# Cavaness

> District Court, N.D. Texas · May 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367123

## Case

- **Full name:** Dwight Henry Cavaness v. 160th Judicial District Court, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** May 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DWIGHT HENRY CAVANESS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-3197-E-BN
§
160TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT §
COURT, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Dwight Henry Cavaness, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit on
November 20, 2025 against six defendants. See Dkt. No. 3.
On February 17, 2026, Defendants Darren Bender and Zwicker & Associates,
P.C., (collectively, “Zwicker”) moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 17.
On February 20, 2026, Defendant 160th Judicial District Court moved to
dismiss the claims against it. See Dkt. No. 20.
And, on March 4, 2026, Defendants Robert Jenkins and Jenkins Court
Receiver (collectively, “Jenkins”) moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See
Dkt. No. 22. And they joined Zwicker’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction [Dkt. No. 17]. See Dkt. No. 31.
The Court ordered briefing on the motions. See Dkt. Nos. 18 & 23.
Cavaness responded. See Dkt. No. 24. Zwicker and Jenkins replied. See Dkt.
Nos. 25 & 32.
The Court then dismissed the claims against Defendants Capital One NA and
Discover Bank without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 34.
For the reasons set out below, the undersigned enters these findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should grant the motions to
dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, & 22] and dismiss the claims against the remaining
Defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Background
On or about November 6, 2023, Discover Bank, represented by Zwicker, filed a
petition in state court against Cavaness, for breach of contract arising out of

Cavaness’s alleged failure to repay credit services rendered by Discover Bank. See
Dkt. No. 3 at 10-12.
The 160th Judicial District Court entered judgment against Cavaness on
March 10, 2025 and ordered that Discover Bank was entitled to recover damages,
costs, and post-judgment interest from Cavaness in the amount of $5,248.61. See id.
at 18-19, 24. And it appointed a court receiver to take possession of Cavaness’s
nonexempt property to satisfy the judgment. See id. at 24. Capital One became a

successor by merger to Discover Bank. See id.
On October 6, 2025, Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that it “was served a
garnishment order” from the receiver, Jenkins, “to freeze or remove money” in
Cavaness’s Wells Fargo account, at a maximum amount of $7,300.96. Id. at 20, 25.
Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that the funds in that account were exempt from
garnishment, see id. at 21, but that it had frozen $5,025.39 from his account ending
in 2802 for garnishment and charged him a $125 legal process fee, see id. at 31.
And, on October 10, 2025, Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that it had deducted
another $25 from his account ending in 2802. See id. at 26.

On November 20, 2025, Cavaness filed this lawsuit against the 160th Judicial
District Court, Jenkins, and Zwicker. See id. at 2. His complaint is based on the
following allegations:
The judge and the defendant knowingly proceeded without the debt
validation of an agreement with signature and without the full history
of debt requested of both.

The judge and the defendant knowingly proceeded without the identity
of the type of debt being pursued by the defendant: unsecured or
secured.

The type of debt being pursued by defendant is a[n] unsecured credit
card debt.

The judge and the defendant proceeded with the omission of evidences.

The judge ordered the garnishment of my bank account which had my
funds frozen causing damages and pain and suffering, depression,
stressfulness. I am asking $120,000, for damages.

Id. at 7.
Based on these allegations, Cavaness appears to bring claims under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692g (“FDCPA”). Id. at 8.
Legal Standards
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court “must presume that a suit lies
outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction
rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d
912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
The Court must dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
“when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th
Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). The Court will not assume it has jurisdiction. Rather, “the
basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly

and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v.
Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)).
“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party
asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof
that jurisdiction does in fact exist” in any case originally filed in federal court.
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations

omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of relief
sought. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Duno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (noting that
“our standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim
he seeks to press” and that “[w]e have insisted ... that a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought” (cleaned up)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognizes a
distinction between a “facial” attack to subject-matter jurisdiction, which is based
only on the pleadings, and a “factual” attack to jurisdiction, which is based on
affidavits, testimony, and other evidentiary material. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644

F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981); accord Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (“Lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of
disputed facts.”). Regardless of the nature of the attack, the plaintiff seeking a federal
forum “constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact

exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
Where, as here, a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the attack
is presumptively facial, and the Court need look only to the sufficiency of the
allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, or on the complaint as supplemented by
undisputed facts, all of which are presumed to be true. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1989); Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523.
But, on a factual attack, the Court “is empowered to consider matters of fact

which may be in dispute,” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161, and, to oppose the Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, “a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method
and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court
does have subject matter jurisdiction,” Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. “When considering
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district
court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, particularly when disputed
factual issues are important to the motion’s outcome. In some cases, an oral hearing
may be indispensable due to the complicated factual disputes underlying the case.” In
re Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 672 F.3d 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (footnotes omitted).

