# CASTELLI

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367052

## Case

- **Full name:** Nicola Castelli v. American Red Cross, Jill Mullane, Omer Angun, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NICOLA CASTELLI,
Civil Action No.: 23-1198 (ES) (AME)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
AMERICAN RED CROSS, JILL
MULLANE, OMER ANGUN, et al.,

Defendants.
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff Nicola Castelli (“Plaintiff”) filed the First Amended
Complaint alleging various claims against defendants the American Red Cross (“ARC”), Jill
Mullane (“Mullane”), and Omer Angun (“Angun”) (together, “Defendants”). (D.E. No. 54
(“FAC”)). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (D.E. No. 55 (“Motion” or “Mot.”)). The Court has
carefully reviewed the First Amended Complaint and the parties’ submissions in support of and in
opposition to the Motion (see generally D.E. No. 55-1 (“Mov. Br.”); D.E. No. 58 (“Opp. Br.”);
D.E. No. 59 (“Reply Br.”)), and decides the matter without oral argument, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in-
part and DENIED in-part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations1
From on or around October 10, 2020, to on or around March 14, 2022, non-party Dropoff,
Inc. (“Dropoff”) employed Plaintiff as a medical courier. (FAC ¶¶ 11–13). Plaintiff maintains

that Dropoff unlawfully terminated his employment on March 14, 2022. (Id. ¶ 12). Bernard
Melton, Plaintiff’s supervisor, directed Plaintiff’s pickup and delivery schedule for Dropoff. (Id.
¶¶ 15 & 37). “[A]pproximately three to four times per day,” Plaintiff conducted pickups and
deliveries at ARC’s Fairfield, New Jersey office, as directed by Dropoff. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17). Plaintiff
alleges Dropoff unlawfully terminated his employment after he experienced sexual harassment
from an ARC employee, defendant Mullane, whom he encountered “approximately three to four
times per week” while performing his job duties at ARC. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19 & 78).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that after beginning his position with Dropoff, while onsite
at ARC during the workday, Mullane asked Plaintiff out on a date, which made him feel
uncomfortable. (Id. ¶ 22). Although Plaintiff “politely declined” Mullane’s request, she continued

to ask Plaintiff on dates during his pickups and deliveries at ARC and “made other sexually
motivated comments towards Plaintiff at least once or twice per week.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–24; see also id.
¶¶ 25–26 (alleging that Mullane would often ask Plaintiff the following questions: (i) “Will you
go out with me?” (ii) “How would you rate me in attractiveness?” and (iii) “Don’t you fine me
attractive?”). Plaintiff continued to decline Plaintiff’s advances, and made clear that he would not
date women that he worked with. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff maintains that he “made verbal complaints”
about Mullane’s conduct to his supervisor and ARC’s manager, Angun. (Id. ¶ 28). Angun advised

1 The factual background is taken from the allegations in the First Amended Complaint. For purposes of the
instant Motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court assumes the parties’
familiarity with the procedural posture of this matter and recites only the history applicable to the instant Motion.
Plaintiff to “ignore” Mullane and to “keep ‘hush’ about the situation.” (Id. ¶ 29). Angun allegedly
did nothing to address Mullane’s behavior; nor did he conduct an investigation regarding
Plaintiff’s complaints. (Id. ¶ 30).
Meanwhile, Mullane continued to pursue Plaintiff, which caused Plaintiff embarrassment,

stress, and anxiety each time he went to ARC on behalf of Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 32). For example, in or
around June 2021, Mullane allegedly harassed Plaintiff in front of a female FedEx driver, by asking
the driver whether she thought Plaintiff was “attractive” and suggesting that the pair should “go
out on a date.” (Id. ¶¶ 33–35). Next, on or about July 31, 2021, Plaintiff picked up an order from
ARC and “denied a sexual advance made by” Mullane. (Id. ¶ 36). Shortly thereafter, Melton
informed Plaintiff that his employment at Dropoff had been suspended—without an explanation—
until ARC reviewed its security camera footage. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38). Melton further advised Plaintiff
that ARC did not want him on site because of a complaint lodged by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 38). Plaintiff
contacted Angun, who informed him that Mullane “complained to [ARC] that Plaintiff was loud
and slammed his trunk when performing [a] pickup.” (Id. ¶ 39). Plaintiff refuted Mullane’s

