. Zamudio Rangel[’s detention] has almost reached the 7-month
15 mark . . . .”).) On January 16, 2026, an immigration judge denied Zamudio Rangel’s
16 asylum claim and ordered her removed. (Decl., ¶ 5.) Zamudio Rangel appealed to the
17 Board of Immigration Appeals on February 9, 2026. (Id. ¶ 6.) She filed a petition for the
18 writ of habeas corpus on March 10, 2026, and an amended petition on March 18, 2026.
19 (ECF No. 1; Am. Pet.)
20 II. DISCUSSION
21 The Petitioner makes three claims. First, the Petitioner argues that the Respondents
22 violated the Administrative Procedure Act when they improperly revoked her parole. (Am.
23 Pet., 3–5.) Second, that the Respondents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
24 Amendment by revoking her parole without notice and opportunity to be heard. (Id. at 5–
25 7.) Third, in the alternative, that the Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond
26 hearing violates the Due Process Clause. (Id. at 7–10.) The Petitioner requests that the
27 Court grant her release on the first two claims and a bond hearing on the third claim. The
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1 Respondents acknowledge that this Court has granted petitions with similar facts and legal
2 issues. (ECF No. 6, at 2.) They “defer[] to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id. at 3.)
3 The Court finds that relief is warranted on the second claim because the Respondents
4 improperly revoked the Petitioner’s parole. The Court declines to reach the first and third
5 claims.
6 A. Parole Claim
7 i. Receiving Parole
8 Before reviewing whether the Petitioner’s parole was improperly revoked, the Court
9 must determine whether the Petitioner received parole. After immigration officials inspect
10 a noncitizen1 at the border, they may release the noncitizen into the country on parole. Cf.
11 Wang v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-01130, 2026 WL 773085, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026)
12 (discussing types of parole). The decision to provide parole is “discretionary and is made
13 on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-01309, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6
14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025).
15 Although it is uncertain which parole was given, the Court finds that the Petitioner
16 was paroled into the country. The Petitioner stated in her declaration that she entered the
17 United States in November 2023 “through CBP One.” (Decl., ¶ 1.) The Court takes
18 judicial notice of the fact that, at the time of her entry, the CBP One phone app allowed
19 noncitizens to “schedule an appointment to present themselves” for an inspection with
20 immigration officials at ports of entry in the southwest border of the United States. CBP
21 One Mobile Application, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 30, 2023), archived on
22 Internet Archive: Wayback Mach., https://web.archive.org/web/20231130202735/https://
23 www.cbp.gov/about/mobile-apps-directory/cbpone [https://perma.cc/LZ5L-SW9V] (last
24 visited Apr. 16, 2026); see Fed. R. Evid. 201. The Petitioner also attested that she had no
25 conditions “on [her] release.” (Decl., ¶ 1.) The Respondents do not contest the facts stated
26 in the petition or declaration. Thus, the Court holds that the Petitioner was granted parole.
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1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 8 U.S.C.
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1 The Court now must determine whether the Respondents properly revoked their grant of
2 parole to the Petitioner.
3 ii. Due Process Rights for Parolees
4 The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens “to due process of law in deportation
5 proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Due Process also “protects
6 noncitizens from unlawful detention during their removal proceedings.” Esquivel Pacheco
7 v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2421, 2026 WL 242300, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing
8 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). Here, the Petitioner challenges her current
9 detention as contrary to the Due Process Clause.
10 The Court recently analyzed the same issue in Tulyakov v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-01695,
11 2026 WL 981218 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026). There, the Court considered the Mathews v.
12 Eldridge factors2 and found that the Respondents violated the Petitioner’s due process
13 rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Tulyakov, 2026 WL 981218, at *2. The Court adopts its
14 previous decision and finds that a similar violation has occurred here. First, the Petitioner
15 acquired a protected interest in being free from imprisonment once the Respondents
16 exercised their discretion and paroled the Petitioner into the country. Second, the
17 Respondents’ process of revoking the Petitioner’s parole—arresting her without notice or
18 an opportunity to be heard—created a substantial risk that the Petitioner’s liberty interest
19 would be erroneously deprived. Third, the Respondents have not argued that their interest
20 in immigration enforcement justifies the process used to detain the Petitioner. Taken
21 together, the Petitioner’s liberty interest and the procedural protections afforded that
22 interest outweigh the Respondents’ enforcement interest.
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2 To determine whether “the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally
25 sufficient,” the Court must consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
26 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
27 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
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l The Respondents violated the Petitioner’s due process rights by “detaining [her]
2 || without justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn.
3 2025); cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“If men must turn square
4 ||corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the
5 || government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”). Moreover, the Respondents
6 ||do not contend that any changed circumstances warranted Petitioner’s redetention or that
7 Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Thus, the writ must issue to
8 ||release her from custody. The petition is granted on the second claim.
9 B. Other Claims
10 Because the Court grants the petition on other grounds, the Court declines to reach
11 ||the merits of the Petitioner’s Administrative Procedure Act and prolonged detention
12 ||claims. Counts One and Three of the petition are dismissed without prejudice as moot.
13 Ht. CONCLUSION
14 The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on the second claim and the
15 is ISSUED. The Respondents shall immediately release Zamudio Rangel from
16 custody on any preexisting conditions. The first and third claims are DISMISSED without
17 || prejudice as moot. The parties shall file a joint statement as to the satisfaction of the writ
18 || by April 20, 2026, at 5 p.m. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 17, 2026 j il Jueek
Honorable Barry Ted Mosko
22 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11369930. Public record. Not legal advice.