# Parker

> District Court, N.D. Texas · March 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366671

## Case

- **Full name:** Robin Parker, et al. v. State of Texas, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ROBIN PARKER, ET AL., §
PLAINTIFFS, §
§
V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:25-CV-592-X-BK
§
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL., §
DEFENDANTS. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action was referred
to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including the entry of findings and a
recommended disposition. The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to proceed in forma pauperis but
did not issue process pending screening. As detailed below, this action should be DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2025, Plaintiffs Robin Parker and Laparis Davis filed this suit raising claims
stemming from state court proceedings that deprived them of custodial rights over their minor,
special needs daughter, E.D., from 2013 to 2020, and resulted in the opening of Title IV-D child
support cases. Doc. 3; State v. Davis, No. DF-1300814 (303rd Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty.). Even
though the undersigned recommended the action be dismissed, Plaintiffs amended the complaint
and the Court found as moot the recommendation on the original complaint. Doc. 33; Doc. 51.
In the Second Amended Complaint (the controlling pleading), Plaintiffs now sue: (1) the
State of Texas, (2) the Office of the Texas Attorney General Child Support Defense Division
(Texas OAG) and Assistant Attorney General Logan Riley Nutt (Nutt), (3) the Texas Health and
Human Services Commission (Texas HHSC) and Jack McDaniel with Office of the Inspector
General, (4) the Children’s Medical Center (CMC) and Social Worker Ethel L. Jernigan and
Privacy Officer Elizabeth Dougharty, (5) the Legal Aid of Northwest Texas (LANWT) and Staff
Attorney Megan Nordyke, (6) Judge LaDeitra Adkins of the 303rd District Court and Judge
Dennise Garcia, the former presiding judge, (8) Lazat Wilson, the estranged mother of Plaintiff
Parker, (9) Sylvester Brown, Wilson’s boyfriend, (10) the U.S. Administration for Children and

Families (ACF) and T. Johnson, and (11) ten John Does. Doc. 64 at 1, 8-11.
Plaintiffs assert a wide array of federal and state claims that arose out of the state dispute
involving child custody and child support rulings. Doc. 64. As in the original complaint, they
broadly state many long-winded claims, spanning over a decade, and requesting wide-ranging
relief. Id. Plaintiffs also move to appear on behalf of their minor daughter but withdraw their
whistleblowers claims under the False Claims Act. Doc. 72 at 1; Doc. 73 at 1-2.
Plaintiffs generally allege “systemic fraud and retaliatory enforcement” and “seek
comprehensive relief for constitutional violations, retaliation, fraud, medical obstruction, and
systemic abuse” of the federal benefit system. Doc. 64 at 5. They assert federal violations under

(1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) Title II of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), (3) Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), (4) Civil RICO, (5) 42 U.S.C. § 407, and (6) whistleblower
statutes. Doc. 64 at 6, 19-25, 27. Plaintiffs also raise several state-law claims. Doc. 64 at 6, 24-
27. They request $350 million in damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Doc. 64 at 28-
32. Specifically, they ask the Court to find that “the OAG Title IV-D child support cases are
unlawful, void, and unenforceable due to fraud, misclassification, and denial of due process” and
that the March 2016 and June 2017 custody orders are “void ab initio.” Doc. 64 at 28-29.
Plaintiffs contend that, in 2012, Wilson “fraudulently submitted” (1) “a Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) application and Medicaid enrollment using E.D.’s
identity” and (2) “a fraudulent child support application falsely claiming herself as E.D.’s legal
guardian.” Doc. 64 at 12. These filings allegedly led to HHSC misclassifying E.D. as a “TANF-
dependent” instead of an “SSI recipient.” Doc. 64 at 12. The misclassification supposedly
“triggered a series of unlawful child support enforcement actions[.]” Doc. 64 at 13. Then, in
2016, Judge Garcia awarded guardianship of E.D. to Wilson, which Plaintiffs insist was

wrongful, and the OAG pursued child support cases against Plaintiff Davis, garnishing his wages
and threating incarceration. Doc. 64 at 13-4. According to Plaintiffs, in 2021, they obtained a
contempt ruling against Wilson for custodial interference which allegedly confirmed their legal
rights and abated child support and cash medical reimbursements. Doc. 64 at 14. They contend
that the OAG and HHSC continued enforcement actions against Davis, however. Doc. 64 at 14.
Plaintiffs further assert that in 2025, the OAG escalated enforcement against Davis after
Plaintiffs filed formal complaints with the HHSC Office of the Inspector General and other
federal agencies. Doc. 64 at 14-16.
II. JURISDICTION IS LACKING IN PART