allegations. (Id. ¶ 40). ARC “cleared” Plaintiff of “all wrongdoings” after it reviewed the its
security camera footage. (Id. ¶ 41). Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that the video footage
“demonstrated that Plaintiff did not engage in the behavior [ ] Mullane falsely accused him of.”
(Id. ¶ 42). Thereafter, Dropoff lifted Plaintiff’s suspension effective August 2, 2021. (Id. ¶ 43).
Plaintiff missed two days of work and income as a result “Mullane’s false allegation.” (Id.).
Sometime later in August 2021, Plaintiff “complained to Melton of the ongoing sexual
harassment and subsequent retaliation he faced from [ ] Mullane.” (Id. ¶ 44). In particular,
Plaintiff told Melton about Mullane’s “constant sexual advances, the incident with the FedEx
driver, as well as [ ] Mullane’s inappropriate inquiries into Plaintiff’s nonexistent relationship with
the FedEx employee.” (Id. ¶ 45). Furthermore, Plaintiff “complained” that Mullane “retaliated
against him by making a false complaint/report for denying her sexual advances.” (Id.). Plaintiff
also made similar complaints to Angun around the same timeframe. (Id. ¶ 46). Again, Angun told
Plaintiff to “avoid” Mullan because she “suffers from bipolar disorder.” (Id. ¶ 47). ARC never

investigated Plaintiff’s complaints; nor did it support Plaintiff regarding his complaints. (Id. ¶ 48).
“For the remainder of his employment [at Dropoff], . . . Plaintiff remained fearful of how [ ]
Mullane would retaliate against him, what she was capable of, and the potential effect of her
causing an end to his employment with Dropoff due to her false retaliatory complaints.” (Id. ¶
49).
Thereafter, on or about October 31, 2021, Mullane allegedly hid plastic snakes in Plaintiff’s
truck in an attempt to both “frighten and/or intimidate him.” (Id. ¶ 50.). Plaintiff maintains that
Mullane used “these pranks as an excuse to speak with, and further harass [him].” (Id. ¶ 51). Then
Mullane’s “attitude toward Plaintiff changed.” (Id. ¶ 52). For example, in November 2021,
Plaintiff alleges he “again brought [ ] Mullane’s conduct to the attention of both Dropoff and

[ARC],” by telling Melton and Angun that he “was being sexually harassed by [ ] Mullane and he
believed she was retaliating against him for denying her advances.” (Id. ¶ 53). Dropoff and ARC
ignored Plaintiff’s complaints and he “was told not to inform anyone else of the treatment he was
facing.” (Id. ¶ 54).
That same month, Plaintiff asserts Dropoff directed him to take certain boxes from St.
Joseph’s University Medical Center (“St. Joseph’s”) to ARC; about ten minutes later, Dropoff
directed Plaintiff to take boxes from ARC back to St. Joseph’s. (Id. ¶¶ 55–56). Plaintiff noted his
confusion about these reverse directives to Mullane, who met Plaintiff when he picked up boxes
at ARC. (Id. ¶ 57). Mullane responded by “scold[ing]” Plaintiff and “slamm[ing] the door on
him.” (Id. ¶ 58). “Soon thereafter,” Dropoff suspended Plaintiff pending ARC’s investigation of
a complaint made against him by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 59). Although Plaintiff maintains that he did not
know the “substance of the complaint,” ARC’s investigation revealed that “Plaintiff did not engage
in any wrongdoing.” (Id. ¶ 60).

Plaintiff additionally asserts that on March 12, 2022, Dropoff directed him to pick up boxes
from ARC for delivery to Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 64). Plaintiff refused, but Plaintiff ultimately agreed
to perform the pickup and delivery. (Id. ¶ 65). When he arrived in Fairfield, no one from ARC
answered the doorbell, which he rang twice. (Id. ¶ 66). While waiting for ARC to answer the
doorbell, he contacted a Dropoff dispatcher, who asked Plaintiff to wait while it contacted ARC.
(Id. ¶ 67). An ARC employee eventually told Plaintiff that “there was no order for him to pick
up.” (Id. ¶ 68). Plaintiff immediately contacted Dropoff to relay the development and his
departure from ARC’s premises, citing his “concern” about “Mullane’s erratic, harassing, and
retaliatory behavior.” (Id. ¶¶ 69–70). About an hour later, Dropoff suspended Plaintiff pending
an investigation by ARC. (Id. ¶ 71). Dropoff did not respond to Plaintiff’s inquiry regarding the

reason for his suspension. (Id. ¶ 72). Angun told Plaintiff that Mullane “reported Plaintiff for
allegedly using a volunteer entrance and entering the building” at ARC “during the [March 12,
2022] pickup, which was prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s
duties as a courier.” (Id. ¶ 73). Plaintiff maintains he never entered the ARC building and that
Mullane fabricated her report. (Id. ¶ 74). Plaintiff alleges that ARC never investigated Mullane’s
“several clearly false reports” about Plaintiff’s purported conduct. (Id. ¶ 75). Moreover, Plaintiff
claims that during each of his suspensions from performing courier services at ARC, Angun and
Dropoff asked him to perform night delivers to ARC when Mullane was off duty. (Id. ¶ 62). Thus,
Plaintiff believes that ARC knew Mullane’s complaints were “frivolous” because he had
permission to conduct courier services when Mullane was not present, “which he did without
issue.” (Id. ¶ 63).
Following Mullane’s last complaint, ARC informed Plaintiff that it did not want him on its
“premises due to the complaints made by [ ] Mullane.” (Id. ¶ 76). Plaintiff asserts that on or about

