# Shekar

> District Court, N.D. Texas · June 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11368986

## Case

- **Full name:** Roger Shekar v. Selene Finance L.P., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** June 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROGER SHEKAR, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:26-cv-1728-B-BN
§
SELENE FINANCE L.P., ET AL. §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Roger Shekar, proceeding pro se, filed
this lawsuit against Selene Finance L.P., Selene Holdings, LLC, Pretium Partners
LLC, PHH Mortgage, and six individual defendants, including a United States
Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Illinois. See Dkt. No. 3. Senior United
States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the lawsuit to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a
standing order of reference.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action on the basis of sanctions
imposed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In the alternative, the Court
should dismiss this action with prejudice as frivolous and malicious.
Applicable Background
Shekar has been pursuing claims against his mortgage company since 2018,
first in the Northern District of Illinois where his property was located and then in

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Middle District of Florida. See, e.g., Shekar
v. Selene Finance L.P., No. 2:24-cv-6794-MAK, 2025 WL 887809, at *1-*3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 21, 2025) (setting out history of lawsuits in Illinois and Pennsylvania); Shekar
v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 8:25-cv-1227-JLB-CPT, Dkt. No. 1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2025).
Although Shekar’s current complaint omits dates and other relevant information,
many of the factual allegations and claims have already been finally decided by other
courts or predate the involvement of the Dallas defendant, Selene Finance L.P. See,

e.g., Shekar v. Selene Finance L.P., 2025 WL 887809, at *5-6; Shekar v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-3019, Dkt. No. 181 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2020), aff'd, 848 F.
App’x 216 (7th Cir. 2021).
In addition to his blatant forum shopping, Shekar is subject to filing bars and
monetary sanctions in the Seventh Circuit and the Northern District of Illinois
because of his abusive conduct. See Shekar v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 848 F.

App’x at 217 (discussing sanctions history dating back to 2012); Shekar v. Duff, No.
22-cv-2123-UNA, 2022 WL 3098772 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2022) (dismissing lawsuit
challenging sanctions orders from the Northern District of Illinois and Seventh
Circuit filed against “every member of the federal judiciary . . . who [Shekar] believes
have crossed him”), aff’d, No. 22-5211, 2023 WL 6883766 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 2023).
And, in the days since filing his complaint here, Shekar has subjected employees of
the clerk’s office for the Northern District of Texas to multiple abusive emails and
phone calls.
Legal Standards and Analysis

“[T]he judicial system is generally accessible and open to all individuals.”
Kaminetzky v. Frost Nat’l Bank of Houston, 881 F. Supp. 276, 277 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
But “district courts have an obligation to protect the orderly administration of justice
and prevent abuse of the court’s process by frivolous and vexatious litigants[, which
means p]ro se litigants have ‘no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery
with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.’” Ruston v.
Dallas Cty., Tex., No. 3:07-cv-1076-D, 2008 WL 958076, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2008)

(quoting Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Courts may also enforce “outstanding sanction orders of sister courts” within
and outside their circuit. See Schmidt v. Van Buren, 243 F. App’x 803, at *1-2 (5th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished per curiam) (upholding the enforcement of a sanction order
from a district court outside the Fifth Circuit); Dominguez v. Scott, 265 F.3d 1058,
2001 WL 872771, at *2 (5th Cir. July 5, 2001) (unpublished) (upholding the

enforcement of a sanction order from a Texas district court); see also Tepe v. Internal
Revenue Service, No. 3:24-CV-1280-L-BK, 2024 WL 3731624, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 2,
2024) (collecting cases and enforcing sanction order from the Eastern District of
Tennessee), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 3732474, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024); Sheehan
v. State of Tex., No. 3:05-cv-1318-K, 2005 WL 2036686, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005)
(“The proper administration of justice requires that courts [honor sanctions orders
imposed by other federal courts as] to prisoner and nonprisoner litigants alike.”
(citations omitted)).
Therefore, the Court should honor the sanctions previously imposed against

Plaintiff Roger Shekar and dismiss this action without prejudice to his ability to re-
file it only after paying the sanctions in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit and obtaining leave from a
district judge of this Court.
But, even if the Court does not honor the sanctions previously imposed against
Shekar, this action should be dismissed as frivolous and malicious. A district court is
required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without payment of the filing

fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on

its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th
Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.
App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).

“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”

(citations omitted)).
And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,
2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly

baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763
F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)
(concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them”)).
And “[a] complaint is malicious if it duplicates claims involving the same series
of events and allegations of many of the same facts asserted by the same plaintiff in
prior or pending litigation.” Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir.

2018) (per curiam) (citing, as applicable, Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th
Cir. 1993)); see also Shakouri v. Davis, 923 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We have
repeatedly stated that a claim qualifies as malicious if it is virtually identical to and
based on the same series of events as a claim previously brought by the plaintiff.”
(citing Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988))). And, “[r]eading
Pittman and Wilson[ v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989),] in conjunction,
it is clear that the Court may dismiss an action as malicious when the complaint

raises claims that would be barred by the principles of res judicata, whether or not
the prior litigation has ended unsuccessfully for the plaintiff.” McGill v. Juanita Kraft
Postal Serv., No. 3:03-cv-1113-K, 2003 WL 21355439, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2003),
rec. accepted, 2003 WL 21467745 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2003).
As discussed above, the group pleading allegations against the “Selene
Defendants” (though divorced of certain specifics such as dates) arise from the same

series of events and allegations that have been asserted by Shekar in multiple prior
cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and the Middle District of Florida. Therefore, those claims should be dismissed as
malicious.
And the new allegations against a Northern District of Illinois bankruptcy
judge and his alleged mistress relating to a purported delay in deciding a motion for
summary judgment are wholly frivolous. Despite multiple factually frivolous and
abusive accusations, the claims against Judge DeCelles ultimately relate to his speed
in deciding a summary judgment motion, an action taken in his capacity and function

as a federal bankruptcy judge. So the claims against Judge DeCelles – whether for
injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief – are barred by judicial immunity. See
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745-47 (1982); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12
(1991); Wightman v. Jones, 809 F. Supp. 474, 476-79 (N.D. Tex. 1992). And the claims
against Mulcahy as to her role in the purported delay are factually frivolous.
And, based on his prior history of abusive behavior in other courts and his
recent abusive behavior with staff of this Court, Shekar should be barred from

accessing the Court’s ECF electronic filing system, barred from sending further
documents or communication for this case or any other existing or new case to the
Court’s emergency filing account or any employee’s or team’s court email account,
and barred from calling the clerk’s office or any court employee.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice on the basis of

sanctions imposed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In the
alternative, the Court should dismiss this action with prejudice as frivolous and
malicious. And the Court should bar Shekar from accessing the Court’s ECF
electronic filing system, barred from sending further documents or communication
for this case or any other existing or new case to the Court’s emergency filing account
or any employee’s or team’s court email account, and barred from calling the clerk’s
office or any court employee.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. □□□□
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: June 3, 2026 : □ :
DAVIDL.HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-8-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11368986. Public record. Not legal advice.