# Mendoza

> District Court, N.D. Texas · June 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11368071

## Case

- **Full name:** Apryl Dawn Mendoza, et al. v. Amarillo Independent School District
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** June 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
APRYL DAWN MENDOZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. 2:24-CV-169-Z
AMARILLO INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Amarillo Independent School District's (“AISD”) Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), filed January 9, 2026. ECF No. 45. Plaintiffs Apryl Dawn
Mendoza and Gabriel Eric Mendoza, Co-Independent Administrators of the Estate of Jaxson
Mendoza, responded on March 16, 2026. ECF No. 66. AISD replied on March 30, 2026. ECF
No. 70. The Motion is now ripe. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.
BACKGROUND
On August 25, 2022, Jaxson Mendoza! tragically passed away. ECF No. 46 at 5. He
was fourteen years old. ECF No. 67 at 38. The day before, he endured an epileptic episode
after “complet[ing] a run [on] the track at Amarillo High School,” where he was an incoming
freshman.” ECF No. 46 at 5-6.
Three years earlier, Jaxson was “diagnosed with epilepsy ... while he was a student
at AISD’s Bonham Middle School campus.” ECF No. 67 at 7. Jaxson’s mother, Apryl Mendoza,

1 Federal court filings generally may refer to minors only by their initials. FED. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3).
However, a party may “waive[] the protection of Rule 5.2(a)” by filing a minor’s name “without
redaction and not under seal.” FED. R. Clv. P. 5.2(h). Plaintiffs have done that here. See ECF No. 67.
2 Amarillo High School is one of six high schools operated by AISD. See High Schools, AMARILLO ISD,
https://www.amaisd.org/146786_3 [https://perma.cc/E4RD-J2HD] (last visited June 24, 2026).

provided the nurse at Bonham Middle School with Nayzilam, a rescue medication for
seizures, and both a Section 504 Plan and a Seizure Action Plan. Jd. at 5, 7, 10; see also ECF
No. 46 at 6 (describing Nayzilam as a “rescue nasal spray’ for seizures). Section 504 plans
derive their name from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which states that students with
disabilities may not “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination” by school districts “receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). AISD developed Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan pursuant to district policy.
ECF No. 46 at 6. The Plan “required school personnel to administer [Nayzilam] in the event
of a seizure lasting longer than five minutes.” ECF No. 67 at 5; see also ECF No. 46 at 6
(noting that “[t]he Seizure Action Plan, which was on file with the District, specifically
provided that his emergency seizure medication was to be administered” for “any seizure
greater than 5 minutes’).
Jaxson’s seizure began “at approximately 12:03:41 p.m.” on August 24, 2022. ECF No.
46 at 6. “At approximately 12:08:10 p.m. (1.e., four and [a] half minutes later), Amarillo High
School Nurses Angela Martinez and Rachel Martin? arrived at the track.” Id. “At 12:11 p.m.,
Nurse Martin contacted Jaxson’s mother, Apryl Mendoza.” Jd. District personnel called an
ambulance around the same time they spoke with Jaxson’s mother. Compare id. Gmplying
that Nurse Martin called the ambulance), with ECF No. 67 at 18 (claiming that an AISD
police officer did). “The ambulance arrived at the Amarillo High School track at 12:17:56,”
roughly fourteen minutes after Jaxson’s epileptic episode began. ECF No. 46 at 6. During
these fourteen minutes, Jaxson was lying on the ground. /d. at 6—7. Jaxson’s father, Gabe,

Martin was later disciplined by the Texas Board of Nursing for her actions. See ECF No. 67 at
19; Notice of Disciplinary Action 10/24, TEX. BD. NURSING,
https://www.bon.texas.gov/discipline_and_complaints_disciplinary_action_102024.asp.html
[https://perma.cc/RK63-QJQW] (last visited June 25, 2026) (issuing Rachel Lea Martin a Reprimand
with Stipulations on July 18, 2024).