But “an oral hearing is not always necessary if the parties receive an adequate
opportunity to conduct discovery and otherwise present their arguments and
evidence to the court.” Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. “This requirement

prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with
prejudice. The court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s case because the plaintiff lacks subject
matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the
plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction.” Id.
(citations omitted).
“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of
removal.” In re Bissonnet Inv. LLC, 320 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2023). To make this

determination, the Court considers the claims in the state court petition as they
existed at the time of removal. See Juanopulos v. Salus Claims Mgmt. LLC, 518 F.
Supp. 3d 973, 975 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Analysis
I. The Court should dismiss the claims against the 160th Judicial
District Court because it is immune from this lawsuit.
“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully
expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v.

Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
F.3d 268, 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)).
That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a
state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its
sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented
by statute, and [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign

immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th
Cir. 2014), then citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)). Courts in this
circuit have also “decline[d] to hold that the FDCPA abrogates state immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment.” Webb v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., No. EP-14-
cv-345-FM, 2014 WL 12594193, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014).
And “the State of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims

‘based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this
state acting in his official capacity.’” Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 F.
App’x 665, 674 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.053);
accord Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas judges
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in
their official capacities as state actors.” (citing Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d
341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996))).
There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek
judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing

state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595
U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But this
exception does not permit injunctions against state courts or their employees because
“’an injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be a violation of the
whole scheme of our Government.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163).
And, so, Cavaness’s constitutional and statutory claims against the 160th

Judicial District Court – a court of the State of Texas – are barred by sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
And, insofar as Cavaness attempts to sue the presiding state judge in the 160th
Judicial District of Dallas County in her individual capacity, “a judge generally has
absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis, 565 F.3d at 221 (citing Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)).
“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment

of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).
There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may
be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial
actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice
are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id.
Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have
absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically
required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,

230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying
out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.”
(citations omitted)).
Cavaness alleges no facts that could overcome judicial immunity for the
judicial defendant.
And, so, his claims against the 160th Judicial District Court should be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants also move to dismiss Cavaness’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1)
because his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Dkt. No. 17 at 2;
Dkt. No. 31.
Only insofar as a state judicial proceeding has concluded, such that no appeal
was pending when Cavaness filed this lawsuit, this federal district court lacks

jurisdiction “to modify or reverse” a state proceeding under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced
to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not
have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized
by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462
(5th Cir. 2004))); accord Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994);
see also Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the
doctrine prevents “thinly veiled attempt[s] to circumvent the state appellate process
and to collaterally attack – in the guise of a federal civil rights action – the validity

of a state court [judgment] and other related orders”); but see Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th
1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is
pending when the federal suit is filed.”).
Cavaness challenges Zwicker’s state court lawsuit on behalf of its clients
Discover Bank and Capital One. See Dkt. No. 3 at 7. He challenges the 160th Judicial
District Court’s entry of judgment against him and the manner in which that court

reached its decision. See id. He appears to challenge Jenkins’ role in the procurement
of his funds to satisfy the judgment. See id. And he seeks relief from the judgment by
asking this Court to unfreeze his funds and for damages resulting from the
garnishment of his bank account in satisfaction of the judgment. See id.
And, so, Cavaness’s lawsuit amounts to nothing more than a collateral attack
on a prior state judgment in violation of Rooker-Feldman. That he frames his claims
under federal laws – such as the FDCPA and the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments – does not allow Cavaness to sidestep this jurisdictional bar. See Turner
v. Cade, 354 F. App’x 108, 111 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“A plaintiff cannot
‘circumvent this jurisdictional limitation by asserting claims not raised in the state
court proceedings or claims framed as original claims for relief,’ if these claims are
‘inextricably intertwined with a state judgment.’”) (quoting United States v.
Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994); citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
And, so, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Recommendation
The Court should grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, &
22] and dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: May 138, 2026

DAVIDL.HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-11-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367123. Public record. Not legal advice.