# Brime

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367090

## Case

- **Full name:** Roderick Damon Brime v. Nickolas Leon, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
RODERICK DAMON BRIME,

Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-240-MMH-MCR
NICKOLAS LEON, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff Roderick Damon Brime, an inmate of the Florida Department

of Corrections, is proceeding on a pro se Second Amended Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (SAC, Doc. 22), filed pursuant
to the Court’s Order (Doc. 21). Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights during his incarceration at Florida State Prison

between September 30, 2024 and December 28, 2024. See Doc. 22 at 3, 5–6, 8–
15. Plaintiff names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) Correctional
Officer Nickolas Leon (Leon), in his individual capacity; (2) Captain J. Moody
(Moody), in his individual and official capacity; (3) Correctional Officer C.

English (English), in his individual and official capacity; (4) Medical Director
F. Hughes (Hughes), in her individual and official capacity; (5) Mental Health
Director G. Emanoilidis (Emanoilidis), in his individual and official capacity;
and (6) Mental Health Director M. Claussen (Claussen), in her individual and
official capacity. Id. at 4.

As to Leon, Plaintiff asserts claims of excessive use of force, assault, and
battery based on events that occurred on September 30, 2024. Id. at 6, 18.
According to Plaintiff, he was in his cell that evening when Leon started
assaulting him “by stabbing the cell window” and threatening to kill or

seriously injure him. Id. at 8. Leon continued his threats even while Plaintiff
was being escorted to the shower. Id. Then, at the shower, Leon used handcuffs
as brass knuckles to punch Plaintiff in the stomach, and continued his threats.
Id. at 9. While Plaintiff was still in handcuffs, Leon grabbed him, threw him

against the shower bars, and started choking him. Id. Another officer had to
intervene to stop the attack so Plaintiff could be escorted back to his cell. Id.
Plaintiff alleges this incident caused him neck pain, immobility, stiffness,
stomach pain, psychological problems, post-traumatic stress disorder, mental

anguish, emotional damage, fear, fright, shock, and insomnia. Id. at 16.
Because of this incident, on October 3, 2024, English served Plaintiff
with a disciplinary report charging Plaintiff with assaulting a correctional
officer. Id. at 10. After a disciplinary hearing held on October 7, 2024, Plaintiff

was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days of punitive confinement. Id. at 10–
11. Plaintiff alleges that English and Moody violated his due process rights by
refusing to allow him to participate in the disciplinary proceeding by calling
2
witnesses and presenting evidence, including his own statement about the
September 30, 2024 incident. Id. at 6, 9–11, 18.

In connection with the same incident, Plaintiff also raises negligence and
deliberate indifference claims against Hughes, Emanoilidis, and Claussen.
Plaintiff claims that Hughes was negligent and deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs by delaying and/or denying treatment to his neck. Id.

at 6–7, 11–13, 18. Similarly, Plaintiff claims that Emanoilidis and Claussen
were negligent and deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health needs
by denying mental treatment. Id. at 7, 13–15, 18. As relief, Plaintiff seeks: (1)
a declaration that all Defendants violated his constitutional rights; (2) an

injunction ordering the Warden to expunge Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction;
and (3) punitive damages against Leon ($100,000), Moody ($40,000), English
($30,000), Emanoilidis ($60,000), Claussen ($60,000), and Hughes ($60,000);
or, alternatively, (4) compensatory damages against all Defendants. Id. at 19–

22.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

3
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language
of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply
the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a

§ 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between
the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

1 The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed as a pauper. See Order (Doc.
8).
2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
4
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted);
Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are
not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further,
the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a
complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
5
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at

1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts
or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the pleading, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol.
Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)3 (quoting GJR

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
6
Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)
(internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in

Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).
Construing the allegations in the SAC liberally, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s federal claims against Hughes, Emanoilidis, Claussen, English, and
Moody must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The

Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide
humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s
conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).
As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
7
Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has

instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:
First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered
a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently
serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with
“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”
id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the
defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his
own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm
to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if
the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to
inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if
he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and
emphasis omitted);4 see also Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir.
2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff
must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the
defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

4 The Eleventh Circuit clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the
“subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the criminal law,” Wade, 106 F.4th at
1253, and to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases are not
inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue to be cited as binding precedent,” id.
at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).
8
disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective
recklessness” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted))

