# STEWART

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · June 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367840

## Case

- **Full name:** Kaysan Stewart v. Kevin Steele, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAYSAN STEWART, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2643
:
KEVIN STEELE, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
MARSTON, J. June 17, 2026
Plaintiff Kaysan Q. Stewart, who is currently incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, initiated this
pro se civil action alleging his rights were violated during a state court criminal prosecution.
Stewart has paid the filing fee for this case. For the following reasons, the Amended Complaint1
will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Stewart may file a second amended complaint
if he can cure the deficiencies noted below.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Stewart brings claims under federal and state law. Named as Defendants are:
Montgomery County Detectives Andrew Rook and Michael Laverty; Montgomery County
1 On April 20, 2026, the Clerk’s Office received Stewart’s initial Complaint. (Doc. No. 1.)
Because he failed to either pay the required fees or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis along
with a prison account statement, the Court directed him to do so. (Doc. No. 3.) On May 7, 2026, the
Court received an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4), and on May 11, 2026, the Court received the filing
fees (see Doc. No. 5). The Amended Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. See Garrett v.
Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes the
original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended
complaint becomes the operative pleading.” (citations omitted)). The Court adopts the sequential
pagination supplied to Stewart’s filings by the CM/ECF docketing system.
2 The factual allegations in this Memorandum are taken from the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No.
4.) Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court records, of which this
Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
District Attorney Kevin Steele; Montgomery County Assistant District Attorneys Karla Pisarcik,
Paul Pruitt, and William H. Highland; Montgomery County Chief Detective Mark Bernstiel; and
Montgomery County. (Doc. No. 4 at 3–4.) Defendants are sued in their official and individual
capacities. (Id.)

The allegations in the Amended Complaint are convoluted. Stewart alleges that he and
his family were sleeping at their residence in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 5, 2025 at 6:30
a.m., when the Narcotics Team of the Montgomery County Detective Bureau “pounded on the
front door” of the home and demanded entry. (Id. at 4–5.) The team “viciously used force
immediately and violently handcuffed a 13 year old minor (female) while pointing firearms, then
forced [Stewart’s] grandmother . . . from the second floor to the first floor.” (Id. at 5.) Stewart
descended from the third floor to the first floor, where officers “violently point[ed] firearms” at
him. (Id.) Stewart contends that he was then arrested without probable cause and transferred to
the Montgomery County Correctional facility. (Id.) He was “charged with Corrupt Organization
charges due to a Pennsylvania Wiretapping & Electronic Surveillance Act investigation by

Defendants employed by the County of Montgomery, Montgomery County Detective Bureau,
overseen by the Montgomery County District Attorney Office.” (Id. at 5–6.) Twenty or more
individuals were arrested for participating in the purported “Corrupt Organization.” (Id. at 6.)
Stewart asserts that his arrest was made pursuant to “an erroneous, misleading,
fabricated, false report” by Defendants Rook and Laverty which “falsely stated and mislead
crimes charged, fabricated identity along with omissions not yet known about” Stewart’s
residence. (Id.) According to Stewart, the charges were based on a fabricated Affidavit of
Probable Cause that “displayed excessive and unlawful derivative interception transcripts.” (Id.)
He also contends that “Defendants” could have ascertained the falsity of the charges had they
exercised reasonable due diligence in performing their duties. (Id.)
On August 11, 2025, a preliminary hearing was held, at which ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt,
along with Detective Rook, allegedly acted together to use “unauthorized, illegally obtained

wiretap content” against Stewart in violation of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (“CAA”), 71
P.S. § 732-205(b). (Id. at 6–7.) Stewart contends that by proceeding with prosecution of the
criminal charges, Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Rook violated his Fourth Amendment rights
and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 7.)
On December 1, 2025, Stewart received pretrial discovery containing the evidence of the
wiretap investigation. (Id.) He contends that “[t]here was no documentary record of the
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General delegating his authority in some formal capacity
authorizing the application to a judge for the order approving the interception of the
communications involved herein.” (Id.) He further claims that ADA Pisarcik “proceeded to
prosecute preliminary hearings and file criminal informations of around 20 or more individuals,

