# Richards

> District Court, N.D. Texas · May 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367554

## Case

- **Full name:** James Richards v. Marsha McLane, TCCO Executive Director, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** May 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
JAMES RICHARDS, §
Institutional ID No. 02346971, §
Plaintiff, §
§
§ No. 5:25-CV-00075-H-BV
§
MARSHA MCLANE, §
TCCO Executive Director, ef al, §
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff James Richards, a sexually violent predator (SVP) confined at the
Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC), filed this civil-rights action against Defendants
Marsha McLane, who serves as Executive Director of the Texas Civil Commitment
Office (TCCO), and Management & Training Corporation (MTC), the private company
that operates the TCCC. United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix referred this

case for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and the undersigned
magistrate judge submits these findings, conclusions, and recommendation in accordance
with the referral order. For the reasons explained below, the recommendation is that
Defendants’ motions to dismiss be GRANTED, with Richards’s official-capacity claims
against McLane for retrospective relief being dismissed without prejudice and all other
claims being dismissed with prejudice.

1. Richards, a civilly confined SVP, alleges violations of his civil rights by
personnel associated with his confinement.
Richards was civilly adjudged to be an SVP as defined by Texas Health & Safety
Code § 841.003. After Richards completed his criminal sentence, Texas transferred him
to the TCCC in Littlefield, where he remains confined for inpatient treatment in
accordance with the provisions of Texas Health & Safety Code § 841.081. Richards’s
claims are set out in his first amended complaint, and they flow from aspects of his civil
commitment. See Dkt. No. 10.
Richards purports to bring his claims as a class representative of TCCC residents.
Id. at 1; see also Dkt. No. 22 (motion to certify class). He claims that Defendants
routinely violate residents’ due process rights by creating and enforcing an
“unconstitutional . .. treatment scheme that is punitive in effect” and “fail[s}] provide
appropriate treatment” for SVPs. Dkt. No. 10 at 4. He further claims that the TCCO
“neriodically places panels on hold to purposely delay [his] progression in the treatment
program.” Jd. at 5. He asserts that TCCC staff lack adequate training, education, and
experience in sex-offender treatment, and he expresses general dissatisfaction with the
treatment curriculum. /d. at 6, 9, 32.
Richards alleges that McLane has interfered with his treatment and that she
created and enforces unconstitutional policies. /d. at 3. He specifically alleges that she is
responsible for “continual amendment of the treatment curriculum over the years, which
substantially delays movement from one tier to the next.” /d. at 6. He accuses McLane
of making “arbitrary administrative decisions” that often “supersede and override MTC’s

professional decisions or opinions by the licensed sex offender treatment providers, or
other treatment professionals.” /d. at 22. He asserts that “written policies . . . arbitrarily
punish without due process.” /d. at 15-17.
Richards also complains about the conditions of the TCCC facility, describing it as

a “maximum security prison” rather than a treatment facility, 7d. at 10-11. In particular,
he criticizes MTC’s use of a secured management unit (SMU) which “is MTC’s version
of the barbaric and outlawed solitary confinement.” Jd. at il.
Richards seeks many forms of relief including: (1) declaratory judgment
proclaiming several of Defendants’ alleged actions unconstitutional and unlawful,
(2) permanent injunctive relief regarding the TCCO policies and procedures he complains
of; (3) the appointment of “independent expert panel(s),” which would oversee the
movement of residents between tiers; and (4) appointment of a “special master” to
“oversee the implementation of’ the Court’s order. /d. at 41-44.
McLane moves to dismiss the claims against her under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1)
and failure to state a claiin under subsection (b)(6). Dkt. No. 26. MTC also moves to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)\(6). Dkt. No. 28.

2. The Court must dismiss claims that fail to meet certain pleading standards,
A. —_ Rule 12(b)(1) standards
Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. When a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, a court should consider the
jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Hitt v. City of Pasadena,