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard
sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical
treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973
F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well
settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of
corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in
Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or
substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).
Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1176
(quotations and citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also noted that
“[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation from a

prison physician’s failure to subordinate his own professional judgment to that
of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference
in medical opinion’ does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v.
9
Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871
F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or
forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and
therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth
Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).
Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations against Hughes, Emanoilidis,
and Claussen are insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. First, as to Hughes, Plaintiff seems to allege that he

delayed or denied Plaintiff’s treatment for extreme neck pain on October 4,
2024, October 21, 2024, and November 3, 2024. See Doc. 22 at 6–7, 11–13, 18.
Plaintiff admits, however, that he saw medical personnel for his neck pain
several times after the incident: on October 31, 2024, when he received

Ibuprofen and non-aspirin; on November 13, 2024, when he received Ibuprofen,
non-aspirin, analgesic balm, and a prescription for Ibuprofen, 600 mg; on
November 19, 2024, when he underwent X-rays, which did not reveal the cause
of his pain; and on December 18, 2024, at cell front. See id. at 11–13. As such,

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Hughes seems to be premised
on Plaintiff’s disagreement with the course of his treatment. But such
disagreement is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Adams, 61
10
F.3d at 1545. When an inmate has received medical care in prison, the inmate
must do more than allege the care provided was “subpar or different from what

[he] want[ed].” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266. Moreover, alleging “a simple
difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and
the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment” does not support
a constitutional claim under § 1983. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505

(11th Cir. 1991). Indeed, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess
[prison physicians’] medical judgments.” Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d
1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that
“[m]edical treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is ‘so

grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Thus,
allegations of medical negligence do not satisfy the stringent deliberate
indifference standard. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Accordingly, even if Hughes’s

conduct could be considered negligent, the Constitution is not implicated by
the negligent acts of prison officials. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31;
Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348. As Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that he
suffered a deprivation that was objectively, sufficiently serious, or that Hughes

acted with subjective recklessness, his claim for deliberate indifference will be
dismissed without prejudice.

11
For the same reasons, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claims against Emanoilidis and Claussen. These claims

appear to be based on Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s grievances and/or
requests for mental health treatment on October 22, 23, 25, 30, and 31, 2024,
and November 5, 12, and 13, 2024. See Doc. 22 at 13–15. However, Plaintiff’s
vague and conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference are insufficient to

state a claim for relief against Emanoilidis and Claussen. Plaintiff alleges he
was denied mental health treatment for his insomnia with nightmares and
flashbacks from the September 30, 2024 incident. See id. at 13–14. Accepting
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he fails to allege that he suffered a deprivation

that was objectively, sufficiently serious, or that Emanoilidis and Claussen
were aware that their own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm
to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Emanoilidis
and Claussen fail.

Plaintiff also alleges that he declared a psychological emergency on
December 28, 2024, as instructed previously by Emanoilidis, but was still
denied mental health treatment by unidentified staff who said that they
“need[ed] to see blood.” Id. at 15. These conclusory allegations against

unidentified staff are insufficient to state a claim. Further, to the extent
Plaintiff attempts to hold Emanoilidis and/or Claussen liable for the actions or
omissions of their unidentified subordinates, liability under § 1983 may not be
12
premised on a theory of vicarious liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall, 610 F.3d

at 709; see also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is
axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more
than a theory of respondeat superior.”).
In addition, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Emanoilidis, Claussen,

and/or Hughes were deliberately indifferent because they were involved in his
grievances, see Doc. 22 at 12–15, “filing a grievance with a supervisory person
does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the

grievance is denied.” Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF, 2013 WL
6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013)5 (collecting cases). There are
circumstances in which a defendant’s failure to act in response to an inmate’s
grievances may result in a constitutional violation. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty.,

510 F.3d 1312, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that a defendant’s lack of
action in response to an inmate’s written complaint amounted to deliberate
indifference and the delay attributable to the defendant’s deliberate