arrived at the track three minutes later after receiving a call from Apryl—a total of seventeen
minutes after the start of the epileptic episode. See ECF No. 67 at 19 (“Gabe looked at Jaxson
and could tell he was seizing and not recovering from the seizure. ... Gabe asked how long
Jaxson had been down, and he was told 17 minutes.”).
AISD staff did not administer Nayzilam to Jaxson during these seventeen minutes,
“even though the rescue medication was on the ground sitting right beside Jaxson.” ECF No.
67 at 19. AISD avers it needn’t abide by the Seizure Action Plan because “Jaxson did not
have a [single] seizure that lasted longer than five minutes on August 24, 2022.” ECF No. 46
at 18. “[R]ather,” AISD contends, Jaxson’s seventeen-plus-minute epileptic episode consisted
of “cluster seizures, which lasted 10 to 31 second[s] each with breaks in between.” Jd. Thus—
according to AlSD—the District cannot be liable for Jaxson’s death because “without
instructions in Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan addressing cluster/extended seizures, the
District could not know that it needed to administer Jaxson’s emergency seizure medication.”
Id. AISD then goes a step further, contending that providing Jaxson with Nayzilam during
his epileptic episode “would have directly contravened the directives contained” in the
Seizure Action Plan. Jd.
Jaxson died the next day. His parents, Apryl and Gabe Mendoza, then sued AISD on
August 9, 2024, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. ECF No. 1; see also ECF No. 20 (Amended Complaint
filed October 4, 2024).
LEGAL STANDARD
“{[S]ummary judgment is warranted only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cooper Indus.,
Ine. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 704, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing FED. R. CIv. P.

56(c)). A fact is “material” if its existence or non-existence “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law,” and disputes about a material fact are “genuine” if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Brown v. City of Hou., Tex.,
337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (““Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” (citing
Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003))). “On a motion for summary
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163-64
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Hockman v. Westward Comme’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir.
2004)).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the portions of the
record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party makes this showing, “the
nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e)). While the moving party is not required to negate each element
of the nonmoving party's case, it can meet its burden by demonstrating the “absence of facts
supporting the elements” of the nonmoving party's causes of action. Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195
(5th Cir. 1986)).
“[E]ven in the absence of a factual dispute, a district court has the power to ‘deny
summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be

to proceed to a full trial.” Black v. JI. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also id. (“A district court ‘has the discretion to deny a motion
for summary judgment even if the movant otherwise successfully carries its burden of proof
if the judge has doubt as to the wisdom of terminating the case before a full trial.” (quoting
Veillon v. Exploration Servs., 876 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation modified))); Kunin
v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[E]ven if the standards of Rule 56
are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment... .”); 1OA WRIGHT
& MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2728 (4th ed. 2025) (noting that “the court
retains some discretion to deny a Rule 56 motion” even “in situations in which the moving
party seems to have discharged its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact
exists”). Thus, district courts have considerable discretion to deny motions for summary
judgment when the court believes a trial would be preferable to adjudicating the parties’
rights based on briefing alone.
ANALYSIS
i Disability-Discrimination Claims Under Section 504 and the ADA
The Fifth Circuit “has equated liability standards under [Section] 504 and the ADA.”
D.A, ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000)). It does so because “the language in
the ADA generally tracks the language set forth in [Section] 504” and “the ADA expressly
provides that ‘the remedies, procedures, and rights’ available under the Rehabilitation Act
are also accessible under the ADA.” J.W. vu. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation
modified) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12133)); see also Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302 F.3d
567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The language in the ADA generally tracks the language set forth
in the [Rehabilitation Act].”). Thus, district courts may evaluate claims brought under these

ge

two statutes together. See D.A. ex rel. Latasha A., 629 F.3d at 453; Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799
(“Jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.” (citation omitted)).
To assert a cause of action under either Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) who was excluded from participation in, or
[is] being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the
public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the
public entity; and (3) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is
because of the recognized disability.
Huron v. Natalia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-25-CV-230, 2025 WL 2252606, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2025) (citing Paley, 81 F.4th at 449). To establish causation, a plaintiff must show
that his disability was “the sole reason for the exclusion or denial of benefits.” /d. (citation
omitted).
The core question in ADA/Section 504 cases involving schools “is whether the school
district intentionally discriminated against a student by denying benefits due to the student’s
disability.” Huron, 2025 WL 2252606, at *5; see also Mendoza v. Amarillo Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 2:24-CV-169, 2025 WL 1239906, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2025) (“To recover damages
under either Act, a plaintiff must show that a defendant’s conduct was intentional.”). Until
last year, children suing their schools were required to make “a heightened showing of bad
faith or gross misjudgment.” Huron, 2025 WL 2252606, at *5. But after the Supreme Court’s
decision in A. J. T. by & through A. T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S.
335 (2025), “ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on educational services [are] subject
to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.” 605 U.S. at
345. Consequently, student—plaintiffs “must allege and show only intentional discrimination
based solely upon the student's established and known disability, as is required in other
discrimination cases outside the education context.” Huron, 2025 WL 2252606, at *5

