# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · January 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366922

## Case

- **Full name:** Oleksandr V.M. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** January 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8

9 OLEKSANDR V.M.,1 Case No. 1:25-cv-01431- JLT-EPG-HC

10 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
DENY RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO
11 v. DISMISS, GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DIRECT
12 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE PETITIONER
ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, WITH BOND HEARING BEFORE
13 IMMIGRATION JUDGE
Respondent.
14 (ECF Nos. 1, 12)

15
16 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of
17 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
18 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends denying Respondent’s
19 motion to dismiss, granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and ordering that Respondent
20 provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the
21 government must justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.
22 I.
23 BACKGROUND
24 Petitioner is a noncitizen currently detained at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility
25 pending his ongoing removal proceedings. Petitioner has been detained since April 22, 2025.

26
1 The Court partially redacts Petitioner’s name to mitigate privacy concerns, as requested by Petitioner
and suggested by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial
27
Conference of the United States. See Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security &
Immigration Opinions (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-
1 (ECF No. 1 at 5.2) On May 7, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s request for a
2 custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236, finding that the immigration court lacked
3 jurisdiction because “current regulations . . . preclude an Immigration Judge from redetermining
4 the custody status of arriving aliens in removal proceedings.” (Id. at 22.)
5 As noted by Respondents, (ECF No. 12 at 1), Petitioner previously filed a habeas petition
6 in this Court. See No. 1:25-cv-00953-SKO, ECF 1.3 In the previous petition, Petitioner asserted
7 that his detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1254a and due process because he had been granted
8 Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”).4 Id. On October 10, 2025, this previous petition was
9 denied. The Court held: “Because Petitioner is currently without TPS status, detention is not
10 unlawful.” Id., ECF No. 19 at 4.
11 On October 27, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus,
12 asserting that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his right to procedural due
13 process. (ECF No. 1.) On December 29, 2025, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and
14 response to the petition. (ECF No. 12.) On January 5, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for
15

16 2 Page numbers refer to ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.
3 “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is
17 generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
18 Documents that are part of the public record may be judicially noticed to show, for example, that a
judicial proceeding occurred or that a document was filed in another court case, but a court may not take
19 judicial notice of findings of facts from another case. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 & n.5
(9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
20
banc); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 “Pursuant to the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the DHS Secretary may designate a foreign state for TPS
21
when nationals of that state cannot return there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other
22 ‘extraordinary and temporary conditions,’ unless the Secretary ‘finds that permitting the [noncitizens] to
remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.’” Nat’l
23 TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)). “Such a
designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided in the United
24 States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment authorization and protection
from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Nat’l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1010 (citing 8 U.S.C.
25 § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). “Other restrictions apply: applicants must be ‘admissible’ under the immigration
laws, id. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iii); they must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more
26 misdemeanors committed in the United States,’ id. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i); and they risk revocation of status
if the Secretary ‘finds that the [noncitizen] was not in fact eligible for such status,’ id. § 1254a(c)(3)(A).”
27 Nat’l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1010. “An alien provided temporary protected status under this section shall
not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United
1 temporary restraining order, which was denied by the assigned district judge as untimely. (ECF
2 Nos. 14, 19.) Petitioner has submitted various additional filings in support of his petition. (ECF
3 Nos. 16–18, 21–24.)
4 II.
5 DISCUSSION
6 A. Motion to Dismiss
7 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens
8 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an
9 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or
10 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the
11 necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
12 Here, Respondent asserts that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
13 U.S.C. § 1225(b),5 which the Supreme Court has described as follows:
14 Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who
“arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but
15 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.”
§ 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by
16 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the
country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).
17
As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two
18 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by
§ 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially
19 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or
lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing
20 §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain
other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion.
21 See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as
a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not
22 covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant
here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B).