5 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,
371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would
not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would
have significant persuasive effects.”).
13
indifference may have caused the inmate’s injury). In Goebert, a pregnant
pretrial detainee submitted a medical complaint form, wherein she requested

to see an obstetrician or a doctor outside of the county jail. 510 F.3d at 1318.
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she had leaked amniotic fluid for
approximately nine days, she had not felt any movements from her baby, and
she had a history of miscarriages. Id. The defendant, a facility commander,

responded that medical could arrange an appointment at her expense, despite
the plaintiff noting in her complaint that medical staff had “ignored her daily
requests for aid and had already failed to set up an appointment for her with
an outside obstetrician.” Id. at 1328. In finding that the defendant was not

entitled to summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the inmate’s
written complaint contained sufficient information to provide the defendant
with subjective knowledge of her serious medical need, and his failure to take
action in response to her complaint because he did not believe her amounted

to deliberate indifference. Id. at 1327–28. But the facts of the present case are
distinguishable from those in Goebert. Whereas the defendant in Goebert
completely disregarded his duty to investigate the inmate’s time-sensitive
serious medical complaints, Plaintiff’s allegations in this case, albeit

conclusory and lacking supporting documentation, see Doc. 22 at 12 (informal
grievance about extreme neck pain and stiffness denied by Hughes); id. at 13
(grievance about mental health denied by Emanoilidis); id. at 14 (grievance
14
about mental health denied by Claussen); id. at 15 (unidentified grievances
denied or returned without action by the Warden and the Secretary); id. at 25

(same), do not suggest that prison officials “deliberately disregard[ed], without
any investigation or inquiry,” Plaintiff’s complaints. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1328
Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against
English and Moody, the Court finds that these claims must be dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Construing the SAC liberally,
Plaintiff alleges that English and Moody refused to allow him to participate in
the disciplinary proceeding by calling witnesses and presenting evidence,
including his own statement, in connection with the September 30, 2024

incident. See Doc. 22 at 6, 9–11. Plaintiff further alleges that English deprived
him of most of his personal property. See id. at 11.
First, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim of deprivation of personal
property against English, this claim fails. An intentional or negligent

deprivation of personal property does not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
due process violation “if a meaningful post[-]deprivation remedy for the loss is
available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App’x 697, 698
(11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has a meaningful post-deprivation remedy under

Florida law because he can sue English for conversion. Case v. Eslinger, 555
F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).

15
Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that English and Moody denied
him due process at the disciplinary proceeding, this claim also fails. Courts

“examine procedural due process questions in two steps.” Kentucky Dep’t of
Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). First, the court
“asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been
interfered with by the [s]tate,” and second, the court “examines whether the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”
Id. Even if a plaintiff shows a liberty interest at stake, such as the loss of good-
time credits, the due process clause requires only “some evidence” to support
the disciplinary decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does
not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56.
Here, Plaintiff alleges he received a copy of the disciplinary report on
October 3, 2024; he asked for an opportunity to provide his own statement
about the incident, which was denied; he appeared at the disciplinary hearing

on October 7, 2024; he was found guilty of the disciplinary charge based on
Leon’s statement; and he was sentenced to 30 days of punitive confinement.
See Doc. 22 at 10–11. Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff’s due
16
process claim necessarily fails because there was “some evidence” to support
the disciplinary decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; see also Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974) (holding that in disciplinary proceedings resulting
in a prisoner’s loss of good-time credits or imposition of solitary confinement,
due process requires that the prisoner be afforded “advance written notice of
the claimed violation and a written statement of factfinders as to the evidence

relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken”; and stating that
the prisoner “should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals” (emphasis added)).

Further, assuming that Plaintiff does not allege a loss of gain-time
credits,6 the Supreme Court has held the imposition of disciplinary
confinement does not trigger due process protections. See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (“[D]iscipline in segregated confinement [does] not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest.”); see also Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F.
App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The Due Process Clause does not create an
enforceable liberty interest in freedom from restrictive confinement while a

6 Except for one passing reference to “loss of gain-time,” Doc. 22 at 21, the SAC
does not seem to allege that Plaintiff lost gain-time credits as a result of the
disciplinary proceeding.
17
prisoner is incarcerated.”). Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that he faced
conditions of such a severity that they imposed an atypical and significant

hardship on him in comparison to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail
to show a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff complains the disciplinary proceeding

against him resulted in a loss of gain time, he may pursue any available relief
through a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after exhausting his
state court remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Tedesco v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corr., 190 F. App’x 752, 755–56 (11th Cir. 2006). Relatedly, while

Plaintiff seeks to have his disciplinary conviction “expunged,” such relief is
unavailable in a § 1983 civil rights action. See Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr.
Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 865 (11th Cir. 2017) (“‘[I]f the relief sought by the
inmate would either invalidate his conviction or sentence or change the nature

or duration of his sentence, the inmate’s claim must be raised in a § 2254
habeas petition, not a § 1983 civil rights action.’”) (quoting Hutcherson v. Riley,
468 F.3d 750, 754 (11h Cir. 2006)).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s federal claims against Moody, English,

Hughes, Emanoilidis, and Claussen will be dismissed without prejudice. This
leaves only the claims against Leon, for which the Court will enter a separate
order regarding service of process, and the state law medical negligence claims
18
against Emanoilidis, Claussen, and Hughes, which the Court will dismiss
without prejudice for failure to allege compliance with the pre-suit notice

requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Shands Teaching
Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Estate of Ashley Lawson, 175 So. 3d 327, 334 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2015). Plaintiff’s claims of medical negligence “aris[e] out of the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” Fla. Stat. § 766.106(1)(a).