March 14, 2022, Dropoff terminated his employment because he “was no longer authorized to
enter [ARC’s] premises, where he completed a majority of his work for.” (Id. ¶ 77). Plaintiff
alleges that ARC “utterly failed to investigate and/or remedy the sexual harassment complaint of
by Plaintiff and fostered an environment of unlawful activity.” (Id. ¶ 79; see also id. ¶ 61 (noting
that Plaintiff was “terrified to perform his job duties” at ARC because of Mullane’s conduct and
both Dropoff and ARC’s “failure to investigate and/or remediate his complaints”)). He believes
that ARC did not want him “on their premises due to his numerous complaints of sexual
harassment and retaliation against a[n] [ARC] employee.” (Id. ¶ 80). As a result, Plaintiff alleges
that he “suffered, and continues to suffer, from severe physical and emotional distress, humiliation,
mental anguish, and economic loss.” (Id. ¶ 81).

Finally, Plaintiff maintains that before his interactions with Mullane, he never had any
disciplinary action by Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 20). Nor had he ever been the subject of a complaint or
investigation “by Dropoff or a customer of Dropoff.” (Id. ¶ 21). Furthermore, Plaintiff “was a
highly relied upon employee who excelled in performing his job duties and responsibilities” at
Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges five causes of action against Defendants,
including: (i) violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. §
10:5-1 et seq., specifically retaliation and aiding and abetting retaliation (Counts I and II); (ii)
defamation (Count III); (iii) tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage (Count
IV); and (iv) negligence (Count V). (FAC ¶¶ 82–120). On October 1, 2025, Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot.). The
Motion is fully briefed. (See generally Mov. Br.; Opp. Br.; Reply Br.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations; it does, however, demand “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff’s short and plain statement of
the claim must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” are all disregarded.
City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878–79 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)). Further, a complaint
may be considered frivolous where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a
‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,
530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s NJLAD Claims (Counts I & II)
Under the NJLAD, an employer may not retaliate against an employee because that
employee “has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under [NJLAD] or because that person has
. . . filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [NJLAD].” N.J. Stat. Ann. §

10:5-12(d); see also Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 391 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (D.N.J.
2005). “To state a prima facie case for retaliation under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that
[]he (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) that []he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605 (D.N.J. 2016) (first citing
Sanchez v. SunGard Availability Servs. LP, 362 F. App’x 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2010); and then citing
Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 70 A.3d 602, 619 (N.J. 2013)).
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain his NJLAD claims against Defendants
because they did not employ Plaintiff. (Mov. Br. at 6–8). Plaintiff argues that the statute “is not
limited to one’s employer, but rather applies to the conduct of ‘any person.’” (Opp. Br. at 6–7

(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d) and Cottrell v. J & R Disc. Liquor Gallery, Inc., No. 08-5418,
2009 WL 1085729, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009)); see also id. at 8–9). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court agrees with Defendants and need not reach the balance of their arguments.
As noted by Plaintiff, (see Opp. Br. at 6–7), NJLAD retaliation claims are rooted in Section
10:5-12(d) of the statute, which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination”:
d. For any person to take reprisals against any person because that
person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under P.L.1945,
c. 169 (C.10:5-1 et seq.) . . . .

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d). By the provision’s plain terms, retaliation can occur if reprisals are
carried out by “any person” against an individual who opposes conduct that is prohibited under
the NJLAD, i.e., any forbidden act as defined under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq. See id.
(emphasis added). Indeed, this is the theory Plaintiff pursues as reflected in both his First Amended
Complaint and opposition brief. (See FAC ¶¶ 82–96; see also, e.g., Opp. Br. at 9 (arguing that

“Plaintiff’s complaints to ARC opposing the practice of one of its employees is a protected
activity” under NJLAD “and therefore, the retaliation claim against Defendants is cognizable”)).
Plaintiff broadly alleges that the prohibited practice or act he opposed under the NJLAD is
Mullane’s alleged “sexual harassment” that Plaintiff experienced on a weekly basis when he
performed his job duties for Dropoff on ARC’s premises. (FAC ¶¶ 23–24, 44, 78–80, 91, 93 &
95).
Relevant here, Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to his reports of alleged “sexual
harassment” are vague and conclusory at best. (See FAC ¶ 28 (alleging that Plaintiff made verbal
complaints about Defendant Mullane’s conduct to Melton and Red Cross manager, Angun); id. ¶
45 (claiming that “Plaintiff informed Melton of Defendant Mullane’s constant sexual advances”

and mentioning one encounter with a FedEx driver); id. ¶ 45 (“Plaintiff also complained that he
believed [ ] Mullane retaliated against him by making a false complaint/report for denying her
sexual advances”)). Similarly, Plaintiff seems to allege, in a circular fashion, that Defendants
retaliated against him under the NJLAD because Plaintiff complained about Defendants’
“retaliation” to Angun and Melton. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 44, 78 & 80). These allegations are also
conclusory.2 Sapp v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., No. 24-10360, 2026 WL 636828, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar.
6, 2026) (dismissing NJLAD claim where the court could not determine whether plaintiff engaged
in protected activity by “opposing a practice rendered unlawful by NJLAD” because Plaintiff