relating to corrupt organization drug offenses, without concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with
the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General.” (Id. at 8.) Stewart asserts that, as a result, all the
resulting arrests were invalid and in violation of the CAA. (Id.)
Similarly, Stewart contends that the discovery he received demonstrates that Detectives
Rook and Laverty led an “unlawful” wiretap investigation without “the ‘involvement or
assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police Department’ as directed in the applications for
approval to intercept the communications involved herein” that were authorized by District
Attorney Steele. (Id.) He further claims that Detectives Rook and Laverty knew at the time of
Stewart’s arrest, and afterward, that “physical evidence they had collected in connection with the
charges brought against . . . [Stewart] was inconsistent with his guilt” and that there was no
probable cause to arrest him. (Id. at 8–9.) According to Stewart, “all Defendants” acted in
concert to violate his rights under the United States Constitution and state law. (See id. at 9–10.)
And he seeks millions of dollars in damages. (See id. at 13–14.)

The publicly available state court docket for Stewart’s criminal prosecution shows that
Stewart was initially charged with twenty counts, including corrupt organization charges and
various drug charges. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025 (Pa. Ct. Comm.
Pl. Montgomery Cnty.). On May 11, 2026, Stewart entered into a negotiated guilty plea,
pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to a disorderly conduct charge, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5503(a)(4), and the balance of the charges were dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn, see
Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025. Although the Amended Complaint is not
dated, it was filed with the Court before the entry of the guilty plea. (See Doc. No. 4.) Stewart is
currently incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, awaiting sentencing. (See Doc. No. 6); Commonwealth
v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Stewart paid the filing fee in full, the Court has the authority to screen his
Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116
n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to screen a prisoner
complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis).
Section 1915A requires the Court to “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id.
§ 1915A(b)(1). Likewise, the court must dismiss a complaint that “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b)(2).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). This standard requires the Court to determine whether the
complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At
the screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in a pro se complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021),
abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir.

2024).
As Stewart is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Amended
Complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). Nonetheless, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986
F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot survive dismissal just by alleging the
conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”). Additionally, the Court must review the Amended
Complaint and dismiss the matter if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116,
122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”).
III. DISCUSSION

The allegations in the Amended Complaint are convoluted, and Stewart invokes a litany
of legal concepts under federal and state law, which adds to the confusion. (See generally Doc.
No. 4.) Liberally construing the allegations contained therein, the Amended Complaint is best
understood as presenting Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims,3 Fourteenth
Amendment fabrication of evidence claims, federal conspiracy claims, and state law claims.4

3 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Stewart uses a variety of terms,
including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and others, to assert that this Fourth
Amendment rights were violated during his arrest and prosecution. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 4 at 10–13.)
However, “[a]s the Supreme Court has explained, claims for false arrest challenge ‘detention without
legal process,’ while malicious prosecution involves seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’” Rivera-
Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2024) (first quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 389 (2007); then quoting Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022)). “If the plaintiff is held
pursuant to legal process, then his proper claim is a malicious prosecution claim, which is a claim
involving the ‘wrongful institution of legal process’ (not the absence of legal process).” Voorhis v.
Ginkel, No. 24-2859, 2025 WL 2556241, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390).
The Court understands Stewart to allege that he was arrested on June 5, 2025, pursuant to a warrant that
was not supported by probable cause. (See Doc. No. 4 at 4–6); see also Commonwealth v. Stewart, MJ-
38109-CR-0000184-2025 (listing criminal complaint filed on June 4, 2025). Consequently, his Fourth
Amendment claims sound in malicious prosecution and will be addressed under that standard.
4 Stewart also lists the First and Eighth Amendments as bases for his claims. (See, e.g., Doc. No.
4 at 2.) But Stewart does not allege any facts that would suggest a violation of his First or Eighth
Amendments rights, and passing references to legal provisions are insufficient to bring a plausible
constitutional claim before the Court. See Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763
(3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”
(cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26
F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))). Accordingly, any claim based on a violation of the First or Eighth
Amendment will be dismissed.
Additionally, to the extent that Stewart is raising claims based on any injuries suffered by the
minor who was in the home on June 5, 2025, when he was arrested (see Doc. No. 4 at 10–11), Stewart
lacks standing as to those claims, as he may not raise claims based on injuries sustained by another. See
Township of Lyndhurst v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff must assert
Even under a liberal reading of the Amended Complaint, however, Stewart has failed to present a
plausible claim. The Court will address the pleading deficiencies below.
A. Federal Claims
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in

federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Local governments and municipalities are considered persons
under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
1. Individual Capacity Claims Against DA Steele and ADAs Pisarcik,
Pruitt, and Highland

The Court understands Stewart to contend that the DA and ADAs overseeing his criminal
case violated the Pennsylvania CAA and his federal constitutional rights in prosecuting the state
court case against him. He alleges that DA Steele authorized the “applications” that were used
by Detectives Rook and Laverty. (See Doc No. 4 at 8.) Stewart also states that at the
preliminary hearing on August 11, 2025, ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt, along with Detective Rook,
acted to use “unauthorized, illegally obtained wiretap content” against him in violation of the
CAA and that by proceeding with the charges, Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Rook violated his
Fourth Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 6–7.) Stewart
further claims that ADA Pisarcik prosecuted the case by participating in the preliminary hearing

his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third party.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Stewart also could not assert claims on behalf of the minor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules
of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); Osei-Afriyie ex rel.
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991) (a pro se litigant who is not an
attorney may not pursue claims on behalf of anyone other than himself).
and filing informations relating to corrupt organization drug offenses “without concurrent
prosecutorial jurisdiction” with the Pennsylvania AG because there is “no documentary record”
of the AG “delegating his authority in some formal capacity authorizing the application to a
judge for the order approving the interception of the communications involved herein.” (Id. at 7,

8.) Stewart concludes that, as a result, his arrest was invalid and in violation of the CAA,
specifically 71 P.S. §§ 732-205(a)(2), (a)(6), and (b). (Id.). The Court considers Stewart’s CAA
claims before addressing his constitutional claims against the prosecutors.
a. CAA Claims
The enactment of the CAA in 1980 “made it clear that the powers of the state Attorney
General are no longer an emanation from some bed of common law precepts, but are . . . strictly
a matter of legislative designation and enumeration.” Commonwealth v. Carsia, 517 A.2d 956,
958 (1986). Thus, “[t]he Attorney General’s criminal authority is limited.” Commonwealth ex
rel. Krasner v. Att’y Gen., 309 A.3d 265, 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024). Section 205(a) of the Act
provides the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute certain cases in county criminal

court. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 732-205(a)(1)–(8). Section 205(b) also provides that the “[t]he
Attorney General shall have the concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with the district attorney”
in specific situations. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 732-205(b). Relevant here, the AG and the
county district attorneys have concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction for criminal charges involving
corrupt organizations set forth in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 911. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 732-
205(a)(2); 732-205(b).5 However, a violation of the CAA does not, in itself, provide a basis for
a § 1983 claim because it does not create a protectible liberty interest or property interest. See

5 The section of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code pertaining to corrupt organizations also provides
that the Attorney General and county district attorneys have concurrent jurisdiction to institute criminal
proceedings under the provisions of that section. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 911(e).
Voicenet Commc’ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04-1318, 2006 WL 2506318, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
30, 2006) (stating that the violation of a state law only gives rise to a § 1983 claim if the
violation implicates a federal constitutional right). Thus, even assuming arguendo that any of
the named Defendants could violate the CAA, which governs the authority of the AG, Stewart