23
Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of
24 certain aliens. Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally
ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to
25 an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a
26
5 Petitioner does not contest this assertion. For purposes of the instant petition, the Court assumes that
27 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). However, the Court notes that
Petitioner alleges that from December 13, 2021 until his arrest on April 22, 2025, Petitioner was “at
1 § 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for
asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an
2 asylum interview. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer
determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of
3 persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration
of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are
4 instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a
different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal]
5 proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are]
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the
6 country. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

7 Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their
detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on
8 parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3
9 (2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an
admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when
10 the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith
return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
11 thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
12 States.” Ibid.
13 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018).
14 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to
15 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the
16 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could
17 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United
18 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062
19 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not
20 authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
21 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533
22 U.S. at 689. Thus, after a presumptively reasonable detention period of six months, a noncitizen
23 was entitled to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal
24 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.
25 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
26 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Supreme Court upheld its “longstanding
27 view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period
necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 526. The Supreme Court distinguished Zadvydas
1 by emphasizing that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination point” and
2 “in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered presumptively valid in
3 Zadvydas.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 529. However, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that “a
4 lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized
5 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
6 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7 “In a series of decisions, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . grappled in piece-meal fashion with
8 whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged
9 detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v.
10 Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). This culminated in Rodriguez v.
11 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the Ninth Circuit held that for
12 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must
13 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their
14 continued detention as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows.’” 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf
15 v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit
16 applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret these immigration detention provisions
17 as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention become prolonged. See Rodriguez
18 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022).
19 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the
20 constitutional avoidance canon to find that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) contain an implicit 6–
21 month limit on the length of detention” and “[o]nce that 6–month period elapses, respondents
22 contend, aliens previously detained under those provisions must instead be detained under the
23 authority of § 1226(a), which allows for bond hearings in certain circumstances.” 583 U.S. at
24 297–98. Jennings also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a statutory right under 8
25 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General
26 must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.”
27 Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] constitutional
1 district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance but observed that it had
2 “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process
3 is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the
4 arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255,
5 256 (9th Cir. 2018).
6 There has been a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an immigration
7 detainee’s continued mandatory detention becomes unconstitutional. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53
8 F.4th at 1203 (noting that both the Ninth Circuit “and the Supreme Court have repeatedly
9 declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the immigration
10 detention context”). The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires
11 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but it has recognized that
12 “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings
13 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that
14 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal
15 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’”
16 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other
17 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024).
18 In upholding mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore, the Supreme
19 Court made repeated references to the “brief” and “limited” timeframe at issue. See Demore, 538
20 U.S. at 513 (“brief period”); id. at 523 ((“brief period”); id. at 526 (“limited period”); id. at 529
21 n.12 (“[t]he very limited time of the detention at stake under § 1226(c)”); id. at 531 (“limited
22 period”). Demore specifically noted that “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a
23 month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in
24 the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal,” relying on statistics from the
25 Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). 538 U.S. at 530. However, “[t]hirteen years
26 after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court,
27 and which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors,’” and for the years 1999–
1 little more than a year.” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-CV-04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5
2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citing Letter from Acting Solicitor General Ian H. Gershengorn to Hon.
3 Scott S. Harris (Aug. 26, 2016), at 2, 3, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491)).
4 “The data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c)
5 subclass were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual
6 detention periods exceeding four years.” Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citing Joint
7 Appendix (Table 20) (Aug. 26, 2016), Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (No. 15-
8 1204)). The Government Accountability Office conducted a study and “found that as of 2015,
9 the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450
10 days.” Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citing United States Government Accountability
11 Office, Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-
12 Standing Management and Operational Challenges 33 (2017),
13 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf).
14 As noted above, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention
15 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent . . . filed a
16 habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . challenging the constitutionality of
17 § 1226(c) itself.” (emphasis added)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149 n.22 (2d Cir. 2024)
18 (“Demore ruled on a due process challenge to the facial constitutionality of section 1226(c)[.]”).
19 In Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court expressly preserved the right to
20 bring an as-applied challenge: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision
21 [§ 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to
22 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. See Black, 103 F.4th
23 at 149 (Demore “said nothing about whether due process may eventually require a hearing. If
24 Demore had, in fact, foreclosed the due process challenge now before us, the Jennings Court
25 would have had no reason to remand to the Ninth Circuit ‘to consider ... in the first instance’ the
26 detainees’ argument that ‘[a]bsent ... a bond-hearing requirement, ... [section 1226(c)] would
27 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
1 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 291, 312)). Moreover, Demore does not directly address the issue
2 presented here: whether § 1225(b) as applied to Petitioner is unconstitutional.