2 The vague complaints and reports made by Plaintiff are distinguishable from the alleged questions Mullane
asked Plaintiff on a weekly basis (see FAC ¶¶ 22–26); however, those allegations are likewise sparse at best.
failed to “allege any facts regarding the substance of [his] complaints” to the department of
education).
Despite these pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint also fails to cite
or reference the underlying NJLAD provision(s) that forms the basis of the alleged “sexual

harassment” and “retaliation” that Plaintiff allegedly opposed as conduct that is prohibited under
the NJLAD. (See generally FAC; see also Opp. Br.). For example, as it relates to sexual
harassment, the NJLAD provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the
case may be, an unlawful discrimination”:
a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership
status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information,
pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression,
disability [and other protected statuses] . . . to discriminate against
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment . . . .

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). This provision plainly applies to discriminatory conduct by “an
employer.” See id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff concedes that neither ARC, Angun, or Mullane
employed him during the relevant period. (See FAC ¶ 11 (alleging that “Plaintiff, at all times
relevant to this Complaint, was employed by Dropoff, Inc.”)). Accordingly, it is unclear how
Plaintiff could have opposed ARC, Angun, or Mullane’s conduct under Section 10:5-12(a)—
applicable only to “an employer.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a) (emphasis added). To the
extent Plaintiff maintains that ARC acted as an “employer-controller of the worksite,” (see Opp.
Br. at 8), he does not expand on this or any other joint-employer theory of liability in his opposition
brief or First Amended Complaint (see id.; see also FAC).
Furthermore, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has sufficiently invoked any other provision of
the NJLAD that would permit a retaliation claim under Section 10:5-12(d) in the absence of an
employer-employee relationship. Relevant here, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to amend his
pleading in opposition to Defendants’ Motion by transforming Count I into a public
accommodation retaliation claim under Section 10:5-12(f)(1). (See Opp. Br. at 8).3 On this score,
the Court agrees that Plaintiff does not allege that ARC’s Fairfield location is “open to the public,”

(see Reply Br. at 6). When read as a whole, Mullane’s alleged sexual harassment forms the basis
of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim—not ARC’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff in a public space. (See
generally FAC (omitting any reference to “public accommodation” or “Section 10:5-12(f)(1)”)).
Thus, even if construed broadly, the First Amended Complaint does not put Defendants on notice
of a public accommodation retaliation claim under NJLAD. (See generally id.).
For these reasons, the Court finds this matter distinguishable from cases that hold an
employer-employee relationship is not required to pursue an NJLAD retaliation claim. See, e.g.,
Cottrell v. J & R Disc. Liquor Gallery, Inc., No. 08-5418, 2009 WL 1085729, at *4 n.6 (D.N.J.
Apr. 21, 2009) (noting that the NJLAD is “not limited to employer/employee relationships” where
plaintiffs brought an NJLAD relation claim premised on their reporting of defendants’ alleged

“failure to make accessible handicapped parking for the disabled liquor store patrons” under the
public accommodations prong of the NJLAD, Section 10:5-12(f)). Accordingly, Defendants’
motion to dismiss Count I is GRANTED. See, e.g., Turner v. Johnson, No. 17-0541, 2024 WL
4891773, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim where no employer-
employee relationship existed among the parties and noting that “[t]o the extent [p]laintiff has an
NJLAD claim against [d]efendants, it would be based on NJLAD’s prohibition on discrimination

3 Plaintiff may not amend his First Amended Complaint through arguments raised in an opposition brief. See,
e.g., Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a court considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion must limit its review to the allegations in the complaint, and “[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint
may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss” (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1984))).
in public accommodations”). Count I is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to
amend his complaint and clarify the basis of his NJLAD retaliation claim. In doing so, Plaintiff
shall identify how the conduct he opposed is prohibited by the NJLAD and identify the specific
provision(s) that forbid the opposed conduct by the non-employer Defendants. In addition, to the

extent Plaintiff continues to maintain an NJLAD retaliation claim premised on alleged sexual
harassment, he shall allege the details surrounding the alleged sexual harassment, including all
reports made in relation thereto, with the appropriate specificity.4
Finally, because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the principal violation
of NJLAD retaliation, he cannot maintain a separate claim for aiding and abetting the same under
Section 10:5-12(e). See Taylor v. Lincare, Inc., No. 15-6284, 2016 WL 3849852, at *7 (D.N.J.
July 15, 2016) (“Therefore, ‘because [p]laintiff’s underlying causes of action fail, there can be no
claim for aiding and abetting in violation of the NJLAD.’” (quoting Haddix v. Camden Cty. Youth
Det. Ctr., 2015 WL 3755023, at *6 (D.N.J. June 16, 2015))). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count II is GRANTED and Count II is DISMISSED without prejudice.5

B. Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim (Count III)
“To establish defamation under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show the defendant (1)
made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) communicated the statement
to a third party, and (3) had a sufficient degree of fault.” Mangan v. Corp. Synergies Grp., Inc.,
834 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63,

4 Relevant here, an amended pleading should include all allegations within Plaintiff’s knowledge, including,
but not limited to, the time the alleged sexual harassment began, and any and all details regarding: (i) Plaintiff’s
complaints to Angun and Melton regarding Mullane’s alleged sexual harassment; (ii) Mullane’s allegedly false
complaints/reports regarding Plaintiff; and (iii) the extent and breadth of Mullane’s alleged sexual advances, “sexually
motivated comments,” or similar behavior. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 24).
5 Because the Court dismisses Counts I and II for the reasons stated above, it need not address Defendants’
remaining arguments in support of dismissal.
79, 876 A.2d 885 (N.J. App. Div. 2005)).
As a preliminary matter, in opposing Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff clarifies that his
“defamation claim is solely against Mullane.” (Opp. Br. at 20 & 21 n.1). Thus, the Court need
not address Defendants’ defamation arguments that pertain to Angun or ARC.6 (See Mov. Br. at

20–21). For this reason, Count III is DISMISSED as to Angun and ARC with prejudice.
On the merits of Count III, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead facts
“to identify the defamatory words, their utterer[,] and the fact of their publication” such that his
“vague and conclusory allegation[s] [are] not enough.” (Mov. Br. at 21–22 (quoting Langley v.
United Airlines, Inc., No. 23-20602, 2024 WL 3219295, at *4 (D.N.J. June 28, 2024))).
Defendants also encourage the Court to dismiss Count II “because the alleged words do not rise to
the level of defamatory.” (Id. at 23). Specifically, Defendants argue that the only statement
Mullane made that is pled with “any semblance of particularity” (see id. at 24), is that Plaintiff
“used a volunteer entrance and enter[ed] the building of [ARC] during the pickup, which was
prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s duties as a courier,” (see FAC

¶ 73; see also id. ¶ 104). They contend that this statement “does not convey anything that would
subject Plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, nor would it deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him.” (Mov. Br. at 24). At most, Defendants suggest that Mullane’s statement
reflects “a trivial mistake” Plaintiff made when “carrying out his duties.” (Id.).
Plaintiff opposes, arguing that he alleged “a concrete accusation by Mullane” which
consisted of her report that he “used a volunteer entrance” and “entered ARC’s building during a
pickup” combined with the allegations that Mullane uttered the statement to “ARC management”

6 Plaintiff fails to explain—in his First Amended Complaint and opposition brief—how Count III is pled as to
ARC “in the alternative based on publication through workplace channels” under a vicariously liability theory, (see
Opp. Br. at 21 n.1). Thus, the Court will not assess Plaintiff’s purported alternative theory against ARC.
that was subsequently “relayed to Dropoff” on “March 12, 2022 at ARC’s Fairfield facility.” (Opp.
Br. at 21 (quoting FAC ¶ 73); see also id. at 22 (noting that “employment-related reports about a
person’s honesty, fitness, or compliance with workplace rules are ‘published’ when they are made
to management”)). Plaintiff further asserts that Mullane’s statement was disparaging because the

alleged conduct defied ARC’s policies and procedures and “intended to harm Plaintiff’s reputation
with his employer and in the community.” (Id. at 21 (citing FAC ¶¶ 104–05)). In addition, Plaintiff
maintains that he need not plead the “precise defamatory statements” Mullane made at the motion
to dismiss stage. (Id. at 22). For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion
to dismiss Count III as it pertains to Mullane’s statement regarding Plaintiff’s improper use of
ARC’s volunteer entrance.
While “a defamation pleading does not need to cite precise defamatory statements, it must
. . . provide sufficient notice to the other party of the allegations made against [it].” Cristelli v.
Filomena II, Inc., No. 99-2862, 1999 WL 1081290, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1999) (emphasis added).
The “pleading must allege the elements of defamation . . . to a degree of sufficient specificity.”