cannot state a due process claim for noncompliance with the CAA. See id. at *11.
b. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Stewart likewise may not proceed on for his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland. As an initial matter, Stewart
does not describe any actions taken by ADA Highland, other than to state that he replaced ADA
Pisarcik and, at the time of the writing of the Amended Complaint, continued the prosecution.
(See Doc. No. 4 at 3.) Nonetheless, the claims Stewart seeks to bring against ADAs Pisarcik,
Pruitt, and Highland are based on their actions taken during the prosecution of the state criminal
case. It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for
damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976); see also Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 624 (3d Cir.
2024) (“Prosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for engaging in
conduct that serves a quasi-judicial function.”).
“[W]hether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she
establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged
conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d
129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution,
including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable
cause hearings,” presenting a state’s case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present
evidence. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Sanders v. City of Erie, No. 26-1135, 2026 WL 1428876, at *2 (3d Cir. May
21, 2026) (“[A] district attorney acting ‘within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a

criminal prosecution’ is immune from suit, even when a litigant alleges a lack of probable
cause.” (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997)). “[P]rosecutors [also] are entitled
to absolute immunity from claims for damages related to their roles in choosing when and
whether to dismiss charges or withdrawal [sic] an arrest warrant lodged against a defendant.”
Garcia v. Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Off., No. 23-1224, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (3d Cir. June 1,
2023) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 850 (2024).
Moreover, district attorneys and other supervisory prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute
immunity from claims based on their role in initiating and pursuing a prosecution on behalf of
the Commonwealth, and in seeking an arrest warrant. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31; Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348–49 (2009); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.

Because Stewart’s claims against ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland are based upon
actions taken in a prosecutorial function in the judicial phase of Stewart’s state criminal
proceedings, each is entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland in their individual
capacities will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).6

6 As to DA Steele, Stewart alleges only that he was the duly elected District Attorney of
Montgomery County (see Doc. No. 4 at 3), and that Steele authorized “applications” that were used by
Detectives Rook and Laverty (see id. at 8). These allegations do not sufficiently describe the actions that
DA Steele is alleged to have taken in violation of Stewart’s constitutional rights. In a § 1983 action, the
personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element,
meaning a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving
rise to the claims brought against that defendant. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1998); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
2. Individual Capacity Claims Against Detectives Rook and Laverty
Next, the Court understands Stewart to present Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claims and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claims against Detectives Rook and
Laverty. Specifically, Stewart asserts that his arrest was made pursuant to “an erroneous,

misleading, fabricated, false report” by Defendants Rook and Laverty which “falsely stated and
mislead crimes charged, fabricated identity along with omissions not yet known about” Stewart’s
residence. (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) According to Stewart, the charges were based on a fabricated
affidavit of probable cause, which “displayed excessive and unlawful derivative interception
transcripts.” (Id.) He also contends that “Defendants” could have ascertained the falsity of the
charges had they exercised reasonable due diligence in performing their duties. (Id.)
Stewart further avers that Detective Rook acted with ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt to use
“unauthorized, illegally obtained wiretap content” against him at the preliminary hearing on
August 11, 2025. (Id. at 6–7.) Additionally, he asserts that the evidence of the wiretap
investigation that he received in December 2025 contained “no documentary record of the

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General delegating his authority in some formal capacity
authorizing the application to a judge for the order approving the interception of the
communications involved herein.” (Id.) Stewart concludes that the discovery he received
demonstrates that Detectives Rook and Laverty led an “unlawful” wiretap investigation without
“the ‘involvement or assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police Department’ as directed in
the applications for approval to intercept the communications involved herein” that were

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Thus, a proper complaint explains what each defendant did or
did not do with respect to the alleged constitutional harms. It is possible that DA Steele would be entitled
to prosecutorial immunity from Stewart’s claims, but because Stewart does not describe DA Steele’s
actions with sufficient specificity, the individual capacity claims against DA Steele will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
authorized by DA Steele. (Id.) He further claims that Detectives Rook and Laverty knew at the
time of Stewart’s arrest, as well as thereafter, that “physical evidence they had collected in
connection with the charges brought against . . . [him] was inconsistent with his guilt” and that
there was no probable cause to arrest him. (Id. at 8–9.)