The Court should always examine, sua sponte, if necessary, the threshold question of
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. The Lamar Co., L.L.C. v. Mississippi Transp.
Comm'n, 976 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2020); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The
plaintiff, as the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing that
subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Willoughby v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 730
F.3d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 2013).
Likewise, the Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants.
Even under the most liberal construction, however, the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims
against the State of Texas, its entities, judges, and state officials.
A. Sovereign Immunity of State of Texas and State Entities and Officials
Plaintiffs’ claims against the State of Texas, the various state entities, and their

employees in their official capacity are barred either by sovereign or absolute immunity. The
State of Texas and the OAG and HHSC, as arms of the State of Texas, are not a “person”
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or state entity, whether money
damages or injunctive relief is sought. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984) (in absence of consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal
court in which a state or one of its agencies or departments is named as defendant). Likewise, an
official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which
the individual defendant is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sue the State of Texas, the OAG, the HHSC, their employees
in their official capacity (Nutt and McDaniel), and the state judges in their official capacity for
monetary damages and declaratory or injunctive relief. As such all federal and state claims
against these Defendants should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity of Assistant Attorney General
Similarly, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “for actions ‘initiating a
prosecution and … presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.’” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). This immunity “shelters prosecutors even when
they act ‘maliciously, wantonly or negligently.’” Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.
1987) (citations omitted). And this immunity applies to prosecutors in the OAG child support
division. See Nixon v. Abbott, 589 F. App’x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Ramirez v.
Arteaga, No. 3:23-cv-2617-X-BN, 2023 WL 11931496, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2023), adopted,
2024 WL 421959 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 16, 2024).

Although a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity for certain administrative
activities, see Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009), Plaintiffs’ allegations
against Assistant Attorney General Nutt relate to alleged misrepresentations in court, which is
part of the prosecution of the State’s case. Doc. 64 at 9 (alleging Nutt presented false
information in court, obstructed enforcement of valid orders); Doc. 64 at 15 (asserting Nutt
misrepresented matters during a hearing). Moreover, the assertions that Nutt supposedly
retaliated against them in response to whistleblower activity all relate to how the child-custody
case(s) against them were brought. Because Plaintiffs point to no action that Nutt performed
outside the scope of his prosecutorial duties, all retaliation claims are barred by prosecutorial

immunity. See, e.g., Doc. 64 at 9 (alleging Nutt “retaliate[ed] against Plaintiffs for engaging in
protected legal activity”); Doc. 64 at 14-15 (summarizing escalation of enforcement action by the
OAG to collect child support arrears in 2025). Thus, the claims against Nutt, in his individual
capacity, are barred by prosecutorial immunity and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
C. Absolute Immunity of State Judges
Plaintiffs’ claims against the state judges, in their individual capacity, run headlong into
judicial immunity. Although the complaint presents many grievances and allege several
conspiracies, Plaintiffs clearly assert claims that arise directly from Judges Adkins’ and Garcia’s
actions taken in their official capacities. Doc. 64 at 4, 9, 13. Plaintiffs’ allegations and claims
against the judges stem entirely from rulings issued by the judges in their respective judicial
capacity and function as presiding judge in those proceedings. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 361-62 (1978). This immunity extends even for judicial acts alleged to have been done
maliciously, corruptly, or in error, as Plaintiffs seem to suggest. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Judicial immunity is overcome only where (1) the judge acts in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction, or (2) the challenged act is not a judicial act at all. Id. Absolute immunity attaches
to the nature of the act, not to its perceived propriety or the motives attributed to it. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11. Notably, neither exception applies here.
Even when liberally construed, Plaintiffs plead no plausible fact that the Judges acted
outside their jurisdiction or that the challenged conduct was unrelated to their judicial function.
Consrquently, Plaintiffs’ claims against Judges Adkins and Garcia—whether for injunctive,
declaratory, or monetary relief—are barred by judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11-12 (1991); Wightman v. Jones, 809 F. Supp. 474, 476-79 (N.D. Tex. 1992). Plaintiffs’
claims against the state judges should be dismissed.