3 To the extent Respondent relies on Jennings to argue that Petitioner’s as-applied
4 constitutional challenge is foreclosed, Jennings held the Ninth Circuit erred in finding a statutory
5 right to periodic bond hearings under § 1225(b) and § 1226(a). However, Jennings did not
6 address the constitutional arguments. Therefore, Respondent’s reliance on Jennings to dismiss
7 Petitioner’s constitutional claim is not persuasive. To the extent Respondent relies on Keo v.
8 Warden, No. 1:24-cv-00919-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 1029392 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2025), appeal
9 dismissed, No. 25-3546, 2025 WL 2528945 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025), to argue that Petitioner’s
10 as-applied constitutional challenge is foreclosed, “[a] decision of a federal district court judge is
11 not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon
12 the same judge in a different case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7, 131 S.Ct. 2020,
13 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d],
14 p. 134–26 (3d ed. 2011)).
15 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner’s as-applied
16 constitutional challenge is not foreclosed, and thus, dismissal of the petition is not warranted.
17 B. Due Process Analysis
18 Petitioner contends that “[d]etention without a bond hearing is unconstitutional when it
19 exceeds six months,” and even absent a bright-line six-month standard, his “detention, without
20 any individualized review, is unreasonable under the Mathews v. Eldridge due process test” or
21 alternatively, “under the multi-factor reasonableness test the Third Circuit adopted in German
22 Santos v. Warden Pike Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020).” (ECF No. 1 at
23 7, 8.) Respondent notes that “this Court has repeatedly refused to find a specific time limit past
24 which a noncitizen’s detention will be considered presumptively violative of due process,” and
25 that the “use of a multi-factor balancing test to analyze Petitioner’s statutorily-compelled
26 detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings is unsupported by Supreme Court
27 authority.” (ECF No. 12 at 4, 5.) Respondent argues that this “Court should decline to engage in
1 analyzing a noncitizen’s procedural due process rights,” but “even if the Court were to apply a
2 multi-factor balancing test to Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing, neither of the most
3 common tests would favor the Petitioner.” (ECF No. 12 at 6, 7.)
4 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have taken a variety of approaches to determine whether due
5 process requires a bond hearing in a particular immigration detention case. See, e.g., Rodriguez,
6 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (applying bright-line rule that “detention becomes prolonged after six
7 months and entitles [the petitioner] to a bond hearing” in § 1226(c) context); Banda v.
8 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, which
9 include: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3)
10 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5)
11 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the
12 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez v.
13 Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021)
14 (considering, in addition to six factors set forth above, “whether the detention will exceed the
15 time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the
16 nature of the crimes the petitioner committed” in § 1226(c) context), report and recommendation
17 adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2021); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870,
18 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of
19 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the
20 government” in § 1226(c) context).
21 There are also some courts that apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
22 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL
23 1862254, at *3–4 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted,
24 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). In Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen
25 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional
26 because under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond
27 hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,”
1 Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal
2 proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the
3 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53
4 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v.
5 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework
6 to determine whether there was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219
7 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See also Black, 103 F.4th at 147 (“conclud[ing] that due process
8 challenges to prolonged detention under section 1226(c) should also be reviewed under
9 Mathews”); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal.
10 May 16, 2025) (applying Mathews test to determine whether due process entitled petitioner to a
11 bond hearing in § 1225(b) context), findings and recommendations adopted, 2025 WL 1808676
12 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025).