Based on these allegations, the Court understands Stewart to present Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claims and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claims against
Detectives Rook and Laverty.
a. Malicious Prosecution
To state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable
seizure of his person. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022)). A malicious prosecution claim under
§ 1983 has five elements: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable
cause;7 (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to

7 For the “lack of probable cause” element, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant or a
previously sworn criminal complaint, a plaintiff must allege plausibly “(1) that the police officer
knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions
that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir.
2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Pinkney v. Meadville, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024)
(same); see also Evans v. Newark City, 152 F.4th 537, 545–47 (3d Cir. 2025) (discussing “lack of
probable cause” element). The existence of probable cause is typically a question of fact for a jury, unless
the evidence “reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may
determine the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Basile v. Township of Smith, 752 F. Supp.
2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and dismissing false arrest claim with
leave to amend (citing Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also
Slack v. McHugh, No. 24-2153, 2025 WL 2753671, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[A] plaintiff must
adequately allege a lack of probable cause to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal” for either a false arrest or
malicious prosecution claim).
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that
the person committed the crime at issue.” Id. at 199 (quotations omitted).

The Amended Complaint does not present sufficient facts that would permit the Court to
draw the reasonable inference that either Detective Rook or Detective Laverty engaged in
malicious prosecution. Stewart repeatedly asserts that he was arrested without probable cause,
but he does not allege any facts in support of that assertion. As stated earlier in this
Memorandum, the Court must determine whether Stewart’s Amended Complaint contains
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis
added). “Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does

require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). And it requires more than “unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations.” Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2024); see also Schuylkill
Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the
reviewing court is not required “to accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted
inferences” (citations omitted)).
Even under a liberal construction of the Amended Complaint, the allegations against
Detectives Rook and Laverty fail to meet this standard with respect to the elements of a
malicious prosecution claim. For example, as to the third and fourth elements (lack of probable
cause and malice), Stewart does not allege what facts were known to the detectives, identify
which statements in the affidavit of probable cause were allegedly false, explain what (if any)
information was known but not included in the affidavit that would lead a reasonable person to

think Stewart did not commit the crimes charged, or otherwise provide any context for why it
was unreasonable to pursue the criminal charges against him.8 Accordingly, the malicious
prosecution claims against the detectives must be dismissed because they are not plausible as
pleaded. See, e.g., Santiago v. Humes, No. 14-7109, 2015 WL 1422627, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2015) (dismissing malicious prosecution claims because the plaintiffs failed to “affirmatively
assert facts to show that the Officer Defendants did not have probable cause” and instead,
generally alleged that all allegations against them in the underlying criminal proceedings were
false).
b. Fabrication of Evidence
Turning to Stewart’s claims for fabrication of evidence, “[d]ue process forbids the

government from using ‘falsified evidence . . . as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a
defendant.’” Dalal v. Molinelli, No. 24-2649, 2026 WL 579387, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026)
(quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 289 (3d Cir. 2014)). A criminal defendant who has
been convicted at trial “has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth
Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the

8 As for the second element, a “favorable termination” occurs when a prosecution ends “without a
conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49 (“In sum, we hold that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983
for malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with
some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended
without a conviction.”). The publicly available state court docket demonstrates that Stewart entered into a
negotiated guilty plea pursuant to which most of the charges were dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn.
See Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025. However, because the Amended Complaint
was filed before the guilty plea was entered, Stewart does not address this element either.
defendant would not have been convicted.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294. Additionally, “an acquitted
criminal defendant may have a stand-alone fabricated evidence claim against state actors under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged.” See

Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016). The “reasonable likelihood”
standard requires that a plaintiff draw a “meaningful connection” between the due process injury
and the use of fabricated evidence against him. Id. at 371 (citations omitted). “[T]estimony that
is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to
have been wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).
While Stewart alleges that the affidavit of probable cause in support of the arrest warrant
contained fabricated evidence, he does not offer any facts in support of this assertion. (See
generally Doc. No. 4 at 6–8.) In other words, he does not say in his Amended Complaint what
the “evidence” was that he claims the detectives fabricated. Stewart simply does not present
sufficient facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that either Detective Rook or

Detective Laverty violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, this claim will be
dismissed because it is wholly conclusory and undeveloped and does not meet the Iqbal pleading
standard.
3. Individual Claims for Supervisory Liability Against Chief Detective
Bernstiel

Stewart’s claims against Montgomery County Chief Detective Mark Bernstiel also are
not plausible. A “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs” to be liable. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining
that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution”); Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 290 (“Each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)).
Generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an
office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional

violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Saisi asserted that some
defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed
merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director
cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))). Rather, “[s]uits against high-level
government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v.
Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).
There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).

First, a supervisor may be personally liable if he or she “with deliberate indifference to the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused
[the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)).9 “Second, a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed

9 “Failure to” claims, such as a failure to train are generally considered a subcategory of policy or
practice liability. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316–17 (citation omitted). A claim for supervisory liability or
liability based upon a failure to train involves four elements: (1) that an existing policy created an
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor was aware of this unreasonable risk; (3) the
supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice. See Sample
v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210,
227 (3d Cir. 2015) (same).
others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. “Although a court can infer that a defendant had
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case,
the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v.

Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).
Stewart alleges only that Chief Detective Bernstiel was the commanding officer of
Defendants Rook and Laverty, and was responsible for their training, supervision, and conduct,
as well as for enforcing the regulations of the Montgomery County Detective Bureau. (See Doc.
No. 4 at 3–4.) Thus, Stewart has not plausibly alleged that Detective Bernstiel established and
maintained a policy, practice, or custom with deliberate indifference that caused constitutional
harm, nor has he plausibly alleged Detective Bernstiel’s personal involvement in any alleged
underlying constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Jankowski v. Lellock,
649 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of failure-to-train claim “relegated to
a single sentence in the complaint” as “merely a rote recitation of a cause of action coupled with

a legal conclusion” that was insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard).
Further, a supervisory claim requires “a showing that there was an actual constitutional
violation at the hands of subordinates” before finding liability on the part of the supervisory
official. Allen v. Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that failure to train
and supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants were meritless where the plaintiff
failed to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation). As discussed
above, Stewart has not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation by Detectives
Rook or Laverty. Accordingly, any individual capacity claim against Detective Bernstiel is not
plausible and will be dismissed.
4. Individual Capacity Conspiracy Claims Against Various Defendants

Stewart alleges throughout the Amended Complaint that the various Defendants acted
together to violate his rights. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 4 at 4, 9.) The elements of a § 1983 claim of
conspiracy to violate federal civil rights are that “(1) two or more persons conspire to deprive
any person of constitutional rights; (2) one or more of the conspirators performs any overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that overt act injures the plaintiff in his person or property
or deprives the plaintiff of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, with the added
gloss under § 1983 that the conspirators act under the color of state law.” Jutrowski v. Township
of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Barnes Foundation v.
Township of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2001)). “[T]o properly plead an
unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement
can be inferred.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “[A] bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. Here, Stewart has presented no factual allegations to support conspiracy claims;

therefore, his conspiracy claims will be dismissed. See Cromwell v. Fichter, No. 22-3169, 2023
WL 3734969, at *1 (3d Cir. May 31, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff
presented no factual allegations to support a conspiracy claim).10

10 Stewart also references 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in connection with his conspiracy claims. (See Doc.
No. 4 at 2.) Nothing in Stewart’s allegations plausibly suggests that he was the target of race or class
based discriminatory animus designed to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, as would be
necessary to proceed on a claim under that provision. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[T]he reach of section 1985(3) is limited to private conspiracies predicated on ‘racial, or perhaps
otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 102 (1971))).
5. Official Capacity and Municipal Liability Claims

