# Wilson

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366604

## Case

- **Full name:** Shawn Wilson v. J.E. Moore
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHAWN WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:23-cv-1002-JEP-PDB

J.E. MOORE,

Defendant.
/
ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, is proceeding pro
se on a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1)
against an officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, J.E. Moore. Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Moore used excessive force during his September 2, 2021
arrest and denied him medical care for the injuries he sustained when he
crashed his motorcycle while attempting to outrun police. See Doc. 1 at 4–5.
Before the Court is Defendant Moore’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
47) and Plaintiff’s pro se Response in opposition (Doc. 62).
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.
1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th
Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving

party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on
a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of
material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and

2
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. City of Miami,
52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca

Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).
III. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that, after he crashed his motorcycle, Defendant Moore
struck him about five to six times and dragged him by his helmet, still strapped

to his head, across the road. Doc. 1 at 4–5, 12. He further implies Defendant
Moore prevented him from receiving medical attention at the scene by telling
EMTs that he was being “combative” and did not need medical attention, and
at the jail, by “over-[riding] medical.” Id. at 5, 12.

IV. Motion & Response
Defendant Moore invokes qualified immunity. See Doc. 47 at 10–11. He
supports his Motion with the following evidence: his own declaration (Doc. 48-
1); the transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony (Doc. 48-2); and video

evidence filed under seal, including footage from his own body worn camera

3
(“BWC”), Officer Yates’s BWC, Officer Pingry’s BWC, and the camera from the
sally-port area at the jail (Doc. S-51).1

In his Response, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Moore’s counsel was
“uncooperative and evasive” during the discovery process, and he has been
denied crucial video and medical evidence. See Doc. 62 at 3–4. He also says
that the video evidence Defendant Moore did provide is incomplete in that it

does not show what happened before he was handcuffed, which is when he
claims Defendant Moore punched him and pulled him across the road by his
helmet. Id. at 9. Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendant Moore’s
Motion on the ground that he never received or reviewed the videos he

requested. Id. at 10.
Although Plaintiff has not filed a motion seeking affirmative relief, his
request implicates Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides in part that a court may deny a Rule 56 motion or allow time for

discovery before ruling on it if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1), (2). Plaintiff is not entitled to

1 Video footage was provided on a thumb drive. That footage will be cited
according to sealed document number (Doc. S-51), followed by a camera identifier
(i.e., “Moore BWC” for the footage from Defendant Moore’s BWC or “SP” for footage
from the sally-port) and a time stamp.
4
relief under Rule 56(d). Importantly, he does not provide an affidavit or
declaration with “specified reasons” he cannot effectively oppose Defendant

Moore’s Rule 56 Motion.2 Regardless, he has had ample time to conduct
discovery. See Case Management & Scheduling Order (Doc. 32). The Court
even granted Plaintiff’s two motions for more time (90 days each) in which to
conduct discovery. See Orders (Docs. 36, 41). During the discovery period,

Defendant Moore made initial disclosures in accordance with Rule 26(a) and
responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. See Doc. 62 at 31–33, 45–47, 67.
Plaintiff never filed a motion to compel complaining that Defendant Moore’s
discovery responses were insufficient.

Plaintiff now claims he missed the motion to compel deadline because a
faulty fire sprinkler in his cell destroyed his legal papers and the Court’s
scheduling order. Id. at 35–36. Even if proffered through an affidavit or
declaration, this excuse is unconvincing. Plaintiff had from July 2, 2024 until

April 3, 2025, to conduct discovery. See Orders (Docs. 32, 36, 41). In addition,

2 Plaintiff claims his Response is “a sworn affidavit and declaration,” see Doc.
62 at 3, but it is not. “An affidavit is a sworn statement, meaning it is made under
oath before a notary or other oath-taker and affixed with a notary seal. Levitt v. U.S.
Internal Revenue Serv., No. 2:24-CV-00284-SGC, 2025 WL 1745758, at *2 (N.D. Ala.
June 24, 2025). Plaintiff’s Response is not sworn under oath. He also does not include
a statement, “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct,” or a substantially similar statement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) (allowing for
the use of unsworn verifications if the individual declares under penalty of perjury
that his statements are true and correct).
5
according to a letter he provides as “proof” that a sprinkler head damaged
property inside his cell, that incident appears to have occurred around July

2025, after the discovery period had closed. See Doc. 62 at 35. Had the sprinkler
head broken before the April 3, 2025 discovery deadline, that incident does not
explain why Plaintiff missed not one, not two, but three different deadlines for
the filing of motions to compel.

Finally, Plaintiff does not explain with any specificity what facts he is
missing and how those facts would assist him in opposing Defendant Moore’s
Motion. See generally id. “To invoke rule 56(d), a party may not simply rely on
vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified

facts, but must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the
motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s
showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Burns v. Town of Palm
Beach, 999 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiff vaguely complains that the arrest report and the video
evidence “conflict” on “numerous details,” see Doc. 62 at 23, but as discussed
below, the video evidence, which speaks for itself, captures all relevant
interactions between Defendant Moore and Plaintiff. Thus, the Court will rule

on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

6
V. Law, Evidence & Conclusions
“In order to receive qualified immunity, [a] public official must first prove

that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). There is no dispute that Defendant Moore was
acting within his discretionary duties at the time of the incident. Thus, the

burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove that Defendant “(1) violated a constitutional
right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2004). Plaintiff must satisfy both prongs to survive a qualified-immunity

defense. Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019).
At the time of the events, it was clearly established that an arresting
officer may not use excessive force, evaluated under an objective standard of
reasonableness “without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent or

motivation.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). It was also
clearly established that an arresting officer violates an arrestee’s
constitutional rights if the officer is deliberately indifferent to the arrestee’s
known serious medical needs. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1308

(11th Cir. 2009). However, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant Moore
did not violate a clearly established constitutional right when arresting

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Plaintiff. Indeed, the camera footage shows that Defendant Moore did not use
any force against Plaintiff, either at the scene of the incident or during

transport, nor did he deny or prevent Plaintiff from receiving necessary
medical care for the injuries he sustained when he crashed his motorcycle
while fleeing from police.
First, Plaintiff says in his Response that he was struck and dragged by

his helmet “before [he] was handcuffed,” Doc. 62 at 9 (emphasis added), and he
testified at his deposition that Defendant Moore “was the first male officer to
interact with him” and the one who hit him and tried to remove his motorcycle
helmet, Doc. 48-2 at 19. According to BWC footage, Defendant Moore was not

the first male officer to encounter Plaintiff after he crashed. See Doc. S-51,
Moore BWC, 06:39:35–06:39:40. When Defendant Moore arrived, at least one
other officer was already struggling to get Plaintiff into handcuffs, and Plaintiff
was lying on the side of the road in the grass. Id. Defendant Moore and a female

officer (who arrived when Moore did) assisted in handcuffing Plaintiff. Id.; see
also Doc. S-51, Yates BWC, 06:39:43–06:40:09. Defendant Moore did not hit
Plaintiff, nor did he pull on Plaintiff’s helmet.3 Given Defendant Moore did not

3 Another male officer attempted to remove Plaintiff’s helmet after he was
handcuffed. That officer aggressively slapped the face shield of Plaintiff’s helmet to
open it, and he pulled hard on the helmet trying to remove it. See Doc. S-51, Yates
BWC, 06:40:08–06:40:11. Plaintiff can be heard saying that he had the helmet
strapped and his neck was hurting. Id., 06:40:11–06:40:15. When that was occurring,
8
arrive on the scene until Plaintiff was nearly fully restrained and lying on a
grassy area on the side of the road, Defendant Moore could not have “drug

[Plaintiff] by [his] strapped helmet across the road,” as Plaintiff alleges in his
Complaint. See Doc. 1 at 5.
Second, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that “it took 40 minutes to get
[to the jail], and [he] was slung around . . . . to the point where [he] was

nauseous.” Doc. 48-2 at 21–22. He claimed Defendant Moore drove so
erratically to the jail that he was forced to wedge himself on the floor and had
to be helped off the floor when they arrived at the jail. Id. at 16–18, 21–22, 31.
In his Response to Defendant Moore’s Motion, Plaintiff cites a Tenth Circuit

decision, which held an arrestee stated a plausible excessive force claim where
he alleged the officer intentionally drove recklessly, knowing the arrestee’s
handcuffs were too tight, “so as to toss [him] around the back seat . . . and place
additional pressure on his wrists.” See Doc. 62 at 13 (citing Kostrzewa v. City

of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 640 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the BWC footage shows the ride to
the jail took under twenty minutes, and it was not “erratic.” See Doc. S-51,
Moore BWC, 08:01:55–08:18:00. There were some bumps that caused the car

Defendant Moore was standing up, facing the opposite direction. See Doc. S-51, Moore
BWC, 06:40:07–06:40:12; see also Doc. S-51, Pingry BWC, 06:40:07–06:40:15.
9
to shake or jar, but those appear to have been attributable to road conditions,
not Defendant’s driving. The drive appeared calm and quiet, and no complaints

by Plaintiff can be heard on the camera footage. See id. When Defendant Moore
pulled into the sally-port area, he opened the back door for Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff appeared to be in the exact same position Defendant Moore
recommended he sit before they left the scene—with his back against the door

and his legs across the seat. See Doc. S-51, SP, 04:21:00–04:21:23. He was not
“wedged” on the floor of the car. No one helped him out. He slowly scooted out
on his own. See id.4
Finally, Plaintiff alleges he was “denied ambulance” and “hospital” by

orders of Defendant Moore. See Doc. 1 at 4. He implied during his deposition
that Defendant Moore prevented him from being treated or taken to the

4 Curiously, the plaintiff in Kostrzewa also alleged, as does Plaintiff, that he
was knocked against the plastic partition in the car and had “to wedge himself” on
the floor to keep from being tossed around. 247 F.3d at 640. Even if those facts were
enough to state a claim in the Kostrzewa case—a case that is not binding on this
Court—the video evidence belies Plaintiff’s unsupported claim that these things
happened to him.
Plaintiff also testified at his deposition that Defendant Moore drove to the jail
“in a roundabout way” and was not kind or helpful in getting him into the car so that
he would not hurt himself. See Doc. 48-2 at 28. Although not material to Plaintiff’s
claims, the video evidence blatantly contradicts these statements as well. Defendant
Moore took the highway, and he was respectful in his interactions with Plaintiff,
calling him “sir” or “buddy,” or “bubba,” and even readjusted Plaintiff’s handcuffs
when Plaintiff complained they were hurting, advised Plaintiff how to situate himself
on the seat to be most comfortable, and ensured Plaintiff had enough (or not too much)
air. See Doc. S-51, Moore BWC, 07:00:30–07:01:07, 07:21:40–07:23:23, 07:44:15,
07:56:12.
10
hospital by EMTs and talked the nurses at the jail out of sending him to the
hospital before being booked. See Doc. 48-2 at 26, 31–32. He also testified that

no officer asked him at the scene if he needed medical attention. Id. at 25.
According to the BWC footage, Defendant Moore requested rescue within a
minute of helping to secure Plaintiff in handcuffs. See Doc. S-51, Moore BWC,
06:40:51. He also asked Plaintiff, “What hurts, buddy, so I can tell rescue?” Id.,

06:41:42–06:41:44. Plaintiff responded by saying he was “fine” and only
“scraped up.” Id., 06:41:44–06:41:50. Defendant Moore told Plaintiff that they
were going to have “rescue come to check [him] out” regardless. Id., 06:42:49.
Plaintiff conceded at his deposition that the paramedics evaluated him

at the scene before he was transported to the jail. See Doc. 48-2 at 23. He said
that the paramedics “could tell by [him] sitting on the side of the road that [he]
didn’t have . . . broken bones or anything and [he] didn’t need medical
attention,” and no paramedic concluded after assessing him that he had to be

transported to the hospital. Id. at 23, 27. The BWC footage shows that
Defendant Moore never spoke directly with the EMTs, did not intervene in or
observe their physical evaluation of Plaintiff, and did not decide (or weigh in
on) whether Plaintiff should be taken to the hospital before the jail. See Doc.

S-51, Moore BWC, 06:46:20–06:52:40. Defendant Moore was engaged in
investigatory matters while EMTs were tending to Plaintiff. See id.

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After EMTs left and Plaintiff had been in the backseat of Defendant
Moore’s patrol car for nearly one hour—while still at the scene—something

Plaintiff said to Defendant Moore prompted Moore to ask Plaintiff if he wanted
rescue to come back. See id., 07:56:17. Plaintiff cannot be heard, but Defendant
Moore responded by saying he was not a doctor, and he would do whatever
Plaintiff wanted him to. Id., 07:56:17–07:56:40. Plaintiff apparently declined

rescue. See id. In the sally-port area at the jail, a nurse evaluated and treated
Plaintiff’s wounds. See Doc. S-51, SP, 04:26:30–04:32:10.
As explained, the video evidence blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony and Complaint allegations in most material respects,

such that they are not to be credited. “When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The video evidence indisputably shows
Defendant Moore did not use excessive (or any) force against Plaintiff and did
not deny him medical care.5

5 Given Plaintiff had just suffered a traumatic accident, was admittedly high
on methamphetamine, and conceded at his deposition that he did not know “which
officer arrived first, second, third, or fourth” and the way “he remember[ed events]
might not be exactly the way [they] happened,” Doc. 48-1 at 21, 30–31, 43–44, the
12
Even if Plaintiff should have been sent to a hospital for treatment before
being booked, as an officer with no medical expertise, Defendant Moore was

entitled to defer to the judgment of EMTs at the scene and the nurses at the
jail regarding whether Plaintiff needed emergency medical attention. See
Mann, 588 F.3d at 1308 (holding the plaintiff’s argument that arresting
officers were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs “without

merit” where the officers called emergency medical personnel to the scene, and
the “medically trained” professionals concluded the plaintiff was not “in any
immediate medical distress” that would have warranted transport to the
hospital). There is no evidence that Defendant Moore knew Plaintiff required

more treatment than what was provided but actively prevented a medical
professional from rendering or arranging for that treatment. On the contrary,
Defendant Moore is the one who called rescue initially and asked Plaintiff if he
wanted to have rescue called back to the scene when Plaintiff later started

complaining about his injuries.
Defendant Moore carries his burden on summary judgment showing he
is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the
record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact.

Court gives him the benefit of the doubt regarding his motivations for initiating and
prosecuting this action premised on allegations that are so at odds with reality.
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Accordingly, itis ORDERED:
1. Defendant Moore’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47)
is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant Moore, terminate any pending motions as moot,
and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of April
2026.

□ JORDAN E. PRATT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jax-6

Shawn Wilson
Counsel of Record

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366604. Public record. Not legal advice.