13 Given that Petitioner applied the Mathews test in the petition, the Ninth Circuit has
14 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” Rodriguez Diaz,
15 53 F.4th at 1193, and Respondent addresses the Mathews test as well,6 the Court will apply the
16 Mathews test in addition to addressing the bright-line rule.
17 1. Bright-Line Rule
18 The First, Second, and Third Circuits have “reject[ed] a bright-line constitutional rule
19 requiring a bond hearing after six months of detention—or after any fixed period of detention—
20 in the context of a Congressional mandate, in the immigration context, to detain.” Black, 103
21 F.4th at 150 (citing Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7–9 (1st Cir. 2021); German Santos v. Warden
22 Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020)). The Court finds such authority
23 persuasive and declines to adopt a bright-line rule that detention without a bond hearing is
24 presumptively unconstitutional when it exceeds six months.
25 ///
26
6 Respondent also addresses the Lopez test. (ECF No. 12 at 9–10.) However, as the current record before
27 this Court is devoid of evidence with respect to the second and third factors—likely duration of future
detention and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petition and the government—the
1 2. Mathews Test
2 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due
3 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”:
4 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
5 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
6 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
7 requirements would entail.
8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
9 a. Private Interest
10 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue here is
11 fundamental. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
12 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause
13 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit has held that it “is beyond dispute” an
14 immigration detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from
15 imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v.
16 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
17 (1992)). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an
18 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably
19 substantial.’ . . . Rodriguez Diaz has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty interest
20 under Mathews.” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor
21 weighs in favor of Petitioner.
22 b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
23 With respect to the second factor, the Court considers the risk of erroneous deprivation of
24 Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. “In
25 evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation in the context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth
26 Circuit has looked to whether the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as
27 individualized custody determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout
1 Cal. May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209–10 (finding a small risk of erroneous
2 deprivation where petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) and thus received numerous
3 procedural protections, including individualized custody determinations and right to seek
4 additional bond hearings)).
5 Although the Supreme Court has rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
6 constitutional avoidance canon and its statutory interpretation of § 1225(b), the Court finds
7 Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), informative regarding the
8 constitutional issues before this Court. The Ninth Circuit “note[d] that the discretionary parole
9 system available to § 1225(b) detainees is not sufficient to overcome the constitutional concerns
10 raised by prolonged mandatory detention” because the “parole process is purely discretionary
11 and its results are unreviewable by IJs” and “release decisions are based on humanitarian
12 considerations and the public interest.” Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1144. See Padilla v. U.S.
13 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (finding Plaintiffs
14 “allege[d] a viable due process claim” because “the parole process available to them under 8
15 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for a bond hearing
16 particularly since it does not test the necessity of detention,” “does not afford the noncitizen an
17 in-person adversarial hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present
18 witness testimony or evidence,” does not require “the ICE detention officer [to] make any factual
19 findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an administrative appeal”).
20 Petitioner has been detained since April 22, 2025, (ECF No. 1 at 5), a period of nine
21 months, and has not received any bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker with authority to
22 grant bond. Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s
23 liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is high. See Jimenez v.
24 Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an
25 erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s liberty interest is high. He has not received any
26 bond or custody redetermination hearing during his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value
27 of additional procedural safeguards—a bond hearing—is high, because Respondents have
1 provided virtually no procedural safeguards at all.”). Therefore, the second Mathews factor
2 weighs in favor of Petitioner.
3 c. Government’s Interest
4 With respect to the third and final factor, the Court recognizes that “the government
5 clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in the United States in
6 violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous
7 criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, 515). The
8 Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]hese are interests of the highest order that only increase with the
9 passage of time,” noting that “[t]he longer detention lasts and the longer the challenges to an IJ’s
10 order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to securing an alien’s ultimate
11 removal” and “[t]he risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates as the time for
12 removal becomes more imminent.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208.
13 However, it is important to stress that the “government interest at stake here is not the
14 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond
15 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7. See Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
16 Servs., 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the question [under the third Mathews
17 factor] is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement” “in general” (emphasis
18 added)); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
19 June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration
20 laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly executed, the
21 Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized bond hearing
22 is low.”).
23 Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
24 minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court demonstrating that providing
25 Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome. See Marroquin
26 Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in context of a § 1226(a)
27 detention, the parties did not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine
1 Supp. 3d 1005, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of § 1226(a) detention that “[t]he
2 government has not offered any indication that a [ ] bond hearing would have outside effects on
3 its coffers”). Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
4 In sum, each of the Mathews factors weighs in favor of Petitioner. Based on the
5 foregoing, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.
6 C. Remedy
7 Petitioner requests that this Court hold a hearing and “determine that Petitioner’s
8 detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing
9 evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger in light of available alternatives to
10 detention, and order Petitioner’s release, with appropriate conditions of supervision if necessary,
11 taking into account Petitioner’s ability to pay a bond[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Alternatively,
12 Petitioner requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner’s release
13 within 30 days unless Respondents schedule a hearing before an IJ. (Id.)
14 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy
15 is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882. See Martinez
16 Leiva v. Becerra, No. 23-cv-02027-CRB, 2023 WL 3688097, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2023)
17 (“The Court further concludes that the appropriate remedy here is a bond hearing, and that an IJ,
18 not the Court, should conduct it[.]” (footnote omitted)); Mansoor v. Figueroa, No. 3:17-cv-
19 01695-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL 840253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“The Court finds the IJ is
20 uniquely qualified and situated to make neutral administrative determinations about Petitioner’s
21 eligibility for release on bond and/or placement in a supervised release program such as ISAP.”).
22 The Court now turns to the burden of proof at the bond hearing and which party should
23 bear such burden. Petitioner argues that the government must bear the burden of proof by clear
24 and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk, citing to citing to Singh v.
25 Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). (ECF No. 1 at 13.) Having “previously applied the
26 canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret . . . immigration provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b),
27 1226(c), and 1231(a)(6)—as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention
1 with due process, the government had to bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing
2 evidence that the alien poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53
3 F.4th at 1196 (citing Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–05). Although Rodriguez Diaz may have declined
4 to impose the standard articulated in Singh, the panel majority specifically stated that it was not
5 “decid[ing] whether Singh remains good law in any respect following Jennings” and even
6 recognized that Singh was based “on general principles of procedural due process, reasoning that
7 a detained person’s liberty interest is substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202 n.4, 1199.
8 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has suggested post-Jennings that Singh remains good law in
9 Martinez v. Clark, which took “no position” on “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing
10 for aliens detained under § 1226(c),” but did address “the scope of federal court review of those
11 bond determinations” and found with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under
12 § 1226(c) that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear
13 and convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community.” Martinez, 36 F.4th at
14 1223, 1231. On remand, and after Rodriguez Diaz was decided, the Martinez panel reconfirmed
15 “that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez
16 is a danger to the community” and “that the BIA applied the correct burden of proof.” Martinez
17 v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024).
18 The undersigned recommends that the government must justify Petitioner’s continued
19 confinement under § 1225(b) by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a
20 danger to the community. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
21 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (recommending that “Respondent be ordered to
22 provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which Respondent must
23 justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence” in § 1225(b) context);
24 Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski, No. 22-cv-1357-MMA (JLB), 2023 WL 139801, at *7 n.5 (S.D.
25 Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (following “an overwhelming majority of courts that have held that the
26 government must justify the continued confinement of a non-citizen detainee under § 1226(c) by
27 clear and convincing evidence that the non-citizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community”).
1 flight risk as to require detention without bond, the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial
2 circumstances or alternative conditions of release. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000 (“Plaintiffs
3 are likely to succeed on their challenge under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy
4 of allowing ICE and IJs to set immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees’
5 financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release.”); Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The
6 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and
7 establishing appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and
8 alternative means of assuring appearance.”).
9 III.
10 RECOMMENDATION
11 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
12 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED;
13 2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) be DENIED; and
14 3. Petitioner be released unless Respondent schedules a bond hearing before an immigration
15 judge to be held within THIRTY (30) days that complies with the requirements set forth
16 in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), at which
17 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is
18 a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638
19 F.3d at 1203, and
20 b. the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative
21 conditions of release in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the
22 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without
23 bond.
24 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District
25 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
26 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within
27 fourteen (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file
1 | serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
2 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed
3 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District
4 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
5 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the
6 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.
7 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
8
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10] Dated: _ January 27, 2026 [spe ey
11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366922. Public record. Not legal advice.