# Sievers

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367294

## Case

- **Full name:** Mark D. Sievers v. Dr. Verona, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARK D. SIEVERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL

DR. VERONA, et al.,

Defendants.
___________________________________

ORDER
Plaintiff Mark D. Sievers, an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDC), initiated this case by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). The Court granted his request to proceed as a
pauper (Doc. 4) and directed him to file an amended complaint (Doc. 5),
explaining in part as follows:
[Sievers] does not describe how each defendant violated his
constitutional rights, but rather he seeks to hold all defendants
jointly liable for the alleged “prolonged denial of the medically
necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea”;
and it appears he seeks to proceed against some defendants solely
on a theory of vicarious liability without alleging a causal
connection between any individual supervisor’s actions and an
alleged constitutional violation (i.e., the CEO of Centurion, the
Chief Health Officer, Directors, Administrators, the Warden, and
the Secretary of the FDC).

See Order (Doc. 5) at 4–5.
Before the Court for screening is Sievers’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 6;
Amended Complaint). In his Amended Complaint, Sievers names eight

Defendants: (1) Ricky Dixon, Secretary of the FDC; (2) Barry Reddish, Warden
of Union Correctional Institution (UCI); (3) K. Tomlinson, Assistant Warden
and ADA coordinator at UCI; (4) Dr. Verona, Regional Medical Director (RMD)
for Centurion; (5) Dr. Asbelti Llorens, Chief Health Officer and site Medical

Director for Centurion; (6) Jessica Putney, Nurse Practitioner for Centurion;
(7) Stephanie Alvarez, Health Services Administrator for Centurion; and (8)
Eve Gilbert, Director of Nursing for Centurion. See Amended Complaint at 3–
5.

Sievers alleges all Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 5, 21–22.
He explains that he was admitted to UCI in 2020 with a VPAP machine, which
he was prescribed to treat his diagnosed sleep apnea. Id. at 9. Between 2020

and 2023, the UCI medical department provided Sievers the equipment needed
to operate and maintain his VPAP machine, including replacement tubing,
water, and a mask. Id. However, in September 2023, his machine stopped
working. Id. After submitting multiple requests for a new one, Sievers received

a replacement machine on January 31, 2024, but it came without a new mask.
Id. For nearly one year, he submitted sick-call requests and grievances for a

2
mask.1 Id. When he finally received a mask on January 14, 2025, the mask was
too big, so it “would not seal.” Id. He did not receive a proper-fitting mask until

July 23, 2025. Id. Sievers asserts that the “prolonged denial of the medically
necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea” negatively
impacted his health in numerous ways. Id. at 20–21.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

1 In a grievance Sievers provides with his Amended Complaint, he
acknowledges that he had a mask to use, but it was two years old and “worn out.” See
Doc. 6-1 at 13.
3
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
4
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further, the plaintiff

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must
allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

5
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Amended Complaint, the Court must read Sievers’s pro
se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under
Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

6
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must
provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s
conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).
As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “[T]he deliberate-indifference standard sets
an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. For decades, the Eleventh
Circuit described that “high bar” inconsistently as a “more than mere

negligence” or “more than gross negligence standard.” See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate

7
indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and

(3) acted with more than gross negligence.” (internal quotations omitted)); see
also Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). However, in 2024,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit

should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as used in the criminal
law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has
instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a
deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective
recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so
he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware
that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to
the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant
“actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he
“cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3

3 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to
the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit
deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue
to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

8
The law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the
negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process
Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of
due care by prison officials.”). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently

emphasized that the subjective recklessness standard requires a plaintiff to
show a prison official had “more than a generalized or abstract knowledge” of
a risk. See McClinton v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL
1002166, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026). “Put simply, a constitutional violation

occurs only when prison officials act ‘consciously’ such that their acts or
omissions knowingly have the effect of inflicting a punishment.” Id. at *5, 7
(holding that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because, even
though some were aware of a “risk in the abstract,” the plaintiffs’ arguments