Mangan, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 204. As such, a plaintiff “‘must plead facts sufficient to identify the
defamatory words, their utterer[,] and the fact of their publication. A vague[,] conclusory
allegation is not enough.’” Robles v. U.S. Env’t Universal Servs., Inc., 469 F. App’x 104, 109 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 514 A.2d 53, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986)); see also F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 875 (3d Cir. 1994). “In other words, a plaintiff
must plead facts sufficient to identify ‘when, where, by which defendants and by what words,
written or oral, plaintiff was defamed.’” Russomanno v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., No. 22-5032,
2023 WL 2649453, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2023) (quoting Cruz v. HSBC, No. 10-0135, 2010 WL
2989987, at *3 (D.N.J. July 26, 2010)), aff’d, No. 23-1587, 2023 WL 6374191 (3d Cir. July 17,
2023). “A plaintiff can bolster a defamation cause of action through discovery but not [ ] file a
conclusory complaint to find out if one exists.” Printing Mart–Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp.,
563 A.2d 31, 46 (N.J. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although Defendants correctly note that a defamatory statement must be pled with

specificity, the Court disagrees that Plaintiff has failed to do so here with respect to Mullane’s
statement about Plaintiff’s use of ARC’s volunteer entrance. For example, Defendants are on
adequate notice that Mullane allegedly reported Plaintiff’s use of a volunteer entrance at ARC on
or about March 12, 2022. (FAC ¶¶ 64 & 73). Plaintiff identifies Mullane as the person who uttered
the allegedly defamatory statement and it can easily be inferred that Mullane made the statement
sometime between March 12, 2022—the date of the incident in question—and March 14, 2022,
the day Dropoff terminated Plaintiff. (See FAC ¶¶ 64 & 95). When viewing the allegations in the
non-movant’s favor, the Court can infer that Mullane made the allegedly false report to
management because Angun, an ARC supervisor, informed Plaintiff about Mullane’s report. (See
id. ¶ 73). Indeed, “while it would be more clear had the First Amended Complaint been more
specific about which employees and/or management at ARC”7 Mullane made the allegedly false

statements to, “the Court believes that the First Amended Complaint describes the alleged facts of
publication with enough particularity to provide ARC with knowledge of the circumstances.” See
Cruz, 2010 WL 2989987, at *3 (quotation modified).8 However, to the extent Plaintiff maintains

7 The fact that Mullane allegedly made the defamatory statement to ARC—not Plaintiff’s employer—is of no
moment in the context of a defamation claim. See Mangan, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (“New Jersey courts have instead
addressed whether the statement was protected by a qualified privilege.” (citing Abella v. Barringer Res., Inc., 615
A.2d 288, 291 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1992) (“A defamatory statement is published when it is communicated ... to one other
than the person defamed.”))).
8 Defendants’ cited cases are distinguishable from the instant matter because those complaints either fail to
provide any subject matter regarding the alleged defamatory statements or they broadly attribute vague and conclusory
criminality to the plaintiff. (See Mov. Br. at 21–22 (citing cases)). In addition, for the reasons noted above, the Court
rejects Defendants’ argument that “[v]erifiability of Plaintiff’s allegations is also questionable because Plaintiff
that Mullane made any other “knowingly false statements concerning [him]” (FAC ¶ 104), the
Court agrees that these purported statements are vague and conclusory; thus, they lack the requisite
specificity to survive Defendants’ Motion.
Next, while also a closer call, the Court disagrees that the alleged statement regarding

Plaintiff’s use of ARC’s volunteer entrance is not defamatory as it pertains to ARC and Dropoff.
“A defamatory statement is one that is (1) false and injures another person’s reputation, or (2)
subjects a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or (3) causes others to lose good will or
confidence in that person.” Castillo v. Viso, No. 17-5255, 2024 WL 3594351, at *12 (D.N.J. July
31, 2024) (quoting Morgan v. Maxwell, No. A-3157-19, 2021 WL 1605989, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 26, 2021)). Thus, a defamatory statement “is one that . . . deter[s] others from
wanting to associate or deal with [the subject of the statement].” Read v. Profeta, 397 F. Supp. 3d
597, 650–51 (D.N.J. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J.
2011)). To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the Court assesses the statement
“according to the fair and natural meaning which it would be given by persons of ordinary

intelligence.” Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
Based on the allegations, which the Court must accept as true, Plaintiff maintains that
Mullane’s false reporting of his use of a volunteer entrance damaged his reputation with both ARC
and Dropoff such that both entities lost confidence in his ability to perform his job duties as a
courier. (See FAC ¶¶ 103–06). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that use of the volunteer entrance
“was prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s duties as a courier.”
(Id. ¶ 73; see also id. ¶ 104). As a result, Plaintiff learned that ARC no longer wanted him on its

provides no precise words actually spoken.” (Id. at 24). Indeed, the Court finds that Mullane’s allegedly defamatory
statement has been pled with sufficient particularity for identification purposes.
premises in Fairfield, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 76). And Dropoff terminated Plaintiff shortly thereafter.
(Id. ¶¶ 77 & 107).9 For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Count III is DENIED. The
Court recognizes, however, that Defendants may move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
defamation claim after the close of discovery.

