# Nicaisse > District Court, M.D. Florida · May 21, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11369530 ## Case - **Full name:** Lyndon Merlick Nicaisse v. ICE South Florida Detention Facility - **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida - **Decided:** May 21, 2026 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11369530 ## Opinion text UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION LYNDON MERLICK NICAISSE, Petitioner, v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01526-SPC-KRH ICE SOUTH FLORIDA DETENTION FACILITY Respondent, / OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Lyndon Merlick Nicaisse’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 11) and supplement (Doc. 12). Nicaisse is a native of Haiti who entered the United States with a temporary visa on April 3, 1986. Between 2004 and 2012, he was convicted of multiple crimes, including grand theft, possession of cannabis, burglary, petit theft, and trespassing. On October 15, 2014, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Haiti and granted withholding of removal to Haiti. On January 30, 2026, Nicaisse completed a state prison sentence for aggravated battery, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took him into custody to execute the removal order. On March 4, 2026, ICE took Nicaisse to a port of entry at the U.S.-Mexico border. Nicaisse refused to exit the holding room and cross into Mexico, and ICE returned him to Alligator Alcatraz. Nicaisse argues his continued detention is unlawful. Before addressing the merits of Nicaisse’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The government argues two sections of the INA strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. They first points to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims. It states: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”). “When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The government also raises the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Nicaisse does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Nicaisse challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-court review.”). A decision in Nicaisse’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. The Court thus turns to the merits of the petitioner’s due process claim. “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing. Id. The government argues Nicaisse’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume a six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention starts each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Nicaisse carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE cannot removed him to Haiti because an immigration judge granted withholding of removal The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its March 2026 attempt to send Nicaisse to Mexico. But the evidence before the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to show it has a plan in place to lawfully remove Nicaisse. The Court finds no significant likelihood Nicaisse will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, assuring the presence of a noncitizen at the moment of removal is not the only statutory justification for immigration detention. “The second justification—protecting the community—does not necessarily diminish in force over time.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court has “upheld preventative detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Jd. ICE has already scheduled a custody review of Nicaisse’s file for June 11, 2026. (See Doc. 5-1 at 4). The Court finds continued detention pending the review reasonable. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Lyndon Merlick Nicaisse’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) remains under advisement. 1. On or before June 18, 2026, the respondents shall file a supplemental response, addressing the results of the file custody review scheduled for June 11, 2026. If ICE determines continued detention is appropriate, the respondents must explain why. 2. Nicaisse may file a reply within three days of the supplemental response. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 21, 2026. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11369530. Public record. Not legal advice.