561 F.2d 606, 608 (Sth Cir. 1977), “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional

power to adjudicate the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab, Litig.
(Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (Sth Cir, 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In evaluating its jurisdiction, a court may consider: “(1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed
facts.” Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 284 (Sth Cir. 2023) (quoting Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (Sth Cir. 2001)). The district court has substantial authority to
“weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.”
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (Sth Cir. May 1981) (citation omitted). A court
should only grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when it is
convinced that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief.
Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Sth Cir.
1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) standards
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts “to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); see Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (Sth Cir.
2011). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Under this standard, a court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, while the plaintiff must allege facts supporting
each element of the cause of action. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F 4th 270, 279 (Sth Cir.
2021) (quoting Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Factual allegations must go beyond mere
speculation, and the court does not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Any ambiguities in controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
See Walker vy. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (Sth Cir. 2019) (quoting
Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (Sth Cir. 2001)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally examines the complaint and any attachments
thereto. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (Sth Cir. 2000).
3. Richards’s claims should be dismissed.
A. Richards may not bring class claims.
Richards attempts to bring claims against Defendants on behalf of himself and a
class of civilly committed individuals at the TCCC. But Richards is proceeding pro se,
and “courts have generally held” that such plaintiffs “may not serve as class counsel
because they are ill-suited to protect the interests of the class.” Armour v. Davis, No.
6:18-CV-535, 2020 WL 2850140, at *22 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2020) (citing McGrew v, Tex.
Bad. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Indeed, under Fifth Circuit precedent, “those not licensed to practice law may not

represent the legal interests of others.” Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dep't, 819
F.3d 205, 210 (Sth Cir. 2016),
Richards does not claim that he is licensed to practice law. While he can represent
himself under 28 U.S.C. § 165, he cannot represent others and “should be limited to
seeking relief for the damages that he alleges he personally suffered[.]” May v. Bell, No.
5:24-CV-14-BR, 2025 WL 2844784, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2025), R. & R. adopted by
2025 WL 2841985 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (dismissing class-action claims brought by
pro se plaintiff).
The undersigned recommends that Richards’s pending motion to certify a class be
denied, Dkt. No. 22, and that all class claims be dismissed without prejudice.
B. The Court lacks jurisdiction over claims seeking retrospective
injunctive relief.
Richards’s pleadings state that he is suing McLane in her official capacity. Dkt.
No. 10 at 3, 41-44. As the filings make clear, Richards seeks both retrospective and
prospective injunctive relief. See id.
“Official capacity suits generally represent another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany,
187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir, 1999), “A suit against Defendant McLane in her official
capacity is simply another way of stating a claim against the TCCC or TCCO, and
therefore the State of Texas.” May v. McLane, No. 5:21-CV-271-BQ, 2022 WL
4353562, at *3 (ND. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022). “The Eleventh Amendment bars an individual
from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly

and validly abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv.
Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (Sth Cir. 2002).
However, under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may sue a state official in her official
capacity if the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief to redress an ongoing violation of
federal law. 209 U.S. at 167-68. “To determine whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward
inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Newton v. Joseph, No. 1:13-CV-
510, 2015 WL 1321491, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Here, Richards alleges that McLane implemented and continues to enforce
unconstitutional policies and practices. McLane argues that Richards lacks standing to
assert his claims because he fails to (1) allege any injury-in-fact and (2) demonstrate that
he permissibly requested retroactive relief that will redress his claimed injuries. See Dkt.
No. 26 at 8-10. “This is a challenge to the existence ofa cause of action in each of
[Richards’s] Section 1983 claims” and is “properly considered as an attack on the merits”
of his claims. Richards v. Taylor, No. CIV.A. H-13-1394, 2015 WL 5310853, at *7
(S.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2015) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (Sth Cir,
May 1981)).
The undersigned agrees that since Richards asks the Court to declare past acts
unlawful, he secks retrospective injunctive relief for which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
But to the extent that Richards seeks prospective injunctive relief, the Court has subject-

matter jurisdiction over his claims and addresses the objection to standing as a direct
attack on the merits. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415 (stating that “[w]here the
defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction ts also a challenge to the existence of a
federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that
jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the
plaintiff's case”); Williams v. McLane, No. 5:24-CV-00248-H, 2025 WL 2773806, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 2025) (acknowledging defendant’s argument that SVP lacked
standing because he failed to allege a constitutional injury but addressing the merits).
For these reasons, the district judge should grant-in-part McLane’s motion under
Rule 12(b)(1) and dismiss the claims for retrospective relief.
C. Richards fails to state a viable due process claim based on the alleged
delay in progression through the treatment program.
Many of Richards’s allegations concern his delayed progress through the tiered
treatment program, He claims he completed Tier 3 of the program on May 6, 2024, and
has been waiting ten months to appear before a panel for advancement to Tier 4. Dkt. No.
10 at 5. He argues that the delay constitutes a denial ofa “seamless” transition between
programming tiers and treatment progression, as required by Chapter 841. Jd.
Richards also alleges that the treatment program is inadequate. He complains that
MTC administers the treatment program but allows McLane to override treatment
decisions that should be made by qualified sex-offender treatment providers. /d. at 9, 22.
Richards alleges that staffing is inadequate due to high turnover of treatment providers,
requiring residents to repeat treatment. Jd. at 26. He also argues that the disproportionate