C. Plaintiff’s Tortious Interference with a Prospective or Existing Economic
Advantage Claim (Count IV)
Under New Jersey law, to establish tortious interference with a prospective or existing10
economic advantage, a party must establish:
(1) a reasonable expectation of economic advantage from a
prospective contractual or economic relationship; (2) the defendant
intentionally and maliciously interfered with the relationship; (3) the
interference caused the loss of the expected advantage; and (4)
actual damages resulted.

Am. Leistritz Extruder Corp. v. Polymer Concentrates, Inc., 363 F. App’x 963, 967 (3d Cir. 2010).
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that “Mullane interfered with Plaintiff’s reasonable
expectation of economic advantage by intentionally sabotaging Plaintiff’s reputation and
succeeding in having Plaintiff terminated from his employment with Dropoff.” (FAC ¶ 111). He
further asserts that each of “Mullane’s complaints to [ARC] were fabricated and made in
furtherance of [ ] Mullane’s attempt to have Plaintiff terminated.” (Id. ¶ 112; see also id. ¶ 113).
Thus, Plaintiff believes that “Mullane tortiously interfered with [his] prospective economic
relationship,” which directly and proximately resulted in Plaintiff’s damages. (Id. ¶¶ 114–15).
First, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count IV against Angun and ARC because the
allegations in Count IV pertain only to Mullane. (Mov. Br. at 25). Plaintiff fails to refute this

9 For clarity, the Court agrees with Defendants in that Plaintiff has not pled how Mullane’s allegedly
defamatory statement damaged his reputation in the greater community. (See Mov. Br. at 24).
10 Although pled as “tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage,” (FAC at 19), Defendants
seemingly accept that Count IV relates to Plaintiff’s then-existing economic relationship with his prior employer,
Dropoff. (See Mov. Br. at 25–26).
argument and essentially confirms that he seeks to hold only Mullane liable under Count IV. (See
Opp. Br. at 23–24 (arguing that “Plaintiff can demonstrate [ ] Mullane tortiously interfered with
[his] contract and/or prospective economic advantage with Dropoff); see also id. at 25–26
(maintaining that but-for “Mullane’s intentional[ ] and malicious[ ] interfere[nce]” with Plaintiff’s

relationship with Dropoff, he would not have been terminated; nor would he have suffered
economic damages or emotional distress (emphasis added))). In addition, the allegations in Count
IV recounted above relate only to Mullane. (See FAC ¶¶ 108–15). Thus, Count IV is
DISMISSED without prejudice as to Angun and ARC.
As it relates to Mullane, Defendants’ sole argument in support of dismissal is that Mullane
never “complained to Plaintiff’s employer, Dropoff,” nor did she ever “communicate[] with
Dropoff management.” (Mov. Br. at 26). Rather, Defendants note that Mullane only “complained
to ARC, her employer,” which they say is fatal to Count IV because Plaintiff fails to allege “facts
showing th[at] [ ] Mullane specifically intended to interfere with his employment with Dropoff.”
(Id.). Defendants cite to Angrisani v. Capital Access Network, Inc., 175 F. App’x 554, 557 (3d

Cir. 2006) in support of its position because there, “the Third Circuit upheld dismissal of a tortious
interference claim” where the plaintiff “could not demonstrate specific intent to interfere.” (Mov.
Br. at 25). Plaintiff opposes, noting, among other things, that Mullane made “frivolous, unfounded
complaints” with malice and “with the goal of having Plaintiff terminated.” (Opp. Br. at 25).
Accepting all facts pled as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
movant, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of a
tortious interference claim against Mullane. Relevant here, “malice is defined to mean that the
harm was inflicted intentionally and without justification or excuse.” Printing Mart-Morristown,
563 A.2d at 37. Plaintiff alleges that Mullane purposefully “sabotage[d]” his reputation by lodging
false reports and complaints to ARC regarding Plaintiff’s conduct during the course of his
employment. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 45–46, 86 & 111). He also alleges that Mullane fabricated her
complaints in furtherance of her “attempt to have Plaintiff terminated.” (Id. ¶ 112). In addition,
Plaintiff maintains that ARC cleared him of “wrongdoing in response to each false complaint”

filed by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 88). At this juncture, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to establish
intentional and malicious interference with Plaintiff’s economic advantage, i.e., his employment
relationship with Dropoff.
Defendants cite no authority that compels the Court to find that Mullane had to file
complaints directly with Dropoff—Plaintiff’s employer—to establish a tortious interference claim.
(See Mov. Br. at 25–26). Although Defendants acknowledge that “it is equally plausible—if not
more plausible—that [ ] Mullane . . . complain[ed] to her own employer to try to minimize her
contact with Plaintiff,” (Mov. Br. at 26 (emphasis added)), it is thus also equally plausible that she
complained for the purpose alleged in the First Amended Complaint—to sabotage Plaintiff’s
economic relationship with Dropoff.