eae

(emphasis added) (citing A. J. T., 605 U.S. at 345).
II. Failure to Accommodate and Intentional Discrimination
A. Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan
AISD maintains that it did not violate Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan—and thus did not
fail to accommodate his disability—because “without instructions in Jaxson’s Seizure Action
Plan addressing cluster/extended seizures, the District could not know that it needed to
administer Jaxson’s emergency seizure medication.” ECF No. 46 at 13. AISD accordingly asks
the Court to grant summary judgment.
To prove a failure-to-accommodate claim under either the ADA or Section 504, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability; (2) the
disability and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and (3) the
employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.” Neely v.
PSEG Tex., Lid. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Feist v. La. Dep’t of Just.,
740 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013)). AISD does not dispute that Jaxson “was a qualified
individual with a disability.” ECF No. 46 at 18. There is also no dispute that AISD was
generally aware of Jaxson’s epilepsy. Instead, AISD argues that it “could not know the
‘consequential limitations’ of Jaxson’s epilepsy on August 24, 2022, when he had never had
the type of cluster/extended seizures that presented on that day.” Jd. (quoting Smith v. Harris
Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020)). It follows, according to AISD, that the
Mendozas cannot establish that AISD “discriminated against Jaxson in violation of Section
504 and the ADA by failing to administer his emergency seizure medication.” Jd. AISD
further contends that this means the Mendozas cannot show that it failed to accommodate
Jaxson’s disability in a way that is actionable under the ADA or Section 504. Jd.
Because abiding by Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan would be prima facie evidence of
making reasonable accommodations for his disability, a key question is whether AISD

violated the Plan when it failed to administer Jaxson’s rescue medication. As AISD
acknowledges, this requires asking whether Jaxson had “a seizure” longer than five minutes
on August 24, 2022. See ECF No. 46 at 13. If he did not, as AISD contends, then AISD likely
complied with the Seizure Action Plan. But if Jaxson did suffer “a seizure” lasting longer
than five minutes, then AISD failed to accommodate Jaxson’s disability by failing to
administer his rescue medication for nearly twenty minutes. All that remains is for the
Finder of Fact to ask whether this failure was intentional.
AISD cites no case law—and the Court is aware of none—holding that “a seizure” can
only be defined as a single, continuous bout of abnormal electrical activity in the affected
person’s brain. AISD simply repeats ad nauseam that “Jaxson did not have a seizure that
lasted longer than five minutes,” insisting that he instead had a series of “cluster seizures”
lasting “10 to 31 second[s] each with breaks in between.” ECF No. 46 at 13; see also ECF No.
70 at 9 (“But the Seizure Action Plan did not call for the administration of Nasal Midazolam
unless Jaxon had ‘any seizure’—singular—lasting longer than five minutes. He did not
experience such a seizure.”). But Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan does not define “seizure” in
this way. And AISD provides no support for its proposed definition of “seizure” beyond its
own conclusory statements.
“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the [Mendozas] and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor,” it is a disputed question of fact whether the nearly
twenty-minute epileptic episode Jaxson experienced on August 24, 2022 constitutes “a
seizure” lasting longer than five minutes. Deville, 567 F.3d at 163-64 (citation modified). If
the jury finds that it was, and that AISD accordingly failed to comply with Jaxson’s Seizure
Action Plan, the next question will be whether this failure was intentional.
B. Intentional Discrimination After A. J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools
AISD contends that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that Plaintiff can establish Amarillo