ratio of treatment providers to residents and the use of “unqualified” Affiliate Sex
Offender Treatment Providers (ASOTPs) hinder treatment. /d. at 26-28. Finally, he
complains that the curriculum has been amended at times and that residents are
sometimes required to repeat assignments. Jd. at 20, 26, 33-35, 37,
Under certain circumstances, deprivations related to sex-offender treatment can
give rise to a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Brown v, Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 244 (Sth Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (holding that SVP’s detention in jail where “he received no sex
offender treatment” was not reasonably related to his supervision and treatment and
therefore violated due process); Gomez v. Gonzales, No. 5:23-CV-00148-H, 2025 WL
755226, at *6—-7 (N.D. Tex. Mar, 10, 2025) (finding that SVP stated a plausible due

process claim where he alleged that his case manager and sex-offender treatment provider
demoted his tier before a hearing).
Richards argues that the treatment he receives is “inadequate” under “reasonable
professional judgment, and contemporary treatment standards.” Dkt. No. 10 at 26. This
bare-bones allegation—devoid of factual support——is insufficient to show a due process
violation. Richards concedes that he is receiving treatment, despite his dissatisfaction
with the program’s curriculum, timing, and use of ASOTPs. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 10 at 26—

33 (complaining about the curriculum and use of ASOTPs, which he alleges provide
inferior treatment but without factual support for that allegation); see also Welsh v.
Correct Care Recovery Sols., 845 F, App’x 311, 322 (Sth Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal
of SVP’s claim that defendants denied therapy thereby prolonging his period of civil
commitment, where SVP received some treatment and failed to plead facts “showing that

receiving additional treatment would have expedited his release”); Rogers v. McLane, No.
§:22-CV-130-BQ, 2023 WL 4629044, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2023) (noting that
“Tplaintiff] does not contend that [dJefendants denied him all therapy; instead he
acknowledges that the TCCC provided him group therapy one time per week and also
assigned tier therapy tasks,” which does not give rise to a substantive due process claim),
R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 4636894 (N.D. Tex, July 19, 2023),
The Court cannot discern a plausible due process claim based on Defendants’ use
of ASOTPs generally or the purported lack of a psychologist or psychiatrist overseeing
Richards’s treatment. Under the Texas Administrative Code § 810.3, an individual may
provide sex-offender treatment by obtaining a license as an ASOTP, who is then
supervised by a Licensed Sex Offender Treatment Provider (LSOTP). Tex. Admin. Code
§ 810.3(a), (c)(2). And in any case, “whether Defendants have complied with Texas
licensing requirements is not a constitutional matter.” Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *15
(citing Etheridge vy. Miss. Dept of Corr. Votec Schs., 79 F, App’x 47, 48 (Sth Cir. 2003)
and Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 900 (Sth Cir. 1982)). Richards fails to allege facts
showing how treatment by ASOTPs and lack of oversight by a psychologist or
psychiatrist delays his treatment or tier progression. He also fails to show how the
treatment by the ASOTPs is constitutionally inadequate.'! Therefore, his allegations based

! Richards claims that the ASOTPs should be directly supervised by a LSOTP in group therapy, Dkt. No.
10 at 27-28. But state law imposes no such requirement. See Tex. Admin. Code § 810.3(c)(8) (requiring
that “[aln ASOTP shall receive face-to-face supervision at least | hour per 20 hours of assessment and
treatment with a minimum of 2 hours per month” while providing sex offender assessment and
treatment’). And Richards cites no authority showing that the Constitution requires it.
10

on delaying progression or tier treatment should be rejected. See id. (rejecting plaintiff's
arguments that ASOTP was improperly licensed).
To the extent Richards accuses Defendants—primarily McLane-—of “overrul[ing]
critical treatment decisions,” he fails to provide supporting facts. Dkt. No. 10 at 9. He
likewise fails to provide facts to undergird his claim that Defendants amend the
curriculum to delay progress or intentionally make residents complete unnecessary
assignments. See Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *16 n.18 (recommending dismissal of
SVP’s substantive due process claim when he alleged Defendants gave assignments that

were not part of the curriculum and invented rules because he provided “no facts
detailing specific examples of such conduct or how it caused him particularized harm”);
id. at *19 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim when he alleged that defendants were purposely
hindering his tier progression but failed to provide factual detail); see generally DeMarco
v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (Sth Cir. 2019) (“We do not accept as true conclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” (quoting Gentilello v,
Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir, 2010))).?
Finally, Richards does not specify any harm resulting from the alleged denial of
adequate treatment. His “purported harm—that he might have progressed more quickly
through the tiers with additional [or adequate] . . . therapy—is speculative at best.”

