# Opinion > District Court, M.D. Florida · April 21, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366753 ## Case - **Full name:** Alexis Diequez Montoro v. U.S. Attorney General et al. - **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida - **Decided:** April 21, 2026 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366753 ## Opinion text UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION ALEXIS DIEQUEZ MONTORO, Petitioner, v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01041-SPC-NPM U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL et al., Respondents, / OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Alexis Diequez Montoro’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 11). Diequez Montoro is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United States on July 3, 2015. On April 11, 2016, he was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba in January 2017. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) could not execute the removal order because Cuba refused to repatriate Diequez Montoro, so it released him on an order of supervision on June 6, 2017. On October 24, 2025, Border Patrol agents arrested Diequez Montoro in a targeted immigration enforcement operation and handed him over to ICE. ICE took Diequez Montoro to the Mexican border earlier this year but did not remove him. The only explanation why is a vague claim that Diequez Montoro did not comply with removal. In any case, ICE returned him to Alligator Alcatraz, where he remains detained. “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing. Id. The government argues Diequez Montoro’s petition is premature because he filed it before his current detention exceeded 180 days. They assume a six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention begins each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Diequez Montoro has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was unable to remove him to Cuba in 2017, Cuba is still unwilling to issue travel documents, and the government has not demonstrated any plan for removal since his arrest in October 2025. The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February 2026 attempt to send Diequez Montoro to Mexico. But the evidence before the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear- based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to show it can lawfully remove Diequez Montoro in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, assuring the presence of a noncitizen at the moment of removal is not the only statutory justification for immigration detention. “The second justification—protecting the community—does not necessarily diminish in force over time.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court has “upheld preventative detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Id. Given Diequez Montoro’s criminal history, the Court will give ICE an opportunity to determine whether his detention is necessary to protect the community. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Alexis Diequez Montoro’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) remains under advisement. 1. Within 30 days of this Order, ICE shall conduct a custody review to determine whether Diequez Montoro poses a danger to the community sufficient to justify continued detention. 2. Within seven days of the custody review, the respondents shall file a supplemental response, addressing the results of the review and any updates on removal efforts. 3. Diequez Montoro may file a reply within three days of the supplemental response. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 21, 2026. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366753. Public record. Not legal advice.