Stewart brings § 1983 claims against Montgomery County, as well as claims against the
various Defendants in their official capacities. Claims against municipal officials named in their
official capacities are indistinguishable from, and duplicative of, claims against the municipality
that employs them. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Official-capacity
suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is,
in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. (citation omitted).
A municipality, such as Montgomery County, or any other suable municipal entity, is not
vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees on a theory of respondeat
superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (stating
“local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts’” (quoting Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). There are two ways for a § 1983 claim against a
municipality to proceed: “[a] plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of

the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by
the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93,
105 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation,
policy, or edict.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other
hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically
endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.”
Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). “A plaintiff must also
allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Id. (citing Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative
link’ between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id.
(citation omitted). By contrast, a plaintiff whose claim is predicated on a failure or inadequacy

must allege a failure that amounts to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.
Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citation omitted). “This consists of a showing as to whether
(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the
situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong
choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. (citing
Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Here, Stewart has failed to allege a municipal policy or custom, or deliberate indifference
attributable to the municipality. Accordingly, neither Stewart’s claims against Montgomery
County nor his claims against the Defendants in their official capacity meet the Iqbal pleading
standard, and they too will be dismissed.

B. State Law Claims
Because the Court has dismissed Stewart’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims he seeks to raise.
Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between . . . citizens of different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants,’” which “means that, unless there is some other basis for
jurisdiction, no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Lincoln Benefit
Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche,
546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir.
2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled,
meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v.

Hovensa, LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner before his
imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro v. Kugel,
386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of
citizenship. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); see also Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing
Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity
cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity between the parties and that the amount
in controversy requirement has been met).
Stewart has not met his burden. Stewart states that he resided in Norristown,
Pennsylvania, prior to his arrest. (Doc. No. 4 at 2.) He does not allege the citizenship of the
individual Defendants, but he is suing Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and various officials

of that municipality, which suggests that diversity is lacking. Accordingly, Stewart has not
sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s
jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue and all state law claims will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the individual capacity claims against
ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) based

11 Stewart is also warned that many of his state law claims seemed poised to fail. For example, to
the extent Stewart seeks damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution (see Doc. No. 4 at 12),
those claims fail as a matter of law because “Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to § 1983
and does not recognize a private right of action for damages stemming from alleged violation of the state
on prosecutorial immunity. All other federal claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. All state law claims will be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order follows regarding amendment.

constitution.” Miles v. Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Gary v. Braddock Cemetery,
517 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F. App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“[N]or is there a private right of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Pocono
Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No
Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for
damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (citation omitted)). In addition, Stewart likely cannot
proceed on state tort law claims against the DA and ADAs under the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint. In Pennsylvania, common law tort immunity protects “high public officials,” including
district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, from suit when acting in the scope of their official duties
and authority, as the individual Defendants were in pursuing Stewart’s prosecution. Poteat v. Lydon,
2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Heller v. Fulare, 454 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006);
Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69-70 (Pa. 2001)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1123 (2024); see also
Harris v. Krasner, No. 23-2068, 2024 WL 2861848, at *4 (3d Cir. June 6, 2024) (stating that doctrine of
high official immunity applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and to district
attorneys and assistant district attorneys); Johnson v. City of Reading, No. 21-4860, 2023 WL 1783775, at
*16 n.23 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2023) (“The standard used to determine who qualifies as a ‘high public
official’ under Pennsylvania common law (1) depends on the nature of their duties, (2) the importance of
their office, and (3) whether the role has policy-making functions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
held that District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys qualify as a high official for purposes of
immunity.” (citations omitted)); Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-2057, 2023 WL 5186258, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023) (stating that because the ADA, and by extension, DA, were participating in
“prosecutorial” activity that was absolutely protected, they were operating within the scope of their
official duties and powers, and were immune from plaintiff’s claims for civil damages based on state law
tort claims of malicious prosecution and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367840. Public record. Not legal advice.