“invoke[d] a negligence standard, premised on a violation of a duty owed to
[their son],” who was killed by a known gang member).
The law also is well established that “supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott,

9
610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory
conduct, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated

in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the
supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb
Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).
Causation “may be established and supervisory liability
imposed where the supervisor’s improper custom or policy results
in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id.[4]
(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
plaintiff can also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation
of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[5] 923 F.3d at 957. “Either way,
though, to prove that a policy or its absence caused a constitutional
harm, a plaintiff must point to multiple incidents, or multiple
reports of prior misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation
omitted). And allegations of a single incident of unconstitutional
conduct cannot state a claim for supervisory liability, even when
the conduct involves several subordinates. Id. at 957–58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).
The requisite causal connection is not established merely by filing a
grievance with a supervisory official. See Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-
Ftm-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (citing Gallagher
v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“[F]iling a grievance with a
supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the

4 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).
5 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).
10
allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even
when the grievance is denied.”).

Similarly, where a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need is brought against a private contractor based on its functional equivalence
to a government entity, liability under § 1983 cannot be based on a theory of
respondeat superior. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310. Instead, the plaintiff must show

that the entity “had a ‘policy or custom’ of deliberate indifference that led to
the violation of his constitutional right.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Sievers’s Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as his

original Complaint and is due to be dismissed for his failure to state a claim
for relief. First, despite the Court previously advising Sievers that he cannot
proceed under § 1983 against supervisory officials on a theory of respondeat
superior, see Order (Doc. 5) at 4, he again seeks to proceed against some

Defendants based solely on such a theory, including Defendants Dixon,
Reddish, and Llorens. As to these Defendants, Sievers explains the basis of his
claims as follows: (1) Defendant Dixon did not approve his grievances, two of
which he submitted near or after the date he received a proper-fitting mask

(July 23, 2025);6 (2) Defendant Reddish, who was responsible for the day-to-

6 It appears Sievers mentions the grievances he submitted after he had already
received a new mask to demonstrate he exhausted his administrative remedies before
11
day operations of the prison, received two grievances from Sievers about the
issue, one of which he submitted after July 23, 2025; and (3) Defendant

Llorens, who is responsible for overseeing nurses, denied two of Sievers’s
grievances, one of which he submitted after July 23, 2025. See Doc. 6 at 16, 18.
Even if Sievers had alleged an FDC or Centurion employee had been
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs—which he does not— the

mere filing of a grievance with these supervisory officials is insufficient to
demonstrate “an affirmative causal connection between [their] acts or
omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” See Zatler, 802 F.2d at
401. Insofar as Sievers alleges that these and other Defendants denied him due

process in the grievance procedure, such allegations fail to state a claim
because inmates have “no constitutionally protected liberty interest in access
to the prison’s grievance procedure.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x 656,
659 (11th Cir. 2014)7 (citing Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1177; Grayden v. Rhodes,

345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also Charriez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

bringing this action. The events relevant to whether Sievers states a plausible
deliberate indifference claim are those that occurred before his request for a new
mask was satisfied.
7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th
Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
12
Corr., 596 F. App’x 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding the district court did not
err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants “had violated his

constitutional due-process rights by failing to take corrective action during the
appeal of the suspension of his visitation privileges [b]ecause the prison
grievance procedure does not create a protected liberty interest”); Mathews v.
Moss, 506 F. App’x 981, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the plaintiff failed to state

a claim because he merely “alleged that his prison grievances were either
ignored or wrongly decided or that prison officials did not properly follow the
prison’s own grievance procedures”).
As to the remaining Defendants (Tomlinson, Verona, Putney, Alvarez,

and Gilbert), there are two relevant timeframes, each implicating acts or
omissions of different Defendants: between September 20, 2023, and January
31, 2024 (when Sievers was without a functioning VPAP machine); and
between February 1, 2024, and July 23, 2025 (when he was without a proper-

fitting mask, although he had a working machine with a “worn out” mask or
one that would not properly seal).8
As to the first timeframe, Sievers states the basis of his claims as follows:
(1) Defendant Putney, who is responsible for healthcare at UCI, was notified