Moreover, Angrisani is distinguishable from the instant matter. There, the Third Circuit
upheld the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s tortious interference claim in
favor of the defendant because plaintiff “failed to produce any evidence suggesting that [the
defendant] acted to induce [plaintiff’s employer] to terminate him, or that [defendant] prevented
[plaintiff] from performing his job.” 175 F. App’x at 557. First, this matter is on an entirely
different procedural posture at the motion to dismiss stage and does not yet have the benefit of a
full evidentiary record. Second, the allegations here, taken as true as the Court must at this stage,
state that Mullane did act to induce Dropoff to terminate his employment relationship and that her
actions did prevent Plaintiff from performing his job duties for Dropoff—first during brief
suspensions and then in perpetuity following his termination. Moreover, Plaintiff also alleges that
ARC ultimately “cleared” him of Mullane’s accusations, and he further asserted that before
encountering Mullane, Plaintiff (i) never had an complaint or investigation lodged against him by
“either Dropoff or a customer of Dropoff,” and (ii) never had any prior disciplinary action from
Dropoff. (FAC ¶¶ 20–21 & 88).11

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss Count IV as it
pertains to Mullane. See, e.g., Tonkinson v. Byrd, No. 17-6162, 2018 WL 1919829, at *6 (D.N.J.
Apr. 24, 2018) (noting that “[p]laintiff’s lack of knowledge about what exactly [defendant] said to
her new employer d[id] not cause her claim to fail at this motion to dismiss stage”).
D. Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim (Count V)
To establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (i) owed the
plaintiff a duty; (ii) breached that duty; and (iii) that the breach caused a “foreseeable resulting
injury.” Anderson v. Sammy Redd and Assocs., 650 A.2d 376, 378 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1994).
In Count V, Plaintiff maintains that ARC “negligently created a discriminatory and/or
harassing workplace” and that ARC “breached its duty of care by failing to exercise due care with

respect to sexual harassment in the workplace.” (FAC ¶¶ 117–18). As a result of ARC’s alleged
breach of its duty, Plaintiff claims that he “suffered harm” (id. ¶ 119) and “damages,” (id. ¶ 120).
Plaintiff then broadly seeks an array of damages from all “Defendants.” (Id.).
As with the preceding count, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count V as it pertains to
Mullane and Angun because the “allegations under this count relate only to ARC.” (Mov. Br. at

11 Although Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to allege that Mullane “directly caused Dropoff to terminate him”
in their reply brief (see Reply Br. at 13–14), the Court will not entertain arguments made for the first time in response
to an opposition brief. See, e.g., Spence v. New Jersey, No. 19-21490, 2021 WL 1345872, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2021)
(“[I]t is well-established that new arguments cannot be raised for the first time in reply briefs.” (quoting Pitman v.
Ottehberg, No. 10-2538, 2015 WL 179392, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015))).
26 n.5). Indeed, as reflected above, the First Amended Complaint alleges that only ARC owed
Plaintiff a duty of care. (FAC ¶¶ 118–19). Plaintiff does not respond to this point in his opposition
brief and confines his arguments to ARC’s alleged duty and breach. (See Opp. Br. at 26–27).
Accordingly, Count V is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Mullane and Angun.

As it relates to ARC, the Court further agrees with Defendants in that the allegations
regarding the parties’ relationship “falls far short of establishing any cognizable duty of care.”
(See Mov. Br. at 27). Akin to his NJLAD claim, Plaintiff’s argument in opposition hinges on
liability applicable to employers for “torts committed by an employee[s]” who act within “the
scope of their employment.” (See Opp. Br. at 26). Based on Plaintiff’s own concessions regarding
the lack of any employer-employee relationship amongst the parties, this avenue of relief fails for
the same reasons noted above with respect to Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim. (See Opp. Br. at 24
(arguing that “Plaintiff was part of an existing contractual relationship with his employer, Dropoff,
and [ ] Mullane indisputably knew Plaintiff was employed by Dropoff”); see also FAC ¶¶ 11 &
111). In addition, Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that ARC—a third-

party—owed him a duty of care as an employee of ARC’s “regular vendor,” i.e., Dropoff. (See
Opp. Br. at 27 (arguing that [t]he failure to investigate known risks, mishandling and forwarding
unfounded reports, and using site-access control in a way that foreseeably harms a known, regular
vendor, are classic breach averments that precipitated Plaintiff’s suspensions and termination”)).
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff attempted to amend his negligence claim in his opposition brief
to assert claims for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and/or negligent training, the Court
finds that those claims are not apparent on the face of the First Amended Complaint. (Compare
Opp. Br. at 26, with FAC). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Count V is GRANTED
and Count V is DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff chooses to file an amended
pleading, he shall clearly set forth the basis of his negligence claim, including any and all specific
negligence theories.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in-

part. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: July 2, 2026 s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11367052. Public record. Not legal advice.