Therefore, his claims are subject to the pre-suit requirements of Florida’s
Medical Malpractice Act, contained in Chapter 766, Florida
Statutes. See Johnson v. McNeil, 278 F. App’x 866, 871–72 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1121 (Fla. 2017) (“[B]efore

filing a medical negligence action in Florida, a claimant must satisfy statutory
requirements, which include conducting a presuit investigation process to
ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant
medical provider was negligent, and that the negligence resulted in injury to

the claimant.”). These pre-suit requirements include, but are not limited to the
following: (1) conducting a pre-suit investigation; (2) notifying each prospective
defendant of the intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence; (3) and
submitting to each prospective defendant a verified written medical expert

opinion which corroborates the existence of reasonable grounds to initiate the
litigation. See Fla. Stat. §§ 766.104, 766.106, 766.203(2). Because Plaintiff has

19
not alleged compliance with Florida’s pre-suit notification requirements, his
medical negligence claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Even if Plaintiff had adequately stated medical negligence claims
against Emanoilidis, Claussen, and Hughes, the Court would decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, because the federal
claims against these Defendants, over which the Court has original

jurisdiction, are due to be dismissed. “The decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pend[e]nt state claims rests within the discretion of the
district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir.
2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise

jurisdiction over a state claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Notably, “[a]ny one of the section 1367(c) factors is
sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss a case’s supplemental
state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743
(11th Cir. 2006). However, upon determining that it has the discretion under
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§ 1367(c) to decline jurisdiction, “[a district court] should consider the
traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and

convenience in deciding whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer v.
Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, judicial economy and convenience would not be served by retaining
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s medical negligence claims. First, these claims are

uniquely state law claims that are best addressed by the state courts. Further,
although these claims relate to the treatment Plaintiff received or requested
after the September 30, 2024 use-of-force incident involving Leon, they are not
necessarily connected to the claims involving Leon. It appears that Plaintiff’s

medical negligence claims cover the period of October–December 2024, involve
three separate Defendants, and would require consideration of law and facts
that are different from those involving the claims against Leon. Additionally,
considering that the SAC has not yet been served, the procedural posture of

this case weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims. Moreover, when, as here, federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “encouraged district courts to dismiss
any remaining state claims.” Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089; Busse v. Lee Cnty., 317

F. App’x 968, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Since the district court ‘had dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,’ it therefore had the discretion
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Appellant’s] state law claims.
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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage district courts to
take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed pretrial.”); see

also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the
usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).
Therefore, upon consideration of the § 1367 factors and the “traditional
rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and
convenience,” see Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569, the Court would decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s medical negligence claims, even if
such claims had been adequately pled.7 If Plaintiff chooses to refile his medical
negligence claims, he should do so in the appropriate state court.

7 The Court notes that Plaintiff will suffer no harm from the Court’s decision
to decline supplemental jurisdiction because federal law provides for the tolling of the
state limitations period while a state claim is pending in federal court. Specifically,
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides that:
[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection
(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days
after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.

As such, even if the statute of limitations has otherwise run on Plaintiff’s state law
claims, Plaintiff has at least thirty days to refile his negligence claims in state court.
See Dukes v. Georgia, 212 F. App’x 916, 917–18 (11th Cir. 2006); Dusek v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1354 n.18 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
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Therefore, it is now ORDERED:
1. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) is DISMISSED
without prejudice as to Plaintiffs claims against J. Moody, C. English, F.
Hughes, G. Emanoilidis, and M. Claussen.
2. The Clerk shall terminate J. Moody, C. English, F. Hughes, G.
Emanoilidis, and M. Claussen as Defendants in this case.
3. A separate Order will enter regarding service of process on
Nickolas Leon.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 28rd day of
April, 2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
Chief United States District Judge

Jax-11
C: Roderick Damon Brime, #M85423

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367090. Public record. Not legal advice.