D. Immunity of U.S. Administration for Children and Families
Plaintiffs also sue the U.S. Administration for Children and Families (ACF), a division of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, and T. Johnson, in his official capacity.
Doc. 64 at 11. They assert that ACT and Johnson failed to investigate and intervene despite
Plaintiffs’ repeated whistleblower complaints. Doc. 64 at 11.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States Government cannot be sued
unless it gives its consent. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981) (“[T]he United
States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its
consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” (quotations
and citations omitted)). The sovereign immunity of the United States extends to its agencies.
See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Similarly, Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims
against Johnson, if any, are barred by sovereign immunity, because Johnson’s actions in his
official capacity are considered those of his federal agency employer (the ACF). See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985).

Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475,
Plaintiffs have the burden to show an “unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” St. Tammany
Parish ex rel. Davis v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009). Their bare allegations do not
identify a waiver of sovereign immunity, however, and the Court has found none. Thus, subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against ACF and Johnson is lacking.
E. No Private Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 407
Next, Plaintiffs sue the OAG, HHSC, and their employees under 42 U.S.C. § 407. Doc.
64 at 22. But that section does not expressly create a private right of action to address statutory
violations of the Social Security Act and, thus, does not provide an independent basis for the

Court to exercise jurisdiction. See Galanova v. Portnoy, 432 F. Supp. 3d 433, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
2020); Huffman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. CV-22-00903, 2023 WL 2691455, at *5 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2023) (collecting cases), aff’d, 2026 WL 396536 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026).
F. Jurisdiction is also Lacking to Invalidate State Court Orders
1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Plaintiffs assert civil rights and other violations that arose out of actions taken in
connection with state custody and child support cases. Such claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction
to review state court orders. See Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000). It “holds
that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments.”
Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).1
In their operative complaint, Plaintiffs again seek to invalidate orders issued in state court
proceedings—precisely the 2013 child support order and the 2016 default judgment order

transferring custody of E.D. to Wilson in Case No. DF13-00814. Doc. 64 at 13-14. Plaintiffs’
claims for declaratory/injunctive relief related to these orders (and the associated Title IV-D
child support enforcement cases) clearly fall within the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. See, e.g., Moore v. Whitman, 742 F. App’x
829, 832 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding civil rights claims against foster parents and state officials
involved in removal and placement of child were “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court
judgment and thus precluded by Rooker-Feldman); Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 F.
App’x 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2014) (same as to constitutional claims implicating custody and child
support order).

2. Younger Abstention

To the extent that the Title IV-D child support cases are not final, this Court should
abstain from interfering in the state court proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal courts from “granting either injunctive or
declaratory relief when state criminal actions or certain categories of state civil proceedings are
pending against the federal plaintiff at the time that federal action is commenced.” DeSpain v.

1 The doctrine and its title arises from decisions in two cases—District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Because
Nelson’s state appeal was dismissed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to his claims. Cf.
Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a
state appeal is pending when the federal suit is filed.”).
Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
and companion cases). The doctrine “is based on considerations of equity, comity, and
federalism.” Id. at 1175-76 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45). It requires that federal courts
decline to exercise jurisdiction where three conditions are met: (1) a state judicial proceeding is
ongoing at the time that the plaintiff initiated the federal action, (2) the proceeding implicates