2 Richards admits that other factors, like a high turnover rate, force residents to “repeat their biographies,
sexual histories, and offenses [.]” Dkt. No. 10 at 26. Richards does not say he experienced this, and this
concession undermines the allegations that Defendants intentionally interfere with treatment. See Rogers,
2023 WL 4629044, at *12 n.14 (observing that “[SVP] attributes the alleged reduction in therapy at least
in part to MTC’s inability to retain or hire therapists” and that the “reduction in group therapy sessions
was not intentional and therefore not an actionable constitutional claim” (citations omitted)).
il

Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *12. While he repeatedly alleges that Defendants are
interfering with his “seamless transition” between tiers and thus delaying his eventual
release from his civil commitment, Richards “has not pleaded any facts suggesting when
he might have been released from commitment but for the alleged reduced treatment.”
Id. His “assertion that any deprivation of therapy impeded his release is ‘too attenuated
to invoke further due process protections.’” Welsh, 845 F. App’x at 322 (quoting Senty-
Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 887 (8th Cir. 2006)).
The undersigned therefore recommends that the district judge dismiss Richards’s
substantive due process claim based on delaying sex-offender treatment or tier
progression.
D. Richards fails to state a viable substantive due process claim based on
conditions of confinement.
Richards further complains generally about his conditions of confinement. But for

many of these claims, he fails to allege any personal harm. Among these include his
claims regarding: (1) Defendants’ use of the SMU, (2) imposition of commissary or
delivery restrictions due to failure to complete tests, and (3) name-calling by officials.
Dkt. No. 10 at 11-14, 15-17, 11. Because he fails to allege a personal harm stemming
from these claims and only complains about these issues as generally unfavorable
practices, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss these claims for lack of
standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992) (holding that a
plaintiff lacks Article III standing where the alleged injury does not affect the plaintiff “in

a personal and individual way”); Gregory v. McKennon, 430 F. App’x 306, 310 (Sth Cir.

12

2011) (per curiam) (plaintiff “would lack standing to seek § 1983 damages for violations
of other prisoners’ rights); Williams, 2025 WL 2773806, at *9 n.6 (noting that “[p]laintiff
only makes a facial challenge to the policy—-he does not allege .. . personal harm
from... the policy”); May, 2025 WL 2844784, at *3 (recommending dismissal of some
of SVP’s unconstitutional conditions claims for lack of standing because he did not allege
personal harm and “[could not] represent other TCCC residents”).
Construing the remainder of his claims liberally, Richards alleges barely sufficient
facts to infer specific harm. He claims that the physical conditions at TCCC violate his
substantive due process rights by compelling him to live in the equivalent of a “maximum
security prison,” and he objects to double-fences topped with razor wire, security, strictly
controlled movement about the facility, limited recreation time, steel doors, metal bunks
and toilets, the general atmosphere, and more. Dkt. No. 10 at 10-11. He also challenges
policies requiring ankle monitors and testing. /d, at 17-18, 19-21.
Conditions of confinement for SVPs are governed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Miguel v. McLane, No. 22-10517, 2024 WL 747232, at *9
(Sth Cir, Feb, 23, 2024) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)). Because
he is civilly committed, Richards is entitled to “more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement” than prison inmates, Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 322, but “his
liberty interests are considerably less than those held by members of free society.”
Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 886. “As a result, civil commitment institutions may create
policies that place some restrictions on an SVP’s due process rights, ‘so long as [the
restrictions] advance the state’s interest in security, order, and rehabilitation.’” San
13

Miguel v. Cochran, No. 5:20-CV-041-C, 2022 WL 774147, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2022) (quoting Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App’x 283, 294 (Sth Cir. 2013) (per curiam)),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 2024 WL 747232; see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
368 n.4 (1997) (noting that “[s]tates enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens
[for SVPs}”); Brown, 911 F.3d at 243 (noting that “the Constitution nevertheless affords a
state wide latitude in crafting a civil commitment scheme”).
For SVPs, “[d]ue process requires only that the conditions and duration of
confinement... bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are
committed.” Miguel, 2024 WL 747232, at *9 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Accordingly, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege how the conditions at the
facility lack[] a reasonable relation to Texas’s twin goals of long-term supervision and
treatment of sexually violent predators.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This Court has previously noted that “[w]here an official’s decision ‘is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment,’ the official may be held liable for a constitutional deprivation.” May, 2022
WL 4353562, at *4 (quoting Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 323). But the Fifth Circuit has
stated that “proximity to prisoners and restrictive conditions alone do not state a due

process claim.” Brown, 911 F.3d at 243.
Based on his allegations, “{Richards] has not sufficiently alleged how the
conditions of his civil commitment lack[] a reasonable relation to Texas’s goals of
‘long-term supervision and treatment’ of SVPs.” Welsh, 845 F. App’x at 322. First,
14

regarding his claims about the physical conditions at TCCC, Richards has not asserted
any facts showing that his living conditions—though uncomfortable and institutional in
nature-—constitute a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice
or standards.” May, 2022 WL 4353562, at *4 (citation omitted); see also Brown, 911
F.3d at 243 (holding that “{defendant’s] secure facilities—despite their restrictive rules
and ungraceful living conditions—were reasonably related to the goals of supervision and
treatment”); May, 2025 WL 2844784, at *17 (finding that complaints about conditions of
confinement at TCCC—including those regarding room temperatures, unpleasant smells,
loud noises, and overcrowded areas-—did not state a constitutional violation).
Regarding policies requiring residents to wear GPS ankle monitors and to take
polygraphs and penile plethysmographs, “]the TCCO’s] GPS tracking policies are
reasonably related to the goal of long-term supervision” and “polygraph and PPG
examinations are useful tools to assess treatment progress.” Williams, 2025 WL
2773806, at *9, These requirements “[do] not offend either the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment.” /d.; see, e.g., Day v. Seiler, 560 F. App’x 316, 319 (Sth Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of SVP’s due process claim based on GPS
monitoring); Miguel v. Jack, No. 23-CV-697-RP-SH, 2023 WL 6466231, at *8 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 4, 2023) (finding it “not unreasonable for TCCO/TCCC to impose restrictions

on commissary privileges because [SVP] refuses to take a required [PPG] exam),’

3 While Richards alleges that “it is not an uncommon punishment” for class members to be “arbitrarily
deprived of contact with their family for months at a time” for failing a polygraph, Richards fails to allege
that Ae was deprived of contact with family for any duration of time, nor does he provide any further
details regarding this claim. Dkt. No. 10 at 21.

15

Because Richards fails to allege that the conditions at TCCC bear no reasonable
relationship with the goals of his civil commitment—i.e., supervision and treatment—the
undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss these claims.
D. Richards lacks standing to bring a procedural due process claim.
Richards claims that Defendants issue write-ups and impose punishments with “no
procedural due process.” Dkt. No. 10 at 16,18. But fails to allege facts showing that he
suffered a specific harm and only complains about the general practice. He thus fails to
demonstrate that he has standing to bring this claim. Even if he had standing, the lack of
supporting facts render this claim deficient on its face. The undersigned recommends the
district judge dismiss this claim.
4, Recommendations
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the United
States District Judge (1) GRANT Defendants McLane and MTC’s motions to dismiss,
Dkt. Nos. 26, 28; (2) DENY his motion to certify class, Dkt. No. 22; (3) DENY his
motion for leave to join party as defendant, Dkt. No. 49;4 (3) and (4) dismiss his official-
capacity claims against McLane for retrospective relief without prejudice and all others
with prejudice. Dkt No. 10.

4 Richards seeks to join Cecile Erwin Young, Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (HHSC), as a defendant because he claims that Texas Health & Safety Code §
841.0835 “requires HHSC to coordinate with [TCCO] . .. to provide psychiatry and disability services”
for “a committed person with an intellectual or developmental disability, a mental illness, or a physical
disability.” Dkt. No. 49 at 2 (emphasis omitted). But Richards cannot bring this claim on behalf of other
individuals, and he does not claim that he suffers from any kind of disability. Further, he fails to provide
any facts or other evidence supporting these allegations.
16

5. Right To Object
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within
fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2016); Fed. R.
Civ, P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,
or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the
district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (Sth Cir. 1996).
Dated: May IQ. 2026.
Cina Pwrt~—
AMANDA ‘AMY’ R. BURCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367554. Public record. Not legal advice.