ISD failed to accommodate Jaxson’s disability [on] August 24, 2022, the District is still
entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot establish the intentional discrimination
necessary to recover monetary damages under Section 504 and the ADA.” ECF No. 46 at 14.
AISD suggests that a Section 504 or ADA plaintiff must show that a defendant “acted with
something more than deliberate indifference” to be entitled to compensatory damages. Id.;
see also ECF No. 70 (“[T]he evidence presented simply does not allow the Court to conclude
that Amarillo ISD knew the consequential limitations of Jaxson’s epilepsy on August 24,
2022, or that the District otherwise engaged in something more than deliberate indifference.
(emphasis added)).
If AISD’s “cluster” argument was borderline frivolous on the facts, its “something
more than deliberate indifference” argument is four-square foreclosed on the law. In A. □□□□ T.
vu. Osseo Area Schools, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this heightened standard,
holding that “ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on educational services should be
subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.” 605
U.S. at 345, The Court noted that “[nJothing in the text of Title IT of the ADA or Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that such claims should be subject to a distinct, more
demanding analysis” and there is “no textual indication that the protections of either
disability discrimination statute apply with lesser force to certain qualified individuals
bringing certain kinds of claims.” Jd. (citations omitted).
After A. J. T., “the appropriate standard for Section 504 claims is deliberate
indifference”—nothing more and nothing less. W.H. by & through Larry G. v. Fort Bend

4 As education law specialists, counsel for AISD should have been aware of this and, at a minimum,
brought this major change in the law to the Court’s attention. Instead, citing to cases that predate
A. J. T., AISD repeatedly insists that “something more’ than deliberate indifference” is “required by
the Fifth Circuit to establish intentional discrimination.” ECF No. 70 at 11 (citing Chupka v.
Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 21-50356, 2022 WL 1056101, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022)). That is
simply no longer the case after A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools.

Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:24-CV-1515, 2025 WL 2147067, at *20 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2025) (citing
A. J. T., 605 U.S. at 345). While “[t]he Fifth Circuit has explained that deliberate indifference
is a ‘high bar,” that bar is undoubtedly lower now than before the A. J. 7. decision. /d., at
*21 (quoting Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 167 (5th
Cir. 2011)). Even so, “[b]ecause deliberate indifference is a lesser form of intent rather than
a heightened degree of negligence, neither negligent nor merely unreasonable responses are
enough.” Jd. (quoting ILF. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 915 F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2019)).
“Instead, to clear the ‘high bar’ of proving deliberate indifference, the challenged action must
be ‘clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Jd. (quoting Davis v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)). “A plaintiff need not prove that the defendant
had personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person,” but they “must show that the
defendant disregarded a strong likelihood that the challenged action would result in a
violation of federally protected rights.” [d., at *20 (citing A. J. T., 605 U.S. at 345).
Here, ajury could easily conclude that AISD’s actions on August 24, 2022 were “clearly
unreasonable.” Jaxson suffered an epileptic episode that caused him to lie suffering on the
ground for nearly twenty minutes. Almost a dozen AISD employees, including two nurses,
huddled around Jaxson while he was seizing. But not one administered his rescue
medication—even though it “was on the ground sitting right beside Jaxson.” Jd. Even with
paramedics present, no one took action until Jaxson’s father arrived. See ECF No. 67 at 19
(“Gabe asked how long Jaxson had been down, and he was told 17 minutes. Gabe stated, ‘It’s
too long. We have to load him up and go immediately.’ The emergency personnel immediately
loaded Jaxson in the ambulance.” (internal citation omitted)). A reasonable jury could
conclude that these actions® show that AISD “disregarded a strong likelihood that the

5 While the parties’ summary judgment briefing focuses on the events of August 24, 2022, the
Mendozas’ complaint also contends that AISD inadequately trained its staff to respond to medical

10

challenged action would result in a violation of federally protected rights.” W.H., 2025 WL
2147067, at *20.
Because a reasonable jury could conclude that AISD violated Jaxson’s rights under
the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, AISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is DENIED. A jury will determine at least the following two questions of fact: (1) whether
Jaxson had a seizure lasting longer than five minutes on August 24, 2022, such that AISD
violated Jaxson’s Seizure Action Plan by not administering his rescue medication; and (2)
whether AISD intentionally discriminated against Jaxson by reason of his disability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, AISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
June IF se

MATVHEW J. SMARYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

emergencies like Jaxson’s. See Mendoza, 2025 WL 1239906, at *5 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on
the theories that AISD refused to train staff in a manner that would have reasonably accommodated
[Jaxson|’s disability and that AISD staff refused to administer his emergency medication.”).

al

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11368071. Public record. Not legal advice.