important state interests, and (3) the proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise
constitutional challenges. Texas Ass’n of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004).
The requested declaratory/injunctive relief regarding the child support cases satisfies
Younger abstention requirements. Plaintiffs state two of the cases are ongoing and the state has
an important interest in family law proceedings. Doc. 64 at 13-14. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”). Further, Plaintiffs
have a full opportunity to raise constitutional challenges, if any, in the ongoing state proceedings.
See DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1179 (finding constitutional challenges could be raised in state
proceedings to remove a child and thus plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to present the

federal claims in state court). Finally, Plaintiffs present only conclusory claims of constitutional
violations. Cf. DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1180 (“A federal court should not abstain when the state
court proceeding is brought in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff.”).
The Court thus concludes that Plaintiffs fail to show that any exception to the Younger
abstention doctrine is warranted, and the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction for
federal and state claims directly or indirectly related to child support enforcement cases.
III. REMAINING FEDERAL CLAIMS LACK FACIAL PLAUSIBILITY
Because Plaintiffs proceed in forma pauperis, their remaining claims are subject to
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute provides in part for the sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it fails to state claim upon which relief may be
granted. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). But even
when liberally construed, the remaining claims fail to state a claim.
A. Civil RICO
Plaintiffs broad-based allegations of Civil RICO fraud and conspiracy lack facial
plausibility. Doc. 64 at 23. RICO creates a civil cause of action for any person whose business
or property was injured by another’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Plaintiffs rely on § 1962(c)-
(d). Regardless of subsection, RICO claims “have three common elements: ‘(1) a person who
engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment,
conduct, or control of an enterprise.’” Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). A pattern of racketeering activity consists of two or more predicate criminal
acts that are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. St.
Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs assert that all Defendants, in their individual capacity, “engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity,” including “mail and wire fraud, theft of government funds, identity theft,
obstruction of justice, and retaliation against whistleblowers.” Doc. 64 at 23. Aside from these
conclusory allegations, they present no plausible facts tying any of the Defendants to the
supposed racketeering activity. Doc. 64 at 10-11.
Nor do Plaintiffs plead any non-conclusory facts showing that these Defendants agreed to
form or advance a criminal enterprise, which dooms Plaintiffs’ claims. They merely allege that
the conduct of the Defendants “constituted a RICO enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) with
continuity over a decade (13 years).” Doc. 64 at 23. This is insufficient. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (defining “enterprise” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity”); Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause the core of a RICO civil
conspiracy is an agreement to commit predicate acts, a RICO civil conspiracy complaint, at the
very least, must allege specifically such an agreement.” (citation omitted)).
B. American with Disability Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA)
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA and RA against CMC, LANWT, and
“affiliated individuals” (the non-immune Defendants) lack facial plausibility. Doc. 64 at 20.
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in public services. 42
U.S.C. §12132; PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). Similarly, the RA prohibits

discrimination against disabled individuals in federally funded institutions. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Plaintiffs fail to allege plausible claims of disability discrimination under both statutes.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“The well-pleaded facts” in the complaint must “permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”). Apart from mentioning the word
discrimination twice, they present no plausible facts supporting any inference of discrimination.
Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to connect any of the allegations against the Defendants to Plaintiffs’
purported disabilities, the ADA, or the RA. See Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d
669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants misclassified E.D.’s Medicaid
eligibility as TANF instead of SSI and that this hindered her access to medical care and home
healthcare referral. Doc. 64 at 20. But they do not assert facts showing that a public entity or a
federally funded institution discriminated against them because of E.D.’s and Parker’s alleged
disabilities.
Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot sue persons in their individual capacities under the ADA
or the RA. See Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 376 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012) (ADA

does not authorize individual liability); Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1999)
(same under RA); but see Cooper v. Hung, 485 F. App’x 680, 685 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(distinguishing ADA and RA claims against an individual in his or her official capacity).
C. Retaliation and Interference with Whistleblower Rights
Lastly, Plaintiffs sue CMC, Jernigan, and Dougharty (the non-immune Defendants) under
the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision (42 U.S.C. § 12203), the federal Whistleblower Protection
Act (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)), and federal criminal retaliation laws (18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)). Doc. 64
at 23-24. Again, however, their allegations raise no plausible claim.
First, Plaintiffs present no credible facts tying CMC and its employees to any retaliation.