8 For purposes of this Order, the Court accepts without deciding that Sievers
had an objectively serious medical need when he was without his VPAP machine and
a proper-fitting mask.
13
of Sievers’s need for a replacement machine through one grievance and at two
quarterly ADA meetings; (2) Defendant Alvarez received multiple

communications (from Sievers, his family, and his postconviction counsel)
between September 2023 and November 2023 regarding his need for a
replacement machine; and (3) and Defendant Gilbert “had contact with
[Sievers] and his family” in December 2023 regarding his need for a

replacement machine. See Doc. 6 at 18–19.
As to the second timeframe, Sievers states the basis of his claims as
follows: (1) Defendant Tomlinson received two grievances from Sievers, one of
which he submitted after July 23, 2025, and Tomlinson, as the coordinator of

quarterly ADA meetings, was present at a July 16, 2025 meeting at which
Sievers discussed his medical equipment needs; and (2) Defendant Verona,
who was responsible for authorizing medical equipment orders, delayed
approving the request for a new mask. Id. at 16–17.

September 2023–January 2024
Four Defendants knew that Sievers’s VPAP machine stopped working in
September 2023: Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, and Verona. As to these
Defendants, Sievers’s allegations do not go beyond establishing that they knew

he needed medical supplies. He does not allege facts permitting the reasonable
inference that they subjectively knew their own acts or omissions caused a

14
substantial risk of serious harm or acted unreasonably in response to a known
risk.

First, Sievers alleges that Defendant Putney was on notice of his
problem through a sick-call request he submitted on September 20, 2023. Id.
at 18. But Sievers acknowledges that a nurse (who is not a Defendant) told him
on September 20, 2023, his machine “was being ordered and expedited.” Id. at

12. According to Sievers, a different nurse told him on September 23, 2023,
that “there was nothing in the system about [him] needing a [new machine]”
and that Sievers should contact Defendants Putney and Alvarez. Id. at 12–13.
To the extent there was a three-day delay in submitting a request for approval

of a new VPAP machine, Sievers does not allege the delay was attributable to
Defendant Putney (or Defendant Alvarez, whom Sievers was told was ordering
the machine). See id. at 12.
Sievers also asserts that Defendant Putney was on notice of his medical

need because she was present at two ADA meetings—in October 2023 and
January 2024—when he discussed that his VPAP machine had broken, and he
was waiting for a new one. Id. at 18.9 He claims someone asked him at the

9 Sievers mentions in one section of his Amended Complaint that Defendant
Llorens may have been at the October 2023 ADA meeting, see Doc. 6 at 13, but he
does not repeat that allegation in setting forth the factual basis for his claim against
Defendant Llorens, id. at 18. To the extent Defendant Llorens was present at the
October meeting, Sievers’s claim against Llorens fails for the same reason his claim
against Defendant Putney fails.
15
October 2023 meeting whether he had received his machine yet, telling him it
had been “approved and ordered.” Id. at 13. Even if Defendant Putney knew—

by virtue of her presence at the meeting—that Sievers had not received a
replacement machine yet, she also would have known or heard that the
machine had been ordered. See id. In other words, Sievers alleges no facts
suggesting Defendant Putney was ignoring or delaying his need for medical

equipment. Sievers further asserts that someone told him at the January 2024
meeting that his replacement VPAP machine had been received on November
2, 2023, but was returned. Id. To the extent the machine was received but
returned in November, Sievers does not allege Defendant Putney was

responsible.
Second, Sievers’s mother emailed Defendant Alvarez on October 1, 2023,
and Sievers’s postconviction counsel contacted Defendant Alvarez by telephone
on November 2, 2023. See Doc. 6-1 at 27, 29. Defendant Alvarez responded

directly to Sievers on October 2, 2023, advising that “the order ha[d] been
submitted to the regional doctor for approval,” and, after speaking with
postconviction counsel, Defendant Alvarez noted in Sievers’s medical chart
that “[the machine] has been ordered [sic] awaiting the arrival.” Doc. 6 at 19;

Doc. 6-1 at 29.

16
Third, Sievers’s stepmother emailed Defendant Gilbert on December 5,
2023, explaining that Sievers still had not received a replacement machine.

Doc. 6-1 at 31, 33. Defendant Gilbert responded to her on December 10, 2023,
advising that the RMD (Defendant Verona) had approved the order, and a
Centurion employee had “called about [the order] many times.” Id. at 33.
Defendant Gilbert made a note in Sievers’s medical record about the

communication. Id. at 35.
Sievers received a replacement machine on January 31, 2024. See Doc. 6
at 13. Accepting that a replacement machine was ordered and approved shortly
after Sievers requested one, Defendants Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, and Verona

cannot be said to have denied him necessary medical supplies. Although his
replacement machine was delayed for a few months, Sievers alleges no facts
indicating Defendants Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, or Verona caused the delay or,
if so, “consciously” knew that their acts or omissions “ha[d] the effect of

inflicting a punishment.” McClinton, 2026 WL 1002166, at *5. Sievers’s
allegations against these Defendants “invoke[] a negligence standard,” which
is insufficient to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim. See id. at *7.
February 2024–July 2025

Not including those to whom Sievers merely submitted grievances
(Defendants Dixon, Reddish, and Llorens), Sievers attributes the lengthy delay

17
in receiving a proper-fitting mask to Defendants Tomlinson and Verona. First,
Sievers asserts Defendant Tomlinson denied his August 2024 medical

grievance in which he complained he had been without a proper-fitting mask
for about six months. See Doc. 6 at 16. Even if Sievers’s grievance put
Defendant Tomlinson on notice that Sievers had a serious medical need,
Defendant Tomlinson investigated the issue and discovered that Sievers’s

“supplies ha[d] been approved and ordered” and would be “issued to [him]”
upon receipt by the medical department. See Doc. 6-1 at 14.10 The denial of the
grievance was not tantamount to Defendant Tomlinson (or Defendant Llorens,
who co-signed the grievance response) ignoring Sievers’s serious medical

needs. Sievers complains that he did not receive his replacement mask for
nearly a year after that grievance response, but he does not allege Defendant
Tomlinson was aware of that delay until Sievers mentioned it at the July 16,
2025 quarterly meeting. See Doc. 6 at 17. Sievers received a new mask shortly

after that meeting, which, if anything, suggests the opposite of deliberate
indifference by Defendant Tomlinson.
Second, Sievers implies Defendant Verona unnecessarily prolonged his
receipt of a proper-fitting mask because he was told in two grievance

responses—in February 2025 and June 2025—that medical was “waiting on

10 Defendant Llorens also signed the grievance response.
18
approval from the RMD.” Id. See also Doc. 6-1 at 21, 23. Without more, these
allegations do not permit the reasonable inference that Defendant Verona

consciously delayed the order to inflict punishment. Moreover, according to a
grievance Sievers submitted on July 22, 2025, it appears that the delay was
attributable, at least in part, to a supply chain issue: Sievers noted in his
grievance that someone told him “[V]PAP supplies all over the country [were]

delayed.” See Doc. 6-1 at 6.
The reason for the unfortunately long delay in Sievers receiving a proper-
fitting mask for his VPAP machine is unclear, but the facts he alleges do not
permit the reasonable inference any named Defendant consciously disregarded

a known risk of harm to him. To the extent the problem was attributable to a
supply chain issue, oversight, or lack of due care, Sievers “invokes a negligence
standard.” McClinton, 2026 WL 1002166, at *7. To the extent the delay was
attributable to the process by which Centurion approves medical supplies for

inmates, Sievers does not allege that Centurion “had a ‘policy or custom’ of
deliberate indifference that led to the violation of his constitutional right.” See
Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310.
Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

19
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of April,
2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-6
C:
Mark D. Sievers

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367294. Public record. Not legal advice.