Indeed, they concede that the OAG and HHSC primarily engaged in the alleged retaliatory
conduct. Doc. 64 at 24. Further suits against individuals are unavailable under the ADA’s anti-
retaliation provision. See Salamah v. UT Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:24-CV-0477-D, 2025 WL
1211124, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2025) (citing Forte v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2007
WL 9712189, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2007) (collecting cases)).
Second, the purpose of the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8), is to “prohibit[ ] governmental agencies from taking adverse personnel actions
against employees or applicants for employment because the employee or applicant disclosed
information that the employee or applicant believed evidenced a violation of law by the
government or gross mismanagement of funds.” Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 245
F. App’x 369, 376 (5th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiffs were not employees of a federal agency
or applicants, they do not have a viable claim under the WPA.
Third, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) is a federal criminal statute that does not provide a basis for a
private cause of action. See Rubio v. Wingstop GSR Rest., No. 3:24-CV-00660-K-BT, 2024 WL

2027487, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 1886545 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2024).
IV. STATE-LAW CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
A district court is not required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims
if it dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because
all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims should be dismissed, the Court should also decline to exercise
jurisdiction over their remaining state-law claims for fraud, abuse of process, negligence, gross
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, identity theft,
custodial interference, unlawful concealment and transportation, and due course of law under the
Texas Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser

Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).
V. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF MINOR DAUGHTER SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Plaintiff Parker has not met her “burden to establish that under [28 U.S.C. ]§ 1654,
federal or state law authorizes her to proceed pro se on behalf of her child[].” Raskin ex rel. JD
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 69 F.4th 280, 286 (5th Cir. 2023). In response to the deficiency
Order, Parker only asserts that she is “the natural mother, legal guardian, and sole custodian of
E.D., a child with disability whose rights are directly at stake in this matter[,]” and that E.D.’s
claims are inextricably linked to Parker’s own claims. Doc. 73 at 1-2. Because Parker fails to
identify clear and ambiguous authority to proceed pro se on behalf of E.D., any claims she seeks
to bring on behalf of E.D. in a representative capacity should be dismissed without prejudice.
Garcia v. City of McAllen, No. 7:25-CV-00364, 2026 WL 451524, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16,
2026), adopted, 2026 WL 449146 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2026).
VI. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before

dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pleaded his “best case.” Brewster v.
Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As outlined above, based on the legal theories
Plaintiffs posit, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking over most of their claims and the remaining
claims cannot, as a matter of law, state a plausible legal claim. In addition, Plaintiffs have twice
amended their complaint. Based on the most deferential review of the operative complaint, it is
highly unlikely that, given the opportunity, Plaintiffs could allege cogent and viable legal claims.
Under these circumstances, the Court can only conclude that Plaintiffs have already pleaded their
best case and that granting further leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.
VII. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, all federal claims against the State of Texas, the OAG, the HHSC,
the ACF, McDaniel, Johnson, Nutt, and Judges Adkins and Garcia should be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction as barred by sovereign, absolute, or
prosecutorial immunity, and under the Rooker-Feldman and the Younger abstention doctrines.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). The RICO claims against all Defendants and the remaining federal
claims against CMC, LANWAT, Jernigan, Dougharty, Nordyke, Wilson, and Brown should be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, as no federal claims will remain, Plaintiff’s
state-law claims should likewise be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Lastly, all claims on behalf of Plaintiffs’ minor daughter in a representative capacity
should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, because Plaintiffs lack authority to bring
them on their minor daughter’s behalf.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Marquita Darthard as a defendant.’
SO RECOMMENDED on March 14, 2026.

E HARRIS TOLIVER
UNNEDSTATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (Sth Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to object
to 14 days).

The complaint lists Darthard in the caption but alleges no claim against her. Doc. 64 at 1.
Page 15 of 15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366671. Public